Why God allows evil

[Kylie]

Yes, I understand that. As I already pointed out, you are applying modus tollens to the entire disjunction. Let's substitute the terms using the original post:

• (P -> (A v B)); ~(A v B); ∴ ~P
• P: "God doesn’t want to stop bad things from happening"
• A: "God isn’t good"
• B: "We are incapable of determining what is good"

According to your theory his desired conclusion is ~P, which is "God wants to stop bad things from happening." In my previous post I explained why this is an utterly strange conclusion for him to seek. I would advise re-reading that post. "P" is the antecedent of the conditional statement.

And funnily enough, I'm not fluent with those shorthand symbols. So could you put it in actual English please?

No, it doesn't. His was a dilemma and yours is a reductio. Again, the difference is whether both parties agree to the antecedent ("P"). In your example your interlocutor agrees with the antecedent and you disagree with it, but you assume the antecedent for the sake of argument. In this thread his interlocutor disagreed with the antecedent and he agreed with it, and he affirmed the antecedent in order to force a dilemma. (His aim was to force a dilemma that is problematic for the theist, not to praise God's motives)

I still don't see the difference. In both cases, we are saying, "If X is the case, then we should see A or B."

 

[Ken-1122]

Yes, I understand your new argument, but it is considerably different from the argument you gave in post #131. Kylie and I are talking about the argument given in post #131, not the newer versions. I will return to your newer arguments in time; I have not forgotten.

My argument is the same. You seemed to misunderstood my question. I noted since what I call bad does exist, either I am incapable of determining what is bad, or God doesn’t want to stop bad; then I asked which is it. You never answered my question instead you keep saying I am misquoting you. Would you mind answering it? If neither option is correct, please explain how what I call bad could exist against God’s desires.

 

[zippy2006]

And funnily enough, I'm not fluent with those shorthand symbols. So could you put it in actual English please?

It is just a truncated three step modus tollens argument with the steps separated by semicolons. It is very similar to the argument you gave here. Without the symbols the three step argument looks like this:

1. If P, then (A or B)
2. Not (A or B)
3. Therefore, Not P

I still don't see the difference. In both cases, we are saying, "If X is the case, then we should see A or B."

Yes, both cases contain that conditional, but both cases do not follow the modus tollens form that you claimed here. Modus tollens is a very simple syllogism form:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore, Not P

Someone who employs this form rejects the consequent of the conditional in order to then reject the antecedent. As I explained here, substituting Ken's terms into the argument results in a very strange conclusion for an atheist. The conclusion is "Not P" (~P), which is, "God wants to stop bad things from happening." According to your reasoning, his whole argument was meant to prove the conclusion that God wants to stop bad things from happening. Why would an atheist want to prove that to a theist?

[Again, if we use your erroneous P instead of the authentic P, then your conclusion makes more sense in terms of motives (although it completely fails in terms of validity). If we use your erroneous P then he would be arguing for the conclusion that God doesn't want to stop bad things from happening, and that would be a genuine problem for the theist (and an intelligible conclusion for an atheist to desire).]

Anyway, I can only explain this so many times. On your reasoning he was trying to convince me that God wants to stop bad things from happening. Because it makes no sense for an atheist to try to convince a theist of that conclusion, I don't think that is what he was doing. Context supports this.

 

[Tinker Grey]

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Ergo, not P

Let Q = (A or B)

1. If P, then (A or B)
2. Not (A or B) [or, if one prefers "Not A and Not B"]
3. Ergo, not P

Perfectly valid modus tollens

 

[Kylie]

It is just a truncated three step modus tollens argument with the steps separated by semicolons. It is very similar to the argument you gave here. Without the symbols the three step argument looks like this:

1. If P, then (A or B)
2. Not (A or B)
3. Therefore, Not P

Thanks.

