Syllogism (For the Possibility of God in a Screwy Universe)

[quatona]

Right, and I provided how God can be understood, depending on the context with which he applies to a metaphysical problem. See 2. in the previous post between us.

Leaving out those rabbits that you wisely didn´t ask me to chase, what´s left is the "First Cause" claim.
There´s something strange about it:
The quest for a "First Cause" originally was necessitated by the very worldview that thrived on mechanism and causality.
Now, your entire "screwy" argument is rejoicing over the very fact that modern science might suggest that mechanisms and causality aren´t all there is to it, i.e. that things might not necessarily have to be caused in the way we used to think.
Yet, you feel that the deconstruction of causality as the requirement for an explanation strengthens the "First Cause" idea while actually it would seem to render it unnecessary.

I think it does, but only if we add another element. We could say that explanations can be divided three different ways: we can explain something according to how it 1) is caused by something else and the details of "something else" are fully understood, by 2) caused by something else and the details of this "something else" are partially understood, and 3) caused by something else and this "something else" is entirely beyond our understanding.

(emphasis added)
Unfortunately, the God=First Cause claim doesn´t even attempt to do any of the three. As far as I can see there isn´t (and has never been) an attempt of explaining how God caused the universe. The "hypothesis" merely asserts that Goddidit. That provides amazingly little in terms of an explanation. "The universe needs a cause. The cause is God. God is defined as the First Cause." actually does nothing but give the non-explanation a name.

Now, I'm not claiming that God belongs to 3). I think through a little deduction, you can get at some pretty reasonable properties God would have if He existed. But that's nothing new. What's interesting is that, so far as I know, absolutely nothing fits the criterion of 1). There's always more details objectively there than we can understand in the sense of connecting causes to effects while knowing everything about both. Quantum mechanics proves that this is the case with everything physical (which, for our purposes, is pretty much everything except a possibly existing God), given that the subatomic level, there's screwiness going on we don't understand; so by extension everything that exists is fundamentally mysterious.

I have no problem with this conclusion (and I fail to see how QM etc. was required to arrive at it).
I´m just not seeing how this suggest one particular mysterious non-explanation to be plausible (i.e. more plausible than any other non-explanation that appeals to the fact that it needn´t explain anything because it´s all a mystery, anyway).

It's screwy, but screwy isn't tantamount to contradictory.

But "contradictory" is pretty "screwy".
It seems that this is the main problem when "screwy" becomes a positive criterion of a hypothesis: You want it screwy, but not too screwy.

A self-created entity is a contradiction. Sounds like a cop out, but I think there's something truly to it.

Please explain how it´s contradictory (as opposed to merely screwy), and please explain how it´s contradictory when the postulation of a "self-existing" entity is not.

 

[Elioenai26]

Leaving out those rabbits that you wisely didn´t ask me to chase, what´s left is the "First Cause" claim.
There´s something strange about it:
The quest for a "First Cause" originally was necessitated by the very worldview that thrived on mechanism and causality.
Now, your entire "screwy" argument is rejoicing over the very fact that modern science might suggest that mechanisms and causality aren´t all there is to it, i.e. that things might not necessarily have to be caused in the way we used to think.
Yet, you feel that the deconstruction of causality as the requirement for an explanation strengthens the "First Cause" idea while actually it would seem to render it unnecessary.




(emphasis added)
Unfortunately, the God=First Cause claim doesn´t even attempt to do any of the three. As far as I can see there isn´t (and has never been) an attempt of explaining how God caused the universe. The "hypothesis" merely asserts that Goddidit. That provides amazingly little in terms of an explanation. "The universe needs a cause. The cause is God. God is defined as the First Cause." actually does nothing but give the non-explanation a name.


I have no problem with this conclusion (and I fail to see how QM etc. was required to arrive at it).
I´m just not seeing how this suggest one particular mysterious non-explanation to be plausible (i.e. more plausible than any other non-explanation that appeals to the fact that it needn´t explain anything because it´s all a mystery, anyway).


But "contradictory" is pretty "screwy".
It seems that this is the main problem when "screwy" becomes a positive criterion of a hypothesis: You want it screwy, but not too screwy.

