Where is the hope in atheism?

[apogee]

I think if some joy is required for justification, that isn't good enough of a way to view things for Quid. We couldn't use the word "selfless" anymore, since it would still be at least a little bit about yourself. I would say it's a significant idea though.

I understand the reasoning, I just don't think that degree of utter selflessness is really necessary. For an act to be effectively selfless, all you really need is a deficit of reward. For instance, if I donate a kidney to a complete stranger knowing that they might say 'thank you' is that instantly disqualified?

Sure, people can subjectively feel however it is they feel.

They can do no other, although it's not the subjective 'feelings' here that are key, it's the expected 'costs' and 'rewards'.

 

[apogee]

I think if some joy is required for justification, that isn't good enough of a way to view things for Quid. We couldn't use the word "selfless" anymore, since it would still be at least a little bit about yourself.

I think for this level of perfection you would need an entity inhabiting a state of perpetual bliss, to temporarily interrupt that bliss so that they can endure all manner of humiliation, pain and distress, with the belief that they were doing so for the benefit of someone else, of course everyone else would have to think they had somehow lost the plot, at least until it was all over and done with.

Naturally, such a person would have to be a complete maniac with a God complex, but they'd be an altruistic one, nonetheless.

 

[Moral Orel]

I understand the reasoning, I just don't think that degree of utter selflessness is really necessary. For an act to be effectively selfless, all you really need is a deficit of reward. For instance, if I donate a kidney to a complete stranger knowing that they might say 'thank you' is that instantly disqualified?

It's not that they "might" say thank you though. It's that you know you'll feel good when you make them feel good. All I'm claiming is that I see a correlation, and I think it might be causation. If a good feeling accompanies every good deed, is that simply a correlation, or would no good deed ever be done if there was no good feeling predicted.

Here's an example. I am physically capable of leaning forward quickly. So technically, I am capable of bashing my face into my glass desk right now. But there is no benefit I should predict to come from it, so I never would. So am I really capable of bashing my face into the desk? A good person might say that they would do good even if it only made them feel bad, but frankly, I can't see how that could even be imagined if we're honest with ourselves.

They can do no other, although it's not the subjective 'feelings' here that are key, it's the expected 'costs' and 'rewards'.

No, the subjective feelings here are the key since you said that we would use our subjective feelings to measure the costs and rewards.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

I think for this level of perfection you would need an entity inhabiting a state of perpetual bliss, to temporarily interrupt that bliss so that they can endure all manner of humiliation, pain and distress, with the belief that they were doing so for the benefit of someone else, of course everyone else would have to think they had somehow lost the plot, at least until it was all over and done with.

Naturally, such a person would have to be a complete maniac with a God complex, but they'd be an altruistic one, nonetheless.

Sounds a bit like the Incarnation, no?

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

It isn't an argument from ignorance. I'm not saying, "I have no idea what motivates people, therefore it must be pleasure". Plenty of nice people say they enjoy being nice. I just take their word for it if they say they derive pleasure from helping others. Is that not normal? Are the truly good people out there miserable? This nun you mention, do you imagine she's unhappy with her life? If she was, would you still call her a good person?

So you prefer the fallacy of Composition, then? The reasoning remains erroneous.

People don't always enjoy what they do. Some may, and on occasion many will, but often you don't. Yet you slog on, as it is the right thing to do. I happen to think that a person that hates their life, gets nothing from it, but acts selflessly within it because they see the need for their acts, is laudable.
Have you read war memoirs? How disillusioned they become, yet a vague sense of duty or patriotism drives them on. It is a paradox. There comes a point where people don't care about the opprobrium of desertion or a court martial, but where a idea still drives them on. A good example here, is For Whom the Bell Tolls of Hemingway (although not a memoir, he did fight in the Spanish Civil War). People's motivations are complex, and to assume it all goes down to a basic averting risk of pain and seeking pleasure, I frankly find puerile.
There are many other examples, such as women working as prostitutes to support children that aren't even their own, or social workers and doctors trying to stave the great flood of human misery that enters their doors.

But as I said, there is no way to disprove this assertion, especially if held as a sort-of article of faith, as many do.

