Superstrings

[Penumbra]

You're missing the point. For it to be falsifiable, it must be possible - even if only in principle - to show it false.

When would you ever be in a position to show false the claim that "I exist"? If you don't exist, you are unable to show *anything* as false. If you do exist, then the statement "I exist" is true and cannot be shown to be false (since it's true).

You seem to acknowledge the correct definition here, but then misuse it.

In your first statement there, you show that you understand that something that is falsifiable should at least be falsifiable in principle if it were indeed false. But then in your second statement, you talk about how something that is true cannot be shown to be false.

Of course something that is true cannot be shown to be false. But if this true thing is falsifiable, it can be shown to be falsifiable in principle and will pass the test that tries to falsify it.

For instance, if I build a plane and claim that it can fly, then it's a falsifiable claim because the obvious way to falsify it in principle and practice is to try to fly it. If it doesn't fly, then it has been proven false. If it does fly, it was falsifiable in both principle and in practice, and passed the test.

Existence of the self is no different. First we determine what it means to "exist", just like how to test a plane we'd have to agree on what it means for something to "fly". If we both agree that something can only think if it first exists, then existence of the self is a falsifiable principle. The way to test it is simply to think. If you can think, and recognize that you can think, then you exist. If you cannot, you are either non-existent or at least non-conscious. So the claim that "I exist" is falsifiable in both principle and practice, at least to my own self, and just because it is true and passes the test to falsify it doesn't mean it's not falsifiable in principle and practice.

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

But if I cannot falsify it then it seems that falsifiability of x is not needed for knowledge that x (or at least is might seem that way).

I was agreeing with you and supporting your point.

But I do need to clarify here - your initial post wasn't about whether falsifiability is needed for knowledge, but rather whether falsifiability is needed for scientific knowledge. I think that it's not needed for either, but "I exist" is not a scientific claim, nor is Descartes 'cogito ergo sum' a scientific argument.

 

[Apolloe]

You seem to acknowledge the correct definition here, but then misuse it.

Of course something that is true cannot be shown to be false. But if this true thing is falsifiable, it can be shown to be falsifiable in principle and will pass the test that tries to falsify it.

I have given your comments some thought, and I was not mistaken. My argument was one to the effect that it is not even *in principle* possible to falsify this claim.

You rightly agree with me when I say you cannot actually show false something that is true. To say that you can is to be confused about what we mean by those words.

I think that to say something is *in principle* falsifiable is to say there is a possible world in which it is false and we can show it is false. Or something like this (we might want to outline that this possible world should be an epistemically identical world with regards to things that we do know, and perhaps with things we can know - but these details are not important now).

So how does this influence my statement? I was making this point: in worlds in which it is true that "I exist", I cannot show that claim to be false. So it is not possible to falsify this claim in worlds in which I do exist. In worlds in which I do not exist, I do not exist in order to show that claim false. So it is not even possible to falsify in worlds in which I do not exist. This exhausts all possible worlds, and in all possible worlds it is not possible to falsify, therefore it is not a falsifiable claim even in principle.

Perhaps your confusion comes from a lack of understanding of Descartes argument. We're not looking at an instance of a claim "x exists", where you would say "Apolloe exists" and I would say "I exist". Descartes' argument was only relevant for the person who is the subject of the "I". Of course it's possible for me to in principle falsify the claim "Penumbra exists". It's not possible in principle for me to falsify the claim "I exist".

If you can think, and recognize that you can think, then you exist. If you cannot, you are either non-existent or at least non-conscious.

This is confused. How can something that does not exist "try" to think? There is no thing that exists that can try to think to see if it exists - that very statement presupposes its existence.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

So how does this influence my statement? I was making this point: in worlds in which it is true that "I exist", I cannot show that claim to be false. So it is not possible to falsify this claim in worlds in which I do exist. In worlds in which I do not exist, I do not exist in order to show that claim false. So it is not even possible to falsify in worlds in which I do not exist. This exhausts all possible worlds, and in all possible worlds it is not possible to falsify, therefore it is not a falsifiable claim even in principle.

