The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie's World

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Actually there was evil in heaven which is why it was cast out to the earth by God. God is also casting out evil from earth and bringing His heavenly Kingdom to earth. When Gods will is done, there will be no evil in heaven or earth.

So pretty much everything God creates has evil in it, and since there is evil in heaven or Earth, God's will is not done...

The only place evil has never existed is in God Himself, which of course makes perfect sense

The problem of evil remains - an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God cannot knowingly create or be responsible for evil, directly or indirectly. An omniscient God would know when an action would directly or indirectly lead to evil.

 

[Chriliman]

So pretty much everything God creates has evil in it, and since there is evil in heaven or Earth, God's will is not done...

There is no longer evil in heaven because it has been cast out. Now God is casting out evil from earth.

God's creation has the potential to do evil because God created free willed beings and since evil has been done by free willed beings, God is removing it(evil/sin) from His creation, which results in new free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God(this is yet to happen in all creation, but will happen because it's God's will).

The problem of evil remains - an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God cannot knowingly create or be responsible for evil, directly or indirectly. An omniscient God would know when an action would directly or indirectly lead to evil.

If the omnibenevolent omnipotent God knows the end result is good then He most certainly can and should indirectly allow temporary evil in order to achieve his good will.

 

[anonymous person]

That's what the priests taught me at school. I naturally assumed they ought to know...

And I think you were right to assume that. Unfortunately they probably didn't give any reasons or scripture to support that view. In addition I sympathize with you because you were educated by priests, here I am assuming you were raised Catholic. I can understand more clearly now why you have the aversion you do to Christianity. But that is for another discussion. Needless to say, there is no scriptural support for thinking heaven is the ultimate objective for human beings. I would say a much more modest claim is supported, namely that to be where Jesus is and to experience unbroken and intimate fellowship with Him is what makes heaven the joy of the saints.

If God existed and created evil, then He would not be omnibenevolent, but why a God would create evil is a horrible mystery to me.

I think you misunderstood me. I was asking you why you think evil is something that exists as something which was created as opposed to the traditional conceptualization of it as something which is a privation or a lack of something good. Cold is not something that God created, nor is dark. Evil is to be seen the same way. Cold is the absence or lack of heat, dark is the absence of light, evil is the lack or privation of good in a free moral agent. These things have no existence or ontological status as a concrete entity enduring through time and space.

Your question assumes God made evil like He made the earth or the stars. I see no reason to think that.

It's the traditional problem of evil that remains unanswered. By definition, an omnibenevolent entity is all good, not least in action; such an entity cannot condone or be responsible for evil through its own action or inaction. This world is rife with natural (and moral) evils. Therefore this world cannot be the result of the action of an omnibenevolent entity, and such an entity would, if able, act to prevent those evils. An omnipotent omnibenevolent entity would be able to so act.

You're referring to the logical problem of evil. It is an argument which attempts to prove that there is a logical inconsistency or incompatibility with the existence of our world and God.

Are you aware that this version is no longer defended by philosophers and why it's not?

Dr. Craig reviews this in the video I linked. There is no explicit contradiction between the propositions:

1.God exists

And

2.Our world containing evil exists

So there must be some implicit premise you have which you think warrants seeing the two as logically incompatible. What is it? It is this premise:

God cannot be indirectly responsible for evil. By indirectly, you mean to say, that God cannot create free moral agents who choose to do evil. We both agree that God cannot directly do evil. But why can He not create beings who may choose to do evil?

All you have done is reword the premise you've been asked to substantiate.

If I said that the Bible is God's word and you asked me why, and I told you that it is God's word because it is inspired by God, all I have done is reword the initial premise. I am arguing in a circle or some may call it question begging.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

There is no longer evil in heaven because it has been cast out. Now God is casting out evil from earth.

God's creation has the potential to do evil because God created free willed beings and since evil has been done by free willed beings, God is removing it(evil/sin) from His creation, which results in new free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God(this is yet to happen in all creation, but will happen because it's God's will).