That's just nonsense. I'm not the only one who likes chocolate ice cream. For everyone else that likes chocolate ice cream, we hold an intersubjective value together. I don't need to force people to say they like it even if they don't. I don't assume either. Without prompting, plenty of people will say, "I like chocolate ice cream". So why is it that they are likely lying? But of course, another person who disagrees with me has to bring up terrible things to attempt to argue against my claims. "Look how awful this view makes you feel! You can't say terrible, horrible things are factually the wrong thing to do!".


Somebody, please tell me, am I the only one to notice the irony of using an appeal to emotion to argue against my "all values are subjective" claim and to argue for the "there are objective values" claim?

Feel free to show me how Intersubjective values can be crafted from purely Subjective viewpoints, then. This is the same problem I alluded to earlier, where it was argued by Gaara that your subjective viewpoint is the only objective data. There is no way to assume a subjective viewpoint corresponds to any other's. Is your appreciation of a movie the same as someone else's? Do your tastebuds for that matter, conjure the same physical sensation (they don't by the way, hence some people have better palates, and tastes change as you age)?

You miss the point though. No one cares about people liking ice cream. If some like it more, others less, or some wax lyrical about it, that is immaterial. It is the implication of your thought, that this somehow corresponds to morals. For then those that really care WILL seek to enforce their opinion and it is therefore Will to Power at play here. That would be the only way for any form of 'right action' to occur. It is not about appealing to emotion, but disabusing you of this weird idea that such thinking is innocuous. Have you read Dostoyevsky? This is the classic problem of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, or Rogozhin in The Idiot. Just because you personally don't think in this manner, does not mean others won't; nor use this reasoning in support thereof. You have no way to disagree then, except by enforcing your own set of values over theirs.
Essentially it would argue that whomever can enforce it, that others maintain a society by it, and that can subjectively argue its merits to themselves, so justifies it - that way leads to Gulags, book burnings and the gates of Auschwitz.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Do you really not see the difference between any of this and morality?

I'm beginning to think that the root of the problem here is that you guys are already nihilists and so comfortable with it that you no longer recognize that there are consequences to this position. Who cares if in a couple generations, people decide that the age of consent should be ten years old? We're content with our personal feelings about how wrong pedophilia is, completely removed from any objective standard of morality or real life implications. There was really nothing wrong with pederasty in ancient Greece, after all. We would simply have rather not been there at the time, and if values change again, well, that's just how it goes!

I can't tell if you're stating the obvious or being sarcastic.

Yes, societal values change...and yes, that is the way it goes. I'm not saying anyone had to like it or accept it...but it is reality. Once upon a time, slavery was legal. Not too long ago...almost half this nation was vehemently opposed to gay marriage...but they were fewer than the half in favor of making it legal. I remember a very religious coworker of mine was extremely upset about it and believed that it would tear this nation apart...with good Christian's rebelling against the evil government lol.

It's not nihilism if everyone holds their own set of values (and they do). It simply isn't objective.

If the Christian God is real, then anyone who is not in a proper relationship with him does have a hole in their life that cannot be filled in any other way.

That would depend on the nature of the relationship...which, from my experiences talking about it with various Christians, doesn't amount to a while lot more than feelings.

Most Christians speak to their god... but admit he doesn't speak back in the same manner. Instead, they get feelings from speaking to god...and not much else. It varies from person to person of course...but that seems to be the general nature of this "relationship" (which is a generous word for a one-way conversation and some feelings).

Aside from that, there's various beliefs about how god interacts with the lives of his followers...but they are just beliefs....and the lack of them doesn't leave a "hole" in people.

Of course, if you're willing to add something more substantial about your relationship with god....I'm more than willing to consider it. As it stands though...I can honestly say I don't have any "hole" as a result of not having this "relationship".

Honestly, if any robust form of moral realism is correct and values are an inherent aspect of reality, then anyone who denies this is deeply mistaken about the objective importance of moral imperatives.

I doubt it...if there is some correct form of moral realism, no one has access to it. No two people agree completely on all moral judgements...so it's objectively true that no one has access to any form of moral realism. One could argue that it's "important" despite no one knowing what the "correct" morality is....but that would be a difficult argument to make since we all seem to continue living without any knowledge of it. How important could it be?

