The Problem of Free Will

[juvenissun]

Let's say variable Y represents Fred's day 2 A/B choice. Given your answer, Y has a truth value prior to when Fred was born. However, if Fred freely assigns an A or B value to Y on day 2, then this puts your response in conflict with the presupposition that Fred can freely choose A or B. Are you not aware of this?

Fred can choose freely. But God already know the choice. I do not see any conflict on that.

 

[Albion]

There's still been no one or no thing that establishes that Fred CAN choose freely.

 

[Soul2Soul]

I would say you're correct about foreknowledge. This is part of why the problem of free will can't be reconciled.

My understanding of your example is that Fred eventually makes a free choice despite foreknowledge - already knowing what his final free choice will be? I'm not seeing how Fred does not make his final choice ... freely .... unless Fred too has foreknowledge?

 

[talquin]

Fred can choose freely. But God already know the choice. I do not see any conflict on that.

Let's say it's day 1. X (or God's knowledge of Fred's day 2 a/b choice) has a value of A. Day 2 comes around and Fred freely chooses B. What happens to God's knowledge that Fred would choose A?

 

[talquin]

There's still been no one or no thing that establishes that Fred CAN choose freely.

Perhaps you didn't read the OP.

Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen.

If your argument is that Fred can't freely make choices, then you have a straw man argument.

 

[talquin]

Given initial definitions to what the God should be, the rest of theology would ALL be logically sound. In any argument, just do not question the initial definition. Unfortunately, that is what you usually do.

If you define the God as a Being of all knowing, then do not question if He knows or not. He simply knows by definition. If you do not like that, then do not define a god as one who is all knowing. But, if so, you are not talking about the Christian God. A Buddha might be one who is not all knowing. Would you like Buddha better?

If true, then what appears to be a freely made choice isn't really freely made.

If you're correct, then why would Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen.

 

[Albion]

Perhaps you didn't read the OP.

Gosh, how I regret that kind of line being used when a straightforward reply would be helpful.

If your argument is that Fred can't freely make choices, then you have a straw man argument.

Wow. Is that a mistaken conclusion!

It's no strawman to ask if Fred DOES have free will before moving into all manner of secondary arguments ABOUT free will.

Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen.

Some Christians do. Others do not.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

That is true. And my argument is valid if God is an outside of time being or a being which operates within time.

No, your argument doesn't hold for a god that sees all events as past events. That god's knowledge of what you did do does not impact on another's free will, any more than my knowledge of what someone had for lunch yesterday impacted their free will at the time they made the choice.

 

[talquin]

Gosh, how I regret that kind of line being used when a straightforward reply would be helpful.


Wow. Is that a mistaken conclusion!

It's no strawman to ask if Fred DOES have free will before moving into all manner of secondary arguments ABOUT free will.

Some Christians do. Others do not.

If your argument is against a condition in which humans don't have free will, then it is a straw man argument, as the presuppositions are that humans do have free will.

 

[talquin]

No, your argument doesn't hold for a god that sees all events as past events. That god's knowledge of what you did do does not impact on another's free will, any more than my knowledge of what someone had for lunch yesterday impacted their free will at the time they made the choice.

We have three conditions:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it willremain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.


Since not all three of those can be true, which of the three is invalidated (and why is it invalidated) if God operates outside of time?

 

[Albion]

If your argument is against a condition in which humans don't have free will, then it is a straw man argument, as the presuppositions are that humans do have free will.

Nonsense. There's nothing out of the ordinary in saying that before we assess the consequences of something that's the property of humans, we need to know if it actually is a property of humans. Otherwise, the entire undertaking is nothing but an exercise in the hypothetical. Or do you mean to say that this is the way you see "free will"-- as an unproven theory?

 

[ToddNotTodd]

We have three conditions:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it willremain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.


Since not all three of those can be true, which of the three is invalidated (and why is it invalidated) if God operates outside of time?

Show me why all three cant be true.

 

[talquin]

Nonsense. There's nothing out of the ordinary in saying that before we assess the consequences of something that's the property of humans, we need to know if it actually is a property of humans. Otherwise, the entire undertaking is nothing but an exercise in the hypothetical. Or do you mean to say that this is the way you see "free will"-- as an unproven theory?

It's not nonsense. Again from the OP:

Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen.

With respect to humans, this entire discussion pertains to humans being able to freely choose between A or B. If you're arguing against a position in which humans can't freely choose between A or B, then it becomes a straw man argument.

 

[talquin]

Show me why all three cant be true.

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it willremain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

If #3 is true (X is equal to Y), then #1 and #2 can't both be true, as in #1 and #2, X and Y get their values at different times and/or have different values

If #1 is true, then #2 and #3 can't both be true. Y couldn't be equal to X and get a value at a time other than when X gets a value.

If #2 is true, then #1 and #3 can't both be true. X can't be equal to Y and have a value when Y doesn't have a value.

 

[Albion]

With respect to humans, this entire discussion pertains to humans being able to freely choose between A or B. If you're arguing against a position in which humans can't freely choose between A or B, then it becomes a straw man argument.

Obviously you have a different idea of what a Straw man argument is. It's not just asking you to frame your question without assumptions that haven't been proven.

 

[talquin]

Obviously you have a different idea of what a Straw man argument is. It's not just asking you to frame your question without assumptions that haven't been proven.

You have yet to counter my argument. Not all three of these can be true.

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it willremain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

 

[juvenissun]

If true, then what appears to be a freely made choice isn't really freely made.

If you're correct, then why would Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice and that up until the time an option is chosen, a different option could have been chosen.

Now you are not reasonable.

God knows your choice does not mean you can not choose freely. God does not interfere your choice. He simply knows.

You should not continue to argue on this point.

 

[talquin]

Now you are not reasonable.

God knows your choice does not mean you can not choose freely. God does not interfere your choice. He simply knows.

You should not continue to argue on this point.

Please answer this question:

Let's say Fred has not yet made his day 2 a/b choice. God knows Fred will choose A out of his day 2 a/b choice. Fred then freely chooses B. What happens to God's knowledge that Fred would choose A?

 

[Albion]

You have yet to counter my argument.

That's correct. And it's because we are not at the point where we can entertain it. To debate whether or not "Fred" can exercise his free will under certain circumstances, it is necessary to establish if Fred has free will in the first place. But all three of your scenarios assume that he does. If he doesn't, why should we choose one of these alternatives?

In addition, you now ask us to assume that God does NOT have foreknowledge, when every Christian that I've ever met, Catholic or Protestant or whatever, take it as an article of faith that he does. Even in the predestination vs. free will debates we all love so, everyone agrees that God has foreknowledge.

 

[J0hnSm1th]

I disagree with the original premise. As a logical tool, assume time travel is possible. I can go into the future as see whether Fred chooses A or B. I can then return to a time before Fred makes his choice. My knowledge of his choice doesn't take away his ability to choose.

As for whether we have free will at all - i exercise it every morning when i choose which of the 4 cereals in the kitchen i want to eat today.