No, the hallucinated doughnut was CAUSED BY a set of brain states which were physical but, BEQUEATHED as it were, something non-physical, namely a mental state.
That's anyway the most natural attitude to have here, I think.
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The hallucinated doughnut was a set of brain states which so far as I know is physical.
Correct. Sums, angles, divisions, etc aren't things that exist outside of a computational processing machine such as the brain.Are you saying that the sum of the angles of a triangle is not 180 degrees unless someone thinks it?
This didn't answer my question. Are the computational processes in a computer "non-physical?"I don't think it's been proved computers have a mental life. We are talking as of now about human minds, not computers.
..Though if a computer did have a mental life, as I think Chalmers has postulated, then that mental life would be non-physical, sure.
Yes, exactly. You start off assuming there is no transcendant mind, and then lay out an argument that concludes there is no mind-body problem.
Because the physical is not the mental, put simply.
Correct. Sums, angles, divisions, etc aren't things that exist outside of a computational processing machine such as the brain.
This didn't answer my question. Are the computational processes in a computer "non-physical?"
Logic and mathematics are abstractions (and abstractions of those abstractions) of that which we know to exist physically. We know that a cow is a cow and cannot be NOT a cow simultaneously. We have mathematics due to the fact that we can discern discrete objects and sets of objects. For instance, addition is the combination of two sets. Sets and objects within them are abstractions of observations of reality, that is, of the physical.Interesting. So mathematics do not exist except when there exists a mind. So in a universe without minds, 2+2 might not equal 4? Or how about logic. Does logic exist only when minds exist in tandem with it?
We can measure neural activity in the same way we can measure activity in a computer processor. Where's the mind there? How can we detect it?If you mean by "computational processes" the nuts and bolts which make a computer process than by all means they are physical. Just like the neural inputs and outputs in a human mind are physical. But that is beside the point of whether there exists a mental life.
Logic and mathematics are abstractions (and abstractions of those abstractions) of that which we know to exist physically. We know that a cow is a cow and cannot be NOT a cow simultaneously. We have mathematics due to the fact that we can discern discrete objects and sets of objects. For instance, addition is the combination of two sets. Sets and objects within them are abstractions of observations of reality, that is, of the physical.
We can measure neural activity in the same way we can measure activity in a computer processor. Where's the mind there? How can we detect it?
No, the hallucinated doughnut was CAUSED BY a set of brain states which were physical but, BEQUEATHED as it were, something non-physical, namely a mental state.
That's anyway the most natural attitude to have here, I think.
I think of it as the hallucinated doughnut is the brain states. Nothing (WRT the doughnut), at all, exists outside the brain states.
So far as the doughnut goes, it doesn't exist at all. All that exists is the brain state.
Similarly, when we think of a unicorn, it doesn't actually exist either physically or non-physically. All that exists is the brain state.
Yes it is.And that is something I find completely absurd. An experience is not the same as a section of the brain undergoing change.
Last I could tell, experiences exist, the objects of experience exist. And they are different from the brain state. Thus, your position is refuted.
As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.
Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed
I don't know that there is a majority view of "number." It's not as if sandwiches position is something on the fringes. As far as I know it is considered a serious possibility by most philosophers that number is contigent on mind - even if they argue against it.
Of course there is, and I'm not denying that. What I say, rather, is that something mental (an emotion say) is in a medium all its own rather than an electrical impulse
The correct question is "was the thought of the doughnut physical"? I say yes, since that's all we have evidence of it being. It was the result of normal physical processes in the brain. I'm not sure why you're confusing "thoughts about something" with that something, but it's leading you in the wrong direction. I don't know of anyone advocating the idea that if I think of an elephant one physically appears in my brain, so arguing against that sort of idea isn't going to get you very far.Was the doughnut physical? Of course not.
You're assuming your conclusion here. Of course if you pretend that thoughts are not physical then there must be a non-physical substance to thoughts. But there's no reason to assume that.I invoke the non-physical, because that's exactly what is missing. I know because we do have non-physical thoughts (like the doughnut example).
