Syllogism (For the Possibility of God in a Screwy Universe)

[Received]

Thought up while at work, so forgive me if it's flimsy. What I'm trying to articulate is how God is (arguably) becoming a more reasonable explanation (in a sense) as we realize how screwy the universe is at a fundamental level, particularly in terms of quantum mechanics, as compared with the 19th century universe, where mechanism was the dominant scientific and theoretical framework for understanding things.

1. An infinitely screwy universe would mean theoretical explanations for this universe that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable (i.e., fitting) than more "basic" (even parsimonious) explanations
2. We live in an infinitely screwy universe, by virtue of quantum mechanics and other "basic" problems of physics
3. Therefore, from 1 and 2, theoretical explanations that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable explanations
4. God is a theoretical explanation that approaches infinitely screwy territory
5. Therefore, from 3 and 4, God is a reasonable explanation for our infinitely screwy universe

Related syllogism:

1. God is a better hypothesis in an infinitely screwy universe than a mechanistic, more understandable one
2. We live in an infinitely screwy universe (by virtue of QM and other problems of physics)
3. Therefore, God is a better fitting hypothesis today than previously, specifically than the 19th century (when the mechanistic view was dominant)

 

[Elioenai26]

Thought up while at work, so forgive me if it's flimsy. What I'm trying to articulate is how God is (arguably) becoming a more reasonable explanation (in a sense) as we realize how screwy the universe is at a fundamental level, particularly in terms of quantum mechanics, as compared with the 19th century universe, where mechanism was the dominant scientific and theoretical framework for understanding things.

Excellent ideas Received!

I immediately was recalled to a quote by Sir Fred Hoyle after reading this post. He says in the fifth quote below that it appears that someone has "monkeyed" with the physics of the universe. Indeed, the more we know about the universe the more we come to realize that it is indeed infinitely more complex than we have ever imagined and at times downright screwy indeed!

I look forward to seeing where this thread goes.


ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

Paul Davies has moved from promoting atheism to conceding that "the laws [of physics] ... seem themselves to be the product of exceedingly ingenious design." (Superforce, p. 243) He further testifies, "[There is for me powerful evidence that there is something going on behind it all ... it seems as though somebody has fine-tuned nature's numbers to make the Universe ... The impression of design is overwhelming." (The Cosmic Blueprint, p. 203)

Paul Davies
Superforce, p. 243
The Cosmic Blueprint, p. 203
​

“The more I examine the universe and the details of its architecture, the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have known we were coming.”

Freeman Dyson
Disturbing the Universe
New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 250
​

"The scientist is possessed by the sense of universal causation ... His religious feeling takes the form of a rapturous amazement at the harmony of natural law, which reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all the systematic thinking and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant reflection."

Albert Einstein
​

“The laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron and the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron …. The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been finely adjusted to make possible the development of life.”

Stephen Hawking
​

"A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with the physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question."

Sir Fred Hoyle
​

"For the scientist who has lived by faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries."

Robert Jastrow
God and the Astronomers
​

“On Earth, a long sequence of improbable events transpired in just the right way to bring forth our existence, as if we had won a million-dollar lottery a million times in a row. Contrary to the prevailing belief, maybe we are special …. It seems prudent to conclude that we are alone in a vast cosmic ocean, that in one important sense, we ourselves are special in that we go against the Copernican grain.”

Robert Naeye
“OK, Where Are They?”
Astronomy, July 1996, p.36
​

"We can't understand the universe in any clear way without the supernatural."

Allan Sandage
​

“Philosophically, the notion of a beginning of the present order of Nature is repugnant to me … I should like to find a genuine loophole.”

Arthur Eddington
“The End of the World: From the Standpoint of Mathematical Physics”
Nature, vol. 127 (1931) p. 450
​

Einstein tried to avoid such a beginning by creating and holding onto his cosmological “fudge factor” in his equations until 1931, when Hubble’s astronomical observations caused him to grudgingly accept “the necessity for a beginning.”

A. Vibert Douglas
“Forty Minutes With Einstein”
Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada
Vol. 50 (1956), p. 100
Einstein quote cited in
Fred Heeren
Show Me God: What the Message from Space Is Telling Us About God
Day Star Publications, 2000, pp. 107-108
​

“The big bang theory requires a recent origin of the Universe that openly invites the concept of creation.”

