Why Federalism is self-contradictory

[heymikey80]

But clearly these questions about Christ's atonement are generally irrelevant to the question of whether God's verdict on Adam exhibited justice. (It's like saying, God did a good thing in Christ to make up for the bad way He handled Adam).

Uh ... Romans 5? Romans 5? Paul considered it relevant. So I consider it relevant. A theology that deals with Scripture considers it relevant. Because Scripture considers it relevant.

As is clear from the first post, the only reason I mentioned the atonement was to refute the fallacious argument that it somehow establishes federalism.

And your position's vulnerable to the same charges. Ezekiel 18 points to children of fathers. I believe I've asked questions about that?

What are you getting at, here?
I have already affirmed the cogency of Tertulian's materialistic traducianism (which is very close to my own views) because it isn't federalistic (imputational).

Jonathan Edwards actually used Tertullian's illustration of a poisoned tree affecting each leaf. Sound traducian? Well, Edwards was a federalist.

Your position sets federalism against things it doesn't set itself against.

I see so much dishonest debating on these forums that perhaps I'm overly suspicious. You can easily put my suspicions to rest. Show me the relevance of all these "other issues" which you claim to be so "crucial to handling this issue." (This is what I have been begging you to do).

As there are traducians who hold to federalism as well, there's one.

As there are people who hold to the view I just posted (essential unity), there's another.

I'll explain again. I claim, if you penalize others in any way for what one man has done, this is unjust. I have never heard of a brand of federalism that escapes this charge. You said, "there many varieties of federalism."

Your position doesn't escape this charge. Reread Ezekiel 18. Traducianism doesn't allow you to hold me directly responsible for committing Adam's sin, much less pay for his commission.

I replied, fine, name one that escapes that charge. If you can't do that (I'm still waiting),

I clearly mentioned another position in the prior thread. So it's clear I could, and already did, that.

Maybe though you want a name for dealing with the issue of whether representationalism is exclusive of other views of human responsibility?

John Murray:

It is quite illogical to maintain that on the representationist view of Adam's natural headship there is any incompatibility between natural headship and representative union. On the representative construction natural headship and representative headship are correlative, and each aspect has its own proper and specific function in the explanation of the status and condition in which the members of the race find themselves in consequence of their relation to Adam. Hence it must be appreciated that emphasis on the natural headship of Adam and upon the seminal union of Adam and his posterity in Reformed theologians is not to be interpreted as vacillation between two incompatible ideas, nor is appeal to natural headship and seminal relationship on the part of such theologians to be regarded as the espousal of the realist construction. p. 38, "Imputation of Adam's Sin"
​

Sorry (well, no, I'm not really) if you consider citations to be "putting on airs", but this is the only way to obtain the exact data you say you haven't received. Here's the written word of a representationist theologian.

That is, federalism isn't simply representation. It's representation and geneticism and natural headship -- each in proper place.

 

[JAL]

Heymikey I stated, “First of all, we see that atonement is just, that is, it fits into "regular ol' fairness" as all men understand it. Suppose for example my sister gets a speeding ticket. I offer to pay for it - but note that I earned this money by my own blood, sweat, and tears. Thus by paying the ticket, I am doing PRECISELY what Christ did on the cross - He shed His own blood, sweat, and tears to pay for our sins. To admit that it is okay to pay for someone's speeding ticket is to admit that atonement is a just concept.”

You replied,

“Actually, that's not the case. No one will permit you to substitute for a murderer on Death Row. "Regular ol' fairness" actually considers this a heinous miscarriage of justice. What's more, Jesus was condemned falsely -- so the clearer illustration is that you are tried, condemned and sentenced for someone else's crime.”

Ok, not a bad point you are making here. You’re right that we normally wouldn’t allow a volunteer to pay a murder’s sentence. The question is whether we are being fully consistent. Once we allow one person to pay bail for another, or pay a speeding ticket, we have already consented to the general principle of atonement. The fact that we don’t normally take it as far as Christ did doesn’t prove we are being consistent.

The second problem with your argument is that simply isn’t true. Suppose my son was a murderer. Can you conceive of many fathers, because they love their kids so much, who would be willing to serve the sentence to spare their sons? If we can imagine ourselves loving a child enough to be willing to do this, then we affirm that regular ol’fairness does embrace all kinds of substitationary atonement. And if we can’t imagine ourselves being willing to do this, then perhaps we need to ask, “Am I as loving as God is?”

