The Teleological Argument (p4)

[KCfromNC]

Dude, not only is this a pointless and snarky remark, it shows you're not even paying attention.

Considering that the OPs own experts contradict him on this point, "just making up nonsense to lead to a pre-deteremined outcome" seems like a reasonable guess about the process at work.

If setting the constants is impossible, then physical necessity is an option, and according to his teleological argument, then he wouldn't be able to rule it out and claim that it is due to design. Please don't waste our time and forum space like this.

LOL

 

[Arythmael]

Can you provide a definition of what design is, that is workable?

Can you provide a test to determine when design is present, that is falsifiable?

These are good questions, and important ones. But very involved to answer. I might be able to provide a starting point and whoever wants to try to refine it or challenge could do so.

But I think we will need to first decide what kind of proof we are looking for. I think it is possible to find elements of design, that is, attributes that something is likely to show when it has been designed. But this would be an argument from induction. I'm not so sure it is possible to argue from deductive inference such that based on some particular observation or set of observations there is some predefined rule that forces the conclusion that it must have been designed (apart from eliminating other options, like this topic post attempts to do). Our conclusion would be the most reasonable one, based on inductive evidence.

I'm betting there is also a philosophical argument that can be made which shows why you cannot prove design with deduction -- somewhat like Alan Turning showed that arriving at an algorithm to solve the Halting Problem in computer programming is impossible. But that is probably an exercise for someone with more time than me.

 

[bhsmte]

These are good questions, and important ones. But very involved to answer. I might be able to provide a starting point and whoever wants to try to refine it or challenge could do so.

But I think we will need to first decide what kind of proof we are looking for. I think it is possible to find elements of design, that is, attributes that something is likely to show when it has been designed. But this would be an argument from induction. I'm not so sure it is possible to argue from deductive inference such that based on some particular observation or set of observations there is some predefined rule that forces the conclusion that it must have been designed (apart from eliminating other options, like this topic post attempts to do). Our conclusion would be the most reasonable one, based on inductive evidence.

I'm betting there is also a philosophical argument that can be made which shows why you cannot prove design with deduction -- somewhat like Alan Turning showed that arriving at an algorithm to solve the Halting Problem in computer programming is impossible. But that is probably an exercise for someone with more time than me.

You do realize, the handful of Phd scientists that are design proponents, have despite years of attempts, have failed to come up with a scientific definition of what design is in the human body and any type of reliable test to determine if it is present, which is falsifiable.

At this point, design and or intelligent design beliefs, are faith beliefs and are not scientific.

 

[KCfromNC]

In this case, I'm basing it on the presumption that whatever complexity something has, any system that contains that thing plus any identifiable complexity at all in addition to that thing must be at least as complex as the thing itself.

Why presume that? Simple processes here on earth create complex structures all the time.

 

[paulm50]

No, you can't use induction to prove that because we don't have examples of things creating other things that are as complex or more complex than themselves.

It's called evolution. Or childbirth. Think it through.

As for a designer, did he design all these trying to get it right?
Homo gautengensis
Homo rudolfensis
Homo habilis
Homo floresiensis
Homo erectus
Homo ergaster
Homo antecessor
Homo heidelbergensis
Homo cepranensis
Homo helmei
Homo palaeojavanicus
Homo tsaichangensis
Homo neanderthalensis
Homo rhodesiensis
Homo sapiens

 

[Belk]

In this case, I'm basing it on the presumption that whatever complexity something has, any system that contains that thing plus any identifiable complexity at all in addition to that thing must be at least as complex as the thing itself.

So you have no measurement and are simply stating your opinion?

 

[Arythmael]

You do realize, the handful of Phd scientists that are design proponents, have despite years of attempts, have failed to come up with a scientific definition of what design is in the human body and any type of reliable test to determine if it is present, which is falsifiable.

At this point, design and or intelligent design beliefs, are faith beliefs and are not scientific.

So which is it: either science does not use inductive reasoning, or we cannot prove design with inductive reasoning. Because if both are false, then we can prove design scientifically.

 

[Arythmael]

So you have no measurement and are simply stating your opinion?

No, my response shows that I do not need specific measurement, but yes, I am putting forth my opinion as any other claim. If you can prove that my basis is actually wrong or that it cannot be applied then do it.

 

[bhsmte]

So which is it: either science does not use inductive reasoning, or we cannot prove design with inductive reasoning. Because if both are false, then we can prove design scientifically.