 

[Moral Orel]

So you prefer the fallacy of Composition, then? The reasoning remains erroneous.

People don't always enjoy what they do. Some may, and on occasion many will, but often you don't. Yet you slog on, as it is the right thing to do. I happen to think that a person that hates their life, gets nothing from it, but acts selflessly within it because they see the need for their acts, is laudable.
Have you read war memoirs? How disillusioned they become, yet a vague sense of duty or patriotism drives them on. It is a paradox. There comes a point where people don't care about the opprobrium of desertion or a court martial, but where a idea still drives them on. A good example here, is For Whom the Bell Tolls of Hemingway (although not a memoir, he did fight in the Spanish Civil War). People's motivations are complex, and to assume it all goes down to a basic averting risk of pain and seeking pleasure, I frankly find puerile.
There are many other examples, such as women working as prostitutes to support children that aren't even their own, or social workers and doctors trying to stave the great flood of human misery that enters their doors.

But as I said, there is no way to disprove this assertion, especially if held as a sort-of article of faith, as many do.

For Pete's sake... All I said was "it seems like...". I see a correlation. We can go back and forth with, "these people do this thing that stinks" and "are they happy about this though?" all day. I can't prove it, that's why I don't assert it as true. If I knew of even one person who "hates their life, gets nothing from it, but acts selflessly within it because they see the need for their acts" I would think it laudable too.

Feel free to show me how Intersubjective values can be crafted from purely Subjective viewpoints, then. This is the same problem I alluded to earlier, where it was argued by Gaara that your subjective viewpoint is the only objective data. There is no way to assume a subjective viewpoint corresponds to any other's. Is your appreciation of a movie the same as someone else's? Do your tastebuds for that matter, conjure the same physical sensation (they don't by the way, hence some people have better palates, and tastes change as you age)?

Ugh... You're conflating intersubjectivity between perceptions and intersubjectivity between values. We don't have to agree on how we perceive something, just that we value it. If Ralph and I both value chocolate ice cream, but we can't afford it on our own, we can pool our money and share a tub together. It doesn't matter if perceives cocoa the way I perceive raspberries.

You miss the point though. No one cares about people liking ice cream. If some like it more, others less, or some wax lyrical about it, that is immaterial. It is the implication of your thought, that this somehow corresponds to morals. For then those that really care WILL seek to enforce their opinion and it is therefore Will to Power at play here. That would be the only way for any form of 'right action' to occur. It is not about appealing to emotion, but disabusing you of this weird idea that such thinking is innocuous. Have you read Dostoyevsky? This is the classic problem of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, or Rogozhin in The Idiot. Just because you personally don't think in this manner, does not mean others won't; nor use this reasoning in support thereof. You have no way to disagree then, except by enforcing your own set of values over theirs.
Essentially it would argue that whomever can enforce it, that others maintain a society by it, and that can subjectively argue its merits to themselves, so justifies it - that way leads to Gulags, book burnings and the gates of Auschwitz.

Yep, more appeals to emotion. See that bolded part? That is the definition of an appeal to emotion. You're not showing that the thinking is incorrect in any way. You're not even trying to. You're just showing how problematic it would be if I was right. The ice cream example is perfect precisely because people don't care about ice cream. Then we can have a conversation about how moral values and moral duties work without having to appeal to emotion.

If objective values are real, demonstrate one. I can demonstrate that 2+2=4 using apples. I'll make it easy for you. You mentioned genocide before, I think genocide is terrible too already. Demonstrate, without appealing to emotion, that no person or group of people, ever, should commit genocide or attempt to commit genocide or commit a genocidal act under any circumstances at any time, and if a group ever did, it was objectively evil.

If you have to appeal to emotion, then all you've done is pushed the problem back one step, and we'll just argue about which morals we subjectively feel are objective.

 

[apogee]

Sounds a bit like the Incarnation, no?

I must admit, I quite like how it doesn't require a belief in anything other than the possibility that someone could potentially suffer from this very specific delusion.

 

[Moral Orel]

Here's the thing: my bubble of personal subjectivity unfortunately does not prevent me from viewing reality through this particular lens, but I'm less and less convinced that it's actually a rational conclusion at all. There's nothing fully objective about it; it's simply another subjective vantage point, a figment of our collective imagination as we try to imagine what a truly objective perspective would look like.

