The Law and the Christian Pt. 2
II. The Law in the New Testament
A. Development of nomoV in the Greek Language.
nomoV as it was developed in Greek language, was originally meant as to allot and then developed into the sense of what is proper, and what is assigned to someone. This line of thought was nurtured along in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In ancient times, it also had a wide range of meanings which included any kind of existing or accepted norms, customs, order, usage, or even tradition.
The concept is religious in origin and plays a main role in the cultus. The connection between nomoV and the veneration of the gods finds linguistic expression in the fixed phrase: nouizein qeouV,
[1] I.e.: to honor the gods, according to the cultic usage of the polis, by participation in (natural) worship.
[2]
As politics and the political order started to develop in Greece, the word came into specialized use especially in the judicial realm. Through many Greek philosophers nomoV became more and more specialized. Whereas, Hereclitus, Aeschines, Pindar, and Sophocles, no distinction is made between political and absolute law.
[3]
According to both Aristotle and Andocides, nomoV ay or around the end of the fifth century BC, became to be used in the special sense of a written law and a fixed expression of legal order and the natural constitution in a democratic polis.
[4] And sometime between 348 and 328 BC, Plato began to associate nomoV with qeoV. (cf. Plato, Epistule, VIII, 345e, as transcribed in Tragicorum Gracorum Fragmenta fragment by A Nauck, 1889, adesp. 471)
b. nomoV in Hellenism
a. This philosophical theory became a historical reality bin Hellenism. Here nomoV no longer rules as king in the polis (See any of the writings of this period, I.e.: Philo, Plato, etc).
b. In Stoicism, which regards law as a basis concept, the history developed politikoV nomoV of the classical period is replaced by cosmic and universal law. The term nomoV no longer applies with any strictness to state laws.
[5]As cosmology and nature began to be studied, the influence of the cosmos began to be developed to the view of both an eternal law
[6] and in God.
[7]
The individual of the Hellenistic world can now seek and find the one true and divine nomoV only in the cosmos.
[8] Adjustment is made to popular religion by giving the mane of Zeus to this cosmic nomoV (o nomoV o koinoV, osper estin o orqoV logoV, dia pantwn ercomenoV, o autoV wn tw Dii kaqhgemoni
toutw thV twn ontwn dioikhsewV onti)
[9]
C. The Law in Judaism
a. The Law in the Pseudepigrapha and Apocrypha
Though the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha writings do not form a material or linguistic unity, they are firmly connected in respect of the Law. In all of them the Law is the basis. (Bousset-Gresson., 119ff.) One part of these works is specifically devoted to the Law, seeking to apply, defend, and commend it. Even in the works which have other concerns (especially the apocalypses), the Law is of decisive significance.
1. Linguistically the absolute o nomoV is largely dominate not merely in Pal. Works like 1 Macc., where nomoV is almost absolute and in the singular, but also typically Hellenistic books like Ep. Ar. (39; 122;309) But nomoV can also be used without the article with no discernable distinction of meaning. exeklinan ek nomou qeou (they have turned away from the Law of God) in Bar. 4:12 simply means they have gone astray from the Torah of God.
[10] See also 1 Macc. 4:42 and especially Sirach, e.g.; 19:20, 24; 21:11; etc.
2. In the material understanding of the Law one may see the same duality as in the usage. The position reached in the Post-Exilic period is maintained with some sharpening of the contours, partly through inner development and partly through historical events. Yet new features also arise under intellectual influences from without.
b. Josephus
1. In Josephus, nomoV is normally used to denote the Jewish religious Law. oi nomoV is more common in view of the concern of Josephus to speak good Greek and to make himself intelligible to the Hellenistically educated readers. nomoV and oi nomoV can often be used poetically as the subject of activities. The Laws sigh, Bell., 3:356. They command, Ant. 16, 3. There can, be no question of personification. nomoV without the article is rare for the divine Law.
[11] In other cases nomoV is the book or the Pentateuch: enqa twn otraiwtwn tiV eurwn en tini kwmh tun ieron nomon dierrhxen te tobiblion
[12] labwn eiV ceiraV touV MwusewV
[13] Josephus distinguishes between nomoV (the Pentateuch) and the other writings, Ap. 1, 39.