But someone other than you can falsify the claim thet you exist. So it is falsifiable, just not to you.

 

[Apolloe]

But someone other than you can falsify the claim thet you exist. So it is falsifiable, just not to you.

Exactly like I just said in my post. It's the claim of the *exact* structure "I exist" that cannot be falsified, even in principle.

 

[tucker58]

But someone other than you can falsify the claim thet you exist. So it is falsifiable, just not to you.

Growingsmaller, "If Apoello does not exist, then neither do you."

What is interesting is that Jesus came to visit with us.

Why would our Lord and Savior come to help, if we did not exist?

Yes GrowingSmaller, reality might be an illusion , but at the same time you are living in it. Jesus, if reality is an illusion, offers an escape.

GrowingSmaller you are growing smaller because you do not have the gift of Jesus. And just for fun you are encourging others to grow smaller with you .

just

tuck

 

[Penumbra]

I have given your comments some thought, and I was not mistaken. My argument was one to the effect that it is not even *in principle* possible to falsify this claim.

You rightly agree with me when I say you cannot actually show false something that is true. To say that you can is to be confused about what we mean by those words.

I think that to say something is *in principle* falsifiable is to say there is a possible world in which it is false and we can show it is false. Or something like this (we might want to outline that this possible world should be an epistemically identical world with regards to things that we do know, and perhaps with things we can know - but these details are not important now).

So how does this influence my statement? I was making this point: in worlds in which it is true that "I exist", I cannot show that claim to be false. So it is not possible to falsify this claim in worlds in which I do exist. In worlds in which I do not exist, I do not exist in order to show that claim false. So it is not even possible to falsify in worlds in which I do not exist. This exhausts all possible worlds, and in all possible worlds it is not possible to falsify, therefore it is not a falsifiable claim even in principle.

Perhaps your confusion comes from a lack of understanding of Descartes argument. We're not looking at an instance of a claim "x exists", where you would say "Apolloe exists" and I would say "I exist". Descartes' argument was only relevant for the person who is the subject of the "I". Of course it's possible for me to in principle falsify the claim "Penumbra exists". It's not possible in principle for me to falsify the claim "I exist".

This is confused. How can something that does not exist "try" to think? There is no thing that exists that can try to think to see if it exists - that very statement presupposes its existence.

I already explained this in this thread. I'll elaborate.

It is possible to prove the statement, "I exist", but it is not possible to falsify, even in principle, the statement, "I exist".

BUT, to get around this, we can falsify the negative, because the negative is falsifiable in principle. As I said earlier:

So, one can simply rephrase it.

If I did not exist, I could not think.
I am thinking right now as I write this.
Therefore, it is not true that I do not exist.

One can falsify the statement, "I do not exist".

So, going back to the root of this discussion:

Can you falsify the proposition "I exist"? If not, does that mean you don't know whether you exist?

No, it does not mean that you don't know whether you exist, because you can prove that you exist and you can falsify the statement that you do not exist.

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

Growingsmaller, "If Apoello does not exist, then neither do you."

What is interesting is that Jesus came to visit with us.

Why would our Lord and Savior come to help, if we did not exist?

Yes GrowingSmaller, reality might be an illusion , but at the same time you are living in it. Jesus, if reality is an illusion, offers an escape.

GrowingSmaller you are growing smaller because you do not have the gift of Jesus. And just for fun you are encourging others to grow smaller with you .

just

tuck

What?

Besides not getting the point of the discussion or what GrowingSmaller is talking about, you use a liberal dose of smileys to try and soften the fact that you're telling him he's not a Christian, and encouraging others not to be?

I'm struggling here to see where you're coming from, unless you're basing this off things he's said in other threads. He does have himself listed as a Catholic.

 

[Apolloe]

I already explained this in this thread. I'll elaborate.

