While We're on the Subject of Total Depravity...

[Received]

Rick (and I must say that R'cvd looks pretty cool)

I have nothing wrong with your presention of theology being what it is; my question regards internal consistency, capacity for non-contradiction. I am addressing those who say that men are commanded to repent by God, yet who also hold that God alone holds this capacity to repent for man, thus negating the commandment by making it nonsensical, contradictory.

 

[frumanchu]

I know it's hard to let go of what you have believed for so long, and hard to take "the whole counsel of God" into consideration and let Scripture interpret Scripture, but when you have preconcieved thoughts and ideas about what Scripture says, you have a tendancy to read those into the text. Now God says He commands all men everywhere to repent, yet those from a reformed position see Him only commanding the elect to do so.

I'm sorry, but that's quite simply false, SE. I challenge you to find me any Reformed creed or confession (the traditional standards of orthodoxy in Reformed churces), or even author, which states that "only the elect are commanded to repent."

What must we do to the rich young ruler? He was commanded to sell all, but refused to. Why would God command Him to do something, but decree him to resist His commanding word spoken to Him? I know this happened to Pharoah, but He resisted God's commanding will first, a few times to be exact. Man kind even in their fallen state has the ablility to resist or recieve the Lord. So for God to command someone all throughout their life, and decree them unable to every single time, and then punish them though they never had the chance sound wack. No offense to my reformed brothers and sisters.

None taken, but the fact is that you are not correctly representing the Reformed view on the matter. When you say God is "decreeing" them to be unable every single time, the implication seems to be that God is actively suppressing their will to respond positively to them, as though they would run to Him were He not keeping them from doing so. That is not the Reformed view. Fallen man is wholly disinclined to God. His heart is corrupt and does not seek Him. Even the "good" that the unsaved may do is tainted in sin and done without faith for selfish motive. God does not have to actively work evil in the hearts of men in order to get them to reject Him. The evil already in their heart is sufficient to this task.

 

[frumanchu]

But then we go back to the beginning -- God is asking the created to do something he cannot do in his own power (keeping in mind that dancing is analogous to response by faith), and therefore artificializes the conversation by even commanding him to dance, speaking to him as if he could. It is like me commanding a man with no legs to dance knowing full well that he cannot dance, likewise, God asking a man to respond in faith who can only respond if God allows it is something of a contradiction of implication in commanding him to repent.

Ahh, but that is not entirely accurate! God is not asking the created to do something he cannot naturally do in his own power. He is asking Him to do something he cannot morally do in his own power.

Man has the natural ability to choose God. The natural function of choice is the ability to choose what one wants. This is the essence of "free will." There are certain logical limitations to this via the law of non-contradiction (ex-God has free will, but He cannot choose to die).

However, man never wants to choose God. He is morally corrupt, and this corruption affects every aspect of his being (hence the term "total depravity").

If I command you to do something you are naturally capable of doing, whether or not you comply ultimately depends on whether or not you desire to do so at the moment you make the choice more than the alternative. If I know ahead of time with certainty that you will not want to do so, it still does not invalidate my command when it is given, nor does it abrogate your responsibility (if such command entails responsibility).

God need not create the disinclination in man's heart in order to prevent him from obedience. The disinclination is already there as a result of the Fall. That is why we Reformed maintain that one must be born again (regenerate) before one can come to faith in Christ, because until the Holy Spirit changes the disposition of your heart you will never choose Him because you will never want to.

 

[Received]

The natural function of choice is the ability to choose what one wants. This is the essence of "free will."

Not according to the reformed conception of freedom -- that is, a negation of freedom by virtue of, as your premise states, the ability to choose what one wants. You got this from Edwards, eh? Maybe not.

If one can choose only what one wants, then there is no freedom; freedom is constituted in the capacity to do otherwise, to detach oneself from one's immediate inclinations, and this includes "wants". If one is compelled to choose on the basis solely of his "wants", there is no choice, for the "wants" dictate the solution, the action taken; hence, there is no accountability, hence, God is the one (given that He has forced creatures into existence) who is responsible for this state of affairs. Accountability implies freedom, and insofar as there is unfreedom, there can be no accountability. To call freedom the capacity to answer according to one's desires is a contradiction, so far as I perceive freedom.

Cheers,

John

 

[frumanchu]

Not according to the reformed conception of freedom -- that is, a negation of freedom by virtue of, as your premise states, the ability to choose what one wants. You got this from Edwards, eh? Maybe not.

