I wrote an essay on this topic recently. I guess it's more suited to the early part of the thread but here it is anyway:
Does the Free Will Defence solve the problem of evil?
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but unwilling? Then he is not benevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
So goes the argument against belief in the Judeo-Christian God, (henceforth referred to as God), known as the problem of evil. One of the earliest examples of the argument was developed by Epicurus and has proved to be a lasting and very debatable issue.
Taken at face value the argument appears to be a very logical, uncomplicated indictment of belief in God. The argument rests on the idea that two of God’s characteristics are irreconcilable with the existence of evil in this world. The existence of evil is seemingly incompatible with the notion that God is both benevolent and omnipotent for his omnipotence would make it possible for Him to prevent evil and His benevolence would require Him to do so. It is clearly not the case, however, that evil is always prevented. Therefore either one or both of these characteristics should not be attributed to God. The problem now is that it is impossible for God to still be God without benevolence and/or omnipotence.
But if the argument was that clear-cut the world’s major monotheistic religions would not have continued to survive. In response to the problem of evil, theists have developed theodicies in an attempt to discover why God does allow evil and so show that the problem of evil is not sufficient proof that God does not exist. One such theodicy is the Free Will Defence.
Before the arguments are pitted against one another, it is necessary to be clear on the relevant terms as different thinkers utilise various definitions and this can determine the effectiveness of their arguments. The terms in need of clarification are: a) omnipotence; b) benevolence; c) evil; and d) free will.
Omnipotence is described by J.L. Mackie as being the ability to do anything and that “there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do,” and I am inclined to agree with this conclusion. By accepting Mackie’s definition I include the idea that an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible (for example: make a square circle). Further issues are raised due to this strict interpretation of omnipotence and they will arise in the course of the argument.
Secondly, benevolence I take to mean, in God’s case, supremely good. This