It is possible to prove the statement, "I exist", but it is not possible to falsify, even in principle, the statement, "I exist".

Then you agree that some propositions that count as knowledge are not falsifiable. That's all I was arguing. We should be done here.

BUT, to get around this, we can falsify the negative, because the negative is falsifiable in principle.

What exactly are you trying to get around? What's the problem you are trying to avoid?

One can falsify the statement, "I do not exist".

This reformulation doesn't change anything. One can show it false, indeed. But one can never show it to be true. It is not possible *in principle* for me to show "I do not exist" to be true. And this would be (according to those who tout falsifiability as critical) unacceptable for a scientific proposition.

This "solution" doesn't get you away from the fact that some propositions (eg, "I exist") are not falsifiable even in principle, yet I do in fact know it to be true. Moreover, I'm not sure what problem you are trying to solve.

 

[Penumbra]

Moreover, I'm not sure what problem you are trying to solve.

The problem I solved was the OP's question.

Post #6 in this thread was:

Can you falsify the proposition "I exist"? If not, does that mean you don't know whether you exist?

This post, by the OP, sparked the discussion on whether proof of the existence of the self is falsifiable. My two posts after that (#8 and #13) showed that a) One can prove that their self exists and b) One can falsify the statement that their self does not exist.

It was at that point that you jumped in and responded to my post #13 about falsifiability which seemed to have missed the point of my two posts.

Then you agree that some propositions that count as knowledge are not falsifiable. That's all I was arguing. We should be done here.

What exactly are you trying to get around? What's the problem you are trying to avoid?

This reformulation doesn't change anything. One can show it false, indeed. But one can never show it to be true. It is not possible *in principle* for me to show "I do not exist" to be true. And this would be (according to those who tout falsifiability as critical) unacceptable for a scientific proposition.

This "solution" doesn't get you away from the fact that some propositions (eg, "I exist") are not falsifiable even in principle, yet I do in fact know it to be true.

It counts as knowledge because the negative is falsifiable. The idea is falsifiable, and that's the important part. One can use semantics to isolate a part of the idea as not falsifiable in principle but that doesn't actually affect the idea itself.

One can prove that one exists, AND one can falsify the opposite statement that one does not exist, with the same experiment. It's all in the wording- the idea is provable and there exists an aspect of it that is falsifiable.

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

One can prove that one exists, AND one can falsify the opposite statement that one does not exist, with the same experiment. It's all in the wording- the idea is provable and there exists an aspect of it that is falsifiable.

But these claims are the same! Showing "I exist" is true is the same thing as showing "I do not exist" is false. In logical form, let P be the proposition "I exist". The claim "I do not exist" is just ~P ("It is not the case that I exist"). To show this claim false is to show that ~~P

So we have:
1. P ("I exist" is true)
2. ~~P ("I do not exist" is false)

Using double negation, (2) is just (1). There are some logicians who deny a double negation rule is allowed, but that's certainly not an uncontroversial view nor is it commonly accepted.

 

[Penumbra]

But these claims are the same!

Which is exactly why the idea is falsifiable in principle. This post showing that they are the same is unnecessary and misses what I was saying in my last post.

The idea is falsifiable in principle because we can both prove that it is true and we can show that the opposite is false.

So, the two conclusions I made are:
1. Yes, we can prove the existence of the self (which was part of the OP's question in post #6. At first I wasn't even getting into this falsifiability business until it was brought up, I was merely showing that one can prove they exist.)
2. The idea is falsifiable even if semantics can isolate part of the idea and claim that it's not falsifiable. With this in mind, I still see nothing that can count as knowledge that is not falsifiable in principle except perhaps logic itself which is a whole 'nother discussion.

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

The idea is falsifiable in principle because we can both prove that it is true and we can show that the opposite is false.

Let me rewrite your sentence, since I have clearly established that the two claims are the same:
"The idea is falsifiable in principle because we can both prove that it is true and we can show that it is true". It's the same thing.

