May I ask why?
I might need to amend the scenario with some more details about the mudslide. What I had in mind was a catastrophic change in the landscape which would render Fred's understanding of the road system nearly, but not completely useless. A simple turn around the corner to find a detour is just too easy to really demonstrate this.
Indeed. Perhaps there is a catastrophic earthquake that both considerably re-orders the landscape AND knocks Fred out, so that when he wakens some hours later it is dark and nothing looks at all as he remembers, and he is also a bit disoriented and possibly had some memory loss, so that he can't exactly remember where he'd last been?
How does that work?
I'm beginning to think that certainty is subjective.
I am surprised when people say otherwise. I mean, not to say that they don't assert everyday walking around practical certainty, but when they assert metaphysical or epistemic certainty.
One of the objects of certainty would have to be objective and the other subjective. This is what I have in mind: Fred has two separate understandings involved in the scenario. One is the mental map of the road, the other is a separate understanding of how reliably his mental image adheres to the real road system that he perceives. This separate understanding is what I'm thinking is rational certainty, which was obliterated when he discovered the mudslide. In other words, rational certainty would be a kind of trust that is gained through first hand experience.
I don't think the issue is quite so clearly delineated philosophically. I mean, personally, I think of all sense experience as being continually verified empirically, but don't see *that* sort of verification as leading to the sort of metaphysical certainty you seem to be implying. Fred could have warrant, based in experience, to place a high degree of trust in the *usefulness* of his mental model. Does this fact allow him to make absolute ontological claims about the world? I don't think so. (Forgive me if this isn't the question you're trying to investigate here, as it has occurred to me (somewhat belatedly) might be the case. If it is not, then I apologize for derailing your thread.

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But then, my metaphysics tend toward the minimalist, and the sort of certainty you seem to be after is something I neither strive for nor think is possible or particularly useful, really, mainly because developing metaphysics that answer all the imponderables about the nature of existence and knowledge seems to me to invariably involve a commitment to some unfalifiable belief structure, and I just don't think it makes sense, or is particularly useful, to believe unfalsifiable things (due to considerations of parsimony, Ockham's Razor, etc.)).
But then, I've been kicking around a theory that religiosity correlates with one's relative comfort with imponderables: the more uncomfortable one is with epistemic and ontological uncertainty, the more likely he is to be religious. Just a vague sort of idea I have, nothing I'd care to argue at this point.
I'm just taking a philisophical walk through the park... where the path leads I do not know.
This is an interesting area of exploration, isn't it? There is another thread in the philosophy forum wherein people are discussing whether philosophy (by which they mean, I think, metaphysics: ontology, epistemology, etc.) is really a useful endeavor.
I'm not sure it's *useful*, but it's certainly fun.
Regards,
M.