Theodicy

[Resha Caner]

God knows everything necessary for accomplishing His will

Maybe the other theodicy discussion was too far along to get comments on the above statement, so I thought I'd start a fresh thread.

A) For those who take a strong view in theodicy, would you still agree the above statement is true? By "strong" I mean that for virtually any question in the form of "Does God know x?", you would answer yes.

B) For those who claim the strong view produces a logical contradiction, would you agree the above statement does not suffer those same contradictions?

- - -

Just to avoid being accused of information hiding, my next question to those in category A) would be: If you agree the statement is true, what theological consideration leads you to maintain the strong form? For those in category B): Does agreeing that the statement is possible change the theodicy conversation for you?

 

[Ana the Ist]

B. I'd say "no"...it doesn't appear to create any logical contradictions. I would guess that's because "god's will" is, at this point in the conversation, vague and undefined.

For your follow-up question...no, it doesn't. Once we get into a practical discussion of what is meant by "god's will" I'll wager all the logical problems will come flooding back in.

 

[Resha Caner]

Once we get into a practical discussion of what is meant by "god's will" I'll wager all the logical problems will come flooding back in.

For example?

 

[Paradoxum]

I'm not sure I understand the question.

What difference does omniscience make to the problem of evil?

(Bear in mind, I wouldn't assume a God exists, or that the God knows or cares what is moral).

 

[juvenissun]

God knows everything necessary for accomplishing His will

Maybe the other theodicy discussion was too far along to get comments on the above statement, so I thought I'd start a fresh thread.

A) For those who take a strong view in theodicy, would you still agree the above statement is true? By "strong" I mean that for virtually any question in the form of "Does God know x?", you would answer yes.

B) For those who claim the strong view produces a logical contradiction, would you agree the above statement does not suffer those same contradictions?

- - -

Just to avoid being accused of information hiding, my next question to those in category A) would be: If you agree the statement is true, what theological consideration leads you to maintain the strong form? For those in category B): Does agreeing that the statement is possible change the theodicy conversation for you?

For part A, I say yes. Reason: That is a nature defines God. Without this nature, the being is not God.

For part B, since the nature in A is a definition, so whatever consequence it leads to will not cause any contradiction.

 

[Resha Caner]

What difference does omniscience make to the problem of evil?

If God doesn't know everything, he can't know all the possible implications of his creation, and therefore can't be held responsible for the evil abuses of those who use it in ways he did not intend (or foresee).

If God doesn't know everything, he can't use his power to prevent all the evil that might occur in the future.

As it happens, I don't subscribe to all the "omni" words people use when speaking of God, so I'm only noting the arguments other people have used to connect omniscience to the problem of evil.

 

[Resha Caner]

Without this nature, the being is not God.

Why?

 

[Paradoxum]

If God doesn't know everything, he can't know all the possible implications of his creation, and therefore can't be held responsible for the evil abuses of those who use it in ways he did not intend (or foresee).

If God doesn't know everything, he can't use his power to prevent all the evil that might occur in the future.

As it happens, I don't subscribe to all the "omni" words people use when speaking of God, so I'm only noting the arguments other people have used to connect omniscience to the problem of evil.

The a main point of the 'problem of evil' is that God is supposed to be omniscient. Why are we talking about God not knowing some things?

Again, I don't get what your point is.

 

[Resha Caner]

The a main point of the 'problem of evil' is that God is supposed to be omniscient. Why are we talking about God not knowing some things?

Again, I don't get what your point is.

Oi.

 

[juvenissun]

Why?

If a god has something he does not know, then there must be at least one more god who knows it. Then there will be two gods. The theology of two gods would be very awkward. It would be better to have many gods.

If a god has something he does not know and nobody else knows it, then we do not need that god. We should focus on the discovery of that unknown. Once we know it, then we are better than god.

Either of the above situations would lead to a terrible theology.

 

[Resha Caner]

Either of the above situations would lead to a terrible theology.

I don't think those are the only possibilities.

 

[juvenissun]

I don't think those are the only possibilities.

1. One God,
2. A few gods, or
3. Many gods.

I don't think there is a situation more than the above. Among the three, the most difficult theology should be the second one.

If there were 2 gods, then who should, or would know what? Who is responsible for what?

 

[Resha Caner]

1. One God,
2. A few gods, or
3. Many gods.

I don't think there is a situation more than the above. Among the three, the most difficult theology should be the second one.