I hear you when you say that you've said:
a) We can show that "I exist" is true
b) We can falsify the claim that "It is not true that I exist"

Let's be clear - the challenge was to show how it is possible in principle to falsify the claim "I exist". Your "solution" was to draw to our attention some other claim (the negation), "I do not exist", and say that can be shown false. Two problems:
1. That doesn't show how the original claim can be falsified, which is what we care about - thus you have failed to meet the challenge. What we want is for it to be in principle possible for us to know ~P (I do not exist).
2. All you're doing is showing the truth of the original proposition - you haven't taken us anywhere new (You've taken us from P to ~~P, which is P)

It's like you're saying, "I've given you two dollars, AND I haven't not given you two dollars", as though you're saying two different things, or giving an interesting "fresh perspective", but you're not.

Just to reiterate: You're not falsifying the original claim "I exist" ( P ). You're falsifying some different claim, "I do not exist" (~P), which was never an issue. You have not shown how it is possible to falsify the claim, "I exist" (ie, show that ~P). And I maintain it is not in principle falsifiable (ie, impossible for us to know ~P).

The idea is falsifiable even if semantics can isolate part of the idea and claim that it's not falsifiable.

You are the one engaging in word plays (or semantics) that purport to support your position, but in effect show nothing. It doesn't matter if we've isolated a part of an idea. The part we have isolated is still some proposition, something that can count as knowledge on its own, and can't be falsified. And given that, you are wrong to say "I still see nothing that can count as knowledge that is not falsifiable in principle" (in addition to your possible exemption for logic).

 

[Apolloe]

At first I wasn't even getting into this falsifiability business until it was brought up, I was merely showing that one can prove they exist.

Forgot to respond to this. This "falsifiability business" was brought up in the first post.

 

[variant]

2. The idea is falsifiable even if semantics can isolate part of the idea and claim that it's not falsifiable. With this in mind, I still see nothing that can count as knowledge that is not falsifiable in principle except perhaps logic itself which is a whole 'nother discussion.

"I exist" is not a falcefiable statement, but it can be shown to be true by falcefieing the null hypothesis.

The problem is that "I exist" or "I appear to exist to myself" are subjective statements which are not supposed to be the focus of scientific inquiry.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

What?

Besides not getting the point of the discussion or what GrowingSmaller is talking about, you use a liberal dose of smileys to try and soften the fact that you're telling him he's not a Christian, and encouraging others not to be?

I'm struggling here to see where you're coming from, unless you're basing this off things he's said in other threads. He does have himself listed as a Catholic.

Ty I am Christian and was at Mass yesterday, and Monday, and Saturday evening, and a seperate protestant church service on Sunday.

 

[Penumbra]

Let me rewrite your sentence, since I have clearly established that the two claims are the same:
"The idea is falsifiable in principle because we can both prove that it is true and we can show that it is true". It's the same thing.

I hear you when you say that you've said:
a) We can show that "I exist" is true
b) We can falsify the claim that "It is not true that I exist"

Let's be clear - the challenge was to show how it is possible in principle to falsify the claim "I exist". Your "solution" was to draw to our attention some other claim (the negation), "I do not exist", and say that can be shown false. Two problems:
1. That doesn't show how the original claim can be falsified, which is what we care about - thus you have failed to meet the challenge. What we want is for it to be in principle possible for us to know ~P (I do not exist).
2. All you're doing is showing the truth of the original proposition - you haven't taken us anywhere new (You've taken us from P to ~~P, which is P)

It's like you're saying, "I've given you two dollars, AND I haven't not given you two dollars", as though you're saying two different things, or giving an interesting "fresh perspective", but you're not.

Just to reiterate: You're not falsifying the original claim "I exist" ( P ). You're falsifying some different claim, "I do not exist" (~P), which was never an issue. You have not shown how it is possible to falsify the claim, "I exist" (ie, show that ~P). And I maintain it is not in principle falsifiable (ie, impossible for us to know ~P).

