Properly Basic Beliefs

[elopez]

This dress appears white and gold to me, yet I know that it isn't. Appearances can be misleading.

Of course perceptual experience is fallible, but does that mean we can't have basic beliefs?

On another note, say we are one of those that see the dress as blue and black, and that's the colours the dress actually is. Would you say our perceptual experience is that of the dress itself, or is it the result of a type of sense-data?

 

[elopez]

Sure, I gave you three examples in post #13.

So, "the hat exists"?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Of course perceptual experience is fallible, but does that mean we can't have basic beliefs?

I think it casts doubt on such a claim being a "properly basic belief."

On another note, say we are one of those that see the dress as blue and black, and that's the colours the dress actually is. Would you say our perceptual experience is that of the dress itself, or is it the result of a type of sense-data?

I don't know.

 

[elopez]

I think it casts doubt on such a claim being a "properly basic belief."

Well of course, but perceptual experience isn't the only source of knowledge, either. Even then I think it can be, and in many cases is.

 

[juvenissun]

The belief in God, though, is not a fact. Nor is it self-evident. Would this then be one of the "few fundamental assumptions"? It seems so, which to me really says a basic belief doesn't need to be self-evident.

This few words puzzled me at least for a whole decade. To me, it is never a basic belief. It is a very complicate statement.
It is not a complete sentence. Something important is missing in these few words.
The belief (of what) in God?
If you say: whatever. Then it is definitely not a basic belief.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Truth isn't a "game."

Ah, so we can kick Wittgenstein out of the conversation, then? Isn't that a little too convenient? [I mean this with a dab of humor, Ana.]

 

[TheoNewstoss]

I was wondering what you all here think of this idea. For all those familiar with epistemology, a properly basic belief is one which does not need justification from another belief or proposition. Further, all other beliefs are justified by this basic belief. An example of a basic belief would be:

The hat is blue.

"The hat is blue" is not properly basic. It relies on other beliefs or assumptions.

Our perceptual experience of this is not based on any further beliefs, according to this idea. My question is, do you find this to be true? Are there such things as properly basic beliefs? Can you provide an example?

It seems to me that the hat being blue is not basic, as it based on our further beliefs there are hats, and there exists a colour such as blue. Would this seem like an accurate objection to the idea of properly basic beliefs?

The laws of thought are properly basic. For example, the law of identity must obtain for language to have meaning. Properly basic beliefs are foundational to any epidemiological system by necessity, despite what anyone tells you. The Christian maintains that all meaning, ergo the laws of thought, are reflective of God's mind and nature. The transcendental argument for the existence of God establishes this. Thus in the Christian conceptual framework, God must exist in order for anything to even begin to make sense. On a naturalistic conceptual framework, God is replaced by the uniformity of nature.

 

[Jipsah]

I dont think you need any beliefs to say the hat is blue. Its basic experience. You can argue about what it "really is" all day long. But your experience that the hat is blue requires nothing else.

Which is great in a purely subjective way. "If I say it's blue then by Godfrey it's blue!", even though the one making the assertion is color blind, and the frequencies he perceives as "blue" are what are commonly called yellow.

And unless you assign a specific frequency range to "blue", then what constitutes blue is always subjective.

 

[elopez]

The laws of thought are properly basic. For example, the law of identity must obtain for language to have meaning.

Are the laws of logic even a belief? Regardless, it depends on the context that one is applying the law. If we use that law as a basic belief what other non-basic beliefs can be derived from that?

Properly basic beliefs are foundational to any epidemiological system by necessity, despite what anyone tells you.

Well that's the thing, the alternative to foundationalism, coherentism, denies that there are such things as basic beliefs. The point to foundationalism is to structure our knowledge, so that we start with basic beliefs, and work to non-basic beliefs. It seems there are not many basic beliefs, if any at all really.

The Christian maintains that all meaning, ergo the laws of thought, are reflective of God's mind and nature. The transcendental argument for the existence of God establishes this. Thus in the Christian conceptual framework, God must exist in order for anything to even begin to make sense. On a naturalistic conceptual framework, God is replaced by the uniformity of nature.