Yes, both cases contain that conditional, but both cases do not follow the modus tollens form that you claimed here. Modus tollens is a very simple syllogism form:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore, Not P

Why do both cases not follow the modus tollens?

In both cases, Q is representing one of two possible situations. In the case of our discussion about God allowing evil, Q represents "God isn't good/We can't tell what is good". In the case of my example, Q represents "Bed stripped/Clean sheets on bed".

And P represents in your case, "God doesn't stop things which we consider bad," and in my case "My daughter has taken the sheets off her bed."

Substituting these phrases into the logic works for both.

Someone who employs this form rejects the consequent of the conditional in order to then reject the antecedent. As I explained here, substituting Ken's terms into the argument results in a very strange conclusion for an atheist. The conclusion is "Not P" (~P), which is, "God wants to stop bad things from happening." According to your reasoning, his whole argument was meant to prove the conclusion that God wants to stop bad things from happening. Why would an atheist want to prove that to a theist?

That's not how I approached it at all.

I approached it like this:

Assume the premise that God wants to stop bad things from happening.

Yet we see that bad things do happen. This is not an assumption, it's a fact, easily demonstrable, I'm sure you'd agree.

Since bad things do happen, this is apparently at odds with the premise that God wants to stop bad things.

There are two solutions that Ken proposed - God is not good (basically stating that our original premise is wrong), or we are incapable of determining what good and bad are (basically stating that God allowing these bad things is somehow working for some greater good).

[Again, if we use your erroneous P instead of the authentic P, then your conclusion makes more sense in terms of motives (although it completely fails in terms of validity). If we use your erroneous P then he would be arguing for the conclusion that God doesn't want to stop bad things from happening, and that would be a genuine problem for the theist (and an intelligible conclusion for an atheist to desire).]

Based on Ken's clarification in post 138, I figured that he was proceeding from the same point as I am.

Anyway, I can only explain this so many times. On your reasoning he was trying to convince me that God wants to stop bad things from happening. Because it makes no sense for an atheist to try to convince a theist of that conclusion, I don't think that is what he was doing. Context supports this.

It makes sense if the atheist is pointing out to the theist that God wants to stop bad things from happening, and yet bad things still happen, so we must ask ourselves WHY. Because the theist's answer to this question can be quite informative.

 

[zippy2006]

Why do both cases not follow the modus tollens?

In both cases, Q is representing one of two possible situations. In the case of our discussion about God allowing evil, Q represents "God isn't good/We can't tell what is good". In the case of my example, Q represents "Bed stripped/Clean sheets on bed".

And P represents in your case, "God doesn't stop things which we consider bad," and in my case "My daughter has taken the sheets off her bed."

Substituting these phrases into the logic works for both.

Ken could run a modus tollens, but that would result in the conclusion that God desires to stop bad things from happening. He used modus ponens instead:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q

If you read his post you will see that his conclusion is Q, not ~P. He says, "So which is it?" Q comprises two unfavorable disjuncts, and he asked me which one I would choose.

I approached it like this:

Assume the premise that God wants to stop bad things from happening.

Actually you chose both, waffling between the two, as I demonstrated here. Ken's premise is obvious if you read his post. His "P" is clearly and unambiguously "God doesn’t want to stop bad things from happening." You are therefore misrepresenting him by choosing a P which is the direct opposite of what he wrote in his post.

Assume the premise that God wants to stop bad things from happening.

Yet we see that bad things do happen. This is not an assumption, it's a fact, easily demonstrable, I'm sure you'd agree.

Since bad things do happen, this is apparently at odds with the premise that God wants to stop bad things.

There are two solutions that Ken proposed - God is not good (basically stating that our original premise is wrong), or we are incapable of determining what good and bad are (basically stating that God allowing these bad things is somehow working for some greater good).

Sure: "If there is evil, then either God is not good or we are incapable of determining good and evil." That's a semi-reasonable argument. It's different from Ken's. It's also different from your proposed modus tollens interpretation of Ken's.

