The source of moral obligation

[quatona]

Read my OP again.

It doesn´t seem to change no matter how often I read it.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Sorry, their existence isn't dependent upon showing they exist. However, it is unreasonable so assume they exist without first demonstrating they exist.

Why cannot the rest be as fair and lovely as you?

 

[Ana the Ist]

Do any of our resident philosophers want to show Ana why her reasoning is fallacious?

Sorry, to assume their existence without first demonstrating it is fallacious. My sincerest apologies.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Why cannot the rest be as fair and lovely as you?

I didn't realize that even posted.

When you're wrong, you're wrong. You don't look less wrong by not admitting it.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Your original post was about moral obligations.
Did you mean to ask about prescriptions right from the start, or have you changed the horses midstream?

My response...

Read my OP again.

Your response...

It doesn´t seem to change no matter how often I read it.

My response to the above will be to call your attention to my OP provided below for accessibility:

Atheists, where do moral obligations and prohibitions come from if there is no moral law giver to prohibit or prescribe moral duties?

I used the phrases moral obligations and moral duties, and the words: prohibitions, prohibit, and prescribe in my OP as is evidenced from the above.

Generally speaking, when someone says of an act that it is a "moral obligation," they are referring to a prescribed act, and from the book entitled, Philosophical Foundations for the Nature of Law we read,

"moral obligations are associated with moral prescriptions which correlate with claims about what... some class of persons (general prescriptions or more commonly norms, including rules and principles) ought to do in some state of affairs. Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Philosophical Foundations of Law) Hardcover – May 10, 2013 by Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (Author)

So when we speak of moral obligations we are speaking of things that have been prescribed by a prescriber and often times in moral discourse these words, i.e. prescriptions, obligations, precepts etc. are used interchangeably. I even used the word prescribe in my OP, so to ask me if I have "changed horses midstream" is unnecessary. When I use the word prescriptions I am still talking about the very same thing I was talking about from the very beginning.

If my post was ambiguous, I apologize for it was not my intent.

 

[quatona]

Generally speaking, when someone says of an act that it is a "moral obligation," they are referring to a prescribed act, and from the book entitled, Philosophical Foundations for the Nature of Law we read,

"moral obligations are associated with moral prescriptions which correlate with claims about what... some class of persons (general prescriptions or more commonly norms, including rules and principles) ought to do in some state of affairs. Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Philosophical Foundations of Law) Hardcover – May 10, 2013 by Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (Author)

It´s noted that this is the way Waluchow and Sciaraffa use this term. Of course, this isn´t the only way "obligation" is used and understood.

So when we speak of moral obligations we are speaking of things that have been prescribed by a prescriber and often times in moral discourse these words, i.e. prescriptions, obligations, precepts etc. are used interchangeably. I even used the word prescribe in my OP, so to ask me if I have "changed horses midstream" is unnecessary. When I use the word prescriptions I am still talking about the very same thing I was talking about from the very beginning.

It´s also noted that now you reveal that this is the way you use this term, too.

Now comes the funny part: If, as you have revealed now, your use of language accepts nothing for an "obligation" that isn´t prescribed by a moral law giver, your OP question

Atheists, where do moral obligations and prohibitions come from if there is no moral law giver to prohibit or prescribe moral duties?

isn´t even a question. It asks for something that, by your very definition, can´t exist.
If a "moral obligation" (as you have just defined it) requires a moral law giver, the question "Where moral obligations come from - if not from a moral law giver" can´t have an answer and thus isn´t even a meaningful question.

If my post was ambiguous, I apologize for it was not my intent.

Thanks for clarifying that you meant to ask a meaningless question right from the start.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

It´s noted that this is the way Waluchow and Sciaraffa use this term. Of course, this isn´t the only way "obligation" is used and understood.



It´s also noted that now you reveal that this is the way you use this term, too.

Now comes the funny part: If, as you have revealed now, your use of language accepts nothing for an "obligation" that isn´t prescribed by a moral law giver, your OP question

isn´t even a question. It asks for something that, by your very definition, can´t exist. [/FONT]
If a "moral obligation" (as you have just defined it) requires a moral law giver, the question "Where moral obligations come from - if not from a moral law giver" can´t have an answer and thus isn´t even a meaningful question.



