SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The passion of Christ (Tertia Pars, Q. 46)
Article 6. Whether the pain of Christ's Passion was greater than all other pains?
Objection 1. It would seem that the pain of
Christ's Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the
martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than
Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering
Christ was not the greatest.
Objection 2. Further, strength of
soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the
soul of a wise
man; and
Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral
virtue fixes the mean in the
passions. But
Christ had most perfect strength of
soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not
exist in
Christ.
Objection 3. Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the
soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the
soul; also,
Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than
Christ had, who assumed a
human body with its
natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in
purgatory, or in
hell, or even
Adam's pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than
Christ's in the
Passion.
Objection 4. Further, the greater the
good lost, the greater the pain. But by
sinning the sinner loses a greater
good than
Christ did when suffering; since the life of
grace is greater than the life of
nature: also,
Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that
Christ's pain was not the greatest of all.
Objection 5. Further, the victim's innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But
Christ died innocent, according to
Jeremiah 9:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that the pain of
Christ's Passion was not the greatest.
Objection 6. Further, there was nothing superfluous in
Christ's conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure
man's salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had
infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains.
On the contrary, It is written (
Lamentations 1:12) on behalf of
Christ's Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow."
I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by
Christ (
III:15:6), there was
true and sensible pain in the suffering
Christ, which is
caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is
caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed "sadness." And in
Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four
causes.
First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the
cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (
[5]) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts--to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. And besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The
cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the
sins of the
human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (
Psalm 21:2): "The words of my
sins."
Secondly, especially the fall of the
Jews and of the others who
sinned in His death chiefly of the
apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is
naturally horrible to
human nature.
The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both
soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned
miraculously by the operation of the
Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by
miracles are better than others, as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which
Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently,
Christ's sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His
soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the
causes of sadness.
Thirdly, the magnitude of
Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of
reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering
Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of
Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted
voluntarily, to the end of
men's deliverance from
sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.
From all these
causes weighed together, it follows that
Christ's pain was the very greatest.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced--namely, from the bodily injury, which is the
cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering
Christ is much more intensified from other
causes, as above stated.
Reply to Objection 2. Moral
virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper
matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in
I-II:64:2, moral
virtue fixes the mean in the
passions, not according to mathematical
quantity, but according to
quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly
believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise
man. But in very
truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)--namely, when it flows from
holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others'
sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for
sins, according to the saying of the
Apostle (
2 Corinthians 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to
God worketh penance, steadfast unto
salvation." And so to
atone for the
sins of all
men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute
quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral
virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the
nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in
Christ's case, as stated above (
cf. 14, 1, ad 2;
III:45:2).
Reply to Objection 3. The pain of a suffering, separated
soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every
evil of this life, just as the
glory of the
saints surpasses every
good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that
Christ's pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated
soul. But
Adam's body could not suffer, except he
sinned. so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than
Christ's body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility
Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ's.
Reply to Objection 4. Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the
sins of all others. And this grief in
Christ surpassed all grief of every
contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and
charity, by which the pang of
contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all
sins, according to
Isaiah 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our sorrows." But such was the dignity of
Christ's life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another
man's life for howsoever long a time. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the
man of
virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he
knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for
virtue's sake. And in like fashion
Christ laid down His most beloved life for the
good of
charity, according to
Jeremiah 12:7: "I have given My dear
soul into the hands of her enemies."
Reply to Objection 5. The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty
man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime. whereas the innocent
man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according to
Isaiah 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no
man layeth it to heart."
Reply to Objection 6. Christ willed to deliver the
human race from
sins not merely by His power, but also according to
justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great
virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His
human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.