Inductive reasoning is used in science to form theories and hypothesis which can then make predictions and be tested. Since ID to date, is not falsifiable and has no clear definition we can't even get to this point of hypothesis and certainly no scientific theory, which Michael Behe had to admit during the Dover trial while under oath.

 

[Arythmael]

Inductive reasoning is used in science to form theories and hypothesis which can then make predictions and be tested. Since ID to date, is not falsifiable and has no clear definition we can't even get to this point of hypothesis and certainly no scientific theory, which Michael Behe had to admit during the Dover trial while under oath.

Very interesting. Tell me, is evolution falsifiable? If so, how?

 

[Joshua260]

So for the "the nature of the universe" there are more or different options than "due to chance, natural necessity or design" while for the "fine-tuning of the universe"?
That´s interesting. Which options would that be, for example?

What I as saying is that which one or more of those is in p3 and p4 depends on the analysis. I don't see any more than the three options to work with. If you can think of any feel free to suggest them.

 

[bhsmte]

Very interesting. Tell me, is evolution falsifiable? If so, how?

Sure, you look at what the theory predicts and you go from there. Here is a short list of what would falsify evolution:

-If it could be shown that mutations do not occur
-If it could be shown that organisms with identical DNA have different genetic traits
-If it could be shown, then when mutations do occur, they are not passed down through the generations
-If it could be shown that although mutations are passed down, no mutation could produce the sort of phenotypic changes that drive natural selection

 

[Joshua260]

Okay. Although I am tempted to argue the way you are slicing and dicing some of the semantics here, I think it is more beneficial to move on with your own last summary.

Given your own restatement of the physical necessity option, is this suggesting that it is "impossible" because it breaks the known laws of physics, or because it is somehow logically or mathematically impossible?

Btw, I'm using a slight variant of Craig's version. If you're still finding my explanation of physical necessity insufficient for you, you might find more info on his sight reasonblefaith.org.
Physical necessity in this argument means that a universe could not exist with any other values that what the constants currently have. For example, one might claim that it is a physical necessity that a cake must be made with eggs. Is that a physical necessity in order to make a cake? I don't know in that case...I don't cook.

I think the problem you're having is that it seems unlikely that it would be impossible for the constants to have any other values than they currently have. I agree, but it's a question that has to be asked. The person who claims that it is a physical necessity that the constants have the values they do has to make quite a convincing argument.

 

[Joshua260]

Any evidence for this claim?

Actually, I think that Gary Habermas conducted a study on this, although I could not cite it for you.

 

[Joshua260]

It sounds precisely like the bible. According to the bible, the Jews were the chosen people. And they were a pretty insignificant tribe at the time.

And I'm sure Christians sects are telling people today they are loved by god more than the others.

Have you never heard that "God so loved the world"? How much did he love the whole world? So much so that "he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

You sure don't sound like you know much about Christianity.

 

[Arythmael]

Btw, I'm using a slight variant of Craig's version. If you're still finding my explanation of physical necessity insufficient for you, you might find more info on his sight reasonblefaith.org.
Physical necessity in this argument means that a universe could not exist with any other values that what the constants currently have. For example, one might claim that it is a physical necessity that a cake must be made with eggs. Is that a physical necessity in order to make a cake? I don't know in that case...I don't cook.

I think the problem you're having is that it seems unlikely that it would be impossible for the constants to have any other values than they currently have. I agree, but it's a question that has to be asked. The person who claims that it is a physical necessity that the constants have the values they do has to make quite a convincing argument.

But I tried to use the definition that "A universe could not exist with any other values than what the constants currently have." It means the same thing as saying "A universe could not exist if the values were set to anything different than what the constants currently have." And this again is semantically no different than saying "If certain constants varied just a little bit, then the universe would not exist at all".

The basic idea is all the same. Imagine any other settings for those constants, and the claim is that you could not end up with a universe as a result using those settings. But you claimed earlier that this was changing your meaning. You said that my definition here is incorrect and did not match your meaning: "If certain constants varied just a little bit, then the universe would not exist at all."

Now you're saying "Physical necessity in this argument means that a universe could not exist with any other values than what the constants currently have."

The two statements are right in front of us, saying the same thing, and you keep telling me they are saying something different, but you cannot tell me exactly why. So I'm a bit stuck.

 

[Arythmael]

Btw, I'm using a slight variant of Craig's version. If you're still finding my explanation of physical necessity insufficient for you, you might find more info on his sight reasonblefaith.org.
Physical necessity in this argument means that a universe could not exist with any other values that what the constants currently have. For example, one might claim that it is a physical necessity that a cake must be made with eggs. Is that a physical necessity in order to make a cake? I don't know in that case...I don't cook.

