The Ontological Argument

[tcampen]

The Ontological argument is an argumnet asserting to prove the existence of a (particular kind of) god using pure reason. It usually goes something like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (Maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.)

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Apologists like William Lane Craig rely heavily on this argument, and IMO overstates the universality of acceptance of premises #2-5. I certainly do have issues with premise #1, as the definition of being "morally perfect" cannot exist in an objective sense, because "perfection" as to personal character traits are in the eye of the beholder.

But the other premises also have serious issues as well, specifically with #2, which tries to make such a God a necessary being. The problem I see with this argument is it's abstract fuzziness. Even if a maximal being (by abstract definition of what it is) must necessarily exist in every possible worlds, the very definition of a maximal being would change according to the different world it existed in. For example, morality does not exist in a vacuum, but must be applied to real sentient individuals in actual situations that could potentially happen. What morality means requires context, and the context in all possible worlds would necessarily change dramatically according to the world - causing "perfect morality" itself to change.

As such, you're not talking about the same maximal being existing in every possible world, but a different being that is maximal according to the possible world it is in. Since the assertion of the Ontological argument is trying to establish a single maximal being that exists the same in all possible worlds, it appears to not hold up under this analysis.

Furthermore, if we can imagine a possible world where a maximal being does not exist, why doesn't the ontological argument work in reverse. I've read Craig's "rebuttal" to Dawkins' argument, but I think it misses the point. Craig fails to see the sarcasm of "a maximal being that does not exist but creates everything" as being internally inconsistent. The point is that if we can imagine a possible world that does not include a maximal being, then it can exist just as well as a possible with with such a being - and the argument flows on from there.

Would anyone care to address this?

 

[Nathan45]

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (Maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, meatball eyes and noodly perfection. RAmen!.)

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

​

Going from #1 to #2 is an equivocation fallacy, conflating two meanings of "possible".

in #1), "Possible" means "unknown, maybe". In #2) "Possible" means, "Of some probability". This is not the same.


to illustrate: Let us imagine that you are studying calculus in college and you have a very very difficult math problem, that would take you an hour to solve. Or one that the answer is simply unknown you don't have enough information.

Now, you could guess at the answer, and it would be "possible" (in sense #1) that your guess would be correct. But this is not the same as saying it would be "possible" (sense #2) in terms of probability.

Everytime you correctly solve a math equation, you get the same answer. Either it's true or it isn't, it's not probabilistic, you're not going to get a different answer depending on what day of week you do the math problem, although It is "Possible" that you would guess right, you're still going to get the same answer to the same problem no matter what "possible world" you are in.

so when it goes to #2:

2. If it is possible [sense 1] that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible [sense 2] world.

We haven't established that a maximally great being is "possible" in sense #2. We've only established (if we took the agnostic position) that we don't have enough information to determine whether it is possible or not. Therefore we could say that it is "unknown if it is possible" for a maximally great being to exist, but that's not the same as saying that it's possible.

 

[Nathan45]

it's worth mentioning that simply showing that an omnipotent, omniscient, etc being is not self contradictory is not enough to show that it is actually "possible" in sense 2.

I'd also take issue with premise #2 on itself, wouldn't that assume infinite multiple parallel universes or something, and then #3 assumes "God" can pass between them as part of the definition of "maximally omnipotent". Again, this assumes that it is physically possible to travel between parallel universes. This might be impossible.

If to be maximally omnipotent a being had to be able to do that, such would add an extra burden to the proposition that such a being is possible in sense 2. Therefore, to establish that a maximally omnipotent being is possible you'd also have to establish that traveling between multiple universes is possible.

 

[tcampen]

Nathan, great points. I think the equivication falacy also applies in the point I was trying to make with regard to a "maximal" or "perfect" person. These terms make perfect sense mathmatically, as does other versions of the ontologocial argument's use of the word "greater." But when applying these terms to character traits of a person (such as a personal god), the terms no longer have any such specific, defined, objective qualities. Thus #1 never really gets off the ground.

Is this a point worth making?

 

[Nathan45]

Nathan, great points. I think the equivication falacy also applies in the point I was trying to make with regard to a "maximal" or "perfect" person. These terms make perfect sense mathmatically, as does other versions of the ontologocial argument's use of the word "greater." But when applying these terms to character traits of a person (such as a personal god), the terms no longer have any such specific, defined, objective qualities. Thus #1 never really gets off the ground.

Is this a point worth making?

probably. Not sure if that qualifies as an equivocation fallacy but not defining your terms basically renders your entire argument meaningless.

