I'm basing my counterargument on Cornelius Van Til's presentation. Moreover, in this OP, I will be going off one form of his presentation. So, in a few short steps...
Now, this argument is not strictly deductively valid, but it is valid as long as you are logical enough to fill in the word-gaps on your own. So anyway, my essential objection is to [1]. As I see it, if [1] were true, then the concept of a final point of reference would itself turn out to be the final point of reference as such, which contradicts the conclusion of the argument. It's rather like how Van Til doesn't accept the disquotational scheme for the truth predicate, which is:
*[You might wonder where on Earth he says this. Albeit I have only read A Christian Theory of Knowledge and The Defense of the Faith, yet I do know a passage in the first of those listed books, in which Van Til defines his notion of truth in itself, based on a rejection of the principle behind the disquotational scheme.]
- 1. Every belief system must have a final point of reference.
- 2. There are only two prima facie possible final points of reference, our reason or God's reason.
- If our reason was the true final point of reference for our belief system, nothing would ultimately mean anything.
- Therefore, God's reason/God is the final point of reference for our ability to have a belief system.
Now, this argument is not strictly deductively valid, but it is valid as long as you are logical enough to fill in the word-gaps on your own. So anyway, my essential objection is to [1]. As I see it, if [1] were true, then the concept of a final point of reference would itself turn out to be the final point of reference as such, which contradicts the conclusion of the argument. It's rather like how Van Til doesn't accept the disquotational scheme for the truth predicate, which is:
"S is P," is true if and only if S is P.
But Van Til thinks that "S is P" is true if and only if God decides it's true, not just in particular but even in the abstract.* (Van Til is rather inimical to the notion of "abstract possibility," at least conceived of as a freestanding "thing." Yet I think he could accept the saying that God is the concrete AND abstract cause of all truth.) However, by basing his argument for God on a prior notion of a final point of reference as such, he accidentally proves that God would not be that kind of final point of reference, as such, so that we might as well just jettison the notion of such reference-points and profess our faith in God some other, better way.
*[You might wonder where on Earth he says this. Albeit I have only read A Christian Theory of Knowledge and The Defense of the Faith, yet I do know a passage in the first of those listed books, in which Van Til defines his notion of truth in itself, based on a rejection of the principle behind the disquotational scheme.]