Please explain how it´s contradictory (as opposed to merely screwy), and please explain how it´s contradictory when the postulation of a "self-existing" entity is not.

quatona, the idea of a self creating entity is absurd for the simple fact that this entity would have had to exist before it existed to create itself! So I hope you do not want to take this ridiculous idea as an entertainable explanation.

Self existing on the other hand, simply means that an entity necessarily exists because it's existence is not contingent on anything outside of itself. This entity never comes into being, but always is. It is never created but is eternal. This is exactly what atheists claim that the universe is.That it is just eternal and exists necessarily. This position has been shown to simply be untenable however, in light of recent research in physics and cosmology, as well as in the fact that a number of actually infinite days cannot be traversed.

Nor will you be let off the hook by saying that the universe does not need a cause. Atheist German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer would accuse you of committing the "hack fallacy" if you did. To dismiss the causal principle when it comes to the universe is simply unwarranted and question begging for the atheist.

 

[quatona]

quatona, the idea of a self creating entity is absurd for the simple fact that this entity would have had to exist before it existed to create itself! So I hope you do not want to take this ridiculous idea as an entertainable explanation.

Self existing on the other hand, simply means that an entity necessarily exists because it's existence is not contingent on anything outside of itself. This entity never comes into being, but always is. It is never created but is eternal. This is exactly what atheists claim that the universe is.That it is just eternal and exists necessarily. This position has been shown to simply be untenable however, in light of recent research in physics and cosmology, as well as in the fact that a number of actually infinite days cannot be traversed.

Nor will you be let off the hook by saying that the universe does not need a cause. Atheist German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer would accuse you of committing the "hack fallacy" if you did. To dismiss the causal principle when it comes to the universe is simply unwarranted and question begging for the atheist.

I prefer to discuss Received´s ideas with Received himself. Thank you.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The universe is absurd.
Art is the imitation of nature.
CARROTS!!!

Something like this right?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

But that leads to yet another, more subtle point. I'm not arguing for God in the gaps because I don't really have a "gap" to fill. I'm not trying to fill in a lack of knowledge about a particular subject, analogous to a person who is filling in a hole around which we completely understands the terrain. I'm speaking of what could more precisely be called God at the cliff. God is a possible (I never said it was the case, by the way, so presumably that knocks me out of the "gaps" territory) explanation for things that we simply don't know now, but are very possibly incompatible with our understanding -- beyond our cognitive faculties completely -- much like (to extend Chomsky's analogy) a rat in a maze involving prime numbers doesn't understand what it's doing, but beings that are to a very large degree entirely beyond its understanding (namely the humans who subjected it to the maze) do.

God is to us as we are to the rats in the maze.

God is a possible [...] explanation for things that we simply don't know now, but are very possibly incompatible with our understanding -- beyond our cognitive faculties completely -- [...]

And there is the problem. How on earth are we going to tell whether the statement "God is a possible explanation for XY" is even true? I am not sure anybody -- and I am talking about real people -- is able to meaningfully answer that with a Yes or a No. How about if I just say "No, God is not a possible explanation for a screwy universe"? What are you going to do about it?

 

[Received]

Leaving out those rabbits that you wisely didn´t ask me to chase, what´s left is the "First Cause" claim.
There´s something strange about it:
The quest for a "First Cause" originally was necessitated by the very worldview that thrived on mechanism and causality.
Now, your entire "screwy" argument is rejoicing over the very fact that modern science might suggest that mechanisms and causality aren´t all there is to it, i.e. that things might not necessarily have to be caused in the way we used to think.
Yet, you feel that the deconstruction of causality as the requirement for an explanation strengthens the "First Cause" idea while actually it would seem to render it unnecessary.

Good point! However, I would emphasize (which you have to even when you're assuming a mechanistic interpretation) that the "first cause" of the universe is different than a cause that works within the universe. Moreover, mechanism isn't necessarily ruled out when trying to explain all phenomena; just those that apply to physics (har har), which is arguably different than metaphysical applications.

Regardless, how is understanding God in different "angles" (First Cause, Sustainer, Morality Legislator, etc.) not at the very least a usable understanding that makes "God" a usable concept?