No, I got it from plain reason and observation. However, Edwards does a superb job of expounding upon it in Freedom of the Will.

If one can choose only what one wants, then there is no freedom; freedom is constituted in the capacity to do otherwise, to detach oneself from one's immediate inclinations, and this includes "wants".

Unfortunately, to proceed upon that supposition is to violate the law of non-contradiction. That the will operates according to desire is the nature of the will. For the will to choose other than that which is most desired at the moment of choice is to advocate either irresistible coercion or erroneously reduce desire to the role of adjunct attribute.

If one is compelled to choose on the basis solely of his "wants", there is no choice, for the "wants" dictate the solution, the action taken; hence, there is no accountability, hence, God is the one (given that He has forced creatures into existence) who is responsible for this state of affairs.

I would prefer to continue using the term "desire" rather than "want" simply because the latter is less sufficient than the former at conveying what is being argued.

One is not compelled to choose based on desire any more than a square is compelled to have four equal sides. The will simply operates that way based upon design, which design reflects that of its Creator whose actions ultimately derive from His sovereign pleasure.

Accountability implies freedom, and insofar as there is unfreedom, there can be no accountability. To call freedom the capacity to answer according to one's desires is a contradiction, so far as I perceive freedom.

Then your perception of freedom is incorrect.

I would challenge you to provide me any example of a person choosing other than according to his strongest desire at the moment of choice.

 

[Received]

One is not compelled to choose based on desire any more than a square is compelled to have four equal sides. The will simply operates that way based upon design, which design reflects that of its Creator whose actions ultimately derive from His sovereign pleasure.

Excellent, here is the heart of it: according to God's sovereign pleasure He causes individuals to necessarily act in the way He has metaphysically predestined them to do. Yes, I can take this. But, back to the beginning: How can man, who is born without faith and incapable of initiating faith on his own, be demanded by God, who is the only one capable of granting faith, to do something he cannot do? You can call whatever act you want "just" or "good" (even though, it is arbitrary and self-assertive to call something "just" or "good" because you interpret it as such), but you cannot uphold a contradiction with omnipotence. This is why I consider Calvinism a nonsensical doctrine; it is like asking you to smell the color nine; you just can't do it.

I would challenge you to provide me any example of a person choosing other than according to his strongest desire at the moment of choice.

Metaphysical evidence? That, too, is a contradiction. I can theorize how it could happen, but I cannot prove it, any more than you can prove that your deterministic conception is true. Here:

X, who is caught in the potentiality of an affair, is stuck between his reason, which considers it a wrong thing to do, and his desire, which indifferently compels his intellect to resign itself. He is the mediator between reason and desire, and from this perspective of mediation, he chooses which route to consummate, which isn't a route external to him (to cheat or not to cheat), but something internal to him: reason or desire, superego or id, whatever you want to call it. This is the only theoretical idea that makes freedom actual; otherwise, as you imply but seem to semantically deny, one's will is determined by prior causes, specifically his greatest desire, which he cannot control, which is to say that freedom does not exist.

Determinism is the doctrine that one's way of acting, thinking, feeling, etc., taken as a whole, is determined by prior causes, which is to say that man has nothing to do with the situation. Why? Because his prior causes take care of it for him. The "him" is immediately negated when prior causes supersede any potentiality of the "him" doing the work. The only way out of this jingle is to conclude that the desires are him, which is -- strange, at the very least. Nevertheless, still you have the fact that he, being desires or whatever particular you want to hold, does not control himself, which way he will go. Why? Because he is determined by prior causes. To claim that he, being desire, can control himself is actually closer to my belief in freedom, sans the man-as-desire bit. Whichever way you turn, you have the fact that man is not responsible, that is, not free, to do otherwise than what he is determined to do, specifically in the immediate context regarding his desires (he always works on his greatest desires), specifically in the context relevant to the OP regarding his inability to initiate a faith (repentance) that God demands, yet still being demanded by God to do so, thus meaning that he is demanded to do something he cannot do, which is a contradiction. Here, for simplicity, is the heart of my statement:

Man is born out of faith.
Man is demanded to have faith as sufficient unto repentance.
Only God holds the individual's capacity for faith to flourish.
Therefore, for God to demand a man to repent when He is the only one can allow it is something contradictory.

To hope to not sound gratuitously crude, but something I think is rhetorically important, it is like God saying: "man, you're screwed from birth, condemned to an eternal Hell, because you cannot do what only I can allow you to do. Your punishment (!) is just (!!)."