2. The material understanding of Josephus gives evidence of the same intermediary position as his usage. In all essentials his thought is Jewish, but he keeps firmly in view the needs of readers of non-Jewish culture. The Law has for Josephus, a dominate position in religion.
[14]He admires those who set the Law above all else.
[15] The Law controls all life.
[16] Customs are part of the Law.
[17] This shows his orientation to Pharisaism. The circumcision demanded by the Law, implies incorporation into the Jewish world.
[18] This also means that mans relationship with God is established by the Law. For this reason, Josephus is no mystic.
On the one side, Josephus understanding of the Law gives evidence of an essential material basis in Jewish and Pharisaic thought. But on the other hand, there is a strong and primarily apologetic orientation to the rationalistic and moralistic world of Hellenistic culture.
c. Philo of Alexandria
1. As regards usage there is no essential difference between Philo and Josephus. o nomoVor nomoV is usually the Torah of the Palestinians.
More broadly than Josephus, Philo uses nomoV for the order and law of nature: o thV jusewV nomoV.
[19] He does this in a twofold (though often barely distinguishable) sense: 1) for order it is: nomoV jusewV anepilhptoV that what has come into being should be of lower rank than its author;
[20] and 2) for obedience: Laban does not observe tomV alhweiV thV jusewV nomouV.
[21]
2. It is hardly possible to give a uniform material exposition of Philos statements about the Law or his understanding of it, for neither the Law or legal religion is the true center of his spiritual life. His basic theological philosophical position is that of mystical ecstatic. For him, the highest stage of religion is the vision which is also unity with the Godhead, the solitary sojourn in the supraterrrestrial world of wisdom.
[22] In relation to this central point the Law can have only a broken position; indeed, in the last resort it ought to be abandoned. But Philo cannot do this, and above all he will not. He prefers to cling to the unique authority of the divine Law, for he is and remains a Jew.
[23]
D. The Law in Rabbinic Judaism
Materially, the Rabbinic understanding of the Torah may be summed up in two inwardly related principles: 1) God has revealed Himself once and for all and exclusively in the Torah; 2) Man has his relationship with God only in his relationship with the Torah. Thus the basic starting point of the O.T., which can be summed up in the preposition that God has revealed Himself to Israel as its God, and hence, Israel is bound to obey this God, is characteristically and decisively changed and annulled. Theostically the two principles remain in force, but for all practical purposes the Torah comes fully to the forefront, primarily as the Law which claims the will of man.
a. The central and dominate position of the Torah as the Law contained in the Pentateuch may be seen already in the relation of dependence in which all other authoritative writings stand to the Torah. The other O.T. writings fundamentally contain nothing other than the Pentateuch. There must be at least an indication of everything in it. Thus Qoh., is not withdrawn from use because it begins with the words Torah and ends with the words of the Torah. (bSlab., 30b) These works are valid because they are Sinaitie (TDNT, Vol. V, p. 1056) though they are only formulated later. This part of the O.T is only an explanation and application of the Law which in and of itself is not unconditionally necessary. If Israel had not sinned, only the five parts of the Torah and the book of Joshua would have been given to it.
[24] Basically, the relation between writer and oral Torah is the same. Agreement with the Torah is a presupposition of the latter. This was tacit at first, but from the time of Jochana ben Zakkai the traditional material was given a basis in the Torah according to specific exegetical methods. In reality, the theory that traditional material has its origin in exegesis of the Torah is, of course, artificial. The validity of this material is dogmatic rather than historical.
b. The authoritative character of the Law is supported by a strict view of the divine origin of the Pentateuch:
Even if a man should say that the whole Torah is from heaven with the exception of this verse, which Moses spoke from his own lips rather than God, it is true of this man that he has despised the Word of Yahweh.