Fred Hoyle
The Intelligent Universe
New York: Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, 1983), p. 13
​

< Staff Edit >

ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE
​

 

[Gadarene]

[*]An infinitely screwy universe would mean theoretical explanations for this universe that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable (i.e., fitting) than more "basic" (even parsimonious) explanations
[*]We live in an infinitely screwy universe, by virtue of quantum mechanics and other "basic" problems of physics

Re: 2 - "Infinitely" screwy? Debatable. The "screwiness" of QM only occurs once below particular length scales, and is also of a pretty well-established magnitude. In addition, our old, mechanistic (and more intuitive) physics still holds on our everyday length scales (and velocities, just to drag relativity into the mix) for most practical uses.

I'm also gonna say that "screwiness" vs. "basic" explanations kinda screams subjectivity. With regard to 1, the most parsimonious explanations of QM that we currently have are actually pretty screwy to many people, so I think that confounds that particular premise (Casimir effect, EPR measurements, Aharomov-Bohm effect etc). It's not a dilemma between screwy/parsimonious in those cases - they're both!

[*]Therefore, from 1 and 2, theoretical explanations that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable explanations
[*]God is a theoretical explanation that approaches infinitely screwy territory

Obviously I'm not gonna buy 3 given my issues with 1 and 2, as for 4: I don't think you can really say this without a concrete idea of what "God" is. Other than "it's infinitely screwy!" What is God, what about him is more screwy than QM?

[*]Therefore, from 3 and 4, God is a reasonable explanation for our infinitely screwy universe

Related syllogism:

[*]God is a better hypothesis in an infinitely screwy universe than a mechanistic, more understandable one
[*]We live in an infinitely screwy universe (by virtue of QM and other problems of physics)

There's a false dilemma in 1, IMO. Somewhere between "screwy" and "mechanistic" I think there's a fine middle ground of "probabilistic" - like in QM

Again, quantum screwiness has limits. It isn't infinite!

[*]Therefore, God is a better fitting hypothesis today than previously, specifically than the 19th century (when the mechanistic view was dominant)
[/LIST]

I don't see how it couldn't be recast - and I think that's the problem with using a term as apparently vague as "screwy". Something similar could be substituted in, like "order" or "wondrousness" pre-QM, and it would be as compelling, but it would also be wrong.

 

[Received]

Gadarene, good thoughts. About to hit up disc golf, but I'd like to point out that my "infinitely" I didn't (necessarily) meant it literally. Bad writing. More later.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

[*]God is a theoretical explanation that approaches infinitely screwy territory

I have always problems seeing God as any kind of explanation at all.

 

[Received]

I have always problems seeing God as any kind of explanation at all.

God as a possible metaphysical solution for the existence of the universe (the other options being an eternal universe or a universe that began by itself) just isn't even a consideration?

 

[Received]

Re: 2 - "Infinitely" screwy? Debatable. The "screwiness" of QM only occurs once below particular length scales, and is also of a pretty well-established magnitude. In addition, our old, mechanistic (and more intuitive) physics still holds on our everyday length scales (and velocities, just to drag relativity into the mix) for most practical uses.

I see the everyday physics undermined by QM, given that the latter is more fundamental (constitutes) the former. As for the screwiness of QM, its being established is not (in my mind, at least) the same as saying it is understood. I watched a brilliant philosophical from a recent talk by Chomsky, where he points out what many physicists have been for a while (but many philosophers seem to avoid): that QM is beyond our grasp, but where Chomsky goes further is with the claim that because we are the product of natural selection, and natural selection by definition imposes both scope and limit on organisms, that we very likely can't understand things like Quantum Mechanics, or the vast majority of the physical world, because it is simply beyond our cognitive faculties -- incommensurate with our comprehension.

I'm also gonna say that "screwiness" vs. "basic" explanations kinda screams subjectivity. With regard to 1, the most parsimonious explanations of QM that we currently have are actually pretty screwy to many people, so I think that confounds that particular premise (Casimir effect, EPR measurements, Aharomov-Bohm effect etc). It's not a dilemma between screwy/parsimonious in those cases - they're both!

Good point!

Obviously I'm not gonna buy 3 given my issues with 1 and 2, as for 4: I don't think you can really say this without a concrete idea of what "God" is. Other than "it's infinitely screwy!" What is God, what about him is more screwy than QM?

You can arguably make at the least peripheral definitions of God just like you can QM.

There's a false dilemma in 1, IMO. Somewhere between "screwy" and "mechanistic" I think there's a fine middle ground of "probabilistic" - like in QM

To me, probabilistic seems too limiting, but otherwise fits within my (professional) "screwy" label.

I don't see how it couldn't be recast - and I think that's the problem with using a term as apparently vague as "screwy". Something similar could be substituted in, like "order" or "wondrousness" pre-QM, and it would be as compelling, but it would also be wrong.