As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.
Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed
I think I'll refrain from mentioning it much more as an aside, as I need to do more research myself. I still think mental-life is far from being "physical." Neuroscientists are not philosophers and shouldn't try to be.
Last I could tell, experiences exist, the objects of experience exist.
Maybe the default comes from applying Occams Razor.Why do you believe the mental is physical? Both seem like fair questions, but why should one default on the physical side when this is in no way obvious?
But they are not generally regarded as having causal power, afaik. But minds cause actions, so they are (probably) physical. This may be tenuous reasoning, but maybe all we have are tiny footholds on the crag.It isn't as though non-physical things don't exist; look at numbers and universals.
I desagree. It may not explain everything, but it does give insight into relevant mechanisms. Are you saying that a brain scientist knows no more about drug action than a newborn bambino?Actually, "brain science" as you so call it does not offer an explanation so far as an actual account of why opium or any intoxicant renders us unconscious. It can only go so far as to detail the steps within the human body which proceed on the basis of this interaction.
Like affects like? So opium must be mental if it affects the mental?in the OP, this is all imagination and imagination is "meaningless" when it comes down to the mental. This is in no small degree because we can't really "imagine" why the opium molecule, when it binds to certain receptors in the brain, gives us the experience of sleep. It merely does because there is a commonality between the state of being and its cause. And on that basis is why I maintain "like meets with like" and that the effect can only be non-different from the cause, which is efficacious due to this identity.
Numbers and mathematics are a language. Without anyone to use the language, it doesn't exist. The language may use symbols and syntax which correspond to reality in some cases, but they're not the reality itself. I don't see what's controversial here.
But they are not generally regarded as having causal power, afaik. But minds cause actions, so they are (probably) physical. This may be tenuous reasoning, but maybe all we have are tiny footholds on the crag.
My point was that no one denies the existence of the body, and rather it's the nature of the mind that's under scrutiny. The mind-body problem doesn't refer to whether or not the body is real.Yes, exactly. You start off assuming there is no transcendant mind, and then lay out an argument that concludes there is no mind-body problem. (Maybe not the exact phrasing you would like, but that's the essence of it) Duh. Of course that's going to be your conclusion.
I gave an example of a hypothetical thing which exists but is untestable: a particle that only interacts with itself. It doesn't decay into other, detectable particles, it doesn't affect and isn't affected by gravity, it has its own 'other-gravity', etc, yet it exists. There are whole constellations of the stuff, which we cannot detect in any way, shape, or form.I'd be curious to know what you think is untestable ... yet exists. Also, note that I qualified what types of past events are scientificially untestable. I never said science is useless to all of history, but there are instances when it does not apply. You seem to indirectly agree with that.
True, but what exactly do we know now? We know the brain and the mind are inextricably linked, we know the physical brain exists, and we don't know that the mind is some terribly distant entity. Everything points to physicalism, and nothing points to dualism or transcendentalism (whatever the correct term is).Parts of it. You've already admitted the mind still has some mysteries. If you've found a way to test those mysteries, I'm anxious to hear about it. Maybe (most likely) science will find ways to do more in the future. But it would be special pleading to speak of anything other than what we know now.
I don't see how that logically works. Physicalism says that the mind is an emergent phenomenon of the brain. That doesn't mean we know how, only that it is. In my opinion, we have evidence for physicalism, but I wouldn't say we've solved physicalism - that is, we don't yet have a working theory as to how all of the mind's functions and properties actually, physically emerge from the brain.I'm surprised you don't see the interesting irony in all this. What is one possible approach a dualist could take? To show a contradiction in the physicalist approach. OK, let's do that:
1. Assume neuroscience can explain mind phenomena X.
2. Use neuroscience to explain how the brain makes that connection to mind.
3. Neuroscience fails to make the connection, therefore the assumption is false - X can't be explained by a physical brain.
That would be the technique ... except ... you have a back door. Well, the special pleading begins, neuroscience is incomplete. We'll know that in the future.
