In a round-about way I was trying to say that we pretty much agreed on the gramar of ἑιμί, but we disagree on the core issue which I say is the "dead man argument" and which you say is "the question of the basis of action; i.e. whether that participation is the direct product of grace and that alone, or something in the individual."
This has a bit of relevence to the thread, since if dead people can't believe unless belief is gifted to them, then it stands to reason that dead people can't hear and learn from God unless God gifts them hearing and learning. This is the concept we disagree on, and I believe my points on the grammar are stronger since active, middle, and deponent voice verbs make the subject the doer of the action. Adjectives don't change the agency of the action away from the subject.
What points? I responded to your points. That's why I'm confused by your re-assertion of them. To recap:
1. Ἔσονται is a future indicative of ἐιμί. All future indicatives of ἐιμί take middle forms. That does not mean it conveys the idea of having acted for oneself, or even necessarily having participated in the action. Consider the phrase, "the glass will be etched by the engraver." "[It] will be" would be ἔσται, future middle indicative. Yet that does not mean that the glass participates as an agent in its own engraving. Rather, the glass is the beneficiary of the etching action.
2. Taught/teach is usually translated from the verb διδάσκω, not the adjective. The adjective is rare, especially in the Bible (it is more common in ancient Greek philosophy). When it
is used, however, and particularly of persons as the subject, it is
always descriptive of those persons as having received the educational effect of the teaching, the same way that "etched" is descriptive of a subject as having received the effects of the etching (cf. "experts of war" in 1 Maccabees 4:7; the "taught ones" in Plato's "The Republic"). In other words, the
reason for the use of the adjective rather than the verb is to describe the
effect of the teaching, as opposed to the
offering of it.
3. The fact that ἀκούσας and μαθὼν are active is not relevant to the meaning of διδακτοί. You're taking for granted that the actions of hearing and learning somehow imply an active reception of a teaching offered. That not only undermines the whole point of using the adjective in place of the verb, but it also ignores the fact that being the beneficiary of sovereign action would not mitigate the reality of human agency. I think your very apparent animosity toward Calvinism is blinding you a bit here, as you seem to insist upon a caricature of that view; namely, that there can be
no agency involved whatsoever on the view that this drawing/teaching sovereignly brings about a particular outcome. That is simply not the case. Being the beneficiary of a sovereign action in no way implies a contradiction with the idea of secondary causes falling out under that action. In other words, it is perfectly coherent to view the hearing and learning as the
means by which the educational effect of the teaching is sovereignly applied. This is where the issue of "basis" comes in. If God so changes the heart of a sinner that his heart is now
characterized by a
desire for righteousness, then he
will, as a guarantee (cf. vs. 37), actively participate in hearing and learning from God, thus manifesting the
promise of being God-taught.
In other words, hearing and learning describe the human element of what the drawing produces. This follows the pattern of the passage. There is a repeated juxtaposition between divine and human action throughout verses 37-40 and 44-45, with the former always providing the ground and guarantee for the latter:
Verse 37: "
All that the Father gives me will come to me, and
whoever comes to me I will never cast out."
Verse 39: "And this is the will of him who sent me,
that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me..."
Verse 40: "For this is the will of my Father,
that everyone who looks on the Son and believes in him should have eternal life..."
Verse 44: "
No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I
will raise
him up on the last day."
Verse 45: "...
And they will all be taught by God.
Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me"
Divine Ground -
Human Result
- The giving of the Father guarantees the coming of the given one (vs. 37).
- The need to fulfill the Father's will that not one of these given ones should be lost (vs. 39) provides the ground for the Father's will that these gives ones would look on the Son and believe (vs. 40).
- The drawing of the Father provides the ground for the ability to come (vs. 44; note that the condition is stated negatively; the "then" comes before the "if"), as well as the guarantee that the drawn ones will do so (note the identity of the "him" who is drawn with the "him" who is raised).
- Note also that verse 65 quotes verse 44, but uses δίδωμι from verse 37 in the place of ἑλκύω, indicating a paradigmatic-syntagmatic relationship between the two terms in this context. In other words, they're interchangeable. No one can come unless the Father gives/draws them, and all whom the Father gives/draws will surely come. And yet this does not do away with human agency, but rather provides the grounds for it, because:
- The promise that these given/drawn ones will be "God-taught" provides the ground and guarantee that they actively hear and learn. This is simply descriptive of the giving/drawing action of the Father in how it changes the heart of the unable, making it both able and willing, with the end result being that the Son will perfectly and fully accomplish the will of the Father (vv. 39-40), the purpose for which he came (vs. 38).
I realize I've now gone well beyond the scope of the OP, so if we continue with this discussion it would probably be better to start a new thread. I'd be happy to continue if you want to create a new thread and @ me, or feel free to join in over at
A Thought on John 6:44.
