Universal Uncertainty Principle

[juvenissun]

Genesis is demonstrably incorrect.

(this is the part where you label all the demonstrably incorrect parts as "metaphorical")

Every word in the Genesis is correct.

 

[zippy2006]

That is a valid answer to my poorly phrased question, but what I was getting at was: can God create something that is self-reliant for it's own existence?

Ah, I see. No, according to the classical conception he could not do that.

Because if it is contingent on Him continuing to keep me existing...

I just want to point out that the thing to which I asked "Why not?" was that it "can't be right" that "His knowledge of my existence contingent on Him creating me." You seem to have moved away from the topic.

Because if it is contingent on Him continuing to keep me existing, then He is incapable of something, namely, that He is incapable of creating something that does not rely on Him to exist. Which would make Him less than omnipotent, which isn't really the problem posed in this thread, but interesting nonetheless.

The only thing that sustains itself in being is God, who is Being itself. A creature is dependent on God for existence by definition. Therefore the reason God cannot create a creature that does not depend on him for its existence is because it involves a contradiction.

But this was all just to get at the next premise:

God knows that He knows what He knows because He can confirm that He knows it.

Okay. Granted, this is a fairly obscure proposition, but I tentatively accept it.

Of course, God's knowledge of his knowledge is instantaneous and immediate. It is thus not confirmed in the way that humans confirm, by checking over their work or consulting a third party.

Doesn't really matter how He goes about confirming that He knows what He knows, just that He can. If He could not confirm that He knows what He knows, then He wouldn't know He knows what He knows.

Okay.

It probably sounds like I'm being intentionally convoluted, but I'm not. I'm trying to be as specific as I can and as is necessary.

Okay. I'm interested to see the whole argument.

 

[Moral Orel]

Ah, I see. No, according to the classical conception he could not do that.

That's weird. We don't have to go off on another tangent, but after I've laid out the whole argument, I want to get back to this.

Okay. Granted, this is a fairly obscure proposition, but I tentatively accept it.

I said "it doesn't matter how" but to make this clearer I'll define "confirm" for this context as abstractly as I can so as to avoid human context.

God confirms He knows what He knows by distinguishing between an existence in which it is true and an existence in which it is false.

Sound fair and binary? It logically can't be one way and the other.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

Every word in the Genesis is correct.

No, it's not.

 

[juvenissun]

God confirms He knows what He knows by distinguishing between an existence in which it is true and an existence in which it is false.

God does not need to confirm anything about Himself. He is what He is.

 

[zippy2006]

That's weird. We don't have to go off on another tangent, but after I've laid out the whole argument, I want to get back to this.

Some related articles from SEP:

• Creation and Conservation
• Occasionalism

I said "it doesn't matter how" but to make this clearer I'll define "confirm" for this context as abstractly as I can so as to avoid human context.

God confirms He knows what He knows by distinguishing between an existence in which it is true and an existence in which it is false.

Sound fair and binary? It logically can't be one way and the other.

Most of what you say can be objected to on certain grounds, but I have no idea if those objections are even relevant to your larger argument.

For example, you say that God must be able to distinguish whether it is false that he knows that he knows something. That is, God must be able to distinguish the case in which he does not know that he knows something. But such a possibility is incompatible with God's knowledge. God knows everything perfectly and there is nothing that he does not know that he knows.

But does this affect your argument? I don't know, because you haven't presented it. Therefore my tentative answer is yes, God would be able to so distinguish if it were logically possible for him to fail to know that he knows something.

 

[Moral Orel]

Most of what you say can be objected to on certain grounds, but I have no idea if those objections are even relevant to your larger argument.

They're premises. They stand on their own as true or false. You don't need the whole argument to state whether a premise is false or not. You only need the whole argument to state whether the argument is sound or valid.

For example, you say that God must be able to distinguish whether it is false that he knows that he knows something. That is, God must be able to distinguish the case in which he does not know that he knows something. But such a possibility is incompatible with God's knowledge. God knows everything perfectly and there is nothing that he does not know that he knows.

You can offer more of a distinction, maybe, but that sounds an awful lot like you're saying God knows everything because God knows everything. Is that it? Please tell me you have a better refutation of my argument than that.