Yes, yes, I know you're bored with our talks. But I did a bit of reading about subjectivists and I think I understand what they're getting at. Nihilists say there are no true moral statements, subjectivists say there are, but you have to consider the perspective of the subject. So if I say, "genocide is wrong", I'm not stating that genocide is objectively wrong, I'm stating that from my subjective vantage point genocide is wrong. Consider this statement: "Five feet behind me is a sleeping woman". That is a true statement, if I say it. Presumably, it would not be true if you said the same exact thing. My wife likes to sleep on the couch.

Personally, I think this is the result of semantics from philosophers being too rigid in how they expect people to make moral statements, like we demonstrated when you asked me to make one. I think it's more honest to simply start a moral statement with "I think" or "in my opinion" but I don't take this as seriously as a lot of you. So the problem is with the semantics.

There are subjectively true moral statements.
Subjectivity is grounded in reality because my perceptions are the only things I can be 100% sure exist at all.
Nihilists say there are no true moral statements at all, so that is false.

Boom! Nihilism debunked! Mic drop!

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Ugh... You're conflating intersubjectivity between perceptions and intersubjectivity between values. We don't have to agree on how we perceive something, just that we value it. If Ralph and I both value chocolate ice cream, but we can't afford it on our own, we can pool our money and share a tub together. It doesn't matter if perceives cocoa the way I perceive raspberries.

No, actually you conflated perceptions and values with your ice cream argument. You can't complain then if I extend it to subjectivity, as I am still awaiting your explanation of how intersubjectivity can thus exist somehow. For this is the point. The principle remains that as we perceive subjectively, this would be true of anything, any and all qualia. If value is subjective, then it all is, and all values of a kind.

Yep, more appeals to emotion. See that bolded part? That is the definition of an appeal to emotion. You're not showing that the thinking is incorrect in any way. You're not even trying to. You're just showing how problematic it would be if I was right.

Exactly. It is problematic if you are right. Hence complex problems like justifying murder in Crime and Punishment are at play here. I for one, trust my own sense that feeding a child is better somehow than killing it, but ultimately it is axiomatic that things ought to be so.

The ice cream example is perfect precisely because people don't care about ice cream. Then we can have a conversation about how moral values and moral duties work without having to appeal to emotion.

A moral duty by nature is related to the idea of value - something valued is something cared about, which implies emotive connection. So to argue for values or morality without appealling to a sense of right and wrong, is arguing it essentially doesn't exist. This is the flaw that people have been pointing out to you with your ice cream, that at heart, it is a little specious. To argue thus, concedes the point, while ignoring the actual nature of the thing. For some form or sense of morality does exist, even if often poorly articulated.

If objective values are real, demonstrate one. I can demonstrate that 2+2=4 using apples.

False. You can't. You would be extrapolating an abstract principle from a specific example, not demonstrating the reality of 2+2 = 4. That is dependant on many assumptions, that such learned men like Bertrand Russell and Whitehead set out to try and prove in Principia Mathematica, and failed to do.

I'll make it easy for you. You mentioned genocide before, I think genocide is terrible too already. Demonstrate, without appealing to emotion, that no person or group of people, ever, should commit genocide or attempt to commit genocide or commit a genocidal act under any circumstances at any time, and if a group ever did, it was objectively evil.

If you have to appeal to emotion, then all you've done is pushed the problem back one step, and we'll just argue about which morals we subjectively feel are objective.

So frankly, this is a fool's errand you'd have me run. I can't prove objective values, but neither can you prove only subjective ones, except fallaciously. The point though is that if objective values exist, then the majority of mankind seems roughly in accord what they are. Similar then to the base assumptions of Mathematics. For while we cannot prove what is objective, we can acknowledge that something objective might exist, to which we must try and tend - Forms or Idealism or such.

If objective values don't exist, then the world is monstrous and a Noble Lie of objective values has to be created for any sort of stability. So I don't think it worthwhile to chase my tail trying to prove an unprovable abstraction drawn from human experience, for even if not true, it must be treated as if it is. Even Atheists acknowledges some form of Rights or at least justifies action for a endpoint conceived as 'good', though this becomes incongruous in their metaphysics. Otherwise we descend into Raskolnikovs bearing axes and ruin.