It's called 'evidence'. If we have two opposing ideas - the mind is a wholly physical phenomenon, vs. the mind is a wholly transcendental phenomenon - with one having evidence and the other not, even if one idea is incomplete we still lean towards it rather than the the unevidenced counterpart.I actually accept that using current neuroscience for the argument does not prove a mind-body problem. It merely establishes that we must leave the door open. What I don't understand is why people don't get that - why they think the issue is closed - since we can explain a few things it follows with absolute certainty that we will be able to explain all things. It does? Hmm.
On the contrary, I was speaking with regard to my hypothetical scenario:I never told you what my experience was, so I doubt you know if there is good evidence against it or not. There seems to be a confirmation bias at work here.
If you don't have a definition of 'spiritual', how can you speculate that your experience had a spiritual cause? Don't you need a working idea before you can start attributing things to it?In a way that would satisfy you? Probably not. It is something I roll around in my head, though. When I come up with something, I'll let you know. I suppose we could discuss some of the preliminaries I've been pondering, but I don't expect they'll be convincing yet because of what I'm trying to point out in this thread. For example, ...
But that's just it: anything that interacts with us is physical. That's the only coherent definition I can see - if neutrinos are physical, then ghosts must be too. I'll accept any evidence you care to mention, so long as it actually is evidence. Don't conflate my definition with yours.Yeah, exactly. You won't accept any evidence except that which you consider to be evidence of the physical. We've been through this before. By your thinking, anything that interacts with us is physical. If that is your assumption, we're not going to get far.
I don't see how that's any more a difference in views - you, the believer, believe it to be true, hence the 'is'. I, the sceptic, don't believe it to be true, but acknowledge that it might be, hence the 'could be'.IMO, not "could be," but "is," and hence the difficulty of the problem.
On the contrary, I'm arguing my position based on what I perceive to be the evidence. In my opinion, there is evidence for physicalism but not dualism, hence the logical position should be the former and not the latter. Just because I've concluded that it is the former doesn't mean I've made no a priori assumption that it must be the former.You're not familiar with Monty Python? A shame. The point is, I see this problem of "common cause" all the time - the idea that since unusual causes are unlikely, that everything must have a common cause.
It's a real problem for history - the "common man" argument. Since all Frenchman are dutiful to the king, Napoleon would never have usurped royal authority, therefore accusations that he did are false. Those activities must have come from outside France, from its enemies - the Brits.
It's a bad argument. Most Frenchmen may have been dutiful to the king, but Napoleon wasn't. He was an uncommon man.
That's just a made-up example, but I see it happen from time to time. It appears you might be trying to apply the same argument to science - that all causes must be common.
I gave an example of a hypothetical thing which exists but is untestable: a particle that only interacts with itself.
As for scientific testability, I'm of the opinion that the historical method is a specific instance of the more general scientific method. That is, when historians deduce this or that, what they're doing is not all that different from what scientists usually do: hypothesising, testing, and re-hypothesising. So no, I don't agree that there are parts of history where science doesn't apply. Science may have difficulty, but it's purview isn't restricted by the past.
Everything points to physicalism, and nothing points to dualism ...
What reason do you have for assuming this?
The correct question is "was the thought of the doughnut physical"?
I say yes, since that's all we have evidence of it being.
I'm not sure why you're confusing "thoughts about something" with that something, but it's leading you in the wrong direction. I don't know of anyone advocating the idea that if I think of an elephant one physically appears in my brain, so arguing against that sort of idea isn't going to get you very far.
You're assuming your conclusion here. Of course if you pretend that thoughts are not physical then there must be a non-physical substance to thoughts. But there's no reason to assume that.
The author of that page does a shoddy job of defending his opinion. His argument boils down to "If mathematics didn't exist before minds, how did reality have properties that we now describe mathematically?" The same way that colors didn't exist before eyes and brains. Light of different wavelengths existed but colors, as such, didn't.As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.
Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed
So, how do you even know minds exist, as something separate or "transcendent" from brains?Strictly speaking minds ARE undetectable... and this follows as a direct result of their being non-physical!
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