The Ethics of Cuteness

[variant]

I know, this is why I'm comparing me being constructed (against my will, involuntarily) and how I run on autopilot with ethical faculties or with being a gun, as opposed to using your ethical faculties or shooting the gun.

Which is oversimplified. You can't be separated from your construction and thus neither can your ethics.

Evolutionary consequences permeate your very being, so we can not simply disregard them as illegitimate as if you, the rational, sentient you is somehow separate from how you were constructed.

 

[Received]

Which is oversimplified. You can't be separated from your construction and thus neither can your ethics.

I'm not saying a person is. There's your construction and there's your action based on this construction. Credibility comes when you make the action rather than rely immediately on your construction; apropos our discussion, anyone who just lets his cuteness faculty push him involuntarily to action doesn't deserve credit for this action, because it's immediate and therefore he didn't work for it, i.e., put forth effort beyond his construction.

Evolutionary consequences permeate your very being, so we can not simply disregard them as illegitimate as if you, the rational, sentient you is somehow separate from how you were constructed.

I'm not disregarding them.

 

[variant]

I'm not saying a person is. There's your construction and there's your action based on this construction. Credibility comes when you make the action rather than rely immediately on your construction; apropos our discussion, anyone who just lets his cuteness faculty push him involuntarily to action doesn't deserve credit for this action, because it's immediate and therefore he didn't work for it, i.e., put forth effort beyond his construction.

I don't care if the impetus for action comes from his most rational faculties or his basal lizard brain, it comes from him.

Your point that he doesn't deserve credit for the latter is incorrect, he absolutely does, his very humanity made the decision.

I'm not disregarding them.

You are definitely disregarding them as ethically illegitimate goals.

I am saying they should be judged on their own merits, regardless of whether they come from your rational mind or your instincts.

 

[Received]

I don't care if the impetus for action comes from his most rational faculties or his basal lizard brain, it comes from him.

Your point that he doesn't deserve credit for the latter is incorrect, he absolutely does, his very humanity made the decision.

You are definitely disregarding them as ethically illegitimate goals.

I am saying they should be judged on their own merits, regardless of whether they come from your rational mind or your instincts.

A person's human making a decision = him not making it. Him = he's acting in such a way where it's against the grain of immediacy in choosing, i.e., is work. Me sneezing involuntarily isn't the same as me choosing to walk an old lady across a street. The former is involuntary whereas the latter is voluntary, and to equate both as relating to our humanity fails to notice this distinction, which is where ethical credit lies.

 

[variant]

A person's human making a decision = him not making it. Him = he's acting in such a way where it's against the grain of immediacy in choosing, i.e., is work. Me sneezing involuntarily isn't the same as me choosing to walk an old lady across a street. The former is involuntary whereas the latter is voluntary, and to equate both as relating to our humanity fails to notice this distinction, which is where ethical credit lies.

Now I suspect you are making some sincere assumptions about how voluntary your motivations are in general.

Let's apply this to a differn't ethical issue and see how well it holds up eh?

How about choosing sexual partners? Where do my instincts end there and I begin? Only when I am fighting my instincts?

I feel very skeptical that my rational ethical framework can be so easily liberated from my biological ethical framework, and this is by no means simple in my estimation.

Now the question isn't about helping cute kitty cats and babies but instead choosing a biological mate, is it still not ethical to weight aesthetics in my decisions?

 

[Received]

Now I suspect you are making some sincere assumptions about how voluntary your motivations are in general.

Let's apply this to a differn't ethical issue and see how well it holds up eh?

How about choosing sexual partners? Where do my instincts end there and I begin? Only when I am fighting my instincts?

I feel very skeptical that my rational ethical framework can be so easily liberated from my biological ethical framework, and this is by no means simple in my estimation.

Now the question isn't about helping cute kitty cats and babies but instead choosing a biological mate, is it still not ethical to weight aesthetics in my decisions?

I think we could simplify this whole thing by reducing it to talking about voluntary behaviors and involuntary behaviors which might be an expression of our nature. So choosing sexual partners means voluntary behavior insofar as I'm weighing pros and cons about a person and choosing the person who is more difficult to choose (e.g., someone who doesn't put out easily but is an overall better person), and involuntary behavior insofar as I'm attracted to this person and (to some degree) find myself looking at more attractive people, smiling at them, etc.