But I'll finish it and put it all here so we can get to it, because I don't see a good refutation forthcoming.

p1 If God doesn't know something, then He doesn't know that He doesn't know that thing.
p2 God knows that He knows what He knows because He can confirm that He knows what He knows.
p3 God confirms that He knows what He knows by distinguishing between an existence in which something is true, and an existence in which something is false.
p4 An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.

Therefore, working backwards up the list, God can't distinguish between an existence in which He is aware of everything and an existence in which He is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of. So He can't confirm that everything He is aware of is everything that is.

c Therefore, He doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.

Honestly, I don't feel as though I've said anything new since the OP, and nothing I've said required any human context, so I don't see why you made us debate that for a few pages before getting here.

Now the part I found weird, is that you've already demoted God from being omnipotent by explaining that God and His creation work a certain way that He does not have control over. So it is strange, to me, that you would work so hard to defend omniscience after already giving up on omnipotence. So what's the difference if I just say, "God doesn't know how to create things that are separate from Him"?

 

[zippy2006]

They're premises. They stand on their own as true or false. You don't need the whole argument to state whether a premise is false or not. You only need the whole argument to state whether the argument is sound or valid.

Premises can be false in certain ways without invalidating the argument, just like when people orally debate they can make small mistakes in the details which do not affect their argument. Your premises involve fairly complicated ideas and even more complicated grammar structures, so this wouldn't at all be strange in our current context.

You can offer more of a distinction, maybe, but that sounds an awful lot like you're saying God knows everything because God knows everything. Is that it? Please tell me you have a better refutation of my argument than that.

I said he knows everything, not why he does. I've explained why he does in various previous posts: because he is the creator of everything that exists, the sole font of existence.

But I'll finish it and put it all here so we can get to it, because I don't see a good refutation forthcoming.

Great.

p1 If God doesn't know something, then He doesn't know that He doesn't know that thing.
p2 God knows that He knows what He knows because He can confirm that He knows what He knows.
p3 God confirms that He knows what He knows by distinguishing between an existence in which something is true, and an existence in which something is false.
p4 An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.

Therefore, working backwards up the list, God can't distinguish between an existence in which He is aware of everything and an existence in which He is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of. So He can't confirm that everything He is aware of is everything that is.

c Therefore, He doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.

This is a very strange "argument." You give four premises, no inferential reasoning, and a conclusion. How do the premises lead to the conclusion? Are the inferences supposed to be implicit?

Indeed, in your explanation you only reference p4, and it seems that you believe the conclusion follows directly from p4 without any of the other premises (the part I bolded is just another way of phrasing p4). How are the other premises even thought to come into play?

Due to these problems I will give you another opportunity to phrase the argument before I address it. It should be noted that you never justified p4 in our conversation nor did I agree to it, which is strange since your entire conclusion seems to rely solely on p4. As it stands now, p4 is a stark assertion that I never agreed to, and there is no argumentation supporting it. Of course, p4 does seem to imply the conclusion.

Honestly, I don't feel as though I've said anything new since the OP, and nothing I've said required any human context, so I don't see why you made us debate that for a few pages before getting here.

I think you should have presented the argument pages ago, but p2, p3, and p4 are not found in the OP.

Now the part I found weird, is that you've already demoted God from being omnipotent by explaining that God and His creation work a certain way that He does not have control over. So it is strange, to me, that you would work so hard to defend omniscience after already giving up on omnipotence. So what's the difference if I just say, "God doesn't know how to create things that are separate from Him"?

As I've already said, the fact that God cannot accomplish a contradiction does not count against his omnipotence. We can address this after your long-awaited argument is addressed.

 

[Moral Orel]

Due to these problems I will give you another opportunity to phrase the argument before I address it. It should be noted that you never justified p4 in our conversation nor did I agree to it, which is strange since your entire conclusion seems to rely solely on p4. As it stands now, p4 is a stark assertion that I never agreed to, and there is no argumentation supporting it. Of course, p4 does seem to imply the conclusion.

Like I said, no need to build to it anymore since I'm expecting that circular reasoning I mentioned as a response. No, you haven't said as much yet, but your objections thus far seem to be leading to this.