Nevertheless, if we must disagree by virtue of defining our concepts differently, then so be it. Given that this is pretty obviously the case, it is childish and self-assertive to consider another person's conception of freedom or what have you as "wrong" or "misguided" precisely because one disagrees with one's metaphysics on such an issue. All will happen is an appeal to authority -- "uh, uh, Kierkegaard said!" "uh, uh, Edwards said!" and nothing of a conclusion leading soundly from premises that justifies an individual in calling the opposite's metaphysics "wrong". But, fortunately, it doesn't matter if they are wrong in this instance; I am willing to work within the reformed metaphysics, in the hope of resolving a contradiction I see inherent to reformed theology.

Long-winded, little sleep,

John

 

[frumanchu]

I see a few problems, but I don't have the time right now for the lengthy response required to explain.

Two quick observations though:

1. Your "metaphysical example" is incorrectly reduced to a false dilemma (reason vs desire). The "reason" of knowing it's wrong will not be acted upon without a desire to do so, and the "desire" of having the other woman points to a reason (namely the pleasure derived from the encounter). What is really being posited is two conflicting desires...the desire to act according to what's "right" (or perhaps the desire to avoid the negative consequences of doing what's "wrong") and the desire to experience the benefits derived from the affair. Whichever desire is strongest at the moment the choice is made will win out and the person will choose accordingly.

2. God's demand to repent when only He can allow man to is not, strictly speaking, a contradiction, regardless of which concept of responsibility we are operating under. I'm not saying this as a defense against your overall objection to the notion, but rather to point out a misuse of the term. If you haven't guessed already I'm kinda a stickler for the proper use of terms

Will respond in greater detail as time allows.

 

[Received]

Fru, it is a false dilemma only in relation to your metaphysics; and given that metaphysics cannot be proven, it remains a relational difficulty. Indeed, we can only resort to question begging when it comes to disagreeing metaphysics; you can say that "she really has two desires" when I say that desire is antithetical to an ideal that one is convicted of as right, and therefore doesn't have two desires, and according to your perspective I am begging the question by stating it to be the case, and according to my perspective you are begging the question by stating it to be the case. Because these things cannot be proven, we cannot state truth values on the premises involved. Which is why I think it is more important, therefore, to run with the original statement; like I said, I accept your metaphysics in this context, because I am trying to work with consistency, non-contradiction, specifically as it relates to the question stated in the OP. So, I'm trying to say: let's not focus on terms and theories, as this is not relevant to the OP; let's try and focus on things closer to what is stated in your 2.

2. God's demand to repent when only He can allow man to is not, strictly speaking, a contradiction, regardless of which concept of responsibility we are operating under. I'm not saying this as a defense against your overall objection to the notion, but rather to point out a misuse of the term. If you haven't guessed already I'm kinda a stickler for the proper use of terms

What? You? Never! It really isn't like that's a bad thing; quite the contrary.

Nevertheless, the essence of the problem lies with the word "demand"; I would say that "demand" implies an ought; you would seem to deny this. I would ask you to consider this in your reply, rather than essentially vainly focusing on information that I'm interested in, but, for the sake of expediency, would like to keep according to the question of the OP.

Cheers,

John

 

[frumanchu]

Nevertheless, the essence of the problem lies with the word "demand"; I would say that "demand" implies an ought; you would seem to deny this. I would ask you to consider this in your reply, rather than essentially vainly focusing on information that I'm interested in, but, for the sake of expediency, would like to keep according to the question of the OP.

Fair enough. Gives me an excuse to dust off the Augustinian writings as what you described was at the core of the Augustine-Pelagius controversy. Augustine prayed "Grant what Thou commandest, and command what Thou will." Pelagius objected to the first part, claiming as you do that the command to obey necessarily implies the ability to obey.

I'm going on a date with my wife tonight and will be working on our new house most of the day tomorrow, so it may well be a couple days before I am able to carry on further.

Until then...

 

[cygnusx1]

Hi Received , you have said

''Nevertheless, the essence of the problem lies with the word "demand"; I would say that "demand" implies an ought''

I would agree that "demand implies an ought" ............ but where Calvinist's part company is when an ''Ought implies a can'' ......... man ought to repent , the fact that repentance is a gift should tell us something .

We ought to be Perfect as Our heavenly Father is perfect , now saying we can be that perfect is simply impossible in this world.

 

[Received]

Take your time, Fru; debating with a person such as you often makes it necessary to have time to recharge his batteries.