In these cases, the considerations comes into play with voluntary behaviors, such as with choosing a partner when I really "want" to be with someone who puts out; insofar as it's difficult for me to choose is how much I'm responsible. But because this is a pretty basic example of what I like and not about what's good or bad for a person to do, your example with sexual preference is purely aesthetic insofar as it involves things I like. Now, I could make this situation ethical if in an ethical context I choose something related to sex, e.g., if I choose not to have an affair with someone who I really would like to on some immediate level. Here ethical credibility refers to those actions that are voluntary insofar as they involve a sense of work or difficulty rather than immediacy and "can't help but doing it"-ness.

 

[variant]

I think we could simplify this whole thing by reducing it to talking about voluntary behaviors and involuntary behaviors which might be an expression of our nature. So choosing sexual partners means voluntary behavior insofar as I'm weighing pros and cons about a person and choosing the person who is more difficult to choose (e.g., someone who doesn't put out easily but is an overall better person), and involuntary behavior insofar as I'm attracted to this person and (to some degree) find myself looking at more attractive people, smiling at them, etc.

You can simplify it by breaking it into neat categories, the question is, should we? Is this correct?

What if behaviors are on a range all the way from deterministic instinct to pure rational choice? What if we are responding to genetics but choose to rationalize it or, a little from column a and b at once?

The problem is that the involuntary makeup we have does filter through into our supposed choices because no one achieves perfect self awareness, if such a thing is even possible, or even in the end good for you.

Does this make our makeup unethical? I say no. It's just not conscious, it does indeed have it's own ethics, it's own priorities, and it absolutely effects our choices.

And, it should be judged on the merits not, on a preconceived bias toward rational thinking.

In these cases, the considerations comes into play with voluntary behaviors, such as with choosing a partner when I really "want" to be with someone who puts out; insofar as it's difficult for me to choose is how much I'm responsible. But because this is a pretty basic example of what I like and not about what's good or bad for a person to do, your example with sexual preference is purely aesthetic insofar as it involves things I like.

It isn't, how this works for a thinking being is that your rational mind interplays with your biological framework for resolution, requiring you to sort it out.

Nothing voluntary about it, if we wish to neatly package the ideas, you struggle with your other self for dominance.

Now, I could make this situation ethical if in an ethical context I choose something related to sex, e.g., if I choose not to have an affair with someone who I really would like to on some immediate level. Here ethical credibility refers to those actions that are voluntary insofar as they involve a sense of work or difficulty rather than immediacy and "can't help but doing it"-ness.

And I disagree, both you as a rational being, and you as a biological entity have plenty of credibility as ethical actors, and even more interestingly since you act as one person, you can't have credibility any other way.

 

[Received]

Okay, I'm considering all this, but for now let's try this:

I have a disease that makes me randomly stick out my leg. A burglar is chasing a woman trying to take her purse. They pass by me and at a totally random moment (because I'm in shock and don't know what's going on), my disease acts up and out goes my leg, causing the burglar to trip and the woman to run free.

Do I deserve (ethical) credit for this?

 

[RDKirk]

I think if you use this assumption, you see that a whole freaking lot of what people do really isn't ethically motivated, because it isn't motivated by doing the right thing, but rather because, if something that's cute involuntarily invites our supportiveness, it therefore means we have no credit for actually ethically "working" for it.

What does it mean to ethically "work" for something? To do the right thing against the grain; doing the right thing ethically always means some degree of work or unpleasantness. How do we respond to things that are cute? Involuntarily with a sense of support; we can't help but support, and couldn't live with ourselves if we didn't support, the cute thing.

You're making several unsupported and unproven assertions.

1. Prove that an evolutionary impulse is necessarily unethical.

2. Prove that an ethical action must necessarily be "work" and "against the grain."

 

[RDKirk]

Aesthetics is an important and often irrational part of human ethics, so it's not that it's not a good enough justification, it's just that it isn't a very rational one.

The philosophy of aesthetics is very much rational. "Aesthetics," by definition, is the rationalization of the nature of beauty.