I don't think vague terms are wrong, per se. But by "screwy" I mean, basically, beyond our comprehension in a somewhat annoying, somewhat fascinating way. (??)

 

[Lord Emsworth]

God as a possible metaphysical solution for the existence of the universe (the other options being an eternal universe or a universe that began by itself) just isn't even a consideration?

Well, that it would be not even be a consideration might be a consequence. However, I rather meant that it is not really an explanation. I would not know, for instance, how to tell that God is a better explanation than previous explanations (including God-as-an-explanation-for-a-not-so-screwy-universe). Or, ... or anything.

I am sorry to say, but this smacks too much of a God-of-the-Gaps to me.

 

[Eudaimonist]

As for the screwiness of QM, its being established is not (in my mind, at least) the same as saying it is understood.

IMV, if you can model something mathematically, it can't correctly be said that you don't understand it.

Sure, QM is difficult to visualize and understand in a common sensical way, but understanding the mathematics does allow one to grasp what QM is modelling.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[quatona]

Thought up while at work, so forgive me if it's flimsy. What I'm trying to articulate is how God is (arguably) becoming a more reasonable explanation (in a sense) as we realize how screwy the universe is at a fundamental level, particularly in terms of quantum mechanics, as compared with the 19th century universe, where mechanism was the dominant scientific and theoretical framework for understanding things.

1. An infinitely screwy universe would mean theoretical explanations for this universe that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable (i.e., fitting) than more "basic" (even parsimonious) explanations
2. We live in an infinitely screwy universe, by virtue of quantum mechanics and other "basic" problems of physics
3. Therefore, from 1 and 2, theoretical explanations that are (approaching) infinitely screwy territory are more reasonable explanations
4. God is a theoretical explanation that approaches infinitely screwy territory
5. Therefore, from 3 and 4, God is a reasonable explanation for our infinitely screwy universe

Related syllogism:

1. God is a better hypothesis in an infinitely screwy universe than a mechanistic, more understandable one
2. We live in an infinitely screwy universe (by virtue of QM and other problems of physics)
3. Therefore, God is a better fitting hypothesis today than previously, specifically than the 19th century (when the mechanistic view was dominant)

1. I´m not sure that "screwy" is a particularly well-chosen keyword when it comes to logic, science or metaphysics.
2. "God is a better fitting hypothesis": "god" isn´t a hypothesis. There may be hypotheses involving a god concept. So which hypothesis are you thinking of here? What are we trying to explain, and what is the hypothesis that´s meant to explain it?
2. If accepting your premise that the universe is "infinitely screwy" it seems to me that e.g. "God breathed it into existence" (as an example for a hypothesis that operates with a god concept) is - while admittedly pretty screwy - not infinitely screwy.
3. Which brings us to the question: How is "screwiness" quantifiable and quantified? (see also 1. )
4. If I understand your line of argument correctly, you are postulating that phenomenon and explanation need to be proportional in their "screwiness", and that consequently for something "infinitely screwy" the explanation would have to be "infinitely screwy" (and, in lack of an "infinitely screwy" explanation, the best explanation would be the most screwy).
Since I see no problem whatsoever to come up with even more "screwy" explanations for our existential question than "Goddidit", I think your argument failed.

On a sidenote (or on a meta-level, if you will): When discussing the postulate "screwy explanations for a screwy universe" - is it appropriate for our arguments be rational and logical or shouldn´t they rather be, like, "screwy"? (In which latter case I apologize for having missed the mark completely).

 

[Gadarene]

I see the everyday physics undermined by QM, given that the latter is more fundamental (constitutes) the former. As for the screwiness of QM, its being established is not (in my mind, at least) the same as saying it is understood. I watched a brilliant philosophical from a recent talk by Chomsky, where he points out what many physicists have been for a while (but many philosophers seem to avoid): that QM is beyond our grasp, but where Chomsky goes further is with the claim that because we are the product of natural selection, and natural selection by definition imposes both scope and limit on organisms, that we very likely can't understand things like Quantum Mechanics, or the vast majority of the physical world, because it is simply beyond our cognitive faculties -- incommensurate with our comprehension.

I sometimes like to think of our......confusion with QM as akin to "mesoscopic bias" (hereafter "mesoscopic" is basically shorthand for "everyday/classical length scales"). There isn't anything inherently special about the scales we live at, it's just what we're used to, but given our tendency to making everything revolve around us, we are prone to treat certain length scales as "normal", whereas I don't really think there's any such thing. Certainly not within physics, it simply just does its thing. Chomsky is certainly right in that this probably is a consequence of our evolution - and his idea seems to me to be applicable to sentient species. That's not to say QM would play no role in natural selection at all - pretty sure I've seen various papers looking at quantum effects in the substructure of cellular life. Obviously though, this would not be something that they are aware of as they have no awareness to speak of.