The only extra clarity I think p4 needs is that I need to make special note that it is from God's perspective. Two different existences would be distinguishable if you had the ability to distinguish, and I did imply that they would be indistinguishable to anyone, and that would be incorrect. I could rewrite the whole thing to be a generic "observer" as well, but it's fine the way it is too. So here is the slightly modified p4:

To any given observer, an existence in which they are aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which they are aware of everything they are capable of being aware of.

As I've already said, the fact that God cannot accomplish a contradiction does not count against his omnipotence. We can address this after your long-awaited argument is addressed.

See, now this is why I'm expecting a circular answer to my argument. You seem to be conflating a contradiction of a person's nature with a logical contradiction. I'll give it to you that if God can't do the logically impossible (square circles and all that) then He can still be omnipotent. But a contradiction to the way He works, that is not logically impossible, does not mean it is actually impossible.

Here's a metaphor. I have a regular old 2001 Ford Taurus. No modifications. It is a contradiction of how my car works to drive on three wheels. It simply isn't the nature of my car. It is not logically impossible to have a three wheeled car. I could even install hydraulics in my car to enable it to drive on three wheels.

The nature of God and existence, as you've seemed to describe it, is that existing things rely on God to continue to exist, and God must continue to maintain their existence. That's fine, if that's how you think God works. But it is not logically impossible for a god to exist that does not work that way. So the contradiction of how He works does not qualify as a logical contradiction and does mean that He is less than omnipotent because a logically possible ability exists that He does not have.

 

[zippy2006]

The only extra clarity...

So are you dropping p1, p2, and p3 from your argument since they perform no role in your claim that p4 implies the conclusion? And are you unwilling to give any argumentation in favor of p4?

Also, I think your argument is technically invalid, but could be corrected. Here is the argument you are implicitly giving:

p4: An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.
p5: If p4, then God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.
Conclusion: Therefore God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.​

I believe p4 but I don't think it implies the conclusion. Consider my own beliefs: 1) God is aware of everything, 2) God is aware of everything he is capable of being aware of, which is everything, 3) Since God is capable of being aware of everything, the existence in which God is aware of everything is identical (and therefore indistinguishable) from the existence in which God is aware of everything he is capable of being aware of, 4) God knows the two existences to be identical. When God knows the two existences to be identical the conclusion doesn't follow.

Consider the form of your argument, with meta-premises representing the premises above:

mp4: God cannot distinguish scenario A from scenario B.
mp5: If mp4, then God does not know that he is in scenario A rather than scenario B.
Conclusion: Therefore God does not know that he is in scenario A rather than scenario B.​

The problem is that it is possible that scenario A = scenario B and God knows this to be the case. Thus the reason God cannot distinguish them is because they are identical. This is precisely what orthodox Christianity maintains, that God is capable of being aware of everything. Your argument therefore requires an additional premise:

mp4: God cannot distinguish scenario A from scenario B.
mp6: Scenario A is different from scenario B.
mp5: If mp4 & mp6, then God does not know that he is in scenario A rather than scenario B.
Conclusion: Therefore God does not know that he is in scenario A rather than scenario B.​

Your original argument thus requires an altered p4:

ap4: An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is not aware of everything but is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.
p5: If ap4, then God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.
Conclusion: Therefore God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.​

This brings us to a valid argument, yet the fundamental problem remains: you have given us no reason to believe ap4. You spent pages putting forward p1, p2, and p3, and then threw them all out and gave an argument based on an entirely new premise, p4.

 

[Moral Orel]

Your original argument thus requires an altered p4:

ap4: An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is not aware of everything but is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.
p5: If ap4, then God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.
Conclusion: Therefore God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.
This brings us to a valid argument, yet the fundamental problem remains: you have given us no reason to believe ap4.

First, thank you for all that. You're a lot better at formulating a formal argument than I am. I still feel that the other premises help to build to p4 which helps to understand the thing as a whole, even if they aren't technically necessary. Especially since the conclusion points right back to p1.

That quoted finished product is what I have been trying to get at in my own clumsy way, but your objection doesn't make sense to me. ap4 doesn't require the second existence mentioned to be anything but hypothetical, and it is still true.

If they were distinguishable from each other, to God, then that distinction would make God aware of the thing that He didn't know. Since He would be incapable of making that distinction, the two scenarios are, in fact, from His perspective, indistinguishable.