 

[variant]

Okay, I'm considering all this, but for now let's try this:

I have a disease that makes me randomly stick out my leg. A burglar is chasing a woman trying to take her purse. They pass by me and at a totally random moment (because I'm in shock and don't know what's going on), my disease acts up and out goes my leg, causing the burglar to trip and the woman to run free.

Do I deserve (ethical) credit for this?

You probably deserve an ethical demerit for being ungraceful around strangers with your weird leg kicking disease.

How about this one, you have a genetic proclivity to protect helpless people, and when you see someone get robbed your reasoning finds a way to justify you rushing in to protect them saving the person in the process.

Do you deserve ethical credit for this?

 

[variant]

The philosophy of aesthetics is very much rational. "Aesthetics," by definition, is the rationalization of the nature of beauty.

The philosophy of aesthetics is, but actual experience of aesthetics isn't abstract, mind oriented, rational.

 

[RDKirk]

It's not a problem at all. I'm talking about ethical credit, though. You can only get ethical credit for doing something that has ethical repercussions that involves work. Work is what confers credit, be it physical or intellectual. Credit is important because it's what allows a person to gain legitimacy as being ethical at all.

Says who about any of this? Who is handing out this "ethical credit?" What can I buy with it?

How is the credit value of an act determined? Merely by its level of difficulty? So then a given act done by a person who is otherwise a "good person" is less ethical than the same act done by a hoodlum?

 

[variant]

Says who about any of this? Who is handing out this "ethical credit?" What can I buy with it?

I asked that in post #9 I don't believe he answered it.

How is the credit value of an act determined? Merely by its level of difficulty? So then a given act done by a person who is otherwise a "good person" is less ethical than the same act done by a hoodlum?

Good point.

 

[RDKirk]

Okay, I'm considering all this, but for now let's try this:

I have a disease that makes me randomly stick out my leg. A burglar is chasing a woman trying to take her purse. They pass by me and at a totally random moment (because I'm in shock and don't know what's going on), my disease acts up and out goes my leg, causing the burglar to trip and the woman to run free.

Do I deserve (ethical) credit for this?

You're missing the point. The evolutionarily derived action is not random, it's purposeful. It can even be considered a perfect expression of Utilitarianism.

 

[Received]

You're missing the point. The evolutionarily derived action is not random, it's purposeful. It can even be considered a perfect expression of Utilitarianism.

I'm not. I'm distinguishing a faculty a person might have which makes ethical actions more immediate and easy from those actions which are harder and involve more exertion of will. And that's your criterion, by the way: something has ethical credibility in proportion to how much will power is exerted. Responding to a cute baby involves much less exertion than responding to an unattractive stranger, therefore with the latter example you have more ethical credit.

 

[RDKirk]

And that's your criterion, by the way: something has ethical credibility in proportion to how much will power is exerted.

That's not my criterion, that's your criterion, and I've challenged you to provide a logical proof of that assertion.

Moreover, you have yet to define terms like "ethical credibility" and "ethical credit."

The bottom line is that you're upset because "the cute" have a privilege advantage over the plain and you're trying to find some way to claim that's unethical.

But first you have to prove there is something inherently unethical about an action that advances human survival--and at least within both Utilitarianism and Hedonism, you'd be proven wrong.

Let's modify the Trolley Problem a bit. You've got a runaway trolley car full of people heading for a certain doom collision with a freight train crossing on another track. You stand at a rail switch able to divert the car to one of two safe tracks, but on one of the safe tracks is a homeless crack addict and on the other safe track is...your own daughter.

The constraints of the problem are such that you have absolutely no options other than:

1. Take no action and let the trolley full of people strike the freight train and be killed.
2. Divert the trolley to the safe track that will kill the homeless crack addict.
3. Divert the trolley to the safe track that will kill your daughter.

Now, according to your reasoning, the most ethical option is to divert the train to kill your daughter simply because it's the "most difficult" option.

Prove that.

And you still have to define what "ethical credit" means. I'd suppose it means "how close to a moral agent's desired 'end good' a particular action moves that moral agent," but you haven't told us yet what that "end good" might be.

 

[Received]

That's not my criterion, that's your criterion, and I've challenged you to provide a logical proof of that assertion.