Thanks for clarifying that you meant to ask a meaningless question right from the start.

Everyone else that responded to my question rightly inferred from what I wrote using what grade school teachers refer to as "context clues", that I was referring to God when I used the phrase "moral law giver".

Thus the question can be rephrased as:

Atheists, where do moral obligations and prohibitions come from if there is no God (moral law giver) to prohibit or prescribe moral duties?

Ana said that there are no moral obligations. Besides him, most of the replies can all be boiled down to: "People are the moral law givers if there is no God."

As I stated, if you found the question ambiguous, I apologize.

 

[quatona]

Everyone else that responded to my question rightly inferred from what I wrote using what grade school teachers refer to as "context clues", that I was referring to God when I used the phrase "moral law giver".

Most people didn´t get that your premise was that moral obligations can only "come from" a (divine or non-divine) law-giving entity (i.e. depend on "moral laws". Or else 90% of the posts in this thread hadn´t been written.

Btw., I´m still wondering how the entire "What if Jeremy doesn´t (want to) meet his moral obligations [obey moral laws]?" part was relevant (in regards to your initial question). Are you impying that a moral obligation or a moral law only exist if everyone is willing to obey them?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The law enforcer is natural selection, or, the "hand of God" if you want to put it that way. If we dont "live skillfully", or "wisely" then we will die.

Why are we obliged to live skillfully? Because, ontologically health wealth and happiness (combined) are ontologically preferable to disorder and decay.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Most people didn´t get that your premise was that moral obligations can only "come from" a (divine or non-divine) law-giving entity (i.e. depend on "moral laws". Or else 90% of the posts in this thread hadn´t been written.

I do not understand what it is you are trying to say. Sorry.

Btw., I´m still wondering how the entire "What if Jeremy doesn´t (want to) meet his moral obligations [obey moral laws]?" part was relevant (in regards to your initial question). Are you impying that a moral obligation or a moral law only exist if everyone is willing to obey them?

If what the primate cousins of baboons i.e., homo sapiens refer to as moral values and duties are simply by-products of socio-biological evolution i.e. adaptations that aid in our survival like our hands, or our feet, or teeth, then what follows?

This is by far, the most widely held view among modern evolutionists. As philosopher of science Michael Ruse states:

"The position of the modern evolutionist … is that humans have an awareness of morality … because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth. … Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring above and beyond themselves. … Nevertheless, … such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, … and any deeper meaning is illusory." - Michael Ruse, "Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics," in The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), 262,268,289.

So keeping that in mind, let's ask the question:

What if quatona, who is essentially a machine for propagating DNA whose constituents are the results of blind, naturalistic processes acting upon matter, performs a certain action like taking an iPad off of a table. In so doing, he is simply dancing to his DNA. The act which homo sapiens label as stealing goes on all the time among our primate cousins. Some homo sapiens may have evolved to think this act is not conducive to the survival of the species and thus he may be perceived by them as having done something out of the ordinary. But just because some homo sapiens have evolved to think quatona is under obligation not to steal, it does not follow that there is actually a moral obligation that he is under. All he has done is flouted the herd morality like a baboon might do if it takes a banana from another baboon and runs off with it.

Secondly, when atheists say someone "ought not do something", ought implies can. But if the idea that we have freedom of choice is just an illusion, then we really are all determined by virtue of our material constituents. Free will is an illusion. Thus, quatona could not have done otherwise when taking the iPad.

And if one could not have done otherwise, then the idea of moral culpability goes out the window.

 

[Ken-1122]

I have to disagree on that point. As with individual atheists, we don't really know what a theist thinks about morality until we ask him or her. We can presume that they believe morality is tied to theology, but that's only because we most frequently encounter theists who make that claim. The 'theist' label alone does not necessarily imply that, and it is not contrary to theism to suggest otherwise.