 

[Moral Orel]

False. You can't. You would be extrapolating an abstract principle from a specific example, not demonstrating the reality of 2+2 = 4. That is dependant on many assumptions, that such learned men like Bertrand Russell and Whitehead set out to try and prove in Principia Mathematica, and failed to do.

Oh for Pete's sake! If we can't agree that 2+2=4 is true, why are we talking at all? No one can know anything I guess.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Oh for Pete's sake! If we can't agree that 2+2=4 is true, why are we talking at all? No one can know anything I guess.

If you wish to argue the basis of human knowledge since time immemorial, why are some assumptions sacrosant and others not? You asked me to prove the unprovable, while blithely assuming the unprovable. People in glass houses should not throw stones, my friend.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes, yes, I know you're bored with our talks. But I did a bit of reading about subjectivists and I think I understand what they're getting at. Nihilists say there are no true moral statements, subjectivists say there are, but you have to consider the perspective of the subject. So if I say, "genocide is wrong", I'm not stating that genocide is objectively wrong, I'm stating that from my subjective vantage point genocide is wrong. Consider this statement: "Five feet behind me is a sleeping woman". That is a true statement, if I say it. Presumably, it would not be true if you said the same exact thing. My wife likes to sleep on the couch.

Personally, I think this is the result of semantics from philosophers being too rigid in how they expect people to make moral statements, like we demonstrated when you asked me to make one. I think it's more honest to simply start a moral statement with "I think" or "in my opinion" but I don't take this as seriously as a lot of you. So the problem is with the semantics.

There are subjectively true moral statements.
Subjectivity is grounded in reality because my perceptions are the only things I can be 100% sure exist at all.
Nihilists say there are no true moral statements at all, so that is false.

Boom! Nihilism debunked! Mic drop!

...and with that, I wadded up my Philosophy diploma, slam-dunked it into the trash. Ya-hoo! I'm free!

 

[Moral Orel]

...and with that, I wadded up my Philosophy diploma, slam-dunked it into the trash. Ya-hoo! I'm free!

You're welcome!

 

[Silmarien]

I can't tell if you're stating the obvious or being sarcastic.

Yes, societal values change...and yes, that is the way it goes. I'm not saying anyone had to like it or accept it...but it is reality. Once upon a time, slavery was legal. Not too long ago...almost half this nation was vehemently opposed to gay marriage...but they were fewer than the half in favor of making it legal. I remember a very religious coworker of mine was extremely upset about it and believed that it would tear this nation apart...with good Christian's rebelling against the evil government lol.

Legality and morality are different concepts entirely.

Just because slavery was at one point legal does not mean it was ever moral. Even most societies that did not view it as controversial recommended treating slaves kindly, so there are certainly moral dimensions to the question of slavery that have not changed at all. Likewise, the legality and morality of gay marriage do not necessarily match up. There are people who would hold that marriage has always been a political tool of control and therefore that no form of marriage has ever been moral.

This argument is not going to work against anyone who believes in moral progress and rejects the notion of a morally perfect society.

It's not nihilism if everyone holds their own set of values (and they do). It simply isn't objective.

Only in that nihilism is honest, whereas you guys are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

Most Christians speak to their god... but admit he doesn't speak back in the same manner. Instead, they get feelings from speaking to god...and not much else. It varies from person to person of course...but that seems to be the general nature of this "relationship" (which is a generous word for a one-way conversation and some feelings).

I'm a bit of a student of comparative mysticism, so I'm thinking more along the lines of how the relationship is described by the various saints of different traditions. I would not expect it to be like human relationships--what I am interested in is the transformative nature of what they seem to experience.

Granted, I suspect that there is a lot of craziness and self-hypnotism going on in Born Again circles, but this is not all you see if you actually look.

Of course, if you're willing to add something more substantial about your relationship with god....I'm more than willing to consider it. As it stands though...I can honestly say I don't have any "hole" as a result of not having this "relationship".

You can say it, but that certainly doesn't make it true. Your stance on morality would be considerably different if you were Christian, so if Christianity is an accurate description of reality, there is at least one pretty significant hole in your life.