 

[Received]

Hi Received , you have said

''Nevertheless, the essence of the problem lies with the word "demand"; I would say that "demand" implies an ought''

I would agree that "demand implies an ought" ............ but where Calvinist's part company is when an ''Ought implies a can'' ......... man ought to repent , the fact that repentance is a gift should tell us something .

We ought to be Perfect as Our heavenly Father is perfect , now saying we can be that perfect is simply impossible in this world.

I agree with all of this. A demand implies an ought, and an ought implies a can. But where we divide is regarding repentance as it relates to Calvinistic theology: to repent one must have faith, and the Calvinist declares that faith is given by God. With this in mind, we return to a revision of the question in the OP: if God demands that men be saved, and He also holds the faith necessary for men to respond, He would be speaking a contradiction: you cannot demand something of someone that he cannot do. Such it is with the Calvinistic conception, so far as I see it.

We ought to repent; this the non-Calvinist will emphatically declare.
But this repentance is solely at the power of God, who grants faith.
Thus, to declare that you must do something you cannot do is nonsensical. The statement must either must be revised where men are capable of responding to grace (which is not Pelagian theology; not works) to the demand that God makes, or the demand to repent is not at all to be in the direction of the sinner. An ought implies a can, and with this in mind, the demand to repent implies a capacity to repent on one's own power, according to grace, which is not the case if God is completely responsible for any freedom in response by men regarding such repentance.

 

[cygnusx1]

I agree with all of this. A demand implies an ought, and an ought implies a can. But where we divide is regarding repentance as it relates to Calvinistic theology: to repent one must have faith, and the Calvinist declares that faith is given by God. With this in mind, we return to a revision of the question in the OP: if God demands that men be saved, and He also holds the faith necessary for men to respond, He would be speaking a contradiction: you cannot demand something of someone that he cannot do. Such it is with the Calvinistic conception, so far as I see it.

Hi Received , it seems you missed my point .
Let me enquire , does God demand ( a command is a demand) that you are perfect as Our Heavenly Father is perfect?
Yes or no ?

We ought to repent; this the non-Calvinist will emphatically declare.
But this repentance is solely at the power of God, who grants faith.
Thus, to declare that you must do something you cannot do is nonsensical. The statement must either must be revised where men are capable of responding to grace (which is not Pelagian theology; not works) to the demand that God makes, or the demand to repent is not at all to be in the direction of the sinner. An ought implies a can, and with this in mind, the demand to repent implies a capacity to repent on one's own power, according to grace, which is not the case if God is completely responsible for any freedom in response by men regarding such repentance.

Suppose you commit a crime and you are heavily fined , say 100000 Dollars , are you saying that because you cannot pay it , then the whole fine is nonsensical and shouldn't be allowed?
Then are crimes to be judged by ability to pay ?
Consider the implications , someone steals your house , and is fined and pays you a dollar!
Is that Just?

 

[Received]

cyg,

All I'm saying is that when God makes a demand, this implies a capacity to respond to this demand (a demand implies an ought, an ought implies a can) or else he wouldn't use the word "demand"; and because it is something demanded -- something that can be responded to by man in his own power --, man's inability to save himself by faith does not line up with this demand -- the statement would be logically fulfilled if man was capable (an ought implies a can) of responding to God freely.

 

[cygnusx1]

cyg,

All I'm saying is that when God makes a demand, this implies a capacity to respond to this demand (a demand implies an ought, an ought implies a can) or else he wouldn't use the word "demand"; and because it is something demanded -- something that can be responded to by man in his own power --, man's inability to save himself by faith does not line up with this demand -- the statement would be logically fulfilled if man was capable (an ought implies a can) of responding to God freely.

as I said earlier Received ,
"I would agree that "demand implies an ought" ............ but where Calvinist's part company is when an ''Ought implies a can'' ......... man ought to repent , the fact that repentance is a gift should tell us something .

We ought to be Perfect as Our heavenly Father is perfect , now saying we can be that perfect is simply impossible in this world.

Calvinists are very strong on OUGHT , but also as strong on ought does not imply a can!

Should Pharoah have submitted to God's authority on day one ?
Yes !
could he submit to God on day one ................ Romans 9 fills in the gaps

Men ought to seek God , howbeit God's word says no-one seeks after God.
And the saved Gentiles are described by the Lord as those who He said "I was found (by) those who were not seeking me; I revealed myself to those who were not asking for me." Rom 10:20

 

[Received]

Ok, so I misunderstood you.