My response here was largely directed at your use of the word "infinite". While you seem to moved away from that, I'm still not entirely clear on what you intended to say in its stead. Your claim that QM is more fundamental and that that undermines classical mechanics strikes me as the same kind of bias as mesoscopic bias, except with a more explicit focus on QM. I don't really see why it should "undermine" it. Why can't physics simply be regarded as a spectrum of regimes, e.g. QM-probabilistic -> classical -> relativistic, with some blurring at the boundaries? (And for that matter, classical mechanics is a subset of relativistic mechanics too, but why is QM being labelled as fundamental and not SR/GR? I realise that that's as much to do with our current physics being incomplete as much as anything else, but it does seem to confound the construction of your argument somewhat.)

How is classical mechanics "undermined" when the effect of QM at mesoscopic length is so small as to be trivial? Some basic case of quantum weirdness like Heisenbergian uncertainty is bounded by Planck's constant, which is an incredibly small number if you cast it in SI units, which are basically mesoscopic dimensional scales. I personally don't really see why some miniscule fraction of uncertainty should "undermine" classical physics on the mesoscopic level. No, it doesn't apply to every physical scenario, granted, but I don't think that totally trashes it either. It simply means that different length scales have different physics.

I think there's also a unspoken assumption in operation here that we should be able to measure and determine reality with absolute certainty. Maybe the issue here is that humans are simply mistaken to expect such a thing.

You can arguably make at the least peripheral definitions of God just like you can QM.

Er.....that isn't really helping me, sorry.

To me, probabilistic seems too limiting, but otherwise fits within my (professional) "screwy" label.

I've never really gotten why there are so many issues with probabilistic mechanics. No, you can't predict individual events, but you can recover a probability distribution for identical scenarios. The quantum double slit experiment's photon distribution is perfectly predictable, even though the trajectories of individual photons are not. Again, I can understand this being a bit of a shock if you were previously under the impression that you could track photon trajectories, but I think it's simply a case of reappraising your expectations. Again, the screwiness has limits, and it disappears once you start looking at events on the level of distributions rather than individual events. And I think this is why I'm still having issues with "screwy" - it seems to treat mesoscopic bias as some kind of extant thing or property of reality to be concerned about, rather than simply treating it as a bias.

If you want it put pithily (or perhaps pedantically....or simply just "poorly" ), I think one can be mechanistic with regard to probabilistic mechanics.

I don't think vague terms are wrong, per se. But by "screwy" I mean, basically, beyond our comprehension in a somewhat annoying, somewhat fascinating way. (??)

My point was simply that I think you could have constructed a syllogism of similar form pre-QM, but with "screwy" replaced with "orderly", given the state of physics at that time. It would also have been incorrect. Now to some degree, that's down to the level of physics understanding, but that's not to say that mesoscopic bias wasn't in play either, shaping our arguments for the worse. Maybe now it's just trying to take advantage of "screwiness" rather than "orderliness"

 

[quatona]

1. Therefore, God is a better fitting hypothesis today than previously, specifically than the 19th century (when the mechanistic view was dominant)

While I do understand what render an explanation an explanation in the mechanistic pov, I am not sure I am understanding what - besides the your postulate for it to be "screwy" - would be a standard for the soundness of an "explanation".
IOW (and feel free to blame it on my hesitation to leave my conceptual and semantic comfort zone) I seem to run into problems when the new standard for rationality becomes "screwiness".

On a more basic note, I am not convinced that "screwy" phenomena require the explanation to be "screwy". Rather, it seems, the very purpose of an explanation is to be "unscrewy".
The subtones and artefacts produced when playing certain intervals on a distorted guitar are incredibly "screwy". However, the explanation for these phenomena isn´t "screwy" at all - it´s pretty simple, concise and down-to-earth, actually. And, being an old-fashioned guy, that´s exactly what I value an explanation for. A hypothesis that is as "screwy" as the phenomenon itself wouldn´t count for an explanation, in my book. At best, it would be an analogy.

 

[KCfromNC]

3. God is a theoretical explanation that approaches infinitely screwy territory

God as a possible metaphysical solution for the existence of the universe (the other options being an eternal universe or a universe that began by itself) just isn't even a consideration?

Can you give an example of how god explains some of the more "screwy" areas of modern physics? Please be specific - for example how does it reconcile GR and QM or explain why the universe is homogenous?

