The Challenger: What's Wrong with this Picture?

[AV1611VET]

To the OP...

I think it is likely the crew didn't know of the potential problem. This would be consistent with NASA decisions like the one they made not to tell the Shuttle Columbia crew of problems. Though one is before and the other is after the problem. NASA management probably thought the potential gain (image, financial, media, etc.) was greater than the potential risk and felt they had a right to make that decision.

"After one of the MMTs (Mission Management Team) when possible damage to the orbiter was discussed, he (Flight Director Jon Harpold) gave me his opinion: 'You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS (Thermal Protection System). If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?" HERE

Thank you, jacks, for the info!

Okay, back to insulting AV...

 

[John Caldwell]

Please take a look at this picture of the crew of the Challenger -- (God rest their souls) -- boarding:

Notice that there is not ONE SINGLE LOOK of concern on anyone's face?

Why is this?

Despite the theories of Bob Ebeling, Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly, who tried to stop the launch, not one of these seven look the least bit concerned.

Were they sequestered from the facts put forth by these three men?

I doubt it. After so many successful (even with issues) they probably took for granted the possibility of such a tragedy occurring was low. Kinda like we rarely think of the very real possibility we could be killed in an automobile accident coming home from the store, although at some level we know it is a possibility.

 

[AV1611VET]

I doubt it. After so many successful (even with issues) they probably took for granted the possibility of such a tragedy occurring was low. Kinda like we rarely think of the very real possibility we could be killed in an automobile accident coming home from the store, although at some level we know it is a possibility.

But I wonder if they knew that, behind closed doors, there were three men trying to stop them from going up?

 

[John Caldwell]

But I wonder if they knew that, behind closed doors, there were three men trying to stop them from going up?

I don't know. On one hand I'd like to think they were briefed, but on another I don't know that they would be if operations dismissed the engineering concerns.

I suspect if they knew about the potential issue it was from the prospective of the management team.

The sad part is the tragedy was preventable.

 

[AV1611VET]

I don't know. On one hand I'd like to think they were briefed, but on another I don't know that they would be if operations dismissed the engineering concerns.

My guess, going by the looks on their faces, is that they were not briefed.

Nice to meet you, by the way.

Welcome to CF!

 

[John Caldwell]

My guess, going by the looks on their faces, is that they were not briefed.

Nice to meet you, by the way.

Welcome to CF!

It does look like they ate mot concerned.

Good to meet you too.

I've been around for awhile, but working swing shift now so I have more time to kill (we call it "work"). ;-)

 

[AV1611VET]

(we call it "work"). ;-)

Watch the four-letter words here!

I'm surprised that got through CF's wordfilter!

 

[LeafByNiggle]

It appears that three men tried to prevent seven people from carrying out a mission; but said three men were outvoted by others who kept these mens' concerns from reaching these seven people.

Whenever an agency or a company or an army or any other group with an established decision-making structure has to make a decision (such as whether to launch Challenger or whether to bring back Classic Coke or whether to attack at dawn), an effective decision-making procedure is normally followed. If any decision could be countermanded by three objectors then today we would still have only New Coke. It is easy to point out after the fact those instances when the three or four objectors were in fact right. And in the case of Challenger, the agency did undergo a thorough reform of its decision-making policies and procedures and realized that the decision to launch Challenger was too heavily influenced by outside pressure to show a success to the public for political reasons. However that does not automatically elevate the importance of anyone who objects to a group decision in generally. What it does do is point to deficiencies in the group decision-making process in some instances cases.

The astronauts on Challenger knew and accepted the then-current decision-making process and did not expect to be consulted on every detail that those on the ground were handling. Astronauts, especially the pilot/commander, have a lot of mental responsibilities during launch. It would be detrimental to their performance and possibly a threat to the safety of the mission if they were inundated with every bit of information being handled by the team on the ground. The astronauts knew this and accepted it when then signed on.

 

[AV1611VET]

The astronauts on Challenger knew and accepted the then-current decision-making process and did not expect to be consulted on every detail that those on the ground were handling. Astronauts, especially the pilot/commander, have a lot of mental responsibilities during launch. It would be detrimental to their performance and possibly a threat to the safety of the mission if they were inundated with every bit of information being handled by the team on the ground. The astronauts knew this and accepted it when then signed on.

I could understand this, if we're talking about "inundating them" with minutiae about what kind of shoes to wear or something.

But evidently the evidence that was available to these three men to convince the gainsayers just how much danger the crew was in wasn't strong enough to make an impact, other than to call for a vote?

Joe: Okay, let's get this bus rolling. We need to get these fifty people to Boston asap.
Bob: Wait! Look here. The left front tire is completely bald. I don't think they should go.
Joe: We've delayed this trip long enough. If we don't go today, we'll have to wait until Spring.
Bob: But that tire could blow any minute.
Joe: Okay ... quick ... let's all take a vote. Those in favor of departure say AYE.

[after the vote]

Joe: Okay, get'em aboard. We roll in ten minutes.
Bob: At least let them know what they're up against, will you?
Joe: Are you kidding? It's all fifty to Boston, or none go at all.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I could understand this, if we're talking about "inundating them" with minutiae about what kind of shoes to wear or something.