 

[heymikey80]

Alright, let me spell it out for you. Historically, immaterial substance is understood as antithetical to material substance. Material substances are defined as extended in space and divisible into parts. Naturally, immaterial substance is defined as unextended in space and indivisible into parts.

Immaterialism doesn't lend itself to the kind of corporate Adam that I postulated. In a similar way, it doesn't lend itself to Traducianism

You are free to argue otherwise - that's what the debate is about. I am simply asking that if you have an objection, just say what it is. Don't run around telling me that I have to read this book or that book before I qualify to participate in a discussion of the subject.

Ezekiel 18 doesn't allow for the kind of corporate Adam that you postulated. Children aren't to be punished for parents' crimes.

 

[JAL]

Here's another proposal. Metaphysically, the natures of human souls are all the same. They don't need to be "broken apart" from the same one soul to have the same essential nature. They need only be human.

This is realism. Since you are all about telling me to read books, you might want to see Hodge's refutation of it.

No? Ok. "Human nature" doesn't sin. People sin. If "human nature" (as a whole) is what sins, then if, for instance,I robbed a bank, all of us should pay the price as well. We all should. No Christian really believes that noise. In other words, in meting out rewards and punishments, God could not rightly differentiate individuals, on the assumptions of realism.

Mostly it is incoherent though, to say that "nature" sins. What sins is the volition of an individual. Give me something coherent if you are going to propose an alternative to my view.

 

[heymikey80]

Heymikey I stated, “First of all, we see that atonement is just, that is, it fits into "regular ol' fairness" as all men understand it. Suppose for example my sister gets a speeding ticket. I offer to pay for it - but note that I earned this money by my own blood, sweat, and tears. Thus by paying the ticket, I am doing PRECISELY what Christ did on the cross - He shed His own blood, sweat, and tears to pay for our sins. To admit that it is okay to pay for someone's speeding ticket is to admit that atonement is a just concept.”

You replied,

“Actually, that's not the case. No one will permit you to substitute for a murderer on Death Row. "Regular ol' fairness" actually considers this a heinous miscarriage of justice. What's more, Jesus was condemned falsely -- so the clearer illustration is that you are tried, condemned and sentenced for someone else's crime.”

Ok, not a bad point you are making here. You’re right that we normally wouldn’t allow a volunteer to pay a murder’s sentence. The question is whether we are being fully consistent. Once we allow one person to pay bail for another, or pay a speeding ticket, we have already consented to the general principle of atonement. The fact that we don’t normally take it as far as Christ did doesn’t prove we are being consistent.

I'd assert that the fact behind this ability is that the substitution can actually give the guilty person what the guilty person needs. Payment is gifted.

But if we're working with "regular ol' fairness", God would be limited in what He can give.

The second problem with your argument is that simply isn’t true. Suppose my son was a murderer. Can you conceive of many fathers, because they love their kids so much, who would be willing to serve the sentence to spare their sons? If we can imagine ourselves loving a child enough to be willing to do this, then we affirm that regular ol’fairness does embrace all kinds of substitationary atonement. And if we can’t imagine ourselves being willing to do this, then perhaps we need to ask, “Am I as loving as God is?”

You're talking about grace and not justice. There are myriad judges who would point out that punishment is to be felt and imposed on the offending party for good reason.

If it's solely to spare the son, then the intent is wrong.

Of course you can get to substitutionary atonement through other means. But then, federalism never denied substitutionary atonement. In fact some really good stuff has come from federalists about substitutionary atonement.

Atonement is the term that has come to be widely used to denote the substitutionary work of Christ which culminated in the sacrifice of Calvary. John Murray, "The Atonement", p. 1
​

So I'm back to not finding a problematic issue so far with the federalist position.

 

[JAL]

Ezekiel 18 doesn't allow for the kind of corporate Adam that you postulated. Children aren't to be punished for parents' crimes.

But that's a mischaracterization of what I am saying. It's kind of a semantic game (again, arousing my suspicions). It's a neat sleight-of-hand, but nothing of substance. Essentially, it merely inclines me to re-word my reading of Ezek.
(Sigh). I'll put it like this. "In cases where the child's volition is not that of the parental volition which did the crime, the child should not pay."