My point is that until you can use this god to produce actual explanations on par with the field you're trying to co-opt, your premise #3 is just an unfounded assertion. Unless you show that God actually has explanatory power, it can be replaced by anything we make up - the Flying Spaghetti Monster, Invisible Pink Unicorn, Underwear Gnomes, or even (humble) me. After all, it's just as easy to hand wave and say I did it in place of God did it if you have no evidence to favor one versus the other.

 

[Received]

Well, that it would be not even be a consideration might be a consequence. However, I rather meant that it is not really an explanation. I would not know, for instance, how to tell that God is a better explanation than previous explanations (including God-as-an-explanation-for-a-not-so-screwy-universe). Or, ... or anything.

In the sense that God isn't parsimonious in relation to the scientific method? If so, I'm looking beyond (or before) the scientific method by looking philosophically; so appealing to science when we're by definition asking questions that go beyond science (such as where the universe came from, etc., which are strictly metaphysical questions) is an incommensurate type of deal -- and begging the question if we assume science is legitimate, or that the limitation of the questions we can ask should be limited to science (which would be self-negating, given that science can't validate itself), and the metaphysical sphere isn't needed at all.

I am sorry to say, but this smacks too much of a God-of-the-Gaps to me.

And God of the gaps isn't technically a fallacy, let's keep in mind. But I don't think it's a God in the gaps explanation. Very specifically, GITG applies to using metaphysical explanations for phenomena that are explainable (falsifiable) by science. This is a metaphysical question, so the answer doesn't apply, therefore no God in the gaps. That's how I understand it, anyways. I would strongly argue that pushing GITG beyond this into metaphysical/philosophical territory is a misuse of this term, and even a potential fallacy itself (double fallacy?).

 

[Received]

IMV, if you can model something mathematically, it can't correctly be said that you don't understand it.

Sure, QM is difficult to visualize and understand in a common sensical way, but understanding the mathematics does allow one to grasp what QM is modelling.


eudaimonia,

Mark

And perhaps we can say that understanding how or that something works doesn't mean one understands why it works. Even more specifically, being able to model a phenomenon or set of phenomena means we have a grasp on what these things do; it doesn't mean we know the reason for why this phenomena came to be and how it works in relation to sets of phenomena outside it. I may know that two plus two equals four, but that doesn't mean I understand whether mathematics are objective or limited solely to our heads.

 

[Received]

1. I´m not sure that "screwy" is a particularly well-chosen keyword when it comes to logic, science or metaphysics.
2. "God is a better fitting hypothesis": "god" isn´t a hypothesis. There may be hypotheses involving a god concept. So which hypothesis are you thinking of here? What are we trying to explain, and what is the hypothesis that´s meant to explain it?
2. If accepting your premise that the universe is "infinitely screwy" it seems to me that e.g. "God breathed it into existence" (as an example for a hypothesis that operates with a god concept) is - while admittedly pretty screwy - not infinitely screwy.

1. "Screwy" is more stylistic than specific, but I think that (after explaining myself beyond the OP -- sorry) "screwy" can be a good fit, given that, considering basic physical and metaphysical problems (such as why QM works the way it does or, eh, why there's anything at all rather than nothing), these things are "screwy" in the sense that (as I said on a previous post) they're beyond our comprehension or cognitive faculties in a fascinating and slightly annoying way. That's how I understand "screwy".

2. I think God can be a hypothesis, so long as we don't understand it in a limited scientific sense. God is a proposed theoretical explanation for a metaphysical phenomenon in question; he's a hypothesis. Of course, by "God" here I don't necessarily mean every single aspect of said deity, but different qualities depending on the metaphysical question: with the origin of the universe, a First Cause (or "Cause"); with the existence of universal morality that works beyond natural selection (a metaphysical Lawgiver; please don't chase this rabbit, I'm sorry); perhaps even with a needed sustainer of the cosmos, going against our mechanistic, causal understanding of matter being self-sufficient given that it's already in motion (a Logos or unifying principle that sustains the universe; another rabbit, sorry sorry); etc.

2. [the second one] I agree. "Infinitely screwy" is a bad stylistic attempt. Nothing is literally infinitely anything outside of mathematics.

3. Which brings us to the question: How is "screwiness" quantifiable and quantified? (see also 1. )
4. If I understand your line of argument correctly, you are postulating that phenomenon and explanation need to be proportional in their "screwiness", and that consequently for something "infinitely screwy" the explanation would have to be "infinitely screwy" (and, in lack of an "infinitely screwy" explanation, the best explanation would be the most screwy).
Since I see no problem whatsoever to come up with even more "screwy" explanations for our existential question than "Goddidit", I think your argument failed.

