A suggestion was made in this thread. However, in order to address the suggestion, it seems to me there is a list of issues that are probably best taken one at a time. This thread is the first one - philosophy of science. While I think this is an important topic, I am aware many do not think it is important. So, let's first get some feedback on where people fall.
Question 1: Is the philosophy of science important?
Question 2: If you answer "yes" to question 1, what is your philosophy of science?
I'll list a few of what I consider to be the major camps and explain where I fall. Further, I'll be using electrons as an example for the discussion.
Realism: In short, science is describing what is real. Science is objective. If science says electrons exist, then electrons exist.
Empiricism: All we can really know is what our senses perceive. Therefore, science doesn't worry about whether things are real. It focuses on the data our senses (with the aid of scientific instruments) can detect. We measure a phenomena that we have chosen to call an electron, and that's the end of it. Given that perspective, empiricists emphasize data over model. Mathematical models don't mean anything until test data verifies what the model predicted.
Platonism: Our senses are too easily deceived, and need to be guided. Further, whatever it is that we're measuring, there is no guarantee that the electron we measure here is the same as the electron we measure there. Rather, there is a perfect electron - a "Form" of an electron that we can only imperfectly and subjectively know through our measurements.
Platonism has a strong history in science. For example, the fact that all electrons are assumed to have the same rest mass, the same charge, etc. stems from a Platonist influence on science. This was mixed with strong doses of Realism and Positivism for much of the "Newtonian" period of science. However, there was a crisis of confidence in the Scientific Method around the turn of the 20th century. That, along with philosophers like Kant and Nietzsche, led to the rise of empiricism.
Today we have a mixed bag of scientists who speak as if they're empiricists, but who heavily utilize many of the concepts laid down by Platonists.
Instrumentalism: This is where I fall (for the most part). Instrumentalists tend to emphasize model over data, agreeing our senses are too easily fooled. However, they don't look at models as ideal Forms. Rather, it's more of an "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" attitude. There is no claim that the model describes anything real. Rather, it just seems to work. It correlates to the data. Electron is a model that fits observed phenomena well and facilitates discussion and action.
Since all models are based on assumptions (axioms, postulates - pick your word), changing the assumptions can provide valuable insight into what we might be missing. It is an iterative process where models drive experiments, experiments confirm models, repeat. However, there is sometimes a tendency to stand firm on a model prediction that (currently) has no data to support it, whereas an empiricist would tend to dump the model.
Question 1: Is the philosophy of science important?
Question 2: If you answer "yes" to question 1, what is your philosophy of science?
I'll list a few of what I consider to be the major camps and explain where I fall. Further, I'll be using electrons as an example for the discussion.
Realism: In short, science is describing what is real. Science is objective. If science says electrons exist, then electrons exist.
Empiricism: All we can really know is what our senses perceive. Therefore, science doesn't worry about whether things are real. It focuses on the data our senses (with the aid of scientific instruments) can detect. We measure a phenomena that we have chosen to call an electron, and that's the end of it. Given that perspective, empiricists emphasize data over model. Mathematical models don't mean anything until test data verifies what the model predicted.
Platonism: Our senses are too easily deceived, and need to be guided. Further, whatever it is that we're measuring, there is no guarantee that the electron we measure here is the same as the electron we measure there. Rather, there is a perfect electron - a "Form" of an electron that we can only imperfectly and subjectively know through our measurements.
Platonism has a strong history in science. For example, the fact that all electrons are assumed to have the same rest mass, the same charge, etc. stems from a Platonist influence on science. This was mixed with strong doses of Realism and Positivism for much of the "Newtonian" period of science. However, there was a crisis of confidence in the Scientific Method around the turn of the 20th century. That, along with philosophers like Kant and Nietzsche, led to the rise of empiricism.
Today we have a mixed bag of scientists who speak as if they're empiricists, but who heavily utilize many of the concepts laid down by Platonists.
Instrumentalism: This is where I fall (for the most part). Instrumentalists tend to emphasize model over data, agreeing our senses are too easily fooled. However, they don't look at models as ideal Forms. Rather, it's more of an "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" attitude. There is no claim that the model describes anything real. Rather, it just seems to work. It correlates to the data. Electron is a model that fits observed phenomena well and facilitates discussion and action.
Since all models are based on assumptions (axioms, postulates - pick your word), changing the assumptions can provide valuable insight into what we might be missing. It is an iterative process where models drive experiments, experiments confirm models, repeat. However, there is sometimes a tendency to stand firm on a model prediction that (currently) has no data to support it, whereas an empiricist would tend to dump the model.
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