It all comes down to the question, "How does God know that He knows everything?" You're saying that's how he's defined, but how does He know that definition is correct? He can't confirm it (p2, p3).

 

[zippy2006]

First, thank you for all that. You're a lot better at formulating a formal argument than I am. I still feel that the other premises help to build to p4 which helps to understand the thing as a whole, even if they aren't technically necessary. Especially since the conclusion points right back to p1.

Perhaps p1 does come into it--since you didn't reference it in your explanation I didn't think you were using it. But moving from the antecedent to the consequent of p1 isn't necessary if you are trying to disprove omnipotence or omniscience, since the conclusion that God doesn't know something is sufficient. If God doesn't know something then it's true that he doesn't know he doesn't know something, but the simple fact that he doesn't know something disproves omniscience.

That quoted finished product is what I have been trying to get at in my own clumsy way, but your objection doesn't make sense to me. ap4 doesn't require the second existence mentioned to be anything but hypothetical, and it is still true.

If they were distinguishable from each other, to God, then that distinction would make God aware of the thing that He didn't know. Since He would be incapable of making that distinction, the two scenarios are, in fact, from His perspective, indistinguishable.

The only objection I have raised is that you have not provided any justification for ap4. The second existence in ap4 need not be actual for ap4 to be true, but I still don't see any reason to believe ap4 is true.

Now I'll address your last post in more detail:

The only extra clarity I think p4 needs is that I need to make special note that it is from God's perspective. Two different existences would be distinguishable if you had the ability to distinguish, and I did imply that they would be indistinguishable to anyone, and that would be incorrect. I could rewrite the whole thing to be a generic "observer" as well, but it's fine the way it is too. So here is the slightly modified p4:

To any given observer, an existence in which they are aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which they are aware of everything they are capable of being aware of.

Okay, I will stick to your original formulation but alter it in the way noted here:

ap4: An existence in which God is aware of everything is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is not aware of everything but is aware of everything He is capable of being aware of.
p5: If ap4, then God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.
Conclusion: Therefore God doesn't know that there isn't something that He doesn't know.​

I deny ap4. There are at least two reasons.

First and most importantly, because you give no reason to believe ap4. You've provided no argumentation in favor of it, and it is far from self-evident.

Secondly, we would say that one is able to distinguish two possibilities if they know that one is true and the other false. But God knows that the first possibility is true and the second false, therefore he is able to distinguish them. How does he know this? God, knowing himself perfectly, knows that he is the sole source of existence, and thus knows that anything which exists outside of him exists only because it is created and sustained in being by him. Thus there is nothing that God is not aware of, for God is not unaware of that which he created, and he created all that exists.

It seems that you have committed the error of misunderstanding what God is. Your argument implicitly denies that God is the creator of everything that exists, which runs contrary to basic theism. You may have proved that some god is not omnipotent, but it certainly isn't the God of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and the philosophers.

As an aside, I think it is worth pointing out that when you attempt to give an argument disproving God's omniscience you are attempting to show that the common conception of God is incompatible with omniscience. (In this case you are trying to show that omniscience is impossible.) My duty is not a philosophical demonstration that God exists as classically conceived. Rather, I have the duty of showing that the classical conception of God is compatible with omniscience, namely by finding some fault in your argument. It is true that I have provided some philosophical arguments for certain attributes of God, but it is not necessary for me to demonstrate the classical conception rather than defend its coherence.

For example, your argument implicitly asserts that God is not the creator of everything, or at least that he doesn't know he is. Thus if the premises of such an argument have no rational justification in their favor, the argument fails insofar as it is blatantly contrary to the general understanding of God as creator. Without justification, the argument is just an assertion against God as creator rather than a reason to believe that God either didn't create everything or doesn't know that he created everything. And an assertion has no force against the commonly accepted definition of God.

It all comes down to the question, "How does God know that He knows everything?" You're saying that's how he's defined, but how does He know that definition is correct? He can't confirm it (p2, p3).

God knows what he is, and he is being/existence itself, ipsum esse subsistens. He is the sole cause/source of being through which everything else exists. He is the creator.