3. No idea. Does it have to be? See 2. with regard to my use of "hypothesis" (again, sorry for the bad language).

4. I disagree that there's something screwier than God. But that's a subjective estimate, by definition. Again because of my stylistic misuse of "infinitely," let me answer this another way. I'm saying that God, which is a "screwy" (see above definition) hypothesis for, e.g., the raison d'etre for the universe, is a more fitting hypothesis for basic physical and metaphysical (including QM) problems in proportion to how screwy these phenomena are. In other words, the screwier the universe appears, the better fitting a screwier hypothesis would be. In a 19th century, pre-QM mechanistic universe, God is less fitting with a post-20th century, QM universe.

On a sidenote (or on a meta-level, if you will): When discussing the postulate "screwy explanations for a screwy universe" - is it appropriate for our arguments be rational and logical or shouldn´t they rather be, like, "screwy"? (In which latter case I apologize for having missed the mark completely).

I think rationality applies to things we're looking at within whatever system is under discussion. Including "the entire universe." But outside of our proposed systems, things are (arguably by definition) screwy, given that they're outside of our systems and therefore our reasons/rationality. So, basic physical and metaphysical problems, given that they invite considerations that are very likely beyond our full cognitive grasp, have at least an element of screwiness to them.

 

[quatona]

1. "Screwy" is more stylistic than specific, but I think that (after explaining myself beyond the OP -- sorry) "screwy" can be a good fit, given that, considering basic physical and metaphysical problems (such as why QM works the way it does or, eh, why there's anything at all rather than nothing), these things are "screwy" in the sense that (as I said on a previous post) they're beyond our comprehension or cognitive faculties in a fascinating and slightly annoying way. That's how I understand "screwy".

2. I think God can be a hypothesis, so long as we don't understand it in a limited scientific sense. God is a proposed theoretical explanation for a metaphysical phenomenon in question; he's a hypothesis. Of course, by "God" here I don't necessarily mean every single aspect of said deity, but different qualities depending on the metaphysical question: with the origin of the universe, a First Cause (or "Cause"); with the existence of universal morality that works beyond natural selection (a metaphysical Lawgiver; please don't chase this rabbit, I'm sorry); perhaps even with a needed sustainer of the cosmos, going against our mechanistic, causal understanding of matter being self-sufficient given that it's already in motion (a Logos or unifying principle that sustains the universe; another rabbit, sorry sorry); etc.

2. [the second one] I agree. "Infinitely screwy" is a bad stylistic attempt. Nothing is literally infinitely anything outside of mathematics.



3. No idea. Does it have to be? See 2. with regard to my use of "hypothesis" (again, sorry for the bad language).

4. I disagree that there's something screwier than God. But that's a subjective estimate, by definition. Again because of my stylistic misuse of "infinitely," let me answer this another way. I'm saying that God, which is a "screwy" (see above definition) hypothesis for, e.g., the raison d'etre for the universe, is a more fitting hypothesis for basic physical and metaphysical (including QM) problems in proportion to how screwy these phenomena are. In other words, the screwier the universe appears, the better fitting a screwier hypothesis would be. In a 19th century, pre-QM mechanistic universe, God is less fitting with a post-20th century, QM universe.



I think rationality applies to things we're looking at within whatever system is under discussion. Including "the entire universe." But outside of our proposed systems, things are (arguably by definition) screwy, given that they're outside of our systems and therefore our reasons/rationality. So, basic physical and metaphysical problems, given that they invite considerations that are very likely beyond our full cognitive grasp, have at least an element of screwiness to them.

Received,

- I think that before we get into the details it´s necessary for me to understand the hypothesis that you regard sufficiently screwy to explain a screwy universe.
- I insist that merely saying "God" is not a hypothesis. Without further clarification it is just a word.
- I don´t think that substituting "it´s beyond our understanding" by e.g. "it was created by something that´s beyond our understanding" is actually any progress in terms of an explanation.
- I don´t think that "screwiness" is enough of a common denominator for concluding on the accuracy of an explanation for a phenomenon. It just means that both are "beyond our comprehension". That two concepts (or non-concepts, actually) are beyond our comprehension isn´t enough to render one the explanation for the other, or to even only assume correlation or causality.
- When it comes to the origins (for lack of a better term) of the universe, I have never understood why an explanation would have to conform with what we observe within the universe. This isn´t any different with the idea that because we observe certain phenomena within the universe to be screwy the explanation for the universe itself must be screwy. It just doesn´t follow. [Likewise, if the state of affairs within the universe could be explained in a completely mechanistic way, there still would be no sufficient reason to assume that the origin of the universe must be explained by the same mechanisms. IOW: exceptional ("screwy") ideas are not necessarily excluded from being possibly correct, anyway. The only question is: What renders one exceptional ("screwy") idea more plausible than any other. I´ll offer: "The universe created itself out of nothing". That´s pretty exceptional and "screwy", isn´t it? I´m not entirely sure how you think we can judge the plausibility of an explanation once we have declared "screwy" and "rational" indistiguishable.]