You are the one engaging in word plays (or semantics) that purport to support your position, but in effect show nothing. It doesn't matter if we've isolated a part of an idea. The part we have isolated is still some proposition, something that can count as knowledge on its own, and can't be falsified. And given that, you are wrong to say "I still see nothing that can count as knowledge that is not falsifiable in principle" (in addition to your possible exemption for logic).

Let me explain once more.

I'm not falsifying the claim, "I exist", but that is irrelevant. The underlying question is whether knowledge can be had that is not falsifiable. My answer is no, unless one delves into semantics. Asking to show that the claim "I exist" is falsifiable is unnecessary even though it has been asked. It's a matter of asking the wrong question.

The original question of the thread had to do with string theory and falsifiability, to which we all responded. Then the OP brought up another specific example of the statement, "I exist" and questioned whether one can know if they exist if they cannot falsify it. I presented a way to know whether we exist, and he pointed out it wasn't falsifiable, so I showed a falsifiable method, and it's really the same method. At that point you commented on my posts.

So, do we have knowledge as to whether we exist? Yes. Is this knowledge based on something that is falsifiable in principle? Yes. Is the exact phrase, "I exist" falsifiable? No, and it doesn't need to be.

Question:
Do I exist?

Answer 1:
Existence is necessary for thinking.
I think.
Therefore, I exist.

Answer 2:
If I did not exist, I could not think.
I think.
Therefore, it is not true that I do not exist.
Therefore, I exist.

And as you've correctly shown, they're the same thing. One of them is falsifiable, and it's the same knowledge. It doesn't matter whether the exact statement, "I exist" is falsifiable or not because the concept itself is falsifiable and therefore we can derive knowledge from it. So, the answer to the question of whether I exist is knowledge and it's based on falsifiability.

If one proves something true, then they've shown something else to be false, even if that other "something" is simply the negative of their positively proven thing. If, for instance, I prove that the moon is made out of rock, then I've falsified the opposite claim that the moon is not made out of rock. It's knowledge based on falsifiability and on proof because they're two sides of the same coin.

So, in summary, I have knowledge of my own existence and it's based on falsifiability and proof via the same method. If thinking requires existence, and I can think, then I've simultaneously proved that I exist and falsified that I don't exist, because it's the same knowledge to be had. So, I still see nothing that can count as knowledge that is not falsifiable in principle. You can arrange the wording of the knowledge to make a claim that is not falsifiable, but the knowledge itself is still falsifiable in principle.

-Lyn

 

[Penumbra]

Forgot to respond to this. This "falsifiability business" was brought up in the first post.

This is true, and I was thinking in a more limited and specific context when I said that, so it was a mistake for me to phrase it like that.

I responded about falsifiability to the original post, but then when he asked his second question and I answered it, I was merely meaning to answer his question as to whether we can know that we exist. It was at that point that he brought up falsifiability against my post, so I began discussing falsifiability again.

"I exist" is not a falcefiable statement, but it can be shown to be true by falcefieing the null hypothesis.

The problem is that "I exist" or "I appear to exist to myself" are subjective statements which are not supposed to be the focus of scientific inquiry.

And "shown to be true" equates to knowledge based on falsifiability.

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

"I exist" is not a falcefiable statement, but it can be shown to be true by falcefieing the null hypothesis.

The problem is that "I exist" or "I appear to exist to myself" are subjective statements which are not supposed to be the focus of scientific inquiry.

Darn - I saw this reply in my email and thought this was Penumbra. I thought finally we had some agreement!

"I exist" is an empirical fact, but I would hesitate to call it a scientific proposition, like you say. Establishing it follows more of a deductive path than inductive.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Darn - I saw this reply in my email and thought this was Penumbra. I thought finally we had some agreement!

"I exist" is an empirical fact, but I would hesitate to call it a scientific proposition, like you say. Establishing it follows more of a deductive path than inductive.

I'd say it's as scientific a fact as the fact that we live on the world. Arguably, though, it's true by definition...