IN THEORY; in order to know what a theist believes about morality, all you would have to do is read his "unsubstantiated ancient holy text" and that is supposed to paint a clear picture of which they all agree. But in reality; their books are contradictory, and often gives mixed messages so you will usually have individual theists who will cherry pick specific points from their holy text that supports their personal agenda thus the reality is they don't agree and you do have to speak to the individual theist to know what he believes. But the way it is supposed to work is they are all supposed to agree on "the truth"

Ken

 

[bhsmte]

IN THEORY; in order to know what a theist believes about morality, all you would have to do is read his "unsubstantiated ancient holy text" and that is supposed to paint a clear picture of which they all agree. But in reality; their books are contradictory, and often gives mixed messages so you will usually have individual theists who will cherry pick specific points from their holy text that supports their personal agenda thus the reality is they don't agree and you do have to speak to the individual theist to know what he believes. But the way it is supposed to work is they are all supposed to agree on "the truth"

Ken

Arguments from some theists in regards to morality are motivated by one simple principle that they desperately need to convince themselves of:

We have a morality that comes from God and if the other guy doesn't believe in a God, then that means we are better than them in regards to morality.

You see OP's like this all the time on these boards and they are all motivated by what I stated above.

 

[Freodin]

What if quatona, who is essentially a machine for propagating DNA whose constituents are the results of blind, naturalistic processes acting upon matter, performs a certain action like taking an iPad off of a table. In so doing, he is simply dancing to his DNA. The act which homo sapiens label as stealing goes on all the time among our primate cousins. Some homo sapiens may have evolved to think this act is not conducive to the survival of the species and thus he may be perceived by them as having done something out of the ordinary. But just because some homo sapiens have evolved to think quatona is under obligation not to steal, it does not follow that there is actually a moral obligation that he is under. All he has done is flouted the herd morality like a baboon might do if it takes a banana from another baboon and runs off with it.

I really cannot follow your line of thinking... at all.

What is this "moral obligation" that you keep talking about? From a previous post, you say it is "a prescribed act".

But here in this example, you deny that it is something "homo sapiens have evolved to think", and that it is not "herd morality"... both concepts referring to "prescribed acts"

In fact, you keep denying that this "moral obligation" is "a prescibed act", as long as it is humans (or other relevant species) doing the prescribing.

That would lead to the conclusion that there is a qualitative difference between acts prescribed by humans and acts prescribed by "a moral law giver".

As humans who do any kind of prescribing would be "moral law givers", such a difference does not exist under these terms... you have to introduce another distinction: the "moral law giver" cannot be any human or plurality of humans... it has to be "God".

A distinction between the acts of humans, who can only think they prescibe acts and God who really does prescribe acts is nothing but arbitrary.

So you are unable to show that, under the conditions in your example, "human given moral obligations" are in any way different from "God given moral obligations".


Someone could still make the assumption that there exist objective moral obligations, but these would not be "given" at all. Such an assumption would still invalidate one of your premises.

Secondly, when atheists say someone "ought not do something", ought implies can. But if the idea that we have freedom of choice is just an illusion, then we really are all determined by virtue of our material constituents. Free will is an illusion. Thus, quatona could not have done otherwise when taking the iPad.

And if one could not have done otherwise, then the idea of moral culpability goes out the window.

But then the idea of moral culpability would also be determined... based on our material constituents. We could not not have it.

Perhaps the whole concept should be rethought without your simplistic ideas?

 

[quatona]

I do not understand what it is you are trying to say. Sorry.

I´ll rephrase it for you. You just told us that in your definition of "moral obligation" a moral obligation can only "come from" a law-giving entity.
You also claimed that "most people" in this thread got that right away (as contextually clarified in your OP).
I answered: No, they didn´t. Most of the discussions here weren´t based on that loaded definition.

Me: Btw., I´m still wondering how the entire "What if Jeremy doesn´t (want to) meet his moral obligations [obey moral laws]?" part was relevant (in regards to your initial question). Are you impying that a moral obligation or a moral law only exist if everyone is willing to obey them?

If what the primate cousins of baboons i.e., homo sapiens refer to as moral values and duties are simply by-products of socio-biological evolution i.e. adaptations that aid in our survival like our hands, or our feet, or teeth, then what follows?
This is by far, the most widely held view among modern evolutionists.

So what? Are you trying to have a discussion with "evolutionists" now?
Your thread was directed at atheists. It wasn´t clear that you were actually trying to tackle scientist findings
.

