Skeleton form of the Argument from First Cause

[Wiccan_Child]

Premise 1) Everything and every occurrence either has a cause or is uncaused. That is to say, everything either exists for a reason or it doesn't exist for any reason.

I'd rephrase: "everything either exists for a reason, or it exists for no reason".

Premise 2) Any cause itself is also either a "thing" or an "occurence" and is subject to premise 1.

True, though it should be noted that a thing's cause can be itself, and that some things can spontaneously come into existence without a cause.

Premise 3) (not really necessary but i'll put it in) If there is any environment where spontaneous things can arise randomly without cause, this environment is also subject to premise 1

Not if the environment itself can spontaneously come into existence.

Premise 4) If any infinite regresses exist, the regress itself is subject to premise 1.

I'm not entirely sure how a regress can be subject to the first premise.

Conclusion: Everything that exists must either have an infinite chain of caused causes behind it (infinite regress) or at some point in the chain there must be an uncaused cause, something which exists or occurred for no reason. Any infinite regress must also have a cause or be uncaused, therefore an "uncaused cause" must exist.

A more succinct argument would be:

1. Things either exist because of a cause, or have no cause for their existence.
2. Therefore, something exists either because of a finite chain of causes (starting with a first, uncaused cause), or is uncaused itself.

The problem with this is that you don't conclude a single uncaused cause: there is no reason why there can't be billions of uncaused causes, each triggering interweaving causal chains.

The above is a very weak form of the argument, but the strongest i know how to present without running into any real snags.

Typically the "(first) uncaused cause" is said to be "God", however i'll simply say it is "supernatural" because it fundamentally exists or occurred for no reason at all.

Why does that make it supernatural? In physics, we know that particles can spontaneously come into existence, yet I'd hardly call the Casimir effect 'supernatural'.

 

[Vigilante]

In physics, we know that particles can spontaneously come into existence, yet I'd hardly call the Casimir effect 'supernatural'.

I know almost nothing about physics (yet!) or the cosmological argument, but I'd offer the following as a friendly touche' (I'll speak like I know what I'm talking about because it's probably more entertaining to read that way ):

Particles qua natural entities spontaneously come into existence in a universe in which their particular mode of being operates lawfully. That is, their existence is defined by the parameters of their behavior and physical composition, and no characteristics which would reside outside of the permissibility of their environment may obtain for them.

But in an environmental situation of nothing or "no-thing," there would be no parameters to circumscribe the particular nature of a would-be resident entity. Thus, we neither have anything to account for the specifics of the lawful framework within which physical phenomena abide themselves (why do they behave the way they do?), nor do we have any reason why such things would spontaneously appear out of a framework of nothingness (why are they there to behave?).

A bacteria popping into existence in a glass of unpasteurized milk (an environment conducive to it) is vaguely comprehensible. And so the particles and the Casimir effect.

A bacteria popping into existence in an air-tight cube of glass is somewhat incomprehensible. And so the particles and the Casimir effect.

 

[Tikiman06]

I will play devil's advocate, and say what Hume said in respect to the argument for a first cause.

I reject that everything has a cause on the grounds that we have no reason to believe this. It is logically possible for something to exist uncaused, and since we have no proof that there are not uncaused events, I reject the causal principle.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Particles qua natural entities spontaneously come into existence in a universe in which their particular mode of being operates lawfully. That is, their existence is defined by the parameters of their behavior and physical composition, and no characteristics which would reside outside of the permissibility of their environment may obtain for them.

That is one possibility, yes. But it may also be that particles contain their own essence: physical laws and constants aren't dictated by the environment, but by the particles themselves. An electron has a negative charge only inasmuch as it reacts to electromagnetic fields, but what makes it react? Does the field pull the electron, or does the electron move towards the field? Where does the impetus lie?

But in an environmental situation of nothing or "no-thing," there would be no parameters to circumscribe the particular nature of a would-be resident entity. Thus, we neither have anything to account for the specifics of the lawful framework within which physical phenomena abide themselves (why do they behave the way they do?), nor do we have any reason why such things would spontaneously appear out of a framework of nothingness (why are they there to behave?).