(emphasis added)
Unfortunately, the God=First Cause claim doesn´t even attempt to do any of the three. As far as I can see there isn´t (and has never been) an attempt of explaining how God caused the universe. The "hypothesis" merely asserts that Goddidit. That provides amazingly little in terms of an explanation. "The universe needs a cause. The cause is God. God is defined as the First Cause." actually does nothing but give the non-explanation a name.

Disagree. When you fuse God as the First Cause with the reductio ad absurdum conclusion that not everything can possibly have a cause (if it did, we would have an infinite regress, therefore an infinite past, but an infinite past causal chain is impossible given that it doesn't allow for the present moment), you can make a point that God can very well stand for the metaphysical placeholder that is the "first cause". I would emphasize that I can find nothing wrong with this reductio ad absurdum argument when taken out of the context of metaphysical-religious applications. What usually happens here, though, is people are like, "Hey, if God can be the first cause, why not the universe?" But that, to save another rabbit (if you'd like, we can chase), is another point, and in my view a wrong one.

I have no problem with this conclusion (and I fail to see how QM etc. was required to arrive at it).
I´m just not seeing how this suggest one particular mysterious non-explanation to be plausible (i.e. more plausible than any other non-explanation that appeals to the fact that it needn´t explain anything because it´s all a mystery, anyway).

I don't see how God wouldn't be an explanation; He would be a partial explanation (not completely mysterious, not anywhere near fully known like anything that's out there in the physical world given our natural epistemic limitations), and He would be one who would fit the metaphysical requirements given the argument in question (e.g., First Cause), and per the OP would be one "screwy" enough to fit with how screwy the universe in general and in many particular examinations is.

But "contradictory" is pretty "screwy".

Disagreed! The most essential ingredient with "Screwy" is being beyond our cognitive faculties, not inviting contradiction on very basic metaphysical principles we hold. (I realize that QM appears contradictory, but I'm of the camp that this is only because we haven't -- yet -- realized a more fundamental principle that explains, and would make non-contradictory, what we're observing at present.)

It seems that this is the main problem when "screwy" becomes a positive criterion of a hypothesis: You want it screwy, but not too screwy.

Eh, I think it's fair to say I'm offering God as a more screwier explanation, and therefore he would fit better with a non-mechanistic (i.e., more screwy) universe than if we were in the 19th century and had a mechanistic, much more (apparently) understandable one. And "screwy" isn't the same as contradictory.

Please explain how it´s contradictory (as opposed to merely screwy), and please explain how it´s contradictory when the postulation of a "self-existing" entity is not.

"Self-existing" (i.e., eternally existing, everlastingly existing, etc.) is contradictory in the sense of our laws of physics (laws of thermodynamics, etc.), but it isn't contradictory metaphysically (i.e., with regard to basic understandings of causality). Downright contradictory things, particularly ones that work against causality, are both metaphysically and physically (i.e., scientifically) contradictory.

You should try the Control+F and see how many "screwy" words you find.

 

[Received]

And there is the problem. How on earth are we going to tell whether the statement "God is a possible explanation for XY" is even true? I am not sure anybody -- and I am talking about real people -- is able to meaningfully answer that with a Yes or a No. How about if I just say "No, God is not a possible explanation for a screwy universe"? What are you going to do about it?

Let's stretch this. Given the necessary ingredient of falsifiability with regard to scientific-applicable phenomena, how on earth are we going to tell whether X explanation right now (no matter how correct it seems to be) isn't going to undo itself by being corrected with a better explanation in the future, even the distant future? I see no fundamental difference between the epistemological difficulty you brought up and the difficulty that (if we let it by looking close enough) is inherent in all types of knowledge claims, including physical/scientific (where falsifiability applies) ones.

I think we're left with, "Does God -- or anything -- fit best given our attempts to put together metaphysical or physical observations and principles?" And I think God does fit the best with many of our basic metaphysical problems -- and, going back to the OP, even (ironically to many) fits better with our current post-QM understanding of the universe (i.e., a universe where everything is fundamentally very, very screwy and strange) than what had culminated as the late 19th, early 20th century mechanistic universe. It's just that people don't like God as an answer, often for not unreasonable of understandable reasons: because, you know, religious people are dumb, or that we'd have a tricky time wading through the pluralistic collection of religious interpretations at our door (after you admit that God exists, the next question is what form He might take, which leads to religion), or that we're (fallaciously) spoiled against God because his existence and spirituality in general seems like fantasy, etc.