I doubt it...if there is some correct form of moral realism, no one has access to it. No two people agree completely on all moral judgements...so it's objectively true that no one has access to any form of moral realism. One could argue that it's "important" despite no one knowing what the "correct" morality is....but that would be a difficult argument to make since we all seem to continue living without any knowledge of it. How important could it be?

Really, really important? Good luck finding a social reformer who didn't believe that their moral principles were in some sense objectively true--you can't get that sort of depth of conviction if you think that morality is ultimately just a free-for-all. I certainly like having civil rights, and if they ever get stripped away, you guys will be the ones saying, "Oh well, that's just how societies change."

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You're welcome!

It really would be great if it all was as simple as you've implied that it is in post #589. The upshot about the complexity of reality is that not one of us here has the last word on any of this ... there's always more that can be said, more scrutiny that can be applied, another angle to consider, more info that can be discovered.

 

[Silmarien]

Yes, yes, I know you're bored with our talks. But I did a bit of reading about subjectivists and I think I understand what they're getting at. Nihilists say there are no true moral statements, subjectivists say there are, but you have to consider the perspective of the subject. So if I say, "genocide is wrong", I'm not stating that genocide is objectively wrong, I'm stating that from my subjective vantage point genocide is wrong. Consider this statement: "Five feet behind me is a sleeping woman". That is a true statement, if I say it. Presumably, it would not be true if you said the same exact thing. My wife likes to sleep on the couch.

Yes, and this is why I would argue that subjectivism is incoherent. What does it mean for genocide to be wrong from your subjective vantage point? It either means that you genuinely believe that it is wrong, in which case you're assigning objective value to your statement (regardless of that statement's independent truth value), or we are simply describing your emotional response to a certain topic. This does not give it some mystical quality of subjective truth, since you could presumably say that genocide is wrong and then go commit a genocide anyway. (This would be pretty extreme, but people do violate their own values all the time.)

The example of your sleeping wife does not work, because it would still be an objective fact of reality that she is sleeping five feet behind you. A better example would be Christians claiming that the Resurrection was a historical event. Is this subjectively true for them? Presumably so, but this does not mean that it is actually true. Any Christian who holds that the Resurrection is subjectively true but that it does not refer to any objective truth about the world is going to have a lot to explain.

 

[Moral Orel]

or we are simply describing your emotional response to a certain topic.

This one. When I say "genocide is wrong" I mean "I hate genocide". That's why I don't say "genocide is wrong" because I think it's a dishonest way to phrase it. I bring up the semantics though, because apparently that's the only way I'm allowed to phrase it in a formal discussion. Nihilists insist that if it doesn't have intrinsic value, then it doesn't have value at all. But we've established that subjective value exists because you agree that I value ice cream. And if I can value ice cream, I can value other more important things.

This does not give it some mystical quality of subjective truth, since you could presumably say that genocide is wrong and then go commit a genocide anyway. (This would be pretty extreme, but people do violate their own values all the time.)

It does, though. If it merely describes an emotional response, then it is subjectively true that I hate genocide. Since no one can demonstrate any given moral is objectively true, even if I grant that objective morality exists, that is all it effectively amounts to. "In my subjective opinion, genocide is objectively wrong". And with all the appeals to emotion that have been used in this thread to attack my position, it only demonstrates my point here.

The example of your sleeping wife does not work, because it would still be an objective fact of reality that she is sleeping five feet behind you. A better example would be Christians claiming that the Resurrection was a historical event. Is this subjectively true for them? Presumably so, but this does not mean that it is actually true. Any Christian who holds that the Resurrection is subjectively true but that it does not refer to any objective truth about the world is going to have a lot to explain.

My sleeping wife was used, unbeknownst to her, to demonstrate the problem of semantics. I could have said, "there is a sleeping woman five feet behind me" and it would be true, but you couldn't have said "there is a sleeping woman five feet behind me" because that wouldn't have been true. Same exact sentence, but one was objectively true, and one wasn't. It depends on the subject who said it. Now it isn't true at all. She's in the kitchen.