Truly spontaneous phenomena can still be dependant on the environment in which they occur, including the random popping into existence of particles. Calling an event 'random' just says that there is no prior cause; it doesn't tell us how likely it is the event occurs.
Likewise, the probability of a particle popping into existence may change depending on whether we have the philosophical nothingness, or our universal somethingness. It could be that particles can only spontaneously pop into existence if there is something to pop into.

I don't believe that is the case, however. In the nothingness, there are no laws to forbid anything from occurring, so everything occurs. This, I believe, was the origin of the Big Bang.

But I think I'm rambling .

A bacteria popping into existence in a glass of unpasteurized milk (an environment conducive to it) is vaguely comprehensible. And so the particles and the Casimir effect.

A bacteria popping into existence in an air-tight cube of glass is somewhat incomprehensible. And so the particles and the Casimir effect.

True, but that doesn't make them any less possible. The universe wasn't made to be comprehensible to us monkey people. It wasn't made at all .

 

[Vigilante]

True, but that doesn't make them any less possible. The universe wasn't made to be comprehensible to us monkey people.

Calling the ability of phenomena to spontaneously pop into existence "possible" because, for all we know, there are no logical contradictions involved doesn't do much to forward the argument that we should believe that it actually happened. It's often difficult to demonstrate possibility for controversial metaphysical propositions.

Remarks such as these suggest that, as [William Lane] Craig sees it, the matter of plausibility is more difficult to determine than that of mere possibility. Like [Alvin] Plantinga, Craig evidently has in mind a distinction between a Free Will Defence and a Theodicy; and like Plantinga, he places more weight upon that distinction than he should. As Plantinga himself explained the distinction, 'the aim [of a Free Will Defence] is not to say what God's reason [for permitting evil] *is*, but at most what God's reason *might possibly be*.' But why should anyone suppose, in the present context, that a possible reason for why God has permitted evil should be any different from, or any easier to establish than, the actual reason? If by 'a possible reason' one means 'a reason that, for all we know, might have been the actual reason', then of course there are in that epistemic sense many possible reasons why God might have permitted evil. But Plantinga is talking about a reason that is possible in the broadly logical sense; and if God is a necessary being, necessarily omnipotent, necessarily loving, and necessarily wise, then his actual reason for permitting evil may, for all we know, be the only reason possible. Even if it is not the only reason possible, moreover, we could *know* this only if we already knew a good deal about what his actual reason was. And similarly for Craig's apparent assumption that the relevant possibilities are reasonably obvious. With respect to many controversial metaphysical propositions, including most of those that Craig discusses, it is far easier to set forth some plausible reasons for believing such propositions than it would be to *demonstrate* their possibility.

[Emphasis with asterisks by me (can't italicize in quotations).]

Similarly for what may or may not appear in the non-environment of no-thing. The claim that it is possible, for all we know, that matter appeared out of nowhere because, "Well, how could it not be?" is met with the just-as-arbitrary antagonist mirror that it is impossible, for all we know, that matter appeared out of nowhere because, "Well, how could it be?"

The fact of the matter is we don't know if it's possible or impossible for matter to spontaneously appear in a non-environment of no-thing, and because it seems inconceivable that we'd ever find a nice patch of no-thing in this universe in which to perform tests, I doubt we'll ever find out.

Apart from possibility, I don't know of any plausible reasons why matter should have appeared from a non-environment of no-thing, either, so I personally would not grant a claim to the affirmative the status of a scientific proposition. Maybe that sort of thing requires faith (ah, the 'F' word!).

In the nothingness, there are no laws to forbid anything from occurring, so everything occurs.

Or:

In the nothingness, there are no opportunities to permit anything to occur, so nothing occurs.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Calling the ability of phenomena to spontaneously pop into existence "possible" because, for all we know, there are no logical contradictions involved doesn't do much to forward the argument that we should believe that it actually happened. It's often difficult to demonstrate possibility for controversial metaphysical propositions.

Which is why we've run experiments to test those theories, and they are verified. The Casimir effect is one of my favourite demonstrations of 'something from nothing'.

 

[Vigilante]

Which is why we've run experiments to test those theories, and they are verified.

I'd rather not quote Wikipedia, but...

The causes of the Casimir effect are described by quantum field theory, which states that all of the various fundamental fields, such as the electromagnetic field, must be quantized at each and every point in space. In a simplified view, a "field" in physics may be envisioned as if space were filled with [...]