 

[TeddyKGB]

I don't think one can gain traction by attacking the term "possible," nor do I think it fruitful in any case. Premises 1 and 2 establish logical possibility, which is trivial in any case. Some proposition P is logically possible if P does not describe a logical contradiction. Actual possibility is another matter entirely.

I think the OA is best attacked by showing that 'maximal greatness' itself might be a logical contradiction.

 

[tcampen]

I don't think one can gain traction by attacking the term "possible," nor do I think it fruitful in any case. Premises 1 and 2 establish logical possibility, which is trivial in any case. Some proposition P is logically possible if P does not describe a logical contradiction. Actual possibility is another matter entirely.

The inability to apply real-world standards to the OA in my mind is fatal to the argument from the outset. One might object to doing this, but the argument is intended to actually prove something about reality. Thus testing the very premises with real-world examples seems entirely fair.

I think the OA is best attacked by showing that 'maximal greatness' itself might be a logical contradiction.

I don't see how concepts like perfect mercy and perfect justice cannot be reconciled within the same being. Also, what is "greater" to you might not be to me, rendering the whole argument moot as the value of such character traits are inherently subjective.

 

[maybenotcrazy]

if this maximally great being exists in a world it is not maximally great because it is subject to the physical laws of the world as it must to be of the world ergo it must be weaker than able to have created the world and be a maximally great influence on the world. It really is a shame there is no good argument for god but that is why christianity is called the pearl of great price. If it were easily proven it wouldn't be of value. and by the way I don't believe there must be a maximally great being in any world only outside of all worlds and the author of those worlds who himself is worldless, insubstantial yet infinite in greatness, of an essence yet not in essence any particular thing. He is God, great, uncreated and ineffable.

 

[Nathan45]

If it were easily proven it wouldn't be of value.

non-sequitur.

 

[maybenotcrazy]

non-sequitur.

Wow, I'm impressed. Sorry for that, I don't know fillastuffy as well as you do.

And by the way it isn't a non-sequitur for those who believe. Value is dictated by supply and demand. There is a hidden demand for the knowledge christ brings us which is supplied only to some who seek it and sense it. In my opinion all want what christ offers they're just deceived.

 

[maybenotcrazy]

set theory. Empty sets and sets of one element exist.

Let us make greatness concrete. Let us say that beings consist of numbers of vegetables. One being is 5 carrots, another is 5brocolli heads all equivalent somehow, one is made of 5 potatoes. These are the only beings in a world. All can conceive. All are equal in number of vegetables. All may conceive of a greatest being in the world and in fact they each considers its own self to be that being- what does this say about the proof?

Let us say there is a world in which there is nothing.

Let us say that we are christians. We believe the world was created. How does one element of a world create another world unless the second world is within that first world. Then there would have to be a subgod by the argument in the lesser world. Who would that subgod be? Certainly we won't call satan a being of maximal greatness.

Let us say we take the proposition that some worlds having a greatest being implies all worlds have that being. Then some bean soups have eggs in them implies all bean soups have eggs in them. Clearly the bean soup I'm having has no eggs in it. (look up a calendar)

 

[tcampen]

Yea, I'm not really following that last post.

 

[maybenotcrazy]

1. An empty set can be all there is in the world. A set with only one element can be all there is. infinity is not a number.


2. Just because you can conceive of a greatest being doesn't mean that being isn't going to be you or someone who is not extremely great. Perfection means ubatz.

3.Again, there can be a world with no being in it.

4. An ex nihilo creation is not so if it were by a being within the world who is subject to the physical laws of the world. First of all he will be less perfect after creating everything by the conservation laws and must be material.

5. Well come on, just because some person is a redhead doesn't mean all of them are!!!! You don't seriously believe that?

Sorry to tear apart an argument that agrees in conclusion somewhat with my beliefs though I think it makes God less than fully perfect despite what you say. Perfection imo implies detachment from all realities.

 

[tcampen]

1. An empty set can be all there is in the world. A set with only one element can be all there is. infinity is not a number.

2. Just because you can conceive of a greatest being doesn't mean that being isn't going to be you or someone who is not extremely great. Perfection means ubatz.

3.Again, there can be a world with no being in it.

4. An ex nihilo creation is not so if it were by a being within the world who is subject to the physical laws of the world. First of all he will be less perfect after creating everything by the conservation laws and must be material.

5. Well come on, just because some person is a redhead doesn't mean all of them are!!!! You don't seriously believe that?

Sorry to tear apart an argument that agrees in conclusion somewhat with my beliefs though I think it makes God less than fully perfect despite what you say. Perfection imo implies detachment from all realities.

