The inadequacy of free-will theodicies

[Gadarene]

It's not a problem though. It's just a bad experience we all go through on our way to glory. Is it sad? Yes. Is it bad? Yes. But problems are things that are not solved and God clearly promises that for those in heaven, "There will be no more pain."

It's the name given to it in philosophy/theology. The point was that people concerned about the theodicy generally think evil is bad and aren't choosing it, regardless of whether or not they believe the same as you.

Heaven also does not justify God setting things up this way either. The implication of the problem is that such a problem should not be if God exists as described.

 

[tonybeer]

You've also got the problem of whether free will actually exists. This is a non trivial matter and the subject of ongoing scientific research.

 

[FatalHeart]

Well, if God is good that means evil has to exist in order for God not to be evil. Propensity to choose it may very well be unnecessary, but avoiding creating that propensity needs a good enough reason also. To say nobody wants bad things is to ignore a good majority of the way we live our lives.

 

[Ripheus27]

Well, if God is good that means evil has to exist in order for God not to be evil.

Of course the concept of evil must exist if the concept of its opposite exists (or: evil must exist in the abstract if good is also so to exist), but that is no reason for God to create instantiations of the concept of evil (there is no reason for God to render abstract evil in concrete reality).

 

[Crandaddy]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but free-will theodicies are those derived from the idea that God must allow moral evil as a potential effect of free will. Secondly, if God disallowed moral evil, then somehow free will would not exist (keep in mind that the model of volition in play, here, is the libertarian--metaphysical, not political--kind).

But why couldn't God make us able to

(A) choose between what is neutral, what is neutral but "different," what is obligated, and what is supererogatory,
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or,

(B) choose between what is neutral, what is obligated, and what is supererogatory?
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I'm a Christian, but with Gnostic tendencies, so I believe that one of the Persons of the Trinity is a sinner, and His sin was precisely that He created humanity as capable of sin when He plainly might have made us impeccable. However, this is a rather private opinion of mine; otherwise, it seems clear to me that God, defined as a morally perfect person, does not exist, because if He did exist and was perfect, He never would have needed to create humanity as capable of sinning.

It doesn't seem to me that we can have neutrality at the far end of our scale without making it evil. As I see it, evil doesn't have the fixed value you seem to presuppose. “Neutral” choices become evil when paired with available options that are better.

And I might add, by the way, that I've never liked supererogation. It's just always rubbed me the wrong way. If one has a choice between two options, and one of those options is clearly objectively better than the other, then it seems to me that one is obligated to choose the better option, and if he doesn't, then he is morally culpable for not choosing it. There's no such thing as merely “good enough” in my book.

We're to seek perfection; if we don't, then our lack of desire for it bespeaks a flaw in our character.

 

[Ripheus27]

It doesn't seem to me that we can have neutrality at the far end of our scale without making it evil. As I see it, evil doesn't have the fixed value you seem to presuppose. “Neutral” choices become evil when paired with available options that are better.

And I might add, by the way, that I've never liked supererogation. It's just always rubbed me the wrong way. If one has a choice between two options, and one of those options is clearly objectively better than the other, then it seems to me that one is obligated to choose the better option, and if he doesn't, then he is morally culpable for not choosing it. There's no such thing as merely “good enough” in my book.

We're to seek perfection; if we don't, then our lack of desire for it bespeaks a flaw in our character.

I suppose this is a utilitarian sort of objection, at least in terms of meta-ethics (and leaving out of sight the "satisficing" version of utilitarianism). But now the way I see it is that the concept of evil is not "the absence of good" but "the opposite of good," i.e. that which actively cancels out something good. Inactions don't really cancel anything out, and so inactions (a major class of "neutral" actions, I would think) are never really wrong, however much I might be upset at someone standing by and watching me drown (for instance). Or, if they're wrong, they're wrong in terms of some action that the bystander is engaged in (daydreaming that prompts this person to ignore me, perhaps, which daydreaming is what is really wrong, then).

Supererogation, on the other hand, might be a matter of actions that it is impossible to put a limit on, so to speak. Suppose, for example, that I have an infinite amount of money, but can only allot a finite amount of this to anyone. Presuming a duty to be charitable, I ought to allot my funds to others somehow, but since whatever number I choose, I could've chosen a number higher than, there is something perhaps supererogatory about various amounts I might decide on.

But aside from intuitive examples (intuitive to me, anyway), my discursive reason for believing in my spectrum of justificatory notions is, again, deontic logic.