The reason there cannot be two Gods is because there would be no way to differentiate two perfect beings. For example, they are not composed of matter, they have no constitutive parts, they have infinite power, they have perfect knowledge, etc. The only way they could be differentiated is if one had an imperfection, but then that one would not be God. Furthermore, to be ipsum esse subsistens--one that can create ex nihilo as a true source of existence--is to be perfect ("fully actualized") and therefore to be God. Nothing but God can create ex nihilo and sustain entities in existence.

See, now this is why I'm expecting a circular answer to my argument. You seem to be conflating a contradiction of a person's nature with a logical contradiction. I'll give it to you that if God can't do the logically impossible (square circles and all that) then He can still be omnipotent.

The reason that God cannot create a square circle is because of the nature of squares and circles. The reason God cannot create a non-rational man is because of the nature of man. The reason God cannot create a creature that does not depend on him for being is because of the nature of creatures.

Here's a metaphor. I have a regular old 2001 Ford Taurus. No modifications. It is a contradiction of how my car works to drive on three wheels. It simply isn't the nature of my car. It is not logically impossible to have a three wheeled car. I could even install hydraulics in my car to enable it to drive on three wheels.

It would be a contradiction to say that your car could at the same time be a nuclear submarine, for cars travel on ground and run on gasoline or diesel fuel, and nuclear submarines travel underwater and run on nuclear energy. The natures of cars and nuclear submarines are incompatible. There is no reason to believe three wheels contradicts the nature of a car any more than to believe that three legs contradicts the nature of a dog.

(Admittedly, cars and submarines are artifacts and thus do not have an intrinsic nature, but the basic argument still holds)

The nature of God and existence, as you've seemed to describe it, is that existing things rely on God to continue to exist, and God must continue to maintain their existence. That's fine, if that's how you think God works. But it is not logically impossible for a god to exist that does not work that way.

It is logically impossible. Creatures are not sufficient unto themselves for their existence. Their essence is distinct from their existence. There is nothing in the nature of creatures that causes their own existence. If there were, they would neither come into existence nor cease to exist. Contingency belongs to the nature of creatures.

(St. Thomas writes on the question, giving the standard answer.)

 

[Moral Orel]

As an aside, I think it is worth pointing out that when you attempt to give an argument disproving God's omniscience you are attempting to show that the common conception of God is incompatible with omniscience.

Then you misunderstand me. I set out to prove there is an unknowable thing. If there is an unknowable thing, then there is no conception of God that can be omniscient. As predicted, your answer boils down to exactly what I expected:

Secondly, we would say that one is able to distinguish two possibilities if they know that one is true and the other false. But God knows that the first possibility is true and the second false, therefore he is able to distinguish them. How does he know this? God, knowing himself perfectly, knows that he is the sole source of existence, and thus knows that anything which exists outside of him exists only because it is created and sustained in being by him. Thus there is nothing that God is not aware of, for God is not unaware of that which he created, and he created all that exists.

The only way for God to distinguish between those two existences is if God is omniscient. So your answer is no better than, "God is omniscient because He is omniscient". Let's rephrase p4, just for a moment, just as a response to this paragraph:

An existence in which God is the creator of everything that exists is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is not the creator of everything that exists but is the creator of everything He is capable of being aware of.​

Again, totally true, and the only way to distinguish between these two existences is if God is omniscient. So, again, your answer is no better than, "God knows He created everything because He knows He created everything".

By trying to define the problem away, you've answered with circular reasoning. I find that response insufficient and lacking.

I think this is the extent our conversation on this can go. You and I have been at this for pages, and your answer isn't any better than anyone else's. I do appreciate you cleaning things up and making my formal argument much more presentable. So I'll let you have the last word on this. I wanted to mention this so that you don't think my lack of a response is out of rudeness or anger. We'll find something to bicker over in the near future, I'm sure.

 

[zippy2006]

The only way for God to distinguish between those two existences is if God is omniscient. So your answer is no better than, "God is omniscient because He is omniscient".

1. God can distinguish because he is the creator, not because he is omniscient. Those are different reasons. My point is that his omniscience flows from the fact that he is the creator.

2. "God is creator," and "God is omniscient" are not at all problematic assertions. They are part of the millenia-old patrimony of Christianity and classical theism. The burden of proof is on you to disprove them, not on me to prove them. Thus far you have given no argumentation for p4, which therefore effectively amounts to something like "God is not omniscient because God is not omniscient." I have no reason to believe p4, and thus no reason to abandon classical theism.

