The problem of omniscience

[NBB]

Let's say it's day 1 and God knows what your day 2 A/B choice will be. We'll say he knows it will be A (you did say it has a value as of day 1). On day 2, you freely choose B. What happens to God's knowledge that you would choose A?

If that is true then God does not know everything then. But i don't see the point in this exercise.

 

[grasping the after wind]

Proof that it is logically impossible for anyone or anything to have infallible knowledge of yet to be made free choices.

Christians often make the claim that God knows everything. If asked for specifics, they’ll say this includes knowledge about the future (foreknowledge) and that such knowledge is infallible. Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen. At quick glance, these claims may not appear to be in conflict. However, if we dig a little deeper into each of these claims, we’ll see that they are.

Let’s say Pete is faced with a free choice of A or B. He is due to make this choice on Tuesday (day 2). We’ll call Pete’s day 2 A/B choice variable Y - meaning if Pete chooses A, then variable Y gets a value of A and if Pete chooses B, then variable Y gets a value of B. This also means prior to day 2, variable Y has no value (or the choice lies in an unmade state), and on day 2, variable Y will acquire a value of either A or B – to be decided freely by Pete.

Given the Christian claim that God has infallible foreknowledge, this would mean God knows infallibly what A/B choice Pete will make when the choice still lies in an unmade state. To gain further clarity on this, it can be asked, “if it were asked on day 1 does God know infallibly what Pete’s day 2 A/B choice will be, would the answer be YES?”. Christians would typically agree.

So we’ll call what is true on day 1 about God’s knowledge of Pete’s day 2 A/B choice variable X. In other words, if as of day 1, God knows Pete will choose A, then variable X has a value of A - and if as of day 1, God knows Pete will choose B, then variable X has a value of B. If on day 1 it is true that God knows infallibly what Pete’s day 2 A/B choice will be, then it follows that X has a static or fixed value of either A or B as of day 1.

If asked for further specifics, such as what if Pete chooses something in conflict with what God knows he will choose, Christians will respond with the assertion that Pete will choose whatever God knows he will choose. This means that if variable X is equal to A, then variable Y must be equal to A; if variable Y is equal to B, then variable X must be equal to B, etc.

We now have three conditions:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Pete's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Pete’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Pete freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Pete has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Pete chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

Not all three of these conditions can be true.

If #1 & #2 are true, then #3 can’t be true, as X wouldn’t necessarily be equal to Y, nor would Y necessarily be equal to X. Not only would X receive a value at a different point in time than Y, but Y could be assigned a value in conflict with the static value of X.

If #1 & #3 are true, then #2 can’t be true. Pete wouldn’t be able to freely choose A or B, as variable Y would already be defined as being equal to variable X. Christians will often argue that God's knowledge of Pete’s future choice is a function of Pete’s day 2 choice. But this doesn’t hold true if the answer to the question “if asked on day 1, does God know what Pete’s day 2 A/B choice will be?” is YES.

If #2 & #3 are true, then #1 can’t be true. What this means is if variable Y gets its value on day 2, then variable X also gets its value on day 2 and gets the same value as variable Y. It then follows that God can’t have infallible knowledge on day 1 of Pete’s day 2 A/B choice.

Therefore, it is logically impossible for God (or anyone) to have infallible foreknowledge of a yet to be made free choice.

At a high level, what's going on is some people have made claims. These claims are equivalent to:

1) X has a value of A or B on day 1, meaning it must be equal to A or equal to B as of day 1. This is derived from the Christian claim that if asked on day 1, "does God know what Pete will choose tomorrow", they would say "yes".

2) Y gets a value of A or B on day 2, meaning Y has no value prior to day 2 and could be either A or B. This is derived from the Christian claim that Pete freely can choose either A or B and that up until the time he freely chooses either A or B, he could choose the other option.

3) X is always equal to Y and vice versa. This is derived from the Christian claim that whatever God knows Pete will choose is what Pete will choose and whatever Pete chooses is what God knew he would choose.

Since 1, 2 and 3 can't all be true, we can conclude - provided we're responding to the aforementioned claims - that the God described here can't have infallible knowledge of Pete's freely made choices.