It seems that the experiments were run in an environment of "various fundamental fields," each of which, I'd venture to guess, presuppose space-time. So...

Wiccan_Child]The Casimir effect is one of my favourite demonstrations of 'something from nothing'.

...I don't think we're on the same page as to what exactly "nothing" means. Because space-time began (thank you, Stephen Hawking, for saving my otherwise-zilch knowledge of physics!) at the Big Bang, I think the "nothing" in which the Casimir effect takes place is a little bit too much "something" after all to qualify as evidence for "something" (anything!) popping into a non-environment of no-thing (read: no fields, no space-time).

On the other hand, if there's evidence that I don't know about that suggests fields were operating (somewhere?) prior to the Big Bang (was there a somewhere?), then my point goes kaput.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I'd rather not quote Wikipedia, but...

The causes of the Casimir effect are described by quantum field theory, which states that all of the various fundamental fields, such as the electromagnetic field, must be quantized at each and every point in space. In a simplified view, a "field" in physics may be envisioned as if space were filled with [...]

It seems that the experiments were run in an environment of "various fundamental fields," each of which, I'd venture to guess, presuppose space-time. So...

The Casimir effect is one of my favourite demonstrations of 'something from nothing'.

...I don't think we're on the same page as to what exactly "nothing" means.

Yes, but not in the way that you think. In quantum mechanics, fields are essentially large groups of virtual, intermediary particles. The Casimir effect is where two large metal plates are so close together that the average force of these particles popping into existence is weaker between them, so they feel a force pushing them inwards.

Because space-time began (thank you, Stephen Hawking, for saving my otherwise-zilch knowledge of physics!) at the Big Bang, I think the "nothing" in which the Casimir effect takes place is a little bit too much "something" after all to qualify as evidence for "something" (anything!) popping into a non-environment of no-thing (read: no fields, no space-time).

I think you misunderstand what the Casimir effect demonstrates. And the Big Bang isn't the beginning of spacetime: it's simply the limit to how far back we can see, and it may as well be the start. The question of what (if anything) happened before the Big Bang is quite open.

 

[JonF]

Everything and every occurrence either has a cause or is uncaused. That is to say, everything either exists for a reason or it doesn't exist for any reason.

There is a difference between causality and purpose.

Everything that exists must either have an infinite chain of caused causes behind it (infinite regress) or at some point in the chain there must be an uncaused cause, something which exists or occurred for no reason. Any infinite regress must also have a cause or be uncaused, therefore an "uncaused cause" must exist.

Your conclusion doesn't follow from your premises. Where in your premises is the concept of "finite" or "infinite" - yet this concept is in your conclusion. It's unclear at this point if time if finite, infinite, or has bounded limit type behavior. Why does an infinite chain have to be uncaused? Are you familiar with zeno's paradoxes? All zeno chains are infinite. Maybe you mean infinite, unbounded by time chains - yet the term "cause" applied to these is a category error.

 

[lawtonfogle]

Why does that make it supernatural? In physics, we know that particles can spontaneously come into existence, yet I'd hardly call the Casimir effect 'supernatural'.

Any sufficiently advance enough technology is indistinguishable from magick.

That is to say, it is a matter of perspective and semantics.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Any sufficiently advance enough technology is indistinguishable from magick.

That is to say, it is a matter of perspective and semantics.

Exactly. So when people talk about the relationship between science, the natural, and the supernatural, it's all subjective waffle.

 

[Vigilante]

And the Big Bang isn't the beginning of spacetime: it's simply the limit to how far back we can see, and it may as well be the start. The question of what (if anything) happened before the Big Bang is quite open.

Thanks for the heads up. This seems like a more conservative position than your earlier post:

In the nothingness, there are no laws to forbid anything from occurring, so everything occurs. This, I believe, was the origin of the Big Bang.

As I mentioned before, no thing is forbidden or permitted in our epistemic (if not also metaphysical) no-thing that existed (or didn't) before the Big Bang. And as you said, "The question of what (if anything) happened before the Big Bang is quite open." Even if we did have a natural somethingness prior to the Big Bang, we don't yet have any idea of what, if any, contingent processes that some-thing would have permitted, determined or precluded.

So, for now at least, natural explanations must settle for this: ?

Claims to the alleged "possibility" (or impossibility!) of the Big Bang occuring with no prior cause must be as yet unsubstantiated.