If God can produce free willed beings who cannot do evil by removing evil from His creation, why didn't He remove the evil at the outset (or create it without evil) and prevent all that suffering (particularly of the innocent) ?

If the omnibenevolent omnipotent God knows the end result is good then He most certainly can and should indirectly allow temporary evil in order to achieve his good will.

Nope; omnibenevolence means no evil at all. This is source of the Problem of Evil.

In addition, you've made it clear that evil is actually unnecessary, since He can create free willed beings who cannot do evil. Notwithstanding that, an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God would not permit natural evils either (although He might allow natural weevils).

 

[Chriliman]

If God can produce free willed beings who cannot do evil by removing evil from His creation, why didn't He remove the evil at the outset (or create it without evil) and prevent all that suffering (particularly of the innocent) ?

Nope; omnibenevolence means no evil at all. This is source of the Problem of Evil.

In addition, you've made it clear that evil is actually unnecessary, since He can create free willed beings who cannot do evil. Notwithstanding that, an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God would not permit natural evils either (although He might allow natural weevils).

So a perfect God should not create beings who are free to listen to him(good) or not(evil) and thereby prevent all evil? This would render this God the most selfish God imaginable because only he would exist forever, no one else.

Or God could create free willed being who are free to listen to him or not and if they don't, then give them a reason to listen...sounds more loving to me. Rather than this God only existing by himself forever.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

And I think you were right to assume that. Unfortunately they probably didn't give any reasons or scripture to support that view.

What difference would that make?

In addition I sympathize with you because you were educated by priests

Only for Religious Instruction.

I can understand more clearly now why you have the aversion you do to Christianity.

I'm no more averse to Christianity than any other religion; if anything, less so, it being more familiar.

Needless to say, there is no scriptural support for thinking heaven is the ultimate objective for human beings. I would say a much more modest claim is supported, namely that to be where Jesus is and to experience unbroken and intimate fellowship with Him is what makes heaven the joy of the saints.

What has that to do with everyday humans?

I was asking you why you think evil is something that exists as something which was created as opposed to the traditional conceptualization of it as something which is a privation or a lack of something good. Cold is not something that God created, nor is dark. Evil is to be seen the same way. Cold is the absence or lack of heat, dark is the absence of light, evil is the lack or privation of good in a free moral agent. These things have no existence or ontological status as a concrete entity enduring through time and space.

OK; that seems to be a variation of the narrow philosophical concept of evil (i.e. the most morally despicable sorts of actions), whereas I was using the more common broad concept of evil, which divides into moral and natural evils - morally despicable actions, and suffering that is not caused by moral actors, respectively (and seems to be the concept more frequently discussed in theology).

Your question assumes God made evil like He made the earth or the stars. I see no reason to think that.

Yes, I can see that sidesteps the problem of evil.

You're referring to the logical problem of evil. It is an argument which attempts to prove that there is a logical inconsistency or incompatibility with the existence of our world and God.

Are you aware that this version is no longer defended by philosophers and why it's not?

Not all philosophers have abandoned it. I don't agree with the premise that there is no explicit incompatibility between an omnibenevolent entity and evil. I think there is, but it may be the case that the concept of God used in the refutation is not truly omnibenevolent in the sense of eschewing evil under all circumstances. I'm also not comfortable with the idea than an omnibenevolent entity can have morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, if this entity has the option of not allowing evil at all, as an omnipotent creator has - I haven't seen the argument that establishes that there can be a morally sufficient reason to allow evil when evil is not necessary. But, of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one.