I say this because Ezekiel claims, "The one who did the crime should pay."

In my theology, in corporate Adam, our volitions - all of them - ate the "apple". In my theology, those volitions are not currently concurring. We all do different things. Therefore the children should not pay for the crimes of their parents.

As a matter of fact, I did say there were reasons I disagreed with Tertuallian's Traducianism (I honestly couldn't remember what they were). Thanks for reminding me that this is one of them. My view seems to work a little better, in Ezekiel, than Traducianism.

 

[heymikey80]

This is realism. Since you are all about telling me to read books, you might want to see Hodge's refutation of it.

No? Ok. "Human nature" doesn't sin. People sin. If "human nature" (as a whole) is what sins, then if, for instance,I robbed a bank, all of us should pay the price as well. We all should. No Christian really believes that noise. In other words, in meting out rewards and punishments, God could not rightly differentiate individuals, on the assumptions of realism.

I believe the issue is, if realism is used alone to assert the guilt of people for Adam's sin, then the result generalizes to what you stated above.

That is -- realism needs to find something special about Adam.

And then realism needs to avoid the children's guilt for the parents' crimes.

Mostly it is incoherent though, to say that "nature" sins. What sins is the volition of an individual. Give me something coherent if you are going to propose an alternative to my view.

The alternative of representationalism is to provide this something special about Adam. That in the court of his condemnation, Adam represented all of humanity, and that the court's verdict was specifically (though not exclusively) referred to all mankind's human natures as well as Adam's own.

 

[JAL]

HeyMikey, in looking over your last several posts, I noticed several references to Traducianism. Fine. Out with it.

Give me the metaphysics of a Traducianism that is, in your view, justice. I'm not going to rest content with something incoherent. If it is basically unintelligible compared to my own fully intelligible view, then it would be theologically irresponsible for me to prefer your proposal.

 

[JAL]

I believe the issue is, if realism is used alone to assert the guilt of people for Adam's sin, then the result generalizes to what you stated above.

That is -- realism needs to find something special about Adam.

And then realism needs to avoid the children's guilt for the parents' crimes.

The alternative of representationalism is to provide this something special about Adam. That in the court of his condemnation, Adam represented all of humanity, and that the court's verdict was specifically (though not exclusively) referred to all mankind's human natures as well as Adam's own.

Above all, it needs to be coherent. I don't care if your proposal meets all "the other criteria" of theodicy. You still need to show that it is coherent to say that "human nature" sins (as opposed to "an individual's volition sins."). I don't think that can be done.

 

[heymikey80]

But that's a mischaracterization of what I am saying. It's kind of a semantic game (again, arousing my suspicions). It's a neat sleight-of-hand, but nothing of substance. Essentially, it merely inclines me to re-word my reading of Ezek.
(Sigh). I'll put it like this. "In cases where the child's volition is not that of the parental volition which did the crime, the child should not pay."

I say this because Ezekiel claims, "The one who did the crime should pay."

That's an interesting path.

So if the child's volition were the same as the parent's, and yet the child didn't perform the same actions as the parent, would your view choose the punishment of the child or prohibit it? And on what grounds, on the assumption that the child has different actions which indicate the same volition?

Shallowly: dad intentionally kills a rival with a knife. Junior slashes a rival with a knife with full intent to kill, but doesn't succeed. Is Junior guilty of murder, and can he be punished for dad's crime?

Again, the question for the present is not, "What's Ezekiel 18 require of your view?" But if you would like, I'd be interested to know how you reach the conclusion based on the fact that Ezekiel 18 explicitly limits your view solely to the person's own physical actions -- and guilt for Adam's sin doesn't appear to do this, does it?

In my theology, in corporate Adam, our volitions - all of them - ate the "apple". In my theology, those volitions are not currently concurring. We all do different things. Therefore the children should not pay for the crimes of their parents.

That's what I don't understand, based on Ezekiel 18 parents' crimes don't extend to the children as if they actually committed them. So I'm unsure how this can be the case with Adam. Representational views inject terms here, "imputation" and "consequence". So we're not libertarians, nor are we traducians. There's an effect, and a consequence. It's not the exact same thing as guilt for commission.

