Skeptical theism as theodicy

[Athée]

Hey all and sundry,

In a conversation last week we were discussing the problem of suffering and one of the lines of defense that was explored was this notion of skeptical theism. That because we don't have the knowledge of God, we should be wary of attempting to assert what his motive may have been in any given situation. In our discussion the idea was that we just don't have access to the reasons that God would allow suffering in any given instance and that we should not expect to know.

This seems fair to me as far as it goes but it also doesn't seem to offer much of substance. If we imagine that God has reasons we don't have access to, then we cant say that they are likely good moral reasons, as opposed to harmful spiteful reasons, we just don't know.

For this to act as a moral defense of God, wouldn't you have to already assume that the reasons are good and moral, isn't that assuming the very point being discussed?

Looking forward to your thoughts and experiences with skeptical theism.

Peace
Athée

 

[Tolworth John]

that because we don't have the knowledge of God,

That is to assume that God has not made himself known to us and if God is a 'super natural being' then we are not able to find out about God unless he makes himself known.

 

[Athée]

That is to assume that God has not made himself known to us and if God is a 'super natural being' then we are not able to find out about God unless he makes himself known.

Maybe I didn't articulate that very clearly. I'm not talking about God revealing himself. The notion of skeptical theism is that we don't have access to God's reasons for allowing or causing and given event or circumstance. For example, it could be the case that God allows some suffering "S" for the purpose of soul building, but because we don't know and shouldn't expect to have access to God's reasons we should be skeptical about our ability to correctly determine God's reason for S.

My concern is that, without begging the question and simply assuming any unknown reasons must be good ones, this pool of unknown reasons doesn't provide and useful theodicy. As in, for suffering S, it could be the case that God's reason is morally justified, or it could be the case that we would say it isn't, that is the problem with skeptical theism as a defense.

Thoughts?

 

[bcbsr]

Hey all and sundry,

In a conversation last week we were discussing the problem of suffering and one of the lines of defense that was explored was this notion of skeptical theism. That because we don't have the knowledge of God, we should be wary of attempting to assert what his motive may have been in any given situation. In our discussion the idea was that we just don't have access to the reasons that God would allow suffering in any given instance and that we should not expect to know.

This seems fair to me as far as it goes but it also doesn't seem to offer much of substance. If we imagine that God has reasons we don't have access to, then we cant say that they are likely good moral reasons, as opposed to harmful spiteful reasons, we just don't know.

For this to act as a moral defense of God, wouldn't you have to already assume that the reasons are good and moral, isn't that assuming the very point being discussed?

Looking forward to your thoughts and experiences with skeptical theism.

Peace
Athée

What's the point in discussing it at all if not simply to dissuade the opposition from concluding that a good God doesn't exist based on the fact of suffering. You don't have to prove that God's intentions are good, which would be, as you point out, merely a proposition. All you have to do is show that the possibility exists that God is good despite suffering.

An example would be 2Cor 12:7 "To keep me from becoming conceited because of these surpassingly great revelations, there was given me a thorn in my flesh, a messenger of Satan, to torment me."

 

[Athée]

What's the point in discussing it at all if not simply to dissuade the opposition from concluding that a good God doesn't exist based on the fact of suffering. You don't have to prove that God's intentions are good, which would be, as you point out, merely a proposition. All you have to do is show that the possibility exists that God is good despite suffering.

An example would be 2Cor 12:7 "To keep me from becoming conceited because of these surpassingly great revelations, there was given me a thorn in my flesh, a messenger of Satan, to torment me."

I think your response is effective if the discussion is about the logical problem of evil. That said the theodicy was raised in a different context, we were discussing the evidentiary problem of gratuitous suffering.

In any case it seems like your view is that skeptical theism isn't a helpful theodicy, is that correct?

 

[Tolworth John]

As in, for suffering S, it could be the case that God's reason is morally justified, or it could be the case that we would say it isn't, that is the problem with skeptical theism as a defense.

If God's motive for permitting 'S' to suffer are not known we cannot say that the suffering is either good or bad simple because we don't have the information.

That said we know that suffering is bad, that it is not part of God's original plan for the world.

We also know that God is good and that he has implimented a plan that will deal with all suffering.

The question is have we accepted Gods plan and are co-operating with it or have rejected it and working against it.

 

[Athée]

If God's motive for permitting 'S' to suffer are not known we cannot say that the suffering is either good or bad simple because we don't have the information.

That said we know that suffering is bad, that it is not part of God's original plan for the world.

We also know that God is good and that he has implimented a plan that will deal with all suffering.

The question is have we accepted Gods plan and are co-operating with it or have rejected it and working against it.

Sounds like we agree about the usefulness of skeptical theism, that we just don't know one way or the other in any given circumstance.

