Maybe it would be pertinent to the pro-choice/pro-life debate to discuss what makes something a person (particularly because the pro-life position aims to extend the rights of all other persons to include fetuses as well).
Ok, so let's start by setting up two extremes, and then discuss where between the two extremes we can draw the line between what is and is not a person, shall we?
Ok, extreme 1: A healthy, normal adult human being. I think that we can all agree that a healthy human adult deserves to be called a person, can't we?
Alright, how about extreme number 2: a single skin cell. I think we can all agree that a single skin cell does not deserve the same rights as a human adult, right? If I scratch off a skin cell, I probably shouldn't be tried for murder.
Ok, so we have our two extremes. A human adult is definitely a person, and a single skin cell is definitely not a person. So, what can we conclude from this? Let's examine the similarities first. Both are living. Both are diploid. Both have human DNA.
Excellent, so is it fair to conclude that the properties of having human DNA, being alive, and being diploid are NOT properties that constitute being a person?
Can we narrow the question any further? What else constitutes being a person, and what else does not?
Ok, so let's start by setting up two extremes, and then discuss where between the two extremes we can draw the line between what is and is not a person, shall we?
Ok, extreme 1: A healthy, normal adult human being. I think that we can all agree that a healthy human adult deserves to be called a person, can't we?
Alright, how about extreme number 2: a single skin cell. I think we can all agree that a single skin cell does not deserve the same rights as a human adult, right? If I scratch off a skin cell, I probably shouldn't be tried for murder.
Ok, so we have our two extremes. A human adult is definitely a person, and a single skin cell is definitely not a person. So, what can we conclude from this? Let's examine the similarities first. Both are living. Both are diploid. Both have human DNA.
Excellent, so is it fair to conclude that the properties of having human DNA, being alive, and being diploid are NOT properties that constitute being a person?
Can we narrow the question any further? What else constitutes being a person, and what else does not?