So let's consider the historical event. "Jesus was resurrected after three days" from a subjective view would mean "I believe Jesus was resurrected after three days" and if that's what you believe, then the statement "I believe Jesus was resurrected after three days" is true. From an objective view, "Jesus was resurrected after three days" might be true, but only if He actually was resurrected after three days in reality. It's the semantics of a formal morality discussion. I don't get to play if I want to phrase things like I do.

 

[Silmarien]

This one. When I say "genocide is wrong" I mean "I hate genocide". That's why I don't say "genocide is wrong" because I think it's a dishonest way to phrase it. I bring up the semantics though, because apparently that's the only way I'm allowed to phrase it in a formal discussion. Nihilists insist that if it doesn't have intrinsic value, then it doesn't have value at all. But we've established that subjective value exists because you agree that I value ice cream. And if I can value ice cream, I can value other more important things.

I don't think anyone is arguing that you do not subjectively dislike genocide. I can dislike dogs, but that doesn't make this a subjective moral statement. If moral statements are to be considered such because they are "more important," how do we demonstrate that they do in fact have greater importance? Perhaps I really, really hate dogs.

If you cannot provide a coherent definition of "subjective morality" that differentiates it from any other set of likes and dislikes, then the concept seems to collapse into nothingness.

It does, though. If it merely describes an emotional response, then it is subjectively true that I hate genocide. Since no one can demonstrate any given moral is objectively true, even if I grant that objective morality exists, that is all it effectively amounts to. "In my subjective opinion, genocide is objectively wrong". And with all the appeals to emotion that have been used in this thread to attack my position, it only demonstrates my point here.

No, it really doesn't. It's coherent to say that it is your subjective opinion that genocide is objectively wrong. Obviously all we have access to is our subjective vantage point, so this is roughly speaking the equivalent of saying that it is your subjective opinion that the external world exists.

On the other hand, if someone is skeptical enough about the external world to deny that it objectively exists, and then says that it simply exists subjectively for them, their daily existence is going to be a elaborate dance in self-deception, simultaneously accepting and denying the same thing. This is closer to your situation.

So let's consider the historical event. "Jesus was resurrected after three days" from a subjective view would mean "I believe Jesus was resurrected after three days" and if that's what you believe, then the statement "I believe Jesus was resurrected after three days" is true. From an objective view, "Jesus was resurrected after three days" might be true, but only if He actually was resurrected after three days in reality. It's the semantics of a formal morality discussion. I don't get to play if I want to phrase things like I do.

Can you claim, "I believe that Jesus was resurrected after three days" and then turn around and say, "It is not objectively true that Jesus was resurrected after three days"? Because this is effectively what you're doing. These are both subjective statements, and they are in conflict.

 

[apogee]

It's not that they "might" say thank you though. It's that you know you'll feel good when you make them feel good. All I'm claiming is that I see a correlation, and I think it might be causation. If a good feeling accompanies every good deed, is that simply a correlation, or would no good deed ever be done if there was no good feeling predicted.

I would agree that the correlation with feeling good about doing a good deed, may have a causal influence, or even the feeling of guilt if you didn't. However from my perspective, I would not consider these altruistic acts, unless there was another deciding influence at work.

I wouldn't donate a kidney to feel good about myself (I definitely wouldn't do it twice) there are easier ways to feel good, I'd just eat ice cream, or take cocaine, if I really wanted to feel good.

Here's an example. I am physically capable of leaning forward quickly. So technically, I am capable of bashing my face into my glass desk right now. But there is no benefit I should predict to come from it, so I never would. So am I really capable of bashing my face into the desk? A good person might say that they would do good even if it only made them feel bad, but frankly, I can't see how that could even be imagined if we're honest with ourselves.

I certainly couldn't accelerate my head into a glass table, unless I was particularly frustrated by a post I read on here, but it wouldn't be an altruistic act in any case, unless I was doing it to prevent you from doing the same thing, (perhaps it might be more sensible for me to move the table) .

I don't know if you've ever had to give consent for a pet to be put down, but I'd suggest that this might be an example of an act that really does not create any positive feelings.

No, the subjective feelings here are the key since you said that we would use our subjective feelings to measure the costs and rewards.

It is subjective expectations, rather than experiences, although previous experience influences the expectation.