I would debate your premises that suffering is bad and that God's plan was for no suffering and will eventually end suffering...but that would be a different thread.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

This is running straight into Euthrypo's dilemma. You are trying to measure the actions of God by a moral standard to which you assume He must be beholden, which is thus above Him, to be Good. Alternately, the argument is that because God allows a certain amount of suffering, this must be Good because God allows it.

This is a false dilemma. God's nature is the standard by which Good is measured. So it is not that an action could be good because it is 'allowed' by God nor can we measure 'good' apart from God. It is how something approaches God or doesn't, that determines its moral worth, as God is 'the Good' in the Augustinian sense. It does not therefore require 'an assumption that the reasons are good and moral', but per defitionem to assume God is the fount of Reality, of Existence, and therefore what is Good for the existent is what tends towards Him.

 

[bcbsr]

I think your response is effective if the discussion is about the logical problem of evil. That said the theodicy was raised in a different context, we were discussing the evidentiary problem of gratuitous suffering.

In any case it seems like your view is that skeptical theism isn't a helpful theodicy, is that correct?

theodicy is a matter of looking behind the curtain. With the Bible we can look behind the curtain to some degree. But if you're arguing with someone who doesn't view the scriptures as necessarily true, then theodicy ends up being purely speculative.

 

[Athée]

This is running straight into Euthrypo's dilemma. You are trying to measure the actions of God by a moral standard to which you assume He must be beholden, which is thus above Him, to be Good. Alternately, the argument is that because God allows a certain amount of suffering, this must be Good because God allows it.

This is a false dilemma. God's nature is the standard by which Good is measured. So it is not that an action could be good because it is 'allowed' by God nor can we measure 'good' apart from God. It is how something approaches God or doesn't, that determines its moral worth, as God is 'the Good' in the Augustinian sense. It does not therefore require 'an assumption that the reasons are good and moral', but per defitionem to assume God is the fount of Reality, of Existence, and therefore what is Good for the existent is what tends towards Him.

It seems like we agree that skeptical theism as a theodicy doesn't get anywhere. In my case because I do t think we can evaluate a set of potential reasons unknown and in yours because there is no need to evaluate at all in order to know that whatever the reason it must be good. In either case skeptical theism doesn't seem to advance things.

As for the eutyphro I would just rephrase it to ask is God's nature good because it conforms to an external standard of good or is his nature good because he says it is...but that is a subject for another thread ;-)

 

[Athée]

theodicy is a matter of looking behind the curtain. With the Bible we can look behind the curtain to some degree. But if you're arguing with someone who doesn't view the scriptures as necessarily true, then theodicy ends up being purely speculative.

As an atheist I agree Theodicy sounds to me like hopefulness and trust. If you start with the assumption that God is good, thodicy doesn't add anything for you, but if you are wondering how the God described in the Bible could be considered good, theodicy demonstrates that there is no logical contradiction but for me doesn't do anything to make inroads on the moral evaluation of the described God.

 

[Sanoy]

I think knowledge of someones reasons are separate from knowledge of someones nature. If I believe someone is Good and they do things for which I am not privy to the reasons I will attribute good reasons because things act according to their nature. One might say, 'well how do you know He is good', the same way we trust anyone's nature, personal experience and the experience of others. If scripture is true, then Jesus comes right out and says that God is the paradigm to which all goodness refers too (Luke 18:19). So we do have indications of a nature from which actions can be trusted, this is what we Christians call faith. And we do have instances of this playing out like in Romans 11:33 "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!" If we take Job as a true event that would be another example, and it's an example Christians live out everyday in suffering. Christianity grows the most in suffering, typically with the expectation that the suffering will get a lot worse by becoming a Christian. But the relational experience of Christ is so strong that God is trusted through suffering, and it makes sense of the suffering. Ask any newborn Christian in any Country why there is suffering in the world and they will say because it is fallen.

 

[Athée]

I think knowledge of someones reasons are separate from knowledge of someones nature. If I believe someone is Good and they do things for which I am not privy to the reasons I will attribute good reasons because things act according to their nature. One might say, 'well how do you know He is good', the same way we trust anyone's nature, personal experience and the experience of others. If scripture is true, then Jesus comes right out and says that God is the paradigm to which all goodness refers too (Luke 18:19). So we do have indications of a nature from which actions can be trusted, this is what we Christians call faith. And we do have instances of this playing out like in Romans 11:33 "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!" If we take Job as a true event that would be another example, and it's an example Christians live out everyday in suffering. Christianity grows the most in suffering, typically with the expectation that the suffering will get a lot worse by becoming a Christian. But the relational experience of Christ is so strong that God is trusted through suffering, and it makes sense of the suffering. Ask any newborn Christian in any Country why there is suffering in the world and they will say because it is fallen.