I think you make a great point here. I am not a fan of the OA for the reasons you give and many others. But your point of what perfection is, in your opinion, illustrates why the premise of the OA fails from the outset. What perfection means inherently varies from person to person, meaning that it is impossible to acheive an objective sense of perfection of a person. The very concept of perfection, as it relates to the properties of a person or being, cannot be quantified in any rational sense to even assert a being can be greater than what anyone can conceive of. The argument never really gets off the ground.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

1a. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
1b. It is possible that a peak (as part of a mountain) exists.
1c. It is possible that a perfect square circle exists.
1d. It is possible that a certain box contains a diamond.

2a. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
2b. If it is possible that a peak exists, then a peak exists as part of some possible mountain.
2c. If it is possible that a perfect square circle exists, then a perfect square circle exists in some possible world.
2d. If it is possible that a certain box contains a diamond, then that certain box contains a diamond in some possible world.

3a. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
3b. If a peak exists as part of some possible mountain, then it exists as part of every possible mountain.
3c. If a perfect square circle exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
3d. If that certain box contains a diamond in some possible world, then that certain box contains a diamond in every possible world.

4a. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
4b. If a peak exists as part of every possible mountain, then it exists as part of, say, Mount Everest.
4c. If a perfect square circle exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
4d. If that certain box contains a diamond in every possible world, then that certain box contains a diamond in the actual world.

5a. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
5b. If a peak exists as part of Mount Everest, then a peak exists.
5c. If a perfect square circle exists in the actual world, then a perfect square circle exists.
5d. If a that certain box contains a diamond in the actual world, then that certain box contains a diamond.

6a. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
6b. Therefore, peaks (as part of mountains) exist.
6c. Therefore, a perfect square cirlce exist.
6d. Therefore, a certain box contains a diamond.


Hrmph, semantic eyewash.

If you want to define some part of the world as "God" in a similar way that some part of a mountain is defined as "peak" then that is fine by me. You should however be aware of what you are doing. But if somebody constructs absurdities such as the ontological arguments, I cannot but get the impression that they are not aware of what they are doing.


Alternatively, if that what you are trying to prove is a logical impossibility to begin with, no amount of ontological argumentation will change that. Any square cirlce is defined in such a way that it is impossible, perfect or not. IF whatever "maximally great being" is supposed to mean suffers from similar deficiencies, then the ontological argument breaks down on premise one; it is simply not possible; no matter what.

In any case, short of defining some part of any possible world as "maximally great being", the first premise needs to be shown true first. Which is not as easy as it seems at all, because "possible" does not mean "hey, I don't know, but it might be" but is similar in meaning to feasable, doable or even synonymous with actually existing or just actuality. The diamond example shows that. It is only possible that a certain box contains a diamond if it actually contains a diamond. If the box is empty to begin with, is it possible that it contains a diamond? No, of course not. *slaps forehead* In a similar vein, it is only possible that a "maximally great being" exists if it actually exists.


(I have to agree to a large degree with Nathan45 on the conflation of two meanings. At the very least, the arguement plays fast and lose with what is commonly understood by 'possible.')

But the other premises also have serious issues as well, specifically with #2, which tries to make such a God a necessary being. The problem I see with this argument is it's abstract fuzziness. Even if a maximal being (by abstract definition of what it is) must necessarily exist in every possible worlds, the very definition of a maximal being would change according to the different world it existed in. For example, morality does not exist in a vacuum, but must be applied to real sentient individuals in actual situations that could potentially happen. What morality means requires context, and the context in all possible worlds would necessarily change dramatically according to the world - causing "perfect morality" itself to change.

As such, you're not talking about the same maximal being existing in every possible world, but a different being that is maximal according to the possible world it is in. Since the assertion of the Ontological argument is trying to establish a single maximal being that exists the same in all possible worlds, it appears to not hold up under this analysis.

This is similar to the montain peak, right? You may define a certain part of a mountain as its peak, but the exact details will differ from mountain to mountain, for example if the peak is covered by snow or not, consists of basalts rock or not etc.

 

[tcampen]

Lord Emsworth - great post!

The only way out of your comparative analysis is through special pleading, which seems all to common. The argument is that a maximally great being refers to that being's having maximal potency (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.). These qualities, by definition, so the argument goes, necessitates a maximally potent being must exist in every possible world by definition of what those properties mean. I see that point, but just making up a definition like that can only get you so far. When you scratch below the surface, you find that definition simply does not hold up in real terms. It's like Xeno's paradox, where it works superficially in a philosophical sense, but utterly falls apart with real application.