Perhaps the most popular reason, though, why people aren't content to accept God even as a likely candidate for metaphysical problems is because they fallaciously apply parsimony (a scientific principle, which arguably with QM has exceptions) to metaphysical problems. So, like, God can't exist as a first cause, because that would mean something beyond the physical or beyond the universe would have to exist; but that isn't parsimonious, given that the universe is all we have or know, so God doesn't apply.

 

[Received]

The universe is absurd.
Art is the imitation of nature.
CARROTS!!!

Something like this right?

Not really, no.

We're talking broccoli, not carrots. GS, you really need some work on logic.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Let's stretch this. Given the necessary ingredient of falsifiability with regard to scientific-applicable phenomena, how on earth are we going to tell whether X explanation right now (no matter how correct it seems to be) isn't going to undo itself by being corrected with a better explanation in the future, even the distant future? I see no fundamental difference between the epistemological difficulty you brought up and the difficulty that (if we let it by looking close enough) is inherent in all types of knowledge claims, including physical/scientific (where falsifiability applies) ones.

I think we're left with, "Does God -- or anything -- fit best given our attempts to put together metaphysical or physical observations and principles?" And I think God does fit the best with many of our basic metaphysical problems -- and, going back to the OP, even (ironically to many) fits better with our current post-QM understanding of the universe (i.e., a universe where everything is fundamentally very, very screwy and strange) than what had culminated as the late 19th, early 20th century mechanistic universe.

I just think that the ball is in your court.

It's just that people don't like God as an answer, often for not unreasonable of understandable reasons: because, you know, religious people are dumb, or that we'd have a tricky time wading through the pluralistic collection of religious interpretations at our door (after you admit that God exists, the next question is what form He might take, which leads to religion), or that we're (fallaciously) spoiled against God because his existence and spirituality in general seems like fantasy, etc.

Perhaps the most popular reason, though, why people aren't content to accept God even as a likely candidate for metaphysical problems is because they fallaciously apply parsimony (a scientific principle, which arguably with QM has exceptions) to metaphysical problems. So, like, God can't exist as a first cause, because that would mean something beyond the physical or beyond the universe would have to exist; but that isn't parsimonious, given that the universe is all we have or know, so God doesn't apply.

It doesn't really matter whether or not people are going to like your explanation for the screwy universe or not. It also does not matter why (persumably) people don't like the idea of God. It is also fairly irrelevant where they err or not.

However, the dumbness of religious people is a real problem. And while I am not sure how you meant your statement about how religious people are dumb, it is pretty much certain that there are plenty of common folk, plenty of people who lack any kind of education whatsoever, or just have not much education, or just the wrong kind -- the whole spectrum. And trying to square off metaphysical theories, involving the universe along with its quantum mechanics and relativity, and a God that is a little bit more than just more or less confused flowery language, with this religious hoi polloi is going to be tough. And while you might not have to go for the lowest common denominator you still might not want to aim to high or else you are going to deprive yourself of the soil from which the concept "God" grew.

That the other thing about the pluralism is going to be tricky is something that I emphatically agree with. And again, while you mightn't have to go for the lowest common denominator you still might not want to aim too high.

But technically, these are not my problems.



Of course, there is a much simpler solution. However, with this solution it would look a little awkward and out of place to argue if God exists or not and how likely or not.

 

[Received]

I just think that the ball is in your court.

Yeah. But to be fair, when we're speaking about explanations for phenomena, whether physical or metaphysical (and, actually, there are plenty of people who are argue that there is no meaningful distinction between the two), the ball is in everyone's court. I just think that God is frowned upon for a few of the reasons mentioned last post, which you have addressed quite well.

It doesn't really matter whether or not people are going to like your explanation for the screwy universe or not. It also does not matter why (persumably) people don't like the idea of God. It is also fairly irrelevant where they err or not.