I wasn't referring to the number of gods. Truth is, when Lutherans use the word as a descriptor, there are many gods, and the Bible refers to many gods. If, however, you're using God as a name to refer to Yahweh, the creator, then there is only one god - the god with maximal power. In that sense, I think it's illogical to think of more than one god.

But I was referring to ways of knowing. If it is a logical absurdity for God to know something, then he doesn't know it and that in no way subtracts from his maximal power. As the statement says, he still knows everything necessary to accomplish his will.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

The a main point of the 'problem of evil' is that God is supposed to be omniscient. Why are we talking about God not knowing some things?

Again, I don't get what your point is.

Para,

I think they are talking about these things because...well, they can; philosophy affords that kind of alternative questioning. God could be ontologically other than how we have thus far conceived of Him (or Her, It, etc.), and it may be useful to explore those possibilities.

 

[juvenissun]

I wasn't referring to the number of gods. Truth is, when Lutherans use the word as a descriptor, there are many gods, and the Bible refers to many gods. If, however, you're using God as a name to refer to Yahweh, the creator, then there is only one god - the god with maximal power. In that sense, I think it's illogical to think of more than one god.

But I was referring to ways of knowing. If it is a logical absurdity for God to know something, then he doesn't know it and that in no way subtracts from his maximal power. As the statement says, he still knows everything necessary to accomplish his will.

If so, you let logic limits the God. Which is a very poor theology.
If so, I do not need that god. I would only try to master the logic. And I don't care what that god can accomplish. He can not be beat logic. That is a pretty powerless god.

Logic is a gift to us (humans) from God. God is beyond logic.

 

[juvenissun]

The a main point of the 'problem of evil' is that God is supposed to be omniscient. Why are we talking about God not knowing some things?

Again, I don't get what your point is.

That is a VERY SERIOUS assumption. Only the Christian God is assigned that property. With that property, logically, there would be no other equivalent god.

 

[Resha Caner]

If so, you let logic limits the God. Which is a very poor theology.
If so, I do not need that god. I would only try to master the logic. And I don't care what that god can accomplish. He can not be beat logic. That is a pretty powerless god.

I disagree. My God is not a god of chaos (1 Corinthians 14:33).

It's not that God is limited by logic, but that he created logic and is self-consistent. In order to be self-consistent, he restrains himself:
Numbers 14:18
Isaiah 48:9
Psalm 8:5

It's not that God is illogical, but that he is sometimes beyond our understanding:
Job 36:26
Ecclesiastes 3:11
Psalm 92:5-6

 

[Paradoxum]

Para,

I think they are talking about these things because...well, they can; philosophy affords that kind of alternative questioning. God could be ontologically other than how we have thus far conceived of Him (or Her, It, etc.), and it may be useful to explore those possibilities.

I know what philosophy is... I'm asking what point is being made here.

I wasn't asking why anyone would ever ask hypothetical abstract questions.

That is a VERY SERIOUS assumption. Only the Christian God is assigned that property. With that property, logically, there would be no other equivalent god.

Ok... but what point is being made? I don't know what this thread is about.

 

[Crandaddy]

A) For those who take a strong view in theodicy, would you still agree the above statement is true? By "strong" I mean that for virtually any question in the form of "Does God know x?", you would answer yes.

B) For those who claim the strong view produces a logical contradiction, would you agree the above statement does not suffer those same contradictions?

While I don't see any logical contradiction in the strong view, I think I'd reject it because I don't think God has (at least certain kinds of) indexical knowledge -- though not for any theodical reasons, but because of who and what God is. Also, FWIW, I don't think God's knowledge is propositional, nor do I think that God actually thinks -- again, for the same non-theodical reasons. I guess I don't quite fit into either camp, then.

As for God's allowance of the horrendous evil we see in the world, I agree that it's extremely difficult -- ultimately impossible, really -- for us to grasp the meaning behind it, but I really don't see it as any intimidating obstacle for at least certain types of theistic belief.

 

[Resha Caner]

... I don't think God has (at least certain kinds of) indexical knowledge ... I don't think God's knowledge is propositional, nor do I think that God actually thinks.

Would you care to elaborate? What is "indexical knowledge" and why do you think God doesn't have it? What is "propositional knowledge" and why doesn't he have that? Why doesn't God think?