What if X, who is essentially a machine for propagating DNA whose constituents are the results of blind, naturalistic processes acting upon matter, performs a certain action like taking an iPad off of a table. In so doing, he is simply dancing to his DNA. The act which homo sapiens label as stealing goes on all the time among our primate cousins. Some homo sapiens may have evolved to think this act is not conducive to the survival of the species and thus he may be perceived by them as having done something out of the ordinary.

What´s that got to do with the line of reasoning that you engaged so long in and that I asked about: Your infinite regress series of "What if Jeremy doesn´t...what if Jeremy doesn´t care...what if Jeremy refuses to think...etc?"

But just because some homo sapiens have evolved to think quatona is under obligation not to steal, it does not follow that there is actually a moral obligation that he is under.

Not? So what else, in your terminology, does it take for something to be a moral obligation?
You have revealed your first hidden premise in the meantime: It must be given by a moral law-giver. This premise is met here. So what else didn´t you tell us about your premises?

All he has done is flouted the herd morality like a baboon might do if it takes a banana from another baboon and runs off with it.

And with there being a divine moral law-giver, this wouldn´t be any different (he has flouted God´s morality and run off with the ipad). So what´s the point here?

Secondly, when atheists say someone "ought not do something", ought implies can.

Says who?

But if the idea that we have freedom of choice is just an illusion, then we really are all determined by virtue of our material constituents. Free will is an illusion.

Ah, so after having addressed atheists in the OP, you quickly changed to "evolutionists", and now you are addressing determinists. You must be pretty confused. What´s next - communism?

Thus, X could not have done otherwise when taking the iPad.

So what? There could still be a moral law against stealing iPads, and this law could even be a co-determining factor in the way people act.

And if one could not have done otherwise, then the idea of moral culpability goes out the window.

You really seem to be determined to change the subject at every turn. Now you have replaced "moral obligation" by "moral culpability", and have opened a whole nother can of worms.

 

[quatona]

Btw, I have edited my user-name from your examples, and replaced it by "X".
Please don´t do that again. Thank you.

 

[bhsmte]

His OP has not turned out the way he would like and he is scrambling.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

IN THEORY; in order to know what a theist believes about morality, all you would have to do is read his "unsubstantiated ancient holy text" and that is supposed to paint a clear picture of which they all agree. But in reality; their books are contradictory, and often gives mixed messages so you will usually have individual theists who will cherry pick specific points from their holy text that supports their personal agenda thus the reality is they don't agree and you do have to speak to the individual theist to know what he believes. But the way it is supposed to work is they are all supposed to agree on "the truth"

Ken

All Christians are theists, but not all theists are Christians and this is where you err and why what Archaeopteryx said is right.

Both he and I caution against making sweeping generalizations.

Aristotle or Socrates are just two that come to mind that would have laughed at you if you were to have told them that their views on morality were derived from an unsubstantiated holy text.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

I really cannot follow your line of thinking... at all.

What is this "moral obligation" that you keep talking about? From a previous post, you say it is "a prescribed act".

But here in this example, you deny that it is something "homo sapiens have evolved to think", and that it is not "herd morality"... both concepts referring to "prescribed acts"

In fact, you keep denying that this "moral obligation" is "a prescibed act", as long as it is humans (or other relevant species) doing the prescribing.

That would lead to the conclusion that there is a qualitative difference between acts prescribed by humans and acts prescribed by "a moral law giver".

As humans who do any kind of prescribing would be "moral law givers", such a difference does not exist under these terms... you have to introduce another distinction: the "moral law giver" cannot be any human or plurality of humans... it has to be "God".

A distinction between the acts of humans, who can only think they prescibe acts and God who really does prescribe acts is nothing but arbitrary.

So you are unable to show that, under the conditions in your example, "human given moral obligations" are in any way different from "God given moral obligations".


Someone could still make the assumption that there exist objective moral obligations, but these would not be "given" at all. Such an assumption would still invalidate one of your premises.


But then the idea of moral culpability would also be determined... based on our material constituents. We could not not have it.

Perhaps the whole concept should be rethought without your simplistic ideas?

You are not too far off. I think you are getting my point.

The point I am making is that evolutionary biologists because of their belief in naturalism, i.e. that all that exists is reducible to natural processes, maintain that our concept of morality i.e. of moral values (good and bad) and of moral obligations or duties (right and wrong) are simply concepts that we have evolved to possess. Like our hands, or our eyes. They are things that we have solely because they aid in our ability to survive and reproduce. We have eyes, and hands, and feet and teeth because all of these things help us to survive and pass on our genes.