 

[JAL]

HeyMikey, here’s what I said in the opening post:

“Now I will show that His atonement was not federal (representational). In representationalism, the status of the rep determines the status of the people. As long as that rep remains innocent, the people are innocent. The status of the people has NOTHING to do with any behavior on their part. By definition, everything depends on the rep. Notice that Christ was ALWAYS innocent, even before the cross. Therefore if Christ were the federal rep of the human race, there would be no need to atone (and God would be unjust for sending Him needlessly to die). We would ALL be innocent (the whole human race) as long as Christ remained innocent. No human being would go to hell. Thus federalism logically contradicts the atonement.”

You replied:

“Nothing of the sort. In federalism the status of the whole determines ... the status of the whole. Otherwise as you said there would be no need for the Cross. However -- the entirety is treated as a whole, of which the head is the representative. If the head resolves the sins of the whole -- then the sins of the whole are resolved.

In addition, the blamelessness of the head can mitigate the sins of the whole, so that favor on the head may benefit the whole.”

Can anyone make sense of this response? I sure can’t. It looks to me like a pretense of a response. I say that federalism is about Adam representing us (which you explicitly stated in a later post) and then you say, above, that:

““Nothing of the sort. In federalism the status of the whole determines ... the status of the whole.”

The crux is the status of the whole? Not the status of the rep, anymore? Make up your mind. Is federalism is about representation, or not? The Reformed claim (which is what this thread was addressing) is that Romans 5 is talking not about all of us sinning individually but rather about the sin of the one man reckoned as the sin of all.

I’d have to say that this is a Nonresponsive. My argument that Christ’s atonement wasn’t federal stands. (Sorry, but this looks like another smokescreen). However, feel free to clarify it, if I missed something.

 

[JAL]

That's an interesting path.

So if the child's volition were the same as the parent's, and yet the child didn't perform the same actions as the parent, would your view choose the punishment of the child or prohibit it? And on what grounds, on the assumption that the child has different actions which indicate the same volition?

Not sure I follow you. Volition and identity are the same thing in my view. Stated simply, a particle is person (a single volition), numerically distinct from all other person (the only complexity being that such a particle is further subdivisible, so in a sense we really have multiple persons). In the case of a small particle, those "volitions" usually concur, in effect as one volition.

You begin that statement with the hypothetical question, "What if the child is the same volition as the parent and does something different?"
Huh? How can a volition do something "different" than that same volition? If they are one and the same volition, it is the same volition doing the actions, and yes, there would be equal guilt. Again, I think you've exposed a weakness in Traducianism, thought not in my view.

 

[heymikey80]

HeyMikey, in looking over your last several posts, I noticed several references to Traducianism. Fine. Out with it.

Give me the metaphysics of a Traducianism that is, in your view, justice. I'm not going to rest content with something incoherent. If it is basically unintelligible compared to my own fully intelligible view, then it would be theologically irresponsible for me to prefer your proposal.

I'll be quite honest with you. Yes, I have something that's coherent to me. But I doubt it's just. That's because I agree with God that my nature remains corrupt and sinful.

Granted that, I would simply point out that your objection to representationalism has these issues.

Were I a traducian, I would simply point out that in addition to this, there has to be something special about Adam beyond his being "earlier in line". My dad's earlier in line: I still don't bear guilt for his commissions of sin. And ... you'd need to talk about how Jesus is "earlier in line". This is significant to Romans 5. It's not irrelevant.

Representationalism appears to recognize that Adam bore the special place of a representative, and was judged in ways that are somehow representative of the entire human race. His sin is not just "the regular joe". The reckoning of Adam's sin to others is not the same as you might expect from your dad. And it's not unique, because it parallels Jesus'.

Representationalism is not particularly troubled (certainly not at first) with your choice of soul metaphysics. But as the concept tackles certain problems with Scripture like Romans 5, I've found it tends to cut away at some ideas of a metaphysical incorporation. It leaves me with a certain amount of realism, but not as much as Ezekiel 18 would object to.

And representationalism has a precedent in the operation of covenants.

Do I care that you're a traducian? Not particularly; not as long as Scripture reigns even more supreme and you continue to reapply Ezekiel 18, Romans 5, 2 Corinthians 5 until they all fit your view.

Might I become a more radical representationalist? Oh, maybe. You'd have no reason to follow unless you found it Scriptural.