If you want to continue this conversation then you have to substitute Ken's post into the modus tollens into which you claim it fits. Either take that post and fill in "P", "A", and "B" or else admit that your theory fails. Again, the form you proposed is as follows:

1. If P, then (A or B)
2. Not (A or B)
3. Therefore, Not P

It makes sense if the atheist is pointing out to the theist that God wants to stop bad things from happening, and yet bad things still happen, so we must ask ourselves WHY. Because the theist's answer to this question can be quite informative.

I understand Ken's overall logic just fine. It is just a fumbling attempt to express the problem of evil. What began this conversation, and what I object to, is your strange interpretation of one of Ken's posts.

 

[Kylie]

Ken could run a modus tollens, but that would result in the conclusion that God desires to stop bad things from happening. He used modus ponens instead:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q

If you read his post you will see that his conclusion is Q, not ~P. He says, "So which is it?" Q comprises two unfavorable disjuncts, and he asked me which one I would choose.

And I think that was the point he was trying to make. By pointing out that Q comprises two unfavorable disjuncts, I saw that as Ken trying to show you that P was not correct.

It would be like if I presented some scientific idea, and another scientist tried to disprove me: "If we accept the Kylie Theory, then we would see that the mass of the universe is either zero or infinite. Since both of these options are impossible, we can conclude that the Kylie Theory is incorrect."

Actually you chose both, waffling between the two, as I demonstrated here. Ken's premise is obvious if you read his post. His "P" is clearly and unambiguously "God doesn’t want to stop bad things from happening." You are therefore misrepresenting him by choosing a P which is the direct opposite of what he wrote in his post.

And as I stated, I figured from his later clarification that his original statement included the wrong word. Of course, I could be wrong, and @Ken-1122 would like to come and set the record straight, I'd be happy to go with what he says. Until then, I can only go with what I figure he meant, and I have explained what I have figured and why I figured it.

Sure: "If there is evil, then either God is not good or we are incapable of determining good and evil." That's a semi-reasonable argument. It's different from Ken's. It's also different from your proposed modus tollens interpretation of Ken's.

If you want to continue this conversation then you have to substitute Ken's post into the modus tollens into which you claim it fits. Either take that post and fill in "P", "A", and "B" or else admit that your theory fails. Again, the form you proposed is as follows:

1. If P, then (A or B)
2. Not (A or B)
3. Therefore, Not P

I'm not presenting the existence of evil as a premise, I'm presenting it as a fact. There are countless examples of things which most rational people would call evil - I'm sure you don't need me to give you a list.

My premise was that God wants to stop bad things from happening.

I understand Ken's overall logic just fine. It is just a fumbling attempt to express the problem of evil. What began this conversation, and what I object to, is your strange interpretation of one of Ken's posts.

My interpretation was always:

• Evil exists.
• God allegedly wants there to be no evil.
• The things we would expect to see in a world where God wants to prevent evil do not exist.
• Therefore, either the fact of evil existing or the assumption that God wants to prevent it is wrong.

If the fact of evil existing is wrong, then that fits with Ken's proposal that we can't tell what is good or evil. If the assumption that God wants to prevent evil is wrong, then that fits with Ken's proposal that God is evil.

 

[zippy2006]

And I think that was the point he was trying to make...

I've been more than patient with you in this thread, but my patience and time are not endless. Everything you need to correct your view is available in my posts. In my last post I said that if you want to continue this conversation you will have to do the work of substituting his own words into the argument you are ascribing to him. That is a very simple, honest, and straightforward request. Since you have not done that I am not continuing the conversation.

It is ironic that you accuse me of a impregnable bias and yet have maintained an obviously false interpretation over an amazing number of posts, even implicitly refusing to formalize his argument using his own words. Every time you interpret his argument you contradict his own "P" directly. Substitute with his own words and the misrepresentations will cease.

 

[Ken-1122]

Zippy2006 Would you mind answering my question?