[25]
This is the place for the distinctive affirmation that every valid doctrine, every recognized Rabbinic statement, every acknowledged exegetical conclusion, was revealed to Moses at Sinai. This thesis owes its origin to a concern for the comprehensive divinity, and hence also the uniqueness and unity, of the Sinai revelation. It is a judgment of faith rather than a historical theory; hence it is not uniformly followed.
c. Rooted in this divine authority of the Law is the reserve which the Rabbis -increasingly- display respect of the question or reasons behind the Torah.
By your life neither the dead pollutes nor does water purify, but it is a statue of the Most High the reasons for which one should seek out,
[26]
In practice it is one of the favorite proofs of perspicacity and tool of edification to find reasons for the commandments. But this does not rest on any essential concern, least of all apologetic.
d. The strict and logical development of the authoritative character of the Torah is carried to such a degree that God Himself is bound to it:
The first three Laws of the day God sits and occupies Himself with the Torah.
[27]
Naturally, this should not be pressed dogmatically. It is more or less poetic mode of expression. But it is a typical sign of the all-dominate position of the Torah, in which God has wholly and utterly bound Himself.
e. All other relations between God on the one side, man, Israel, and the world on the other, are subject to the Torah. The Torah is the tool by which the world was made.
[28] At creation, God took council with the Torah; it is the master builder of every work. Indeed, the worldly man, and Israel is created simply for the sake of the Torah. History, too, is consistently brought under the scheme of the Law, its transgression or observance. Thus the Law holds a key position in the whole religious life of Rabbinic Judaism.
f. For this reason the Torah has decisive power in the interrelations of men with one another. Israel and the Gentiles are essentially differentiated by possession or non-possession of the Torah. But individuals within Israel are also differentiated by their knowledge of the Torah and their position towards it. This is why the scribe comes to occupy so important a position in community life. Even if a man learns scripture and the Mishnah but does not serve with a wise man (as a pupil) he is regarded as am ha arez. He who has learned scripture without Mishnah is regarded as bor. But he who has learned neither scripture or Mishnah comes under, e.g. Prov. 24:20.
[29]
g. The aim of the Torah is to show man what he should do and not do in order that, obedient to the Torah, he may have Gods approval, righteousness, life, and a share in the future world of God. Why has God given us the commandments? Is it not that we may do them and receive a reward?
[30]
God has willed to allow Israel to earn merits, and therefore He gave them much Torah and commandments, as it is said: In order to give Israel merits, it pleased Yahweh to make the Torah big and strong.
[31] (so Isa. 42:41 according to the Midr.)
This subjection to the Torah can also be seen from the angle that it implies for all the danger of death and condemnation. As the Torah turned to the hurt of the Gentiles because they did not learn it as they could and should have done, (bSota, 35b) so in Israel there are Rabbinic voices which express alarm at the difficulty of perfect obedience.
When Gamaliel read this verse, (Ezr. 18:9) he wept and said: He who observes all this righteousness, but not, alas! He who observes only one part is enough, but Akiba then said to him: on the authority of Lev. 18:24a, that on part is enough
[32]
h. The fact that there is life only by keeping the Torah gives special interest to the development of the Law as casuistiy. The Law and its development and practice gave the Jew his distinctive religious position. But this does not have to mean that true fulfillment of the Law is construed in terms of a casuistically observance of individual commandments and prohibitions, predominate though this may be.
[33]
Alongside this, we find sayings which maintain that the piety of the heart and fear of God are the essential prerequisite of study (bYoma., 72b). All that you do, do only out of love, S.Dt., 41 on 11:3.
A man who has knowledge of the Law without fear of God is like a treasurer to whom are entrusted the inner keys but not the outer keys of the house (of the house); how is he to enter?
[34]
Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that a man achieves righteousness and life by study and observance of the Torah.
The whole Rabbinic understanding of the Law is denoted by a term which is also in most instances the equivalent of the NT term nomoV.
1. The use of (Law, Hebrew equivalent) in the Rabbinic writings is basically the same as that of the end of the OT epoch, though there are some distinctive developments.
The Torah is primarily the Mosaic Law as Law. This is the basis of all other meanings of the Hebrew word in the Rabbinic writings. Thus law can be used for the Decalogue, but the Decalogue is not in any sense exclusive since the Torah.