I do not see any logical stream here that proves what you are claiming to proves. If Pete chooses A and God knew He would choose A, how does that preclude either Pete's having a choice or God not having sure knowledge of what Pete would choose?. They are not mutually exclusive. Had Pete decided to choose B, God would have known he was going to choose B. Pete still got to choose. You have not proven that Pete did not get to choose if God knew what Pete would choose or that if Pete gets to choose God cannot know what Pete will choose. You have assumed that God's knowledge of what Pete's choice would be somehow forces Pete to choose what Pete decides to choose. You need some proof of a cause and effect relationship between God's knowledge and Pete's choice for claiming what you are claiming.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

...I have some questions. In the course of making possible "free choices," does Pete have an infinite array of free choices he could make, or just two, as designated by A or B?

What if Pete decides to go to Baskin-Robbins or Dunkin' Donuts on day 2? Moreover, what if Pete has a choice of going to either or to both places? Also, what if Pete was originally going to go alone, but while in transit he realizes that he has forgotten his wallet, so he calls his buddy and asks him if he wants to go along too. That way, when Pete gets to either establishment he chooses--assuming that his friend agrees to go with him---he can hit up his buddy for some cash to pay for either the ice-cream or the donut(s) [...I mean, the guy is starving!] The upshot in all of this is that, on the same day, it could happen that, just after eating a ton of either ice-cream or donuts (or both!), Pete has a sugar overdose in his bowels and feels the onset of a severe attack of explosive diarrhea.

In such a case, what I want to know is: Does Pete have the free-will to decide to successfully hold in a boat-load of ice-cream and donuts as it begins to put massive amounts of pressure on his intestinal tract, and can he do this whether or not God knows anything about Pete's massive diarrhetic dilemma?

 

[Radagast]

Given the scenario presented in the OP, would you say that as of day 1, X has a truth value? (meaning it is equal to either A or B).

I answered that already.

 

[section9+1]

"Your thoughts are not my thoughts."

 

[bling]

There is the assumption that if the future is “set”, man cannot have libertarian free will, which show a lack of understanding.

He assumes that if the future is “set” than God had to set it every action in the future, but the future does not have to all be “set” by only God’s free will choice, but God could have allowed humans some limited autonomous power to decide some of their own future choices which are than set. If my choices are setting my part of the future than I still made free will choices and the future is “set’.

Think of it like this:

You made some autonomous free will choices yesterday which is now “history” and history cannot change so it is “set”, but even though history is “set” does not mean you did not make some free will choices.

God at the end of time knows all your free will choices as history so they are all “set” for God at the end of time, but the same God also exists at the begin time, so God at the beginning of time has perfect knowledge of all your free will choices from the beginning of man’s time.

If man can make truly free will choice than there is something God cannot know and that is all the free will choices of an individual who will never exist. God can know all the possible choices but not which choices the never to exist person made. At the moment God decided to make a person that person was made, lived, made choices, died and went to heaven or hell in God’s time perspective.

This does not mean there is no sequencing of events in the Spiritual realm God’s time.

 

[Kim7229]

If that is true then God does not know everything then. But i don't see the point in this exercise.

Bingo!!! You've just revealed the point of the exercise. If you have the free will to choose A or B, then God can't have infallible knowledge of your yet to be made choice. If he does have infallible knowledge of your yet to be made free choice, then what seems to you to be a choice really isn't.

 

[Kim7229]

...I have some questions. In the course of making possible "free choices," does Pete have an infinite array of free choices he could make, or just two, as designated by A or B?

What if Pete decides to go to Baskin-Robbins or Dunkin' Donuts on day 2? Moreover, what if Pete has a choice of going to either or to both places? Also, what if Pete was originally going to go alone, but while in transit he realizes that he has forgotten his wallet, so he calls his buddy and asks him if he wants to go along too. That way, when Pete gets to either establishment he chooses--assuming that his friend agrees to go with him---he can hit up his buddy for some cash to pay for either the ice-cream or the donut(s) [...I mean, the guy is starving!] The upshot in all of this is that, on the same day, it could happen that, just after eating a ton of either ice-cream or donuts (or both!), Pete has a sugar overdose in his bowels and feels the onset of a severe attack of explosive diarrhea.

In such a case, what I want to know is: Does Pete have the free-will to decide to successfully hold in a boat-load of ice-cream and donuts as it begins to put massive amounts of pressure on his intestinal tract, and can he do this whether or not God knows anything about Pete's massive diarrhetic dilemma?

For the most part, your response is a red herring. As for the A/B choice, you may read B as 'not A' - meaning B or A is a true dichotomy.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

For the most part, your response is a red herring. As for the A/B choice, you may read B as 'not A' - meaning B or A is a true dichotomy.