As for the probabilistic version, the idea that we are not in a position to establish whether God has a morally sufficient reason to allow evil, because God may have reasons we can't fathom from our limited perspective, amounts to skeptical theism, and begs the question in its own way - if we allow that an actor who does or permits evil may have a morally sufficient reason that observers are unaware of, we would be unable to make any moral judgements; to restrict this dispensation to an omniscient God is special pleading and makes the argument dependent on the very entity who's existence is in question. But it also makes theism unfalsifiable (and so, irrational); because no matter how bad an evil is, we can say God has a reason for it, and so no evil could ever count as evidence against God's existence. But if no evidence can count against a hypothesis, it's a good indication the hypothesis is irrational.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

So a perfect God should not create beings who are free to listen to him(good) or not(evil) and thereby prevent all evil? This would render this God the most selfish God imaginable because only he would exist forever, no one else.

That wasn't my point - you said that God can produce "free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God". I'm asking why he didn't do that in the first place and save a lot of evil and suffering?

Rather than this God only existing by himself forever.

Why? why would an omnipotent, omniscient entity want company? it would already know every last detail of the results of creating others, free will and all. Deja-vu would be the least of its annoyances...

 

[anonymous person]

What difference would that make?

Only for Religious Instruction.

I'm no more averse to Christianity than any other religion; if anything, less so, it being more familiar.

What has that to do with everyday humans?

OK; that seems to be a variation of the narrow philosophical concept of evil (i.e. the most morally despicable sorts of actions), whereas I was using the more common broad concept of evil, which divides into moral and natural evils - morally despicable actions, and suffering that is not caused by moral actors, respectively (and seems to be the concept more frequently discussed in theology).

Yes, I can see that sidesteps the problem of evil.

Not all philosophers have abandoned it. I don't agree with the premise that there is no explicit incompatibility between an omnibenevolent entity and evil. I think there is, but it may be the case that the concept of God used in the refutation is not truly omnibenevolent in the sense of eschewing evil under all circumstances. I'm also not comfortable with the idea than an omnibenevolent entity can have morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, if this entity has the option of not allowing evil at all, as an omnipotent creator has - I haven't seen the argument that establishes that there can be a morally sufficient reason to allow evil when evil is not necessary. But, of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one.

As for the probabilistic version, the idea that we are not in a position to establish whether God has a morally sufficient reason to allow evil, because God may have reasons we can't fathom from our limited perspective, amounts to skeptical theism, and begs the question in its own way - if we allow that an actor who does or permits evil may have a morally sufficient reason that observers are unaware of, we would be unable to make any moral judgements; to restrict this dispensation to an omniscient God is special pleading and makes the argument dependent on the very entity who's existence is in question. But it also makes theism unfalsifiable (and so, irrational); because no matter how bad an evil is, we can say God has a reason for it, and so no evil could ever count as evidence against God's existence. But if no evidence can count against a hypothesis, it's a good indication the hypothesis is irrational.

I think you are uncomfortable with the idea of a God who allows free moral agents to commit evil. Your use of the phrase "I am uncomfortable with" indicates this.

But this is an emotional problem, not an intellectual one as Dr. Craig points out, and thus falls within the realm of the pastoral counselor to attempt to dissolve, not the philosopher.

People when they think of evil, have strong emotional responses to such thoughts and these emotions cause them to question the existence of an all loving and good God. They reason for example, "I was molested when I was a young boy by a priest, where was God when this was happening?" Or "where was God when the quake hit Italy and buried people under tons of rubble? God cannot exist if all these things are happening!" There is something in us that recoils at such tragedies, and rightfully so. But this very fact should be a clue to you that points to the existence of God, not away from it. For to recoil at such tragedies indicates to us that we have this unshakeable intuition and sense that things aren't right. That something is messed up with the world, that abuse and misuse are occurring. But something can't me messed or abused or misused unless there is a specific purpose for that thing, a certain way in which it should be treated, a right way for it to be seen. None of these notions make any sense apart from a purpose and plan and a Creator and Sustainer who made us and the world we inhabit for a purpose.

In addition, Christian Theism is mankind's only hope for this most disconcerting of human predicaments. No other worldview gives us what Christian theism does in this regard. Not only does it affirm evil instead of denying it, but it places the blame squarely on free moral agents creates by a good God who has not left them to be destroyed utterly by this evil, but has made a way of salvation by emptying Himself and humbling Himself, suffering for us and dying for us and rising for us.