I disagree. The biases people have against perfectly reasonable metaphysical explanations, in this case God, does and will continue to limit their willingness to apply these explanations. You can see it by some of the counter-arguments they make, which have an air of derision to them (and are very much questionable as explanations), such as the flying spaghetti monster or the invisible pink unicorn; these are explanations that, by simply using them, are both symptoms and continuing causes for holding incredulity toward the religious-spiritual camp. Or you have more subtle facts like my friend noticed. He was starting a Master's in philosophy, and found himself surrounded by a lot of derisive folk when spirituality was brought up -- this despite the fact that philosophy of religion is a very strong subject for theistic (as well as atheistic and agnostic) types, and his friends were aware of this. He said that after getting to know them, it all went back to a childhood-implanted ax grind toward religion; this ax motivated all types of arguments, and more importantly an unswayable skepticism toward any spiritual explanation for metaphysical debates, that the "average" person doesn't have. That's anecdotal, of course, but to me merely a drop in the bucket of psychological motivations people have against certain explanations (here God). I follow William James to some degree with his idea of willed belief.

However, the dumbness of religious people is a real problem. And while I am not sure how you meant your statement about how religious people are dumb, it is pretty much certain that there are plenty of common folk, plenty of people who lack any kind of education whatsoever, or just have not much education, or just the wrong kind -- the whole spectrum. And trying to square off metaphysical theories, involving the universe along with its quantum mechanics and relativity, and a God that is a little bit more than just more or less confused flowery language, with this religious hoi polloi is going to be tough. And while you might not have to go for the lowest common denominator you still might not want to aim to high or else you are going to deprive yourself of the soil from which the concept "God" grew.

I think it will be impossible. But I don't think less educated people really seek out the same hard-boiled arguments like spoiled skeptics like you and me would (by the way, I'd emphasize that my argument presented in the OP isn't for proof, but the possibility for, adding up credibility for God as a possible explanation given our current epistemic climate), so we have other methods. Put differently, complicated answers, such as by appealing to apologetics or philosophy, are for those who have already opened these doors. I'm far from the belief that rationality is tied with ethics in that everyone should at all times justify their beliefs reasonably.

But with the religious people are dumb deal, this goes more with psychological motivations: the "argument" is that religious people are dumb, nothing significant associated with said religious people can be good (reasonable), therefore God can't be good or reasonable, so I'm going to leave religion and spirituality as possible metaphysical explanations alone.

Of course, there is a much simpler solution. However, with this solution it would look a little awkward and out of place to argue if God exists or not and how likely or not.

Which solution is this?

 

[Elioenai26]

I just think that the ball is in your court.




It doesn't really matter whether or not people are going to like your explanation for the screwy universe or not. It also does not matter why (persumably) people don't like the idea of God. It is also fairly irrelevant where they err or not.

However, the dumbness of religious people is a real problem. And while I am not sure how you meant your statement about how religious people are dumb, it is pretty much certain that there are plenty of common folk, plenty of people who lack any kind of education whatsoever, or just have not much education, or just the wrong kind -- the whole spectrum. And trying to square off metaphysical theories, involving the universe along with its quantum mechanics and relativity, and a God that is a little bit more than just more or less confused flowery language, with this religious hoi polloi is going to be tough. And while you might not have to go for the lowest common denominator you still might not want to aim to high or else you are going to deprive yourself of the soil from which the concept "God" grew.

That the other thing about the pluralism is going to be tricky is something that I emphatically agree with. And again, while you mightn't have to go for the lowest common denominator you still might not want to aim too high.

But technically, these are not my problems.



Of course, there is a much simpler solution. However, with this solution it would look a little awkward and out of place to argue if God exists or not and how likely or not.

Yes please do tell us this solution of yours which you claim is much more simpler than the explanation of Divine Creation.

I am all ears.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Which solution is this?

You define God as the fundamental part of the world/universe. That way you wouldn't have to be bothered about whether God exists or not, or whether it is more compatible with the recent, scewy universe or with more mechanical one. You would approach the subject from a total different angle.

And the other issues would go too, as you wouldn't have to be bothered by more ... uhh ... childish conceptions and/simply wrong apologetics.