No, it's not a red herring if we don't fully understand the two concepts that are being plied and flung-together here in your "copied" OP logic pretzel.

 

[Kim7229]

There is the assumption that if the future is “set”, man cannot have libertarian free will, which show a lack of understanding.

He assumes that if the future is “set” than God had to set it every action in the future, but the future does not have to all be “set” by only God’s free will choice, but God could have allowed humans some limited autonomous power to decide some of their own future choices which are than set. If my choices are setting my part of the future than I still made free will choices and the future is “set’.

Think of it like this:

You made some autonomous free will choices yesterday which is now “history” and history cannot change so it is “set”, but even though history is “set” does not mean you did not make some free will choices.

God at the end of time knows all your free will choices as history so they are all “set” for God at the end of time, but the same God also exists at the begin time, so God at the beginning of time has perfect knowledge of all your free will choices from the beginning of man’s time.

If man can make truly free will choice than there is something God cannot know and that is all the free will choices of an individual who will never exist. God can know all the possible choices but not which choices the never to exist person made. At the moment God decided to make a person that person was made, lived, made choices, died and went to heaven or hell in God’s time perspective.

This does not mean there is no sequencing of events in the Spiritual realm God’s time.

Thanks for your response. Would you say that as of day 1, X has a truth value? (meaning it is equal to A or it is equal to B)

 

[NBB]

Bingo!!! You've just revealed the point of the exercise. If you have the free will to choose A or B, then God can't have infallible knowledge of your yet to be made choice. If he does have infallible knowledge of your yet to be made free choice, then what seems to you to be a choice really isn't.

Not really, God can know the answer beforehand and not intervene in your decision at all, your decision is yours....

 

[Kim7229]

Not really, God can know the answer beforehand and not intervene in your decision at all, your decision is yours....

Then what if God knows you will choose A and you proceed to choose B?

 

[NBB]

Then what if God knows you will choose A and you proceed to choose B?

He knows the answer, but that does not mean he forced it on you somehow...

 

[Radagast]

Then what if God knows you will choose A and you proceed to choose B?

That's incoherent.

 

[Kim7229]

He knows the answer, but that does not mean he forced it on you somehow...

Would you agree that as of day 1, X has a truth value? If you answer 'yes', then you're saying as of day 1, X is either A or B and can't be anything else. If it is A and Pete than gives Y the value of B on day 2, then A and B aren't the same - or Pete's choice is not in alignment with what God knew he would choose. Make sense?

 

[Kim7229]

That's incoherent.

Would you agree that as of day 1, X has a truth value? If you answer 'yes', then you're saying as of day 1, X is either A or B and can't be anything else. If it is A and Pete than gives Y the value of B on day 2, then A and B aren't the same - or Pete's choice is not in alignment with what God knew he would choose. Make sense?

 

[Radagast]

There is the assumption that if the future is “set”, man cannot have libertarian free will

That is actually correct, but man can have other kinds of free will.

 

[Radagast]

Would you agree that as of day 1, X has a truth value?

I already said yes.

If it is A and Pete than gives Y the value of B on day 2

That's incoherent. If Pete is going to choose A, then Pete is going to choose A.

When you cut-and-pasted this rather silly argument, you should have studied it more carefully.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Would you agree that as of day 1, X has a truth value? If you answer 'yes', then you're saying as of day 1, X is either A or B and can't be anything else. If it is A and Pete than gives Y the value of B on day 2, then A and B aren't the same - or Pete's choice is not in alignment with what God knew he would choose. Make sense?

Kim, I think you think to expand your academic acumen and realize that your "choice" here to attempt to reduce down the essence of both the concept of Human Free Will (whatever that is) and Divine Omniscience (whatever that is, too) and then, basically, throw them at each other, comes by way of certain assumptions that don't actually obtain.

 

[bling]

Thanks for your response. Would you say that as of day 1, X has a truth value? (meaning it is equal to A or it is equal to B)

Yes! The question is "who gave it that value"? If I of my own free will gave it the value "B" in my future than that is when the decision was made and I am not making the decision twice.
The problem is thinking about your decision of "A" or "B" not being made by you "yet", since it was made by you already in your future existence. It is kind of like you making the same choice twice, but it is only once in God's time frame.
I see the problem with your thinking: Everything being in the present for God means it is like: a free will agent "first" makes the choice of A or B which God than knows and sends that information back to Himself at the beginning of time so God at the beginning of time knows your free will choice "prior" to you making it, but in your time frame.