You think evil is terrible and rightly so. But there is something more terrible still, and that is Jesus Christ hanging on a cross. So to the one who asks where God is when all these evil.things happen, I always point them to the cross.

 

[anonymous person]

In addition Frumious, if you define God as "one who cannot allow evil to occur" then of course you have an explicit contradiction between the propositions:

1. God exists

And

2. Evil occurs

But why define God as one who cannot allow evil to occur? Your version of the argument is not addressed to the Christian conception of God. It is addressed to a conception I do not acknowledge and so there is no need for I or anyone else who denies that conception to furnish a rejoinder.

The bible most certainly does not claim that God cannot allow evil to occur.

Maybe your issue is with the concept of omnibenevolence?

Maybe you assume such a being would necessarily prefer a world without evil as opposed to a world with one. All that need to be said in response to render this argument invalid is to highlight that such an assumption is not necessarily true.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I think you are uncomfortable with the idea of a God who allows free moral agents to commit evil. Your use of the phrase "I am uncomfortable with" indicates this.

If you're going to quote me, please quote what I actually said - copy & paste is easiest. In this case, the meaning is the same, but a quote should be just that.

The reason is not what you suggest, it's the one I gave - that, "I haven't seen the argument that establishes that there can be a morally sufficient reason to allow evil when evil is not necessary". IOW I'm reluctant to accept an assertion without the argument that establishes it.

By incorrectly assuming what I think and mean, you'll waste your time arguing straw men.

There is something in us that recoils at such tragedies, and rightfully so. But this very fact should be a clue to you that points to the existence of God, not away from it. For to recoil at such tragedies indicates to us that we have this unshakeable intuition and sense that things aren't right.

Again, you may think so, but I - and many others - don't. I find such tragedies horrific because I can empathise with those who suffer as a result. An earthquake is simply a natural phenomenon, a movement of the ground; there's nothing intrinsically right or wrong about it. I am more emotionally inclined to blame those responsible for shoddy construction, where that contributed, although I'm aware that to do so is irrational.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

...But why define God as one who cannot allow evil to occur?
...
Maybe your issue is with the concept of omnibenevolence?

Yes.

Maybe you assume such a being would necessarily prefer a world without evil as opposed to a world with one. All that need to be said in response to render this argument invalid is to highlight that such an assumption is not necessarily true.

It seems to me not so much a matter of preference as obligation. If an omnibenevolent entity has the choice between a creation where evil will occur (and an omniscient entity would know) and a creation where evil will not occur, it must choose the latter.

Unless, of course, there is a utilitarian-style of omnibenevolence, where any amount of evil is tolerable as long as the outcome produces the greatest good for the greatest number?

 

[Chriliman]

That wasn't my point - you said that God can produce "free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God". I'm asking why he didn't do that in the first place and save a lot of evil and suffering?

This is an incoherent question because in order for God to remove evil, evil must first be present and the only way evil can be present is if free created beings choose to do it.

So when you say "I'm asking why he didn't do that in the first place and save a lot of evil and suffering?" you're missing the point that free created beings are still currently choosing to do evil right now and God is still in the process of correcting them and consequently removing evil.

Why? why would an omnipotent, omniscient entity want company?

An omnibeneveleant God would desire company in order to express His love and good will to others and part of that is showing them how he has removed evil which they themselves directly caused.

it would already know every last detail of the results of creating others, free will and all.

Exactly, which is why it would choose to create because it would know the end result is good.

Deja-vu would be the least of its annoyances...

The point is that an omnibeneveleant God isn't omnibeneveleant until it has something other than itself to love and part of loving someone is showing them why what there doing is wrong and showing them the right way.

 

[anonymous person]

Yes.

It seems to me not so much a matter of preference as obligation. If an omnibenevolent entity has the choice between a creation where evil will occur (and an omniscient entity would know) and a creation where evil will not occur, it must choose the latter.