If God does not want evil to happen, why does it happen apparently against his wishes?

Ken

 

[Kylie]

I've been more than patient with you in this thread, but my patience and time are not endless. Everything you need to correct your view is available in my posts. In my last post I said that if you want to continue this conversation you will have to do the work of substituting his own words into the argument you are ascribing to him. That is a very simple, honest, and straightforward request. Since you have not done that I am not continuing the conversation.

It is ironic that you accuse me of a impregnable bias and yet have maintained an obviously false interpretation over an amazing number of posts, even implicitly refusing to formalize his argument using his own words. Every time you interpret his argument you contradict his own "P" directly. Substitute with his own words and the misrepresentations will cease.

I have clearly explained my own position, and I have also clearly explained my interpretation of what he meant. If that's not good enough for you, then you are not interested in hearing my opinion, you are only interested in trying to force me to share your opinion. That is the very antithesis of reasonable and rational discussion, and I have no interest in discussing anything with someone who does not want reasonable and rational discussion.

 

[zippy2006]

I have clearly explained my own position, and I have also clearly explained my interpretation of what he meant. If that's not good enough for you, then you are not interested in hearing my opinion, you are only interested in trying to force me to share your opinion. That is the very antithesis of reasonable and rational discussion, and I have no interest in discussing anything with someone who does not want reasonable and rational discussion.

If you can't use his own words in your interpretation of his argument then you're not being honest.

 

[zippy2006]

Zippy2006 Would you mind answering my question?

If God does not want evil to happen, why does it happen apparently against his wishes?

Ken

I am not opposed to the free will defense in its general form. God grants autonomy and free will to beings other than himself, and at times in the history of creation those beings have chosen to commit evil acts.

 

[Kylie]

If you can't use his own words in your interpretation of his argument then you're not being honest.

And what if I think he made a typo?

 

[Kylie]

I am not opposed to the free will defense in its general form. God grants autonomy and free will to beings other than himself, and at times in the history of creation those beings have chosen to commit evil acts.

And yet if I use the same defense to justify why I let horrible things happen to my daughter, I'm a monster.

Kylie grants autonomy and free will to her daughter, and at times in the history of creation that daughter has chosen to commit evil acts.

 

[Ken-1122]

And what if I think he made a typo?

Are you guys referring to me? If so, I have made it very clear to Zippy2006 that you interpreted my point correctly, and that he did not. He keeps using algebra type characters like P->(A v B) to make his point, and I refuse to play that game. Personally I think he does this to cause confusion in an effort to get out of answering simple questions, so I haven’t been following along with your conversation with him lately.
So if you guys were referring to the points I made, you are correct, he is wrong. However if you guys were referring to someone else; my apologizes and ignore this post.

 

[Ken-1122]

I am not opposed to the free will defense in its general form. God grants autonomy and free will to beings other than himself, and at times in the history of creation those beings have chosen to commit evil acts.

So he allows evil monsters the freewill to commit atrocities against the innocent? Wow! My surprise is actually from the fact that logical reasonable, and intelligent people will believe an all loving, caring, and just God would allow monsters the freewill to do this; and nobody questions it.

 

[zippy2006]

And what if I think he made a typo?

If you actually went through the substitution exercise you would see that the typo possibility doesn't work, either. If you change his "P" then his inferential logic will fail the test of validity. I thought about pointing this out to you earlier when I pointed out your clear misrepresentation, but your ears don't seem to register the corrections, and you are explicitly unwilling to put your theory to the test. It's a standard case of impregnable bias. I see it on these forums often.

 

[MyChainsAreGone]

Abortion is not a very important issue to me so I know little about it. I think the issue is when the sperm and egg combo becomes a person. Of what I know about the first trimester I have no problem with abortions at that time because it isn’t a person yet. I don’t know enough about the second trimester to judge, but I think the third trimester is a little late to abort; I think it’s a person by then. I guess it’s a matter of where to draw the line, I would draw it somewhere during the second trimester.