Follow me so far?

Good.

Our concept of morality is no different. It helps us to survive and reproduce, says these scientists.

And if this is indeed the case, then moral values and duties do not have an objective (independent of human belief or opinion) metaphysical foundation, but rather, a subjective metaphysical foundation.

Take away the objective grounds for moral values and duties i.e. God and all you are left with is a hodgepodge of subjective views that exist as the results of chemical reactions in the brains of homo sapiens. In the same way a blowfish by pure instinct puffs itself up when it senses danger, so homo sapiens have certain responses to perceived stimuli which causes them to react in certain ways.

When, on this view, homo sapiens say something like "rape is wrong", what they are doing is reacting to a stimulus. This stimulus could take the form of a male homo sapien forcefully copulating with a female homo sapien, something our primate cousins do. Upon observing the act, the reaction would be: "rape is wrong!" and then the person may try to intervene in the act.

A good parallel from our animal relatives would be the youtube video wherein a dog is attacking this little child and out of nowhere comes this cat that leaps onto the dog and does so with such force and quickness that the dog scurries away. What the cat did, it did by instinct.

So on this view, our expressions of moral outrage at genocide etc. are merely reactions to stimuli, expressions which are the results of socio-biological processes and chemical reactions taking place in our grey matter. They have no referent outside of or beyond ourselves because there is nothing outside of and beyond nature and thus their metaphysical foundation is purely subjective.

What follows?

No homo sapien could ever do anything objectively good or bad. No homo sapien could ever fail to do that which is objectively right or do that which is objectively wrong.

 

[quatona]

Besides him, most of the replies can all be boiled down to: "People are the moral law givers if there is no God."

Actually, no, they can´t. Moral objectivists - be they theists, atheists or whatnot - understand themselves to be messengers of what they feel they have found out about moral laws, not law givers.
You could know that. After all, the fact that you proclaim the god of your concept to be the moral law giver should not be understood as saying that you are the moral law giver, should it?

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Actually, no, they can´t. Moral objectivists - be they theists, atheists or whatnot - understand themselves to be messengers of what they feel they have found out about moral laws, not law givers.
You could know that. After all, the fact that you proclaim the god of your concept to be the moral law giver should not be understood as saying that you are the moral law giver, should it?

Given philosophical naturalism, objective values are at most epiphenomena.

IOWs, these concepts originate from within the grey matter of the homo sapien's organ of thought i.e the brain.

We are concerned about ontology and the metaphysical foundation of these things, not epistemology.

If naturalism is true, I repeat, if naturalism is true, i.e. if there is no transcendent grounds for the metaphysical foundation of objective moral values and duties, then our concepts of right and wrong, of good and evil, originate, are grounded in, have their foundation in the chemical reactions and neurological processes occurring in the brains of homo sapiens.

I could care less how people claim to know what is moral or whether or not they deny that belief in God is necessary to be moral individuals.

I am not concerned with any of that.

Ontology is the focal point of discourse here, not applied ethics or epistemology.

To help me out and supplement my thoughts, I invite C.S. Lewis to remark:

"These, then, are the two points I wanted to make. First, that human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid of it. Secondly, that they do not in fact behave in that way. They know the Law of Nature; they break it. These two facts are the foundation of all clear thinking about ourselves and the universe we live in." Lewis, C. S. (2009-05-28). Mere Christianity (p. 8). Harper Collins, Inc.. Kindle Edition.

Most will not deny the first thing he said, be they atheist or theist.

Most will not deny the second thing he said, be they atheist or theist.

Most of us, I say most because I am making that exception for you quatona, because for some odd reason I believe you will take exception and not wish to be included in any of this, but most of us have lied, taken something that was not ours or whatever the case may be and knew that we should not have done so, but did it anyway.

There, as I see it, are only two feasible explanations for this queer sense of morality that we have.

1. It is purely illusory, ingrained in us as a result of so many millennia of evolutionary processes.

or...

2. It is a clue that points to a moral law giver to whom we are obligated.

I argue that the second is far more explanatorily superior and parsimonious.