 

[JAL]

Representationalism fails of exegesis, it seems to me, because if Adam were our rep, there should be no individual reckoning of sin. The bible shouldn't even mention it. God shouldn't rebuke someone for "transgressing." Individual behavior is not "transgression" in a truly representationalist framework, it seems to me. Our status is the status of the rep. Where he sins, we have sinned, and where he obeys, we have obeyed. Ostensibly that is how representationalism should work. But of course this contradicts the entire Bible which, from Genesis to Revelation, has occasions of individual reckoning for sin. So I am not surprised that representationalists, in an attempt to avoid contradicting Scripture, try to create a mix of the two elements in their theology. The question is whehter this can be done with any logical consistency.
I am guessing this is, in part, what you are tryiing to do, Heymikey, but I am not sure you have succeeded. However, feel free to clarify this some more, if that's what you intend.

 

[JAL]

Representationalism appears to recognize that Adam bore the special place of a representative, and was judged in ways that are somehow representative of the entire human race. His sin is not just "the regular joe". The reckoning of Adam's sin to others is not the same as you might expect from your dad. And it's not unique, because it parallels Jesus'.

This is one thing I’ve been objecting to you, and I don’t think you’ve surmounted that objection.

Again, Jesus did not represent us. Had He represented us (in the same sense federalists say that Adam did), the cross would have been unnecessary. As long as the rep is innocent, we are innocent. No need to die.

He paid for our sins. That’s not federal representataion. It’s atonement.

 

[heymikey80]

HeyMikey, here’s what I said in the opening post:

“Now I will show that His atonement was not federal (representational). In representationalism, the status of the rep determines the status of the people. As long as that rep remains innocent, the people are innocent. The status of the people has NOTHING to do with any behavior on their part. By definition, everything depends on the rep. Notice that Christ was ALWAYS innocent, even before the cross. Therefore if Christ were the federal rep of the human race, there would be no need to atone (and God would be unjust for sending Him needlessly to die). We would ALL be innocent (the whole human race) as long as Christ remained innocent. No human being would go to hell. Thus federalism logically contradicts the atonement.”

You replied:

“Nothing of the sort. In federalism the status of the whole determines ... the status of the whole. Otherwise as you said there would be no need for the Cross. However -- the entirety is treated as a whole, of which the head is the representative. If the head resolves the sins of the whole -- then the sins of the whole are resolved.

In addition, the blamelessness of the head can mitigate the sins of the whole, so that favor on the head may benefit the whole.”

Can anyone make sense of this response? I sure can’t. It looks to me like a pretense of a response. I say that federalism is about Adam representing us (which you explicitly stated in a later post) and then you say, above, that:

““Nothing of the sort. In federalism the status of the whole determines ... the status of the whole.”

The crux is the status of the whole? Not the status of the rep, anymore? Make up your mind. Is federalism is about representation, or not? The Reformed claim (which is what this thread was addressing) is that Romans 5 is talking not about all of us sinning individually but rather about the sin of the one man reckoned as the sin of all.

Yes. Imputation, though, is not identical reckoning. It's not "you sinned!" "Uh, I wasn't even alive then." "Adam sinned, and so you did!"

Which btw, traducianism has something of a problem with, right?

In fact representation is just that. It's a designation of the hero, who goes before the actual power to demonstrate the truth in representing us all. We don't really escape the truth about ourselves by picking "a good guy" to lead us. Instead, the representative demonstrates what's actually true of us all -- whether we knew it or not.

Unfortunately Adam represented us all in revealing a very negative truth. And it was about ourselves. Adam's sin came straight from his human nature, which was built at least as good as our own. His sin is evidence about who we really are, by nature. It's the status of us all. Adam included, Adam representing, and yet the status of everyone.

In addition, Adam's sin had implications of transmitting both his original nature and God's curse in genetic transmittal, family, culture, and I'm sure I'm missing a few other means of transmitting sin.

 

[JAL]

In fact representation is just that. It's a designation of the hero, who goes before the actual power to demonstrate the truth in representing us all. We don't really escape the truth about ourselves by picking "a good guy" to lead us. Instead, the representative demonstrates what's actually true of us all -- whether we knew it or not.

Unfortunately Adam represented us all in revealing a very negative truth. And it was about ourselves. Adam's sin came straight from his human nature, which was built at least as good as our own. His sin is evidence about who we really are, by nature. It's the status of us all. Adam included, Adam representing, and yet the status of everyone.