Some good stuff in there and it seems like we basically agree. You are convinced ahead of time that God is good and therefore his reasons will be good ones. I am not convinced he is good and am not convinced his reasons (if he exists) are good ones. But simply saying he has reasons we cant access (skeptical theism theodicy) doesn't seem to provide anything useful.

 

[Sanoy]

Some good stuff in there and it seems like we basically agree. You are convinced ahead of time that God is good and therefore his reasons will be good ones. I am not convinced he is good and am not convinced his reasons (if he exists) are good ones. But simply saying he has reasons we cant access (skeptical theism theodicy) doesn't seem to provide anything useful.

I think it's useful in the sense of countering a hard logical objection, but whether it's useful at a personal level all depends on who you are talking to I guess. Oddly enough it seems the most useful to those who are suffering.

 

[Athée]

I think it's useful in the sense of countering a hard logical objection, but whether it's useful at a personal level all depends on who you are talking to I guess. Oddly enough it seems the most useful to those who are suffering.

Agreed about the hard logical objection, it is successful there.
I'm not sure why "we have no access to know if Gods reasons are good or not" would be comforting to someone suffering. Maybe the human brain, in a state of suffering, is more prone to reasoning errors?

 

[Sanoy]

Agreed about the hard logical objection, it is successful there.
I'm not sure why "we have no access to know if Gods reasons are good or not" would be comforting to someone suffering. Maybe the human brain, in a state of suffering, is more prone to reasoning errors?

Yeah, I don't think that statement would be comforting either. I mean that the condition of suffering doesn't seem to create 'hardness' to the question the statement is meant to answer... "why is God allowing this". It seems like the people that should be asking this the most aren't in much need of a strong answer. Their experience of Christ is enough to trust Him through the question.

I have had the statement "we don't know what God's is doing" given to me and it has been useful in a way. It's not comforting, it did nothing to the pain in my heart, but it did change the questions and thoughts brewing in my mind making it easier to deal with. The message last Sunday at Church was this kind of message using the analogy of a delivery room. I felt that was helpful. But if you don't know if God is good it wouldn't be comforting.

 

[gaara4158]

Hey all and sundry,

In a conversation last week we were discussing the problem of suffering and one of the lines of defense that was explored was this notion of skeptical theism. That because we don't have the knowledge of God, we should be wary of attempting to assert what his motive may have been in any given situation. In our discussion the idea was that we just don't have access to the reasons that God would allow suffering in any given instance and that we should not expect to know.

This seems fair to me as far as it goes but it also doesn't seem to offer much of substance. If we imagine that God has reasons we don't have access to, then we cant say that they are likely good moral reasons, as opposed to harmful spiteful reasons, we just don't know.

For this to act as a moral defense of God, wouldn't you have to already assume that the reasons are good and moral, isn't that assuming the very point being discussed?

Looking forward to your thoughts and experiences with skeptical theism.

Peace
Athée

Indeed, the answer "God is in control but we don't know what he's doing" has the exact same predictive value as "There is no God controlling things, things just happen." The latter is the more parsimonious explanation, so to go with the former as an explanation for the problem of suffering, additional justification is required.

 

[Chriliman]

Maybe I didn't articulate that very clearly. I'm not talking about God revealing himself. The notion of skeptical theism is that we don't have access to God's reasons for allowing or causing and given event or circumstance. For example, it could be the case that God allows some suffering "S" for the purpose of soul building, but because we don't know and shouldn't expect to have access to God's reasons we should be skeptical about our ability to correctly determine God's reason for S.

My concern is that, without begging the question and simply assuming any unknown reasons must be good ones, this pool of unknown reasons doesn't provide and useful theodicy. As in, for suffering S, it could be the case that God's reason is morally justified, or it could be the case that we would say it isn't, that is the problem with skeptical theism as a defense.

Thoughts?

God’s allowance of evil has always been for a good reason in the past so that’s why we can assume it’s for good reasons now and in the future.

 

[Athée]

God’s allowance of evil has always been for a good reason in the past so that’s why we can assume it’s for good reasons now and in the future.

How did you determine all instances of past evil or suffering were for good reasons? How did you get access to God's reasons in each instance? And even if you did, how do past reasons guarantee future reasons?

 

[Chriliman]

How did you determine all instances of past evil or suffering were for good reasons?

It’s a matter of knowing God’s character. If God allowed evil for evil reasons then it’s not actually God.

How did you get access to God's reasons in each instance?

Best example is Jesus. God (and Jesus) allowed Jesus to suffer and die at the hands of sinners so he could rise again and defeat death, suffering and sin.

And even if you did, how do past reasons guarantee future reasons?

They don’t, which is why one must have faith.