This seems more suitable for this thread: http://www.christianforums.com/threads/evidential-arguments-of-god.7904214/

 

[TheoNewstoss]

Are the laws of logic even a belief?

The laws of logic are propositions. A belief is just your acceptance of whether or not a proposition is true or false.

If we use that law as a basic belief what other non-basic beliefs can be derived from that?

All of them. All beliefs only make sense in light of one's acceptance of the law of non-contradiction. Hence, the acceptance of the proposition that the law of non-contradiction obtains is properly basic.

Well that's the thing, the alternative to foundationalism, coherentism, denies that there are such things as basic beliefs. The point to foundationalism is to structure our knowledge, so that we start with basic beliefs, and work to non-basic beliefs. It seems there are not many basic beliefs, if any at all really.

Describe coherentism without appealing to something properly basic. You can't, which is why I reject coherentism.

 

[elopez]

The laws of logic are propositions. A belief is just your acceptance of whether or not a proposition is true or false.

Right, but one cannot reject a law of logic unless they want to maintain a point of being illogical. One could rightly reject a basic belief and still be logical in doing so, depending on A)if there are such things as basic beliefs, B) the basic belief constitutes as such.

All of them. All beliefs only make sense in light of one's acceptance of the law of non-contradiction. Hence, the acceptance of the proposition that the law of non-contradiction obtains is properly basic.

Sure all the laws of logic. What I'm asking is what other beliefs about the world, ones that we hold in everyday life, can be derived, if any, from these laws?

Describe coherentism without appealing to something properly basic. You can't, which is why I reject coherentism.

Likewise, describe a basic belief by appealing to foundationalism. One that actually means something to you about the world or this life. That's just it - coherentism dismisses the idea of basic beliefs as a structure of knowledge. Instead, knowledge is structed like a web, and all beliefs are in an epistemological neighborhood of ine another. As long as those neighboring beliefs are coherent are relevant to one another, we could be justified in holding those beliefs (depending on other things, too).

My issue is structuring knowledge in the way foundationalism requires. I seem to not really find many basic beliefs we can start at, like God exists, or that hat is blue.

 

[TheoNewstoss]

Right, but one cannot reject a law of logic unless they want to maintain a point of being illogical. One could rightly reject a basic belief and still be logical in doing so, depending on A)if there are such things as basic beliefs, B) the basic belief constitutes as such.

You cannot deny the laws of logic without using the laws of logic. The statement, "I reject the law of non-contradiction," only makes sense if the law of non-contradiction obtains. Apart from the laws of logic, any properly basic belief has to make sense within the context of its conceptual framework. So on a theistic conceptual framework, belief in God is properly basic. Why would I argue with someone who's a naturalist about whether or not belief in God is properly basic? On their conceptual framework, belief in God isn't properly basic.

Sure all the laws of logic. What I'm asking is what other beliefs about the world, ones that we hold in everyday life, can be derived, if any, from these laws?

Derived from? They only make sense in light of the laws of logic. On a theistic conceptual framework, cause and effect only make sense in light of one's belief in God. The way we experience the world, the physical laws that govern the world, our ability to assign value, etc., all only make sense on a theist worldview in light of one's properly basic belief in God.

Are you familiar with Plato's concept of the good and the allegory of the cave? If so, this should seem pretty basic.

That's just it - coherentism dismisses the idea of basic beliefs as a structure of knowledge. Instead, knowledge is structed like a web, and all beliefs are in an epistemological neighborhood of ine another. As long as those neighboring beliefs are coherent are relevant to one another, we could be justified in holding those beliefs (depending on other things, too).

In order for coherentism to dismiss anything, it has to first presuppose meaning in its dismissal. It must presuppose meaning in language. It must presuppose an objective reality. All of these are properly basic.

My issue is structuring knowledge in the way foundationalism requires. I seem to not really find many basic beliefs we can start at, like God exists, or that hat is blue.

