Inductive reasoning is used in science to form theories and hypothesis which can then make predictions and be tested. Since ID to date, is not falsifiable and has no clear definition we can't even get to this point of hypothesis and certainly no scientific theory, which Michael Behe had to admit during the Dover trial while under oath.
Okay, how about String Theory?
I think your blanket statement about falsifiability and what is Science is not quite as cut-and-dry as you would like to think.
Consider these thoughts related to fine-tuning, String Theory, and falsifiability from a recent article that I will provide the link for below:
This [fine-tuning] is called the “anthropic principle,” and if you think it feels like a cosmic punt, you’re not alone. Researchers have been trying to underpin our apparent stroke of luck with hard science for decades. String theory suggests a solution: It predicts that our universe is just one among a multitude of universes, each with its own fundamental constants. If the cosmic lottery has played out billions of times, it isn’t so remarkable that the winning numbers for life should come up at least once.
In fact, you can reason your way to the “multiverse” in at least four different ways, according to MIT physicist Max Tegmark’s accounting. The tricky part is testing the idea. You can’t send or receive messages from neighboring universes, and most formulations of multiverse theory don’t make any testable predictions. Yet the theory provides a neat solution to the fine-tuning problem. Must we throw it out because it fails the falsifiability test?
"It would be completely non-scientific to ignore that possibility just because it doesn’t conform with some preexisting philosophical prejudices,” says Sean Carroll, a physicist at Caltech, who called for the “retirement” of the falsifiability principle in a controversial essay for Edge last year. Falsifiability is “just a simple motto that non-philosophically-trained scientists have latched onto,” argues Carroll.
Maybe String theory could be used to argue against this teleological argument. Oh, but darn, it fails to qualify as "scientific".
Although such scientists are right to warn against abandoning the importance of falsifiability, the notion you suggest of making it a requirement for deeming a discussion like ours scientific they see as equally wrong and ultimately too simplistic for the needs of real truth seekers.
Perhaps “falsifiability” isn’t up to shouldering the full scientific and philosophical burden that’s been placed on it. “Sean is right that ‘falsifiability’ is a crude slogan that fails to capture what science really aims at,” argues MIT computer scientist Scott Aaronson, writing on his blog Shtetl Optimized.
Carroll argues that he is simply calling for greater openness and honesty about the way science really happens. “I think that it’s more important than ever that scientists tell the truth. And the truth is that in practice, falsifiability is not a good criterion for telling science from non-science,” he says.
Clearly there is too much to be gained by looking for the
reasonability in what could turn out to be strong evidence favoring a concept that we don't know yet how to falsify.
“I think falsifiability is not a perfect criterion, but it’s much less pernicious than what’s being served up by the ‘post-empirical’ faction,” says Frank Wilczek, a physicist at MIT. “Falsifiability is too impatient, in some sense,” putting immediate demands on theories that are not yet mature enough to meet them. “It’s an important discipline, but if it is applied too rigorously and too early, it can be stifling.
See
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2015/02/falsifiability/
And what about sciences that often seek a similar kind of knowledge of authorship where direct evidence proving who is the real author is almost equally inaccessible. What about Archaeology, where a scientist attempts to attribute some scrolls or carvings to a particular person or civilization and in a particular time period? Or Musicology, where the same might be done to determine who composed a piece newly found in someone's attic but written hundreds of years ago? How would their theories about authorship be falsified scientifically, since even a living person could sit down and scribble something similar before our eyes and claim he is the author ... yet still be lying? The archaeologist may have lots of evidence in terms of elements of style, design, process, ... the location and geology around his find, etc., and all of it may point to a rational conclusion about what civilization likely authored it ... but there is no way to conclusively falsify his claim without somehow falsifying his evidence (which could be done with ID as well).
Are those no longer Science either?
With some careful thought and cooperation, I don't see why it would be impossible to come to a reasonable agreement on what constitutes design, even if we primarily use what we know about neurological processes and studies of cognitive functions during what we call the "creative process". Those processes have results. And those results differ from what we see when no attempt to create or organize is being made (e.g., destructive forces). Like the archaeologist, one can use clues ... the tracks in the sand, so to speak, which give rise to a clear, rational conclusion about the thing that caused the tracks. Design causes tracks. Design must mean something, and have a definition. Between these things, I see no reason why a similar kind of proof using empirical evidence and inductive reasoning as the archaeologist might use cannot also be used to show ID.
Finally, with all this weight you are trying to put on science, don't forget that the final goal is always to move ourselves away from the lesser rational or reasonable beliefs, and onto the more rational ones ... falsifiable or not. Certainly, in any case we have to define what the heck we are talking about, whether that is a "designed universe" or a universe that "organized itself" (whatever that means). But with regard to theories about things that happened in the past as opposed to theories about "the way things work now", almost always you are going to have a lot of room for doubt, some difficulty proving or falsifying what happened. So we are primarily interested in stacking the evidence and aligning our "faith" in a theory with whatever is holding the greatest probability based on that evidence.
In my view the more science digs deep and finds greater complexity and intricacy in the universe (even as it also finds some simplicity and elegance), the evidence stacks in favor of an intelligence much greater than ours as its author. And let's not be too quick to discount the validity of inductive reasoning towards that effort. As one writer puts it on a web site dedicated to your own point of view concerning God:
It may seem that inductive arguments are weaker than deductive arguments because there must always remain the possibility of their arriving at false conclusions, but that is not entirely true. With deductive arguments, our conclusions are already contained, even if implicitly, in our premises. This means that we don't arrive at new information - at best, we are shown information which was obscured or unrecognized previously. Thus, the sure truth-preserving nature of deductive arguments comes at a cost.
Inductive arguments, on the other hand, do provide us with new ideas and thus may expand our knowledge about the world in a way that is impossible for deductive arguments to achieve. Thus, while deductive arguments may be used most often with mathematics, most other fields of research make extensive use of inductive arguments.
See
http://atheism.about.com/od/criticalthinking/a/deductivearg.htm