Along with the use of Torah for the Law of Moses, we often find the word in the sense of the O.T. canon which contains the Law, I.e.; the Pentateuch. In most cases, it is hard to distinguish between Torah as the Law, and Torah as the Pentateuch.
Continued...
[1] Hdt., 1, 131, 4, 59; Aristoph., Nu., 329, 423
[2] So also in the charge against Socrates: adikei SwkrathV ouV men h poliV vomizei qeouV, Xenoph. Mem., I, 1, 1f. Only in Plat. Apol., 26cff does nomizein come to have the intellectual sense to acknowledge, to believe. (cf. Aristoph., Nu., 819, Eur. Suppl. 732) Cf. A Menzel, Hellankia, (1938), 17f.; J. Taye, Class. Rev., 51 (1937), 3ff.
[3] Hereclitus, Fr., 114 [I, 176, 5 ff., Deils] Cleschines, of Eleusis, (390-314 BC) Prometheus Vinctus; 150 f.; Pindar, of Cynoscephalae, near Phebes, Pindar, Fr., 169; Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 865.
[4] Aristot. Resp. Ath., 7,1; Andoc. Myst., 83; (cf. The Constitution of Dragontides, J.A.R. Munro, The Classic Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3-4, Jul.-Oct., 1938, pp.152)
[5] The nomoV of the polis is now simply a comparison. What law is in the state, God is for the world. Cf. Aristotle, Mund., 6, p.400ff. (cf. Epict., Diss., I, 12, 7, etc.)
[6] Muson, p.37, 2ff.; Archytas Pyth. In Stab. In Ecl., IV, 1, 135 [p.82, 20f, Hence]
[7] Chrysipp., Fr., II, 315, 23, v. Armin (nomoV men gar huin isoklinhV o qeoV, Ps.-Aristol. Mund., 6, p.400, 28ff.
[8] cf. Plut. De Exilio, 5, [II, 601b]
[9] Zeno Fr. 162 [I, 43, v. Arnim.=Diog.. L., 7, 887]
[10] There can be no question here of a qualitative sense of the use without the article. (Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. V, p. 1070, 15f)
[11] A Schlatter, Theol. d. Judt., 64
[12] Bell., 2, 229.
[13] Vit., 134
[14] P. Kruger, Philo u, Josephus, als Apologeten des Judith, 1906, p.20
[15] Ant. 11, 152
[16] Ap., 2, 173. Ant. 3, 94
[17] Ant. 12, 324; cf. 20, 218; 13, 297
[18] Ant. 13, 257f.
[19] Abr. 135
[20] Plant. 132
[21] Ebr. 47
[22] Spec., Leg., 3, 1
[23] A. Schurer, III, 700, Another reason why there is no uniformity in Philo is that he draws from different sources.
[24] b Ned., 22b
[25] bSanh. 99a
[26] Jochana ben Zakkai, Pesikt., 40a
[27] Ibid, bAZ, 3b
[28] Ibid, Ab., 3,14; S. Dt., 48 on 11:22
[29] Ibid, bSota, 22a.
[30] Ibid, S. Nu. 115, on 15:41
[31] Rabbi Chananiah ben Akashiah
[32] Jochana ben Zakkai, bSanh., 81a
[33] One occasionally finds among the Rabbis a sum of the Law in one or two central commandments, but this summarizing, like the distinction between light and heavy commandments (cf. Wohlgemuth, 13f.), is of no fundamental importance. In bShab., 31a, it is recounted that a Gentile asked Hillel whether he could tell him the Law while he stood on one foot, and Hillel answered: What you would not have done to you, do not to your neighbor. This is the whole Torah. All else is exposition. Go and learn it. David reduced it to 11 (commandments), Isaiah to 6...Micah to 3...Amos to one
Habakkuk to 1...Mak., 23b, 24a. But fundamentally each commandment is just as valid as any other, and such statements are more playful and edifying them of serious significance.
[34] Rabba b. R. Hona