An ought does not always imply a can. Well, then, how is this sensical? Think of this:

"You, do this!"
"But sir, this is impossible for me."
"Oh, stop being silly -- by "do this" I didn't really mean doing it, I was only saying it. Just do the best you can."

In such passages as "be ye perfect," we should understand them as they are -- be perfect; actually, the greek gives the idea of being "mature"; "be ye mature, as your heavenly father is mature" -- this is a much more realistic command.

cygnus, I cannot accept the concept of an all-wise deity meaning by "ought" anything other than an implicit "can". This understanding is nonsensical. "You ought to do this, even though you can't do it." Or:

"Son, you ought to clean your room, even though I know you can't."

If one cannot do something, it is not their responsibility to do so.

Because you are a Calvinist doesn't mean you have the call on what words or phrases mean. You either change your meaning, and the words and phrases involved, or -- what? That is all you can do.

John

 

[CaDan]

/me checks in to watch a really good debate.

 

[Imblessed]

* CaDan checks in to watch a really good debate.

It IS pretty good, isn't it?

I'm truly amazed that no one is resorting to name calling and such as is seen so often in other parts of the forum.....(must be the area we are in....)

'tis nice, very nice......

 

[JJB]

ought[size=-1]1[/size] ([font=verdana, sans-serif] P [/font]) Pronunciation Key (ôt)
aux.v.

1. Used to indicate obligation or duty: You ought to work harder than that.
2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence: You ought to wear a raincoat.
3. Used to indicate desirability: You ought to have been there; it was great fun.
4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week.

[Middle English oughten, to be obliged to, from oughte, owned, from Old English

hte, past tense of

gan, to possess. See aik- in Indo-European Roots.]

Usage Note: Unlike other auxiliary verbs, ought usually takes to with its accompanying verb: We ought to go. Sometimes the accompanying verb is dropped if the meaning is clear: Should we begin soon? Yes, we ought to. In questions and negative sentences, especially those with contractions, to is also sometimes omitted: Oughtn't we be going soon? This omission of to, however, is not common in written English. Like must and auxiliary need, ought to does not change to show past tense: He said we ought to get moving along. ·Usages such as He hadn't ought to come and She shouldn't ought to say that are common in many varieties of American English. They should be avoided in written English, however, in favor of the more standard variant ought not to.​

 

[cygnusx1]

Ok, so I misunderstood you.

An ought does not always imply a can. Well, then, how is this sensical? Think of this:

"You, do this!"
"But sir, this is impossible for me."
"Oh, stop being silly -- by "do this" I didn't really mean doing it, I was only saying it. Just do the best you can."

In such passages as "be ye perfect," we should understand them as they are -- be perfect; actually, the greek gives the idea of being "mature"; "be ye mature, as your heavenly father is mature" -- this is a much more realistic command.

cygnus, I cannot accept the concept of an all-wise deity meaning by "ought" anything other than an implicit "can". This understanding is nonsensical. "You ought to do this, even though you can't do it." Or:

"Son, you ought to clean your room, even though I know you can't."

If one cannot do something, it is not their responsibility to do so.

Because you are a Calvinist doesn't mean you have the call on what words or phrases mean. You either change your meaning, and the words and phrases involved, or -- what? That is all you can do.

John

Two things Received ,
1. What if the reason man cannot is because he will not ?
2. What if the reason for man cannot is because he made himself unable (Adam) ?

As far as Calvinist's are concerned most would affirm man does whatever he wants ........ God forces no man against his will.... in that sense man is free.

Yet man is not morally free.
He is a fallen creature with different desires from that which he was first endowed with. No longer is seeking God and Holiness in man's desires but instead pleasing his flesh , and his fleshly mind.
Man's inability to repent and seek God is not owing to man being robbed of the faculties to do both , fallen man has still a mind and a will.
However , his will and his mind are no longer what they were.
You may be convinced that humans are different from examples such as Sodom and Gommorah , but human nature has not changed .
Society wears a thin veneer of civilised behaviour , but given the right conditions and man shows his true colours.
Total Depravity is not the same as men are as wicked as they possibly can be , it is Total in the sense of every part of man's constitution is effected by sin. Man is corrupt , hence the need for both a Saviour and a New heart. (literally a NEW creation , not just a rehabilative program)

Man's inability to do anything truly good (only God is good) stems not from a mechanism loss , but a strong desire for sin.
This means man is unable because he is unwilling .

So it is perfectly sound and reasonable for God to make moral demands on Rebels who were it not for their sheer love of self and sin would surely obey the Gospel.

Cygnus