That's your criterion insofar as I gave you what you asked for.

Moreover, you have yet to define terms like "ethical credibility" and "ethical credit."

Cf. this:

And that's your criterion, by the way: something has ethical credibility in proportion to how much will power is exerted.

I.e., the very section you quoted from answers the question you think is unanswered.

The bottom line is that you're upset because "the cute" have a privilege advantage over the plain and you're trying to find some way to claim that's unethical.

I'm not upset, and no, I'm not trying to do that. Here's your straw man.

But first you have to prove there is something inherently unethical about an action that advances human survival--and at least within both Utilitarianism and Hedonism, you'd be proven wrong.

I'm not talking about ethics, but about ethical credibility; you're speaking about the content of an ethical problem, and I'm speaking metaethically about the psychological aspects needed to fulfill credibility.

Let's modify the Trolley Problem a bit. You've got a runaway trolley car full of people heading for a certain doom collision with a freight train crossing on another track. You stand at a rail switch able to divert the car to one of two safe tracks, but on one of the safe tracks is a homeless crack addict and on the other safe track is...your own daughter.

The constraints of the problem are such that you have absolutely no options other than:

1. Take no action and let the trolley full of people strike the freight train and be killed.
2. Divert the trolley to the safe track that will kill the homeless crack addict.
3. Divert the trolley to the safe track that will kill your daughter.

Now, according to your reasoning, the most ethical option is to divert the train to kill your daughter simply because it's the "most difficult" option.

See above.

And you still have to define what "ethical credit" means. I'd suppose it means "how close to a moral agent's desired 'end good' a particular action moves that moral agent," but you haven't told us yet what that "end good" might be.

Cf. this:

And that's your criterion, by the way: something has ethical credibility in proportion to how much will power is exerted.

I'm assuming this very explicit definition is being looked over by you because you're looking at ethical problems whereas I'm looking at the stuff metaethically to the psychological aspects involved with ethics. I'd hope, anyways.

 

[variant]

I'm not talking about ethics, but about ethical credibility; you're speaking about the content of an ethical problem, and I'm speaking metaethically about the psychological aspects needed to fulfill credibility.

Actually, you've simply assigned value to the amount of willpower it takes to take an action rather arbitrarily. This would need some further justification.

Exertion of will power can not be in and of itself good or the train problem does indeed work itself out as RDkirk said it would.

Why is the psychological difficulty of the problem (of choosing some ethical action) in any way important to how ethical (or "ethically credible") ones actions are?

This gives the odd conclusion that people who are naturally good at making ethical decisions without psychological exertion (talented for goodness) are less ethically credible? How would that ever follow?

 

[Received]

Actually, you've simply assigned value to the amount of willpower it takes to take an action rather arbitrarily. This would need some further justification.

Exertion of will power can not be in and of itself good or the train problem does indeed work itself out as RDkirk said it would.

I'm not saying it's in and of itself good; I'm saying that willpower allows for a person to even enter an ethical dimension, whether this dimension results in a good or bad action. So a person who trips another person involuntarily isn't a bad person, just as he's not a good person if his involuntary tripping behavior saves someone. Now, very subtly and importantly, his body might be responsible for goodness or badness in these situations, but he (his self) isn't responsible, because selfhood is constituted in large part by will, without which you might refer to aspects of a person's body, personality, etc. when attempting to find a cause for an ethical act, but you're not referring to him in the moment. And a person who commits something without choosing (causing) it isn't responsible for it, i.e., deserves no credit for it. Period.

This gives the odd conclusion that people who are naturally good at making ethical decisions without psychological exertion (talented for goodness) are less ethically credible? How would that ever follow?

Yes. If you repeat a behavior more and more to the point that it's automatic, then you in that moment of ethical action aren't responsible or credible for it except in the most minimal ways involved with making a very basic act of will (kind of like how much will is involved in working a vending machine). You are, however, indirectly responsible for it if indeed your character is such that this action is automatic. Why? Because you've shaped your character through continual exertions (freely) toward the good. This direct/indirect distinction, I think, is very important; at the end of the day, though, an automatic action is precisely that: an action that a person (a self) did no action or expressed no (or minimal) exertion in committing.