Bottom line: Imo there isn´t much point in replacing "We don´t know" by a semantically positive assertion that doesn´t transcend beyond being a mere placeholder for "We don´t know".

 

[Lord Emsworth]

In the sense that God isn't parsimonious in relation to the scientific method?

No, I didn't say anything about the scientific method. And neither about a lack of parsimony.

If so, I'm looking beyond (or before) the scientific method by looking philosophically; so appealing to science when we're by definition asking questions that go beyond science (such as where the universe came from, etc., which are strictly metaphysical questions) is an incommensurate type of deal -- and begging the question if we assume science is legitimate, or that the limitation of the questions we can ask should be limited to science (which would be self-negating, given that science can't validate itself), and the metaphysical sphere isn't needed at all.

Given what I said above, this doesn't apply.

And God of the gaps isn't technically a fallacy, let's keep in mind. But I don't think it's a God in the gaps explanation. Very specifically, GITG applies to using metaphysical explanations for phenomena that are explainable (falsifiable) by science. This is a metaphysical question, so the answer doesn't apply, therefore no God in the gaps. That's how I understand it, anyways. I would strongly argue that pushing GITG beyond this into metaphysical/philosophical territory is a misuse of this term, and even a potential fallacy itself (double fallacy?).

No, I don't think that the charge of God-of-the-Gaps soley applies to things explainable by science. I think the problem is much, much broader. It is a certain pattern of argumentation. A pattern that can be found when arguing for God via certain sciency things, like for instance the complexity of DNA, but also things which are not (necessarily) sciency, like aethetics, morality, mathematics, philosophy. And yes, if you wish metaphysics too.

And the pattern runs a little something like this. Something is not explainable, at least not with science, naturalism, physicalism, atheism, or just not if there is no God. And supposedly this something is explained by God. And sometimes, a lot of time is spent on how the aforementioned can't explain the issue at hand, or if they can after all, and whatnot. The thing, is however that the explanation involving God for our issue is never given.

Now it wouldn't be even so bad if you were just trying to knock down something. It wouldn't be even so bad if you tried to establish that something is not explainable with, say, science. Or something along those lines. It does turn bad however if this unkept promise rears its ugly head. The promise that there is an explanation, which however will not, is not being given.

And the bad turns downright vicious if and when it turns out that the promised explanation is beyond our understanding. Or, even worse, this explanation beyond our understanding can hold true if and only if our issue at hand inherently inexplicable.

What you are achieving with this kind of argumentation is, at the very best, ignorance that might just not feel like ignorance. But it still is. It is not that you are putting God into a gap in our knowledge. God becomes the gap. God literally becomes ignorance.

(And this very pattern that I have tried to describe does not necessarily have to involve science at all. It is just that in reality it often does. Partly because the adressee(s) of such argumentation happen to be married to science of their own will, or they are being married to science willing or not. And partly of course because overall humanity overall does put such great trust into science.)

Now your argument does have certain hallmarks of what I have outlined above.
(i) There is something that needs explanation: the screwy universe. (Fine so far.)
(ii) Something or other is not capable at all while others are not so good. (Fine so far.)
(iii) There is the premise that God is an explanation. The first premise of the related syllogism says "God is a better hypothesis in an infinitely screwy universe than" which implies of course that God is an expanation at all. (You are fine, if you are just out to check the validity of your argument. If you also want the truth of your premises, this would need to be backed up. IOW, God would need to be shown to be an explanation, and shown to be a better explanation.)
(iv) God is also not a very understandable explanation. (Hmmm ...)

And that is why I said that this smacks too much of a God-of-the-Gaps to me.



(I hope that at least some of that^^^ does not come across totally incoherent babble.)

 

[Received]

And the pattern runs a little something like this. Something is not explainable, at least not with science, naturalism, physicalism, atheism, or just not if there is no God. And supposedly this something is explained by God. And sometimes, a lot of time is spent on how the aforementioned can't explain the issue at hand, or if they can after all, and whatnot. The thing, is however that the explanation involving God for our issue is never given.