It is easy to see, after the fact, that this particular decision turned out to be crucial. But you don't know about the hundreds of other decisions that, at the time, might have been judged just as crucial.

This is a general problem that people have in looking backwards in time. There is no way we can put ourselves in the position of those who make decisions when we have knowledge of how things did turn out - knowledge they did not have. Sure, we can point to signs and claim "They should have known." But again, that is easy to say only because we know how it turned out.

The mistake on the Challenger was NOT that the astronauts were not told about this dispute. The mistake was in not recognizing the truth in what those three men said. Here is what likely would have happened if they had been told:

Launch Control: "Commander Scobee, we just wanted to let you know that three of our engineers have suggested this launch is not safe."

Scobee: "Roger, Launch Launch. What do you guys think? It is safe?"

Launch Control: "Well, nothing is 100%. But we think the risk is minimal."

Scobee: "Roger, Launch Control. OK, then, Let's do it!"

On the other hand, if NASA had simply looked at the data objectively and disregarded public pressure, it might have gone this way:

Launch Control: "Challenger, we've got some concerns that this launch is unacceptably risky because of the low temperature at launch time. I know you guys have been looking forward to this, but we're scrubbing the launch for today."

Scobee: "Roger, Launch Control. Yeah, too bad. Better luck next time, I guess."

 

[Enilorac]

This is a general problem that people have in looking backwards in time. There is no way we can put ourselves in the position of those who make decisions when we have knowledge of how things did turn out - knowledge they did not have. Sure, we can point to signs and claim "They should have known." But again, that is easy to say only because we know how it turned out.

Hindsight is 20/20. From the aftermath, we can see where the wrong decisions were, where the mistakes were made. At that particular point in time, they did not have the information we have now. It was claimed that launching below 53F was dangerous, but the SRB with the most blowby was launched at over 70F. So, the claim of cold weather effects was not clear. Yes, people made the wrong (in hindsight) decision, for all the wrong reasons (schedule pressures, bad press, etc). Columbia was a different story, they knew w/in 24 hours that something had happened to the wing. They also had the evidence of the Flight Day 2 object that came off the shuttle and was tracked by radar. I believe there it was a case of "stay in your lane". There were certain staff who ended up paying the price for their stubbornness

 

[ruthiesea]

Please take a look at this picture of the crew of the Challenger -- (God rest their souls) -- boarding:

Notice that there is not ONE SINGLE LOOK of concern on anyone's face?

Why is this?

Despite the theories of Bob Ebeling, Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly, who tried to stop the launch, not one of these seven look the least bit concerned.

Were they sequestered from the facts put forth by these three men?

I saw a movie quite a long time ago and I don’t remember the name but it was about the engineer’s decision to launch despite the weather. As I recall it used a transcript of the meeting. I don’t believe that the astronauts were consulted but, as I said, I saw it a long time ago.

additional information: Groupthink and the Challenger Explosion.

 

[AV1611VET]

I saw a movie quite a long time ago and I don’t remember the name but it was about the engineer’s decision to launch despite the weather. As I recall it used a transcript of the meeting. I don’t believe that the astronauts were consulted but, as I said, I saw it a long time ago.

They may have had concerns about the weather, but certainly not the O-rings.

Those three men who did have concerns with them were voted off the island.

 

[Yaaten]

I'm not a conspiracy theorist (far from it), but this is interesting.

On the left is Judith Resnik, astronaut. She died in the Challenger accident. On the right is Judith Resnik, and she's still alive and is at Yale University teaching law. Judith Resnik the astronaut was born in 1949, but I can't seem to find the age of the other Judith Resnik, but judging by her appearance she'd be about the same age. They do look rather similar, don't they?
The funny thing is, the other astronauts who were on the Challenger shuttle when it blew up have been showing up alive and well too.

Here's another one.

I know, it's all "just a coincidence". Sure. Whatev. And the moon is made of green cheese.

 

[AV1611VET]

I know, it's all "just a coincidence". Sure. Whatev. And the moon is made of green cheese.

Hi, Yaaten.

Welcome to the forums; and nice to meet you.

You're certainly welcome to your opinion, but I think someone's watched Capricorn One and taken it a but too seriously.

 

[Yaaten]

Hi, Yaaten.

Welcome to the forums; and nice to meet you.

You're certainly welcome to your opinion, but I think someone's watched Capricorn One and taken it a but too seriously.

I thought that was a good movie, but no, I wouldn't confuse what's clearly fiction with facts. I realise that we often see patterns and connections where none actually exist, and that our reality, being as finite as it is, will sometimes repeat certain events, sequences and so on (like two people looking exactly the same, being the same age, and having the exact same name).
Even so, when it does happen, it's really hard not to notice it and think that something else is going on, even when we don't have the evidence we would need to be absolutely sure.

 

[AV1611VET]

I thought that was a good movie, but no, I wouldn't confuse what's clearly fiction with facts. I realise that we often see patterns and connections where none actually exist, and that our reality, being as finite as it is, will sometimes repeat certain events, sequences and so on (like two people looking exactly the same, being the same age, and having the exact same name).
Even so, when it does happen, it's really hard not to notice it and think that something else is going on, even when we don't have the evidence we would need to be absolutely sure.

No argument there!