So... what is the absolute measure of personhood?

At what point may we say definitively that killing that unborn life is "evil"?

And if you're not sure, isn't it safer to err on the side of caution?

 

[MyChainsAreGone]

My interpretation was always:

• Evil exists.
• God allegedly wants there to be no evil.
• The things we would expect to see in a world where God wants to prevent evil do not exist.
• Therefore, either the fact of evil existing or the assumption that God wants to prevent it is wrong.

If the fact of evil existing is wrong, then that fits with Ken's proposal that we can't tell what is good or evil. If the assumption that God wants to prevent evil is wrong, then that fits with Ken's proposal that God is evil.

Let me address these statements one at a time...

• Evil exists.

This statement is a statement of morality. It presumes that some actions are good, and some are evil. That means there must be a measure by which the morality of an action may be discerned. The statement by itself is one that makes no sense at all without an ultimate determiner of morality. And if you are indeed an atheist, then you cannot truly believe that evil exists. In fact, you even declared that there's no such thing as "moral absolutes." Yet, to say "Evil exists" is to declare a moral absolute.

If you intend to prove by the existence of evil that God cannot exist, you're faced with the logical problem that you need an ultimate measure of morality (God) in order to even postulate that evil itself exists! This is an impossible moral dilemma. And you cannot prove the non-existence of God by offering a concept that requires His existence to even postulate.

• God allegedly wants there to be no evil.

This is reasonable. But your mistake is in presuming that this is the ONLY thing God wants... or that it is the most important thing that He wants. You're assuming that if He opposes evil conceptually--at all--that He must act to stop it... else you prove that "God is evil" because He doesn't "prevent evil." But that assumption is incorrect.

Yes, God wants there to be no evil.

But God also wants there to be volitional beings populating this universe... beings who make real choices. And God wants that more than He wants to prevent evil. How do I know that? Because of the very same observations that you are making... If God does not stop people from doing evil things, then there must be something else more important to Him than that result... something that He would lose if He were to intervene and "prevent evil." God wanted us to make our own choices. He wants us to make choices for good--for love--to be sure. But absent the capability to choose wrongly, we do not actually have the capacity to choose rightly.

This is a scenario that you are not even considering. You have unilaterally determined that the most important thing God could possibly want to do is to "prevent evil."

I would suggest that you do not understand the heart and motivation of God enough to jump to that conclusion... therefore, your logical conclusions about what it means (that He doesn't prevent evil) are fundamentally flawed.

• The things we would expect to see in a world where God wants to prevent evil do not exist.

Yet.

The Bible speaks prophetically about the "end" of the world as we know it. At that time, full justice will be realized. The Bible teaches that all who ever lived will be made alive again, and they will face God as their Judge. Furthermore, the Bible promises that there is more "life" beyond this life here and now... and that will last for eternity... one that is free from evil... on that offers a much longer perspective than the "here and now."

As Paul the Apostle declared, "
For I consider that the sufferings of this present time [evil] are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us." (Romans 8:18)

So... the world where God prevents evil is going to be a reality... it just isn't... yet.

• Therefore, either the fact of evil existing or the assumption that God wants to prevent it is wrong.

Correct.

The assumption that God wants to prevent it--[as His primary priority and intent]--is wrong.

God's plans, His purposes, His perspective are bigger than we can fully know, because HE is bigger than we can fully know.

 

[Ken-1122]

So... what is the absolute measure of personhood?

At what point may we say definitively that killing that unborn life is "evil"?

And if you're not sure, isn't it safer to err on the side of caution?

Like I said before, it isn't about killing unborn life, but killing an unborn human person. As for where that line is drawn, I would assume somewhere during the second trimester; I admit I don't know enough about the subject to give a definitive answer, because the subject isn't important to me. But different people will draw the line in different places.