Yes, this is a nit pick, but a fun one...
If some theory about the universe is true, then it should not be falsifiable (outside of bad science happening), thus it is not scientific.
Does a more rigorous definition fix this problem?
As stated earlier, science is an attempt to describe reality, ergo scientific predictions are tested against the results of reality in experiments. The term falsifiable is a statement of potential- We don't know the result of experiment X until it is done, so until it's performed we do not know if hypothesis Y's prediction will actually come to fruition in experiment X. Therefore experiment Y is falsifiable because of the potential of experiment X to produce a different result. Let's take this to a logical extreme:
The theory of gravity predicts that a body of sufficient mass will attract smaller bodies towards it. Ergo, since the earth is a body of sufficient mass, if I drop a pencil, it should fall towards the earth. This is a testable prediction, and therefore the theory of gravity is falsifiable, even if I know that when I drop a pencil, it will fall towards the earth. (one can claim that I actually do not know this until it's done- this is where we get into a weird philosophy on empiricism.)
The term falsifiable is referring to the nebulous idea of something being testable in some odd philosophical sense rather than a description of reality. It's important to know that the origin of science arises from the philosophy of empiricism, ergo, when talking about the philosophy of science things get a bit weird- case in point, pure empiricism is not rationalism, in empiricism one cannot conclude absolutely that something is 100% repeatable. (If I dropped a pen 3 billion times, that is not an absolute guarantee that the 3billion and first time will succeed.) Ergo falsifiability is a property of a theory even if we've done every possible experiment on it we can think of right now, since those experiments are repeatable.
What this means is that science will never actually be 100% complete, even if we discover some grand universal equation that perfectly describes everything we know about the universe, and appears absolutely perfect, it will still have the possibility of being proven wrong by future experimentation- even though it looks absolutely perfect to us it may not be in the face of future information. Ergo, science is always open to the possibility of being wrong, and disproving a theory like gravity, evolution, or QM would make somebody crazy rich in grant money.
From here we can get into a philosophical discussion of a 'universal truth' that will never actually be known by us, but rather we will always only be guessing at it.
Also a bit of a different issue. If something is derived, need it be falsifiable to be scientific? For example... Lets say we know all dogs are mammals, we know all mammals have X (don't worry about how we know this), thus we know all dogs have X, but for what ever reason, if one were to try to form an hypothesis 'all dogs have X', it would be unfalsifiable. As long as the premises are scientific, does the deduction from them have to be falsifiable for it to be scientific?
(formal logic alert)
If X is to be known, X must be testable. If X is known to be in all mammals, then X is testable in all mammals. If X is testable in all mammals, and if dogs are mammals, then X is testable in dogs.
ergo If X is not testable in dogs, then X is not known to be in all mammals.