Let's rephrase p4, just for a moment, just as a response to this paragraph:

An existence in which God is the creator of everything that exists is indistinguishable from an existence in which God is not the creator of everything that exists but is the creator of everything He is capable of being aware of.​

Again, totally true,

Saying "totally true" of an unsupported claim that contradicts basic Christian doctrines such as creation and omniscience is doing nothing more than begging the question. In fact it's "totally false" for anyone who believes that God knows he is creator, which is every traditional theist. What reason do we have in favor of God not being able to distinguish? What reason do we have to believe that God does not know he is the sole creator? What reason do we have to believe that God is only capable of being aware of a subset of the things that exist?

You can look at it like this:

• If p4, then God is not omniscient.
• If God is (sole) creator, then God is omniscient.

We must ask ourselves whether we have more reason to believe p4 or the idea that God is creator. We have no reasons in favor of p4, and we have Christian and philosophical tradition in favor of God being creator. (I also alluded to the essence/existence argument, but we can ignore that for now.) Depending on the weight you give arguments from authority, tradition may be a stronger or weaker reason, but it is a reason, which is more than we can say for p4.

and the only way to distinguish between these two existences is if God is omniscient. So, again, your answer is no better than, "God knows He created everything because He knows He created everything".

By trying to define the problem away, you've answered with circular reasoning. I find that response insufficient and lacking.

Saying that God can differentiate your two scenarios because he knows that he is the creator is not circular reasoning. To say otherwise is to utter a demonstrable falsity.

I've given a good reason to believe God can differentiate your two scenarios. Must I also give a reason he is creator? When will it end? Am I to give a full demonstration of classical theism? Because you asserted a premise? Is the assertion of p4 thought to override the traditional doctrines of omniscience and creation? Certainly not! In order for this conversation to move forward you would have to give an argument against God being the creator and ideally at least one argument in favor of p4.

I think this is the extent our conversation on this can go. You and I have been at this for pages, and your answer isn't any better than anyone else's. I do appreciate you cleaning things up and making my formal argument much more presentable. So I'll let you have the last word on this. I wanted to mention this so that you don't think my lack of a response is out of rudeness or anger. We'll find something to bicker over in the near future, I'm sure.

You've given no reason to believe p4, and that is the basic problem. Add this to the fact that the traditional theist has good reasons to deny p4 and the case becomes easy. Why would anyone think that omniscience is undermined by a highly controversial and unsupported premise?

Have a good Easter.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

"God is creator," and "God is omniscient" are not at all problematic assertions. They are part of the millenia-old patrimony of Christianity and classical theism. The burden of proof is on you to disprove them, not on me to prove them.

If there is a claim "God is omniscient", then the burden of proof is on the claimant. The length of time the claim has been around is immaterial to that.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

The thread is based on a non-Christian attempt to disprove omniscience, not a Christian attempt to prove omniscience. Therefore the burden of proof is on the non-Christian who wrote the Original Post.

I don't expect you to understand this, and I am not going to argue with you. It is obvious to me and to the OP and that's all that matters. For someone who goes about attempting to dispute 13 commonsensical propositions, this response is more than you deserve.

Good luck with your "reasoning" in the future.

So you're saying that there isn't a claim that "God is omniscient"?

 

[Moral Orel]

So you're saying that there isn't a claim that "God is omniscient"?

He's actually right about the burden of proof in this thread. I made the claim that omniscience is impossible; I have the burden of proof. I found his response lacking, but I told him I would let him have the last word, so I'll leave it at that. I don't feel he refuted my claim, but he doesn't need to prove God is omniscient. All he needs to do is disprove my claim that: "it is impossible to be omniscient".

I saw the burden of proof thread go down in flames. I'll own when I make a claim and have the burden of proof. This thread is an example of the claims that atheists do make. In general, we don't say: "God is proven not to exist", that would be silly. But we do, and quite often, say: "God can't be what you think He is". The burden is on us, and rightfully so. If only that were enough for some Christians, but many have to make the straw man that we claim to have disproven God...

 

[Chriliman]

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[Chriliman]

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