 

[Gadarene]

Received, maybe you missed it, but I haven't seen a reply from you on post 15 (or maybe I missed the reply)

 

[Lord Emsworth]

This is a common response.

Really? I don't think it is actually that common a response. You should rather be like: :o

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I disagree. The biases people have against perfectly reasonable metaphysical explanations, in this case God, does and will continue to limit their willingness to apply these explanations.

Yes, their willingness. I meant that this shouldn't matter to you.

But with the religious people are dumb deal, this goes more with psychological motivations: the "argument" is that religious people are dumb, nothing significant associated with said religious people can be good (reasonable), therefore God can't be good or reasonable, so I'm going to leave religion and spirituality as possible metaphysical explanations alone.

Be that as it may, it is not as if there weren't ample cause for such thinking.

 

[Received]

Received, maybe you missed it, but I haven't seen a reply from you on post 15 (or maybe I missed the reply)

No, I got overwhelmed. When I see lots of responses, I take the ones most immediately interesting and assume they fairly summarize the main points of the thread. Sorry.

I mean, I can't spend that much time at work.

 

[Gadarene]

No, I got overwhelmed. When I see lots of responses, I take the ones most immediately interesting and assume they fairly summarize the main points of the thread. Sorry.

I mean, I can't spend that much time at work.

*sigh* fine, I guess mine wasn't as interesting

 

[Received]

*sigh* fine, I guess mine wasn't as interesting

Now you're sounding like my wife. You know, where I really dig something and you play the opposite so I have to tell you how really awesome it is.

 

[Received]

Seriously, I'm not at work yet. But more seriously, I want to give it the attention it deserves.

 

[Received]

Hi Gardarene. Thanks for your patience regarding my reply. Now that I'm at work...

See the very last line of this response for a nice primer of what's written between this and that.

I sometimes like to think of our......confusion with QM as akin to "mesoscopic bias" (hereafter "mesoscopic" is basically shorthand for "everyday/classical length scales"). There isn't anything inherently special about the scales we live at, it's just what we're used to, but given our tendency to making everything revolve around us, we are prone to treat certain length scales as "normal", whereas I don't really think there's any such thing. Certainly not within physics, it simply just does its thing. Chomsky is certainly right in that this probably is a consequence of our evolution - and his idea seems to me to be applicable to sentient species. That's not to say QM would play no role in natural selection at all - pretty sure I've seen various papers looking at quantum effects in the substructure of cellular life. Obviously though, this would not be something that they are aware of as they have no awareness to speak of.

Per the first part, see my response to Eudaimonist:

And perhaps we can say that understanding how or that something works doesn't mean one understands why it works. Even more specifically, being able to model a phenomenon or set of phenomena means we have a grasp on what these things do; it doesn't mean we know the reason for why this phenomena came to be and how it works in relation to sets of phenomena outside it. I may know that two plus two equals four, but that doesn't mean I understand whether mathematics are objective or limited solely to our heads. [Emphasis mine]
​

I would also argue that our scales are by definition anthropocentric, so I question speaking about scales as opposed to things that revolve around us. Perhaps a trivial point.

Regarding QM and its application to biology, that's interesting, but it's an ontological consideration, when I'm talking epistemology. To speak sanely, QM arguably does apply very much to the very cells we have, but I'm talking about our understanding and its relation to QM.

My response here was largely directed at your use of the word "infinite". While you seem to moved away from that, I'm still not entirely clear on what you intended to say in its stead. Your claim that QM is more fundamental and that that undermines classical mechanics strikes me as the same kind of bias as mesoscopic bias, except with a more explicit focus on QM. I don't really see why it should "undermine" it. Why can't physics simply be regarded as a spectrum of regimes, e.g. QM-probabilistic -> classical -> relativistic, with some blurring at the boundaries? (And for that matter, classical mechanics is a subset of relativistic mechanics too, but why is QM being labelled as fundamental and not SR/GR? I realise that that's as much to do with our current physics being incomplete as much as anything else, but it does seem to confound the construction of your argument somewhat.)

"Infinite" is rhetoric for, for our purposes, "incommensurate with our understanding," i.e., infinitely beyond our comprehension -- which might be (literally) a wrong way of speaking (incommensurability might not be in the same epistemic ballpark as infinity). I do think "infinite" was reasonably rhetorical, but I apologize if that wasn't clear. Good God, listen to my jibberjabber.