Now it wouldn't be even so bad if you were just trying to knock down something. It wouldn't be even so bad if you tried to establish that something is not explainable with, say, science. Or something along those lines. It does turn bad however if this unkept promise rears its ugly head. The promise that there is an explanation, which however will not, is not being given.

And the bad turns downright vicious if and when it turns out that the promised explanation is beyond our understanding. Or, even worse, this explanation beyond our understanding can hold true if and only if our issue at hand inherently inexplicable.

What you are achieving with this kind of argumentation is, at the very best, ignorance that might just not feel like ignorance. But it still is. It is not that you are putting God into a gap in our knowledge. God becomes the gap. God literally becomes ignorance.

I've had thoughts on God in the gaps as a legitimate fallacy (in line with, say, an appeal to authority). I find that God in the gaps works if you assume that induction holds for what you're applying God in the gaps to. That is, God in the gaps is a fallacy only on the assumption that the "gap" in question will not in the future be explained away by something else than God. So in a very specific sense, appealing to God in the gaps itself is an act of committing a very common fallacy: begging the question. And that, I think, is why God in the gaps isn't mentioned in your everyday logic textbook.

But it's not that easy. When it comes to science, we (or I) limit the natural world to fair game for God of the gaps because the innumerable amounts of explanations by science that have knocked God off the plate have led us to a conclusion (again by induction) that God just doesn't seem to apply to the natural world. By induction we make the conclusion that God in the gaps, at least as far as science, applies. But we've kept this fallacy without screaming "question begging!" for no other reason, I think, than because of the innumerable times that God has been swept off the plate regarding science-applicable phenomena. But it's still purely possible that God applies to natural phenomena, that something like the Cambrian Explosion is accounted for by divine intervention. It goes back to Hume's basic problem as presented in the Enquiry/Human Understanding: that knowledge of the past, no matter how strong of a case we have, doesn't by any means necessarily guarantee the future; we only think this through what he called "custom", which today we would say is simply a natural selection-granted mechanism.

But that leads to yet another, more subtle point. I'm not arguing for God in the gaps because I don't really have a "gap" to fill. I'm not trying to fill in a lack of knowledge about a particular subject, analogous to a person who is filling in a hole around which we completely understands the terrain. I'm speaking of what could more precisely be called God at the cliff. God is a possible (I never said it was the case, by the way, so presumably that knocks me out of the "gaps" territory) explanation for things that we simply don't know now, but are very possibly incompatible with our understanding -- beyond our cognitive faculties completely -- much like (to extend Chomsky's analogy) a rat in a maze involving prime numbers doesn't understand what it's doing, but beings that are to a very large degree entirely beyond its understanding (namely the humans who subjected it to the maze) do.

God is to us as we are to the rats in the maze.

 

[Received]

Received,

- I think that before we get into the details it´s necessary for me to understand the hypothesis that you regard sufficiently screwy to explain a screwy universe.
- I insist that merely saying "God" is not a hypothesis. Without further clarification it is just a word.

Right, and I provided how God can be understood, depending on the context with which he applies to a metaphysical problem. See 2. in the previous post between us.

- I don´t think that substituting "it´s beyond our understanding" by e.g. "it was created by something that´s beyond our understanding" is actually any progress in terms of an explanation.

I think it does, but only if we add another element. We could say that explanations can be divided three different ways: we can explain something according to how it 1) is caused by something else and the details of "something else" are fully understood, by 2) caused by something else and the details of this "something else" are partially understood, and 3) caused by something else and this "something else" is entirely beyond our understanding.

Now, I'm not claiming that God belongs to 3). I think through a little deduction, you can get at some pretty reasonable properties God would have if He existed. But that's nothing new. What's interesting is that, so far as I know, absolutely nothing fits the criterion of 1). There's always more details objectively there than we can understand in the sense of connecting causes to effects while knowing everything about both. Quantum mechanics proves that this is the case with everything physical (which, for our purposes, is pretty much everything except a possibly existing God), given that the subatomic level, there's screwiness going on we don't understand; so by extension everything that exists is fundamentally mysterious.

The only question is: What renders one exceptional ("screwy") idea more plausible than any other. I´ll offer: "The universe created itself out of nothing". That´s pretty exceptional and "screwy", isn´t it? I´m not entirely sure how you think we can judge the plausibility of an explanation once we have declared "screwy" and "rational" indistiguishable.]

It's screwy, but screwy isn't tantamount to contradictory. A self-created entity is a contradiction. Sounds like a cop out, but I think there's something truly to it.