Why think that is necessarily true? This is the crucial premise of the argument for you and what you have to understand is that such an assumption is not necessarily true. As long as it is logically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then the argument fails.

Unless, of course, there is a utilitarian-style of omnibenevolence, where any amount of evil is tolerable as long as the outcome produces the greatest good for the greatest number?

Once again, you can label it whatever you like. The fact remains that these implicit premises must be necessarily true if the logical version of the argument is to go through and they're not.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Why think that is necessarily true? This is the crucial premise of the argument for you and what you have to understand is that such an assumption is not necessarily true. As long as it is logically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then the argument fails.

I'm saying there can be no morally sufficient reason for an omnibenevolent entity to allow evil if it has an alternative.

I'm also saying that the 'morally sufficient reason' argument is fatally weak because it disallows any moral judgements.

I may be wrong, but I'd like to hear the argument to that effect.

...The fact remains that of these implicit premises must be necessarily true of the logical version of the argument is to go through and their not.

Can you say that again in English?

 

[anonymous person]

I'm saying there can be no morally sufficient reason for an omnibenevolent entity to allow evil if it has an alternative.

Ok listen, all you are doing is stating the premise. You aren't giving reasons why this premise is necessarily true.

Do you understand?

If you ask me, "Jeremy, why do you think God and evil are logically compatible?" and I reply by saying "God and evil are logically compatible." you would say and rightly so, that I haven't proven anything, I've just restated the premise.

Do you understand?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Ok listen, all you are doing is stating the premise. You aren't giving reasons why this premise is necessarily true.

An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

Ok listen, all you are doing is stating the premise. You aren't giving reasons why this premise is necessarily true.

Do you understand?

If you ask me, "Jeremy, why do you think God and evil are logically compatible?" and I reply by saying "God and evil are logically compatible." you would say and rightly so, that I haven't proven anything, I've just restated the premise.

Do you understand?

An omnibenevolent, omnipotent god is incompatible with my definition of evil (which focuses on suffering) because the ideas are contradictory. If a all-powerful, all good god could have created a universe without suffering that being would have necessarily done so, because the two stated qualities would have, by definition, demanded it.

Now, you can state that for anyone, their definitions of "omnibenevolent" "omnipotent" and "evil" are such that there is no contradiction. But once you go down the road of redefining words past their breaking points, you cease to be able to communicate.

And it's kind of a cop out...

 

[Chriliman]

An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.

God can either:

A. Choose to create because His omniscience determined the end result is good.

B. Choose not to create because His omniscience determined the end result is evil.

If we're assuming an omnibenevolent, omniscient God exists then we must choose A because we are created beings in creation, therefore God must know what he's doing and the end result will be good, regardless of the evil we as human beings perceive.

If we're assuming God does not exist then the answers are nonsensical.

 

[anonymous person]

An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.

Evil as an essential property is incompatible with omnibenevolence. This we both can agree on. For example we would both agree that God being omnibenevolent precludes Him from being evil. God is not evil. Here, the word evil is used in a way as to denote an essential property. The "is" is indicative of this as well as "being".

However, you still have not given a reason to think that because God is not evil, that therefore it necessarily follows that He cannot create free creatures who by virtue of their choices, do evil things.

It is no indictment against God that men do evil because men freely choose it. They are culpable.

We would say God is morally perfect. That is essentially what omnibenevolence means. You're arguing moral perfection makes it logically impossible for God to create free moral agents who He knew would commit evil but have given no reason to think that that is true.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

You're arguing moral perfection makes it logically impossible for God to create free moral agents who He knew would commit evil but have given no reason to think that that is true.

Since an omnibenevolent, omnipotent god could have demonstrably created a universe in which free moral agents would not choose to do evil, it's true that a failure to do so contradicts the idea of omnibenevolence.

At least any definition of omnibenevolence that I'm familiar with.