As for QM undermining classical mechanics, I think that's both true (as you seem to claim) but more deeply false. We can still speak of causality as with a mechanistic epistemology, so long as we're not literal with this causality; if you really want to get down to it, Hume proved (arguably) during the Enlightenment that we have absolutely no observation of causality, but only infer it because of what he called "custom", or our tendency to associate two things and thereby assume causality. In this sense, QM is beside the point. But I still think it applies: QM has given us the idea that mechanism, speaking objectively with its application to the subatomic world (and I'm happy, by the way, to say that my understanding of QM is "moderate" at best compared to others like yourself), is indeed false, given that things just don't work in this cut-and-dry causal fashion on the most fundamental level.

How is classical mechanics "undermined" when the effect of QM at mesoscopic length is so small as to be trivial? Some basic case of quantum weirdness like Heisenbergian uncertainty is bounded by Planck's constant, which is an incredibly small number if you cast it in SI units, which are basically mesoscopic dimensional scales. I personally don't really see why some miniscule fraction of uncertainty should "undermine" classical physics on the mesoscopic level. No, it doesn't apply to every physical scenario, granted, but I don't think that totally trashes it either. It simply means that different length scales have different physics.

And because we know these scales are there doesn't mean we properly understand the scales in terms of their relation to other phenomena (which, to me, is the right direction toward defining "understanding"). See above. Keep in mind (and it's hard to say "keep in mind" without sounding condescending, which is the last thing on my mind) that I'm using the "weirdness" (in the sense of incomprehensibility, which goes beyond being able to scale it) of QM as an epistemic springboard to allowing "weird" metaphysical claims (such as God) to have more applicability with such a "weird" or "screwy" universe than one in the 19th century, where the overriding scientific epistemology was very, very much understandable -- what's more understandable than straight cause and effect?

I think there's also a unspoken assumption in operation here that we should be able to measure and determine reality with absolute certainty. Maybe the issue here is that humans are simply mistaken to expect such a thing.

That's the idea I'm kind of working against, and which I agree with Chomsky in rejecting. But isn't quite the heart of my (I now see not-too-clear, sorry) OP.

Er.....that isn't really helping me, sorry.

Why not?

I've never really gotten why there are so many issues with probabilistic mechanics. No, you can't predict individual events, but you can recover a probability distribution for identical scenarios. The quantum double slit experiment's photon distribution is perfectly predictable, even though the trajectories of individual photons are not. Again, I can understand this being a bit of a shock if you were previously under the impression that you could track photon trajectories, but I think it's simply a case of reappraising your expectations. Again, the screwiness has limits, and it disappears once you start looking at events on the level of distributions rather than individual events. And I think this is why I'm still having issues with "screwy" - it seems to treat mesoscopic bias as some kind of extant thing or property of reality to be concerned about, rather than simply treating it as a bias.

My point is that predictability is *not* tantamount to comprehension. You can measure pretty much anything, but that sure as heck (to me at least) doesn't mean you understand how it works. You might call it the difference between "how" and "why". I can predict how my wife will act when I do something that will make her angry, but I'm still not quite sure why that is (but I'm working on it; we're both shrinks, so please atheistically pray for our children).

If you want it put pithily (or perhaps pedantically....or simply just "poorly" ), I think one can be mechanistic with regard to probabilistic mechanics.

I like that!

My point was simply that I think you could have constructed a syllogism of similar form pre-QM, but with "screwy" replaced with "orderly", given the state of physics at that time. It would also have been incorrect. Now to some degree, that's down to the level of physics understanding, but that's not to say that mesoscopic bias wasn't in play either, shaping our arguments for the worse. Maybe now it's just trying to take advantage of "screwiness" rather than "orderliness"

I think QM is fundamentally "screwy" -- not, take note, in relation to itself, i.e., by assuming that because we can model or scale that or how QM works, we therefore know why it does. I imagine I could find plenty of physicists who would distinguish the why from the how, but that would take work.

So maybe much of our differences can be narrowed down to "why" and "how" questions?