 

[Crandaddy]

I suppose this is a utilitarian sort of objection, at least in terms of meta-ethics (and leaving out of sight the "satisficing" version of utilitarianism). But now the way I see it is that the concept of evil is not "the absence of good" but "the opposite of good," i.e. that which actively cancels out something good. Inactions don't really cancel anything out, and so inactions (a major class of "neutral" actions, I would think) are never really wrong, however much I might be upset at someone standing by and watching me drown (for instance). Or, if they're wrong, they're wrong in terms of some action that the bystander is engaged in (daydreaming that prompts this person to ignore me, perhaps, which daydreaming is what is really wrong, then).

Well, just because I think that neutral courses of action (or non-action, perhaps) can become evil in certain contexts doesn't make me a utilitarian. As I see it, particular instances of action-types don't change moral values with respect to utilitarian consequences, but rather with respect to the goods that the agent knows as available options at the time that he makes the choice.

Consider two scenarios, both involving non-active behavior:

(1) John is wearing his favorite jacket. He looks outside and notices that a torrential downpour has begun, and he doesn't want to get his jacket wet. So, John chooses not to go outside until the rain slacks up.

(2) John is wearing his favorite jacket. He's walking along and comes to a house that's on fire. He notices that there is a child is inside this house who will almost certainly die unless he goes inside to save it. He has good reason to believe that he can successfully save the child. However, should he choose to do so, there is a very good chance his jacket will be singed in the process, and he doesn't want to take it off and leave it outside because he's afraid someone will come along and steal it. So, John chooses not to go inside and save the child.

In both cases, John chooses a non-active course of behavior because he doesn't want to harm or lose his favorite jacket, but surely these two cases are not on a moral par. I don't think we can blame John for choosing not to walk out into the torrential downpour, but I think we certainly can blame him for choosing not to go into the house to save the child. We can blame him because he chooses the lesser of two goods. He chooses the lesser good of his jacket over the greater good of a person's life.

Supererogation, on the other hand, might be a matter of actions that it is impossible to put a limit on, so to speak. Suppose, for example, that I have an infinite amount of money, but can only allot a finite amount of this to anyone. Presuming a duty to be charitable, I ought to allot my funds to others somehow, but since whatever number I choose, I could've chosen a number higher than, there is something perhaps supererogatory about various amounts I might decide on.

I still don't think any action you should choose would be supererogatory. Perhaps it might be the case that there is no single best course of action. It might be the case that for whatever good and charitable course of action you can think of, some other course comes to mind that's even better.

But here I would simply say that, rather than there being a supererogatory course of action, there is a class of obligatory courses of action to choose from (instead of there being a single best, and therefore obligatory, course). Just as with single obligatory courses of action, this class of obligatory courses would be defined in contrast to at least one immoral course.

 

[Ripheus27]

In both cases, John chooses a non-active course of behavior because he doesn't want to harm or lose his favorite jacket, but surely these two cases are not on a moral par. I don't think we can blame John for choosing not to walk out into the torrential downpour, but I think we certainly can blame him for choosing not to go into the house to save the child. We can blame him because he chooses the lesser of two goods. He chooses the lesser good of his jacket over the greater good of a person's life.

That's how you interpret the immorality of what John does, but I don't see it that way. Now my way of condemning John's choice, here, would be on one level more involved than yours, but it has the benefit of conforming to a more elegant abstract pattern (evil being purely defined as that which cancels out the good, not in any event the mere absence of good). So for that among other reasons, I am intellectually required to continue to think of morality in the terms that I think of it in.

I still don't think any action you should choose would be supererogatory. Perhaps it might be the case that there is no single best course of action. It might be the case that for whatever good and charitable course of action you can think of, some other course comes to mind that's even better.

But here I would simply say that, rather than there being a supererogatory course of action, there is a class of obligatory courses of action to choose from (instead of there being a single best, and therefore obligatory, course). Just as with single obligatory courses of action, this class of obligatory courses would be defined in contrast to at least one immoral course.

This seems like you just wanting to avoid using a certain word, not a substantial objection to a concept. It's rather like how Kant (supposedly) tries to deny goodness beyond the call of duty, yet he still refers to "meritorious," "lax," "wide," or "imperfect" duties. The best models of abstract deontic logic available have, it seems to me, found a place for supererogation (among other categories transcending the traditional deontic hexagon), which is a good enough reason, in my book, to accept supererogation's existence. It is at least as good (and is probably better) a reason to judge one way or another on this question than an appeal to a like or dislike for the notion of going beyond the call of duty.