In addition, Adam's sin had implications of transmitting both his original nature and God's curse in genetic transmittal, family, culture, and I'm sure I'm missing a few other means of transmitting sin.

Ok, this is actually an argument that I probably haven't addressed as yet (well, can't recall). I'll respond in a few minutes.

 

[heymikey80]

Not sure I follow you. Volition and identity are the same thing in my view. Stated simply, a particle is person (a single volition), numerically distinct from all other person (the only complexity being that such a particle is further subdivisible, so in a sense we really have multiple persons). In the case of a small particle, those "volitions" usually concur, in effect as one volition.

You begin that statement with the hypothetical question, "What if the child is the same volition as the parent and does something different?"
Huh? How can a volition do something "different" than that same volition? If they are one and the same volition, it is the same volition doing the actions, and yes, there would be equal guilt. Again, I think you've exposed a weakness in Traducianism, thought not in my view.

A volition can be thwarted by other circumstances: opportunity, mediators, opposition. So the action ends up being different.

I think you've satisfied this issue, though another comes to mind. I would wonder why the person would not be to blame (again) for the predecessor's actions. I expect you'd say that the person's volitions changed -- which is essentially the same as saying they're different now, and thus not responsible for the prior actions.

Would there be any need for sacrifice for sins previously committed and then repented, then? There doesn't appear to be anyone to punish except people who continue to be evil without repentance.

 

[JAL]

In fact representation is just that. It's a designation of the hero, who goes before the actual power to demonstrate the truth in representing us all. We don't really escape the truth about ourselves by picking "a good guy" to lead us. Instead, the representative demonstrates what's actually true of us all -- whether we knew it or not.

Unfortunately Adam represented us all in revealing a very negative truth. And it was about ourselves. Adam's sin came straight from his human nature, which was built at least as good as our own. His sin is evidence about who we really are, by nature. It's the status of us all. Adam included, Adam representing, and yet the status of everyone.

In addition, Adam's sin had implications of transmitting both his original nature and God's curse in genetic transmittal, family, culture, and I'm sure I'm missing a few other means of transmitting sin.

You are essentially implying that Adam was the perfect rep, that his actions expose or prove how we ourselves would have acted in his shoes.

In one sense there would be a sense of justice in this system.

One problem with this theory is that it is too deterministic. If we all act alike – if we all act just like Adam – there must be a reason for it, namely that God designed our dispositions in a way that causes us to act as we do. The fault would lie with God in that case.

Another way to show that this theory is deterministic is to demonstrate that where there is libertarian free will, chances are that we won’t all act alike. The best example of this is the angels. Some of them chose to follow Lucifer, others abstained.


A second problem is that, if we all act alike, then God should not make differentiations in justice. He shouldn’t mete out different rewards and punishments individualistically. But from Genesis to Revelation, that’s precisely the sort of thing that He does.

If we all act alike, the child should suffer for the sins of the parents, and the parents for the sins of their children. But this is precisely what Ezek 18 disavows.

 

[JAL]

I would wonder why the person would not be to blame (again) for the predecessor's actions. I expect you'd say that the person's volitions changed -- which is essentially the same as saying they're different now, and thus not responsible for the prior actions.

A volition is responsible for that which it has done. Let’s roll the clock back, if Adam is currently sinning, any particles (volitions) in him that consent to the action are guilty. Any particles that dissent (try to resist) are innocent. (We have no hard evidence that any dissented).

Now, moving forward through time. I said that God removed most of Adam’s sin-stained particles to a place of suspended animation after the fall.

You now ask, basically, “Who is to blame for what, and why?” Simple. My answer is the same. A volition (a particle) is to blame for anything that it consents to, wherever that particle may be.

The particles that are in me are no longer in the body of Adam. His body no longer has those particles that constitute me. Therefore if I sin today, it would be inappropriate for God, as an act of judgment, to respond with an assault of, say, a deadly disease upon Adam’s body, in direct response to me. The judgment should be launched against my own physique.

Hope this clarifies.

Would there be any need for sacrifice for sins previously committed and then repented, then? There doesn't appear to be anyone to punish except people who continue to be evil without repentance.

Not sure I follow you. Just because someone repented doesn’t exonerate them in itself. We are not fully saved by repentance alone. It’s repentance plus atonement.