I think the problem you're having is that it seems unlikely that it would be impossible for the constants to have any other values than they currently have. I agree, but it's a question that has to be asked. The person who claims that it is a physical necessity that the constants have the values they do has to make quite a convincing argument.

In any case it sounds like the Physical Necessity option just broadens the claim in the opening premise.

It's like saying the reason you can't fly very far on a cow is that you can't even fly on a cow to begin with.

And the problem I'm having with that is that the other options attempt to explain how that necessity-state for life happened in the first place. But the physical necessity option tries to answer that by pointing to just how large that dependency is (i.e., the entire universe is fine-tuned for existence), and it just begs the question: Alright, how did that happen in the first place?

Don't you see?

It's like asking someone how they did a particular magic trick and having them say it was by learning how to do all kinds of magic tricks. Broadening the problem space of the question doesn't really answer the question.

 

[Joshua260]

But I tried to use the definition that "A universe could not exist with any other values than what the constants currently have." It means the same thing as saying "A universe could not exist if the values were set to anything different than what the constants currently have." And this again is semantically no different than saying "If certain constants varied just a little bit, then the universe would not exist at all".

But that's not what I'm saying about fine-tuned. I'm saying in regards to fine-tuned that if the constants varied a slight bit, the universe would not be life-permitting.

The basic idea is all the same. Imagine any other settings for those constants, and the claim is that you could not end up with a universe as a result using those settings. But you claimed earlier that this was changing your meaning. You said that my definition here is incorrect and did not match your meaning: "If certain constants varied just a little bit, then the universe would not exist at all."

Now you're saying "Physical necessity in this argument means that a universe could not exist with any other values than what the constants currently have."

The two statements are right in front of us, saying the same thing, and you keep telling me they are saying something different, but you cannot tell me exactly why. So I'm a bit stuck.

No. You're getting confused.
I'm saying that the universe is fine-tuned, meaning that if the constants were varied just a bit, then the universe would not be life-permitting. But that does not mean that they could vary.

Physical necessity is asking if they could vary, or could a universe exist with other values?

They are two different ideas.

Here's the radio example again:
1. I can hear the universe perfectly. (p1)
2. Is the radio built hard-wired to that frequency? (phy necc)
3. Does the radio have a tuning knob and we happen to be lucky that it's tuned to the universe? (chance)
4. Did someone tune the radio to that frequency? (design)

 

[Joshua260]

In any case it sounds like the Physical Necessity option just broadens the claim in the opening premise.

It's like saying the reason you can't fly very far on a cow is that you can't even fly on a cow to begin with.

And the problem I'm having with that is that the other options attempt to explain how that necessity-state for life happened in the first place. But the physical necessity option tries to answer that by pointing to just how large that dependency is (i.e., the entire universe is fine-tuned for existence), and it just begs the question: Alright, how did that happen in the first place?

Don't you see?

It's like asking someone how they did a particular magic trick and having them say it was by learning how to do all kinds of magic tricks. Broadening the problem space of the question doesn't really answer the question.

Read my radio example in my last response. I really think that's the best example of what I'm trying to say.

Maybe it would be good to remember also that my argument is an "inference to the best explanation". Not quite like the inductive argument I think you would rather use. So anyway, the person who claims that the constants had to have those values would really have to put forth a really good argument to support that. As I've mentioned in this thread several times, even Hawking does not believe that is the best explanation.

So basically, both sides come down to the same option, chance or design. Hawking a priori rules out design because he doesn't believe in God. Therefore, he favors chance. I don't rule out God, and recognize that the odds are extremely low that a universe could exist which is life-permitting. So this argument tends to make me incline towards the design option. Design greatly explains why the most unlikely reality, the existence of a universe that is life-permitting, could be realized.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Read my radio example in my last response. I really think that's the best example of what I'm trying to say.

Maybe it would be good to remember also that my argument is an "inference to the best explanation". Not quite like the inductive argument I think you would rather use. So anyway, the person who claims that the constants had to have those values would really have to put forth a really good argument to support that. As I've mentioned in this thread several times, even Hawking does not believe that is the best explanation.

So basically, both sides come down to the same option, chance or design. Hawking a priori rules out design because he doesn't believe in God. Therefore, he favors chance. I don't rule out God, and recognize that the odds are extremely low that a universe could exist which is life-permitting. So this argument tends to make me incline towards the design option. Design greatly explains why the most unlikely reality, the existence of a universe that is life-permitting, could be realized.

Where's the evidence for design?