Are you just getting into epistemology?

 

[elopez]

Apart from the laws of logic, any properly basic belief has to make sense within the context of its conceptual framework.

Well, any basic belief could not depend on another belief, so it is not enough just to make sense within the context of a framework. That, as it has been described, is more close to coherentism.

So on a theistic conceptual framework, belief in God is properly basic.

How so? A belief in God's existence seems further dependant on another belief, namely, that "existence" has meaning.

Why would I argue with someone who's a naturalist about whether or not belief in God is properly basic? On their conceptual framework, belief in God isn't properly basic.

Then forget arguing with a naturalist and explain it to me. According to this though, we are coming to know God externally, through an observation of say the night sky. In this way, belief of God existing is not basic as it rests also on a belief or a simple proposition of the night sky.

In order for coherentism to dismiss anything, it has to first presuppose meaning in its dismissal. It must presuppose meaning in language. It must presuppose an objective reality. All of these are properly basic.

Are you thinking coherentism is strictly an atheistic view? It is not necessarily so. Of course said view adheres to language and reality. Even those, language and reality, do not seem basic for they also seem further dependant on other propositions.

 

[elopez]

Are you just getting into epistemology?

Not so much, just never seen this specific topic discussed here and was wondering if posters go with foundationalism or coherentism.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Sounds like the Op is describing an a-priori statement or belief, one that is based on an epistemic justification that needs no experiential justification, i.e. obviously true, or true by definition. But a statement like, "The hat is blue" is an a-posteriori proposition, dependent on experiential justification. And yes, formal philosophical arguments do generally need a-priori propositions as a base.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Not so much, just never seen this specific topic discussed here and was wondering if posters go with foundationalism or coherentism.

Hi elopez,

I lean more toward coherentism, at least as far as the Bible is concerned. However, from what I've studied, there are limits (and problems) inherent in all epistemological frameworks. In addition to this, it seems to me that much of what we all try to do in acquiring an understanding of our world is not 'based' on anything that we can necessarily share in at a universal, consensual level.

2PhiloVoid

 

[TheoNewstoss]

Well, any basic belief could not depend on another belief, so it is not enough just to make sense within the context of a framework. That, as it has been described, is more close to coherentism.

Your conceptual framework is your collection of beliefs. It itself is not a belief. Any good conceptual framework must be coherent. If you believe in God, then your conceptual framework has to be modeled after that properly basic belief. It serves as your foundation. God does not need to make sense in light of other facts or propositions. All facts and propositions need to make sense in light of God. That is the opposite of coherentism. On coherentism, God could not stand alone. God would have to make sense in light of other things.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

You cannot deny the laws of logic without using the laws of logic. The statement, "I reject the law of non-contradiction," only makes sense if the law of non-contradiction obtains. Apart from the laws of logic, any properly basic belief has to make sense within the context of its conceptual framework. So on a theistic conceptual framework, belief in God is properly basic. Why would I argue with someone who's a naturalist about whether or not belief in God is properly basic? On their conceptual framework, belief in God isn't properly basic.

Is it really properly basic? I need to assume the existence of a self that is "me" in order to be able to reason about other propositions that may be true or false, including the propositions of theism. I don't need to assume the existence of deities to do that. You are taking an assumption that we must make in order to think and comparing it to a whole body of religious assumptions that don't appear to be essential to our cognitive faculties, but which are still assumed by theists.

 

[TheoNewstoss]

Is it really properly basic? I need to assume the existence of a self that is "me" in order to be able to reason about other propositions that may be true or false, including the propositions of theism. I don't need to assume the existence of deities to do that. You are taking an assumption that we must make in order to think and comparing it to a whole body of religious assumptions that don't appear to be essential to our cognitive faculties, but which are still assumed by theists.

In the context of a theistic conceptual framework, belief in God is properly basic. That just follows. What's so hard to understand about that?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

In the context of a theistic conceptual framework, belief in God is properly basic. That just follows. What's so hard to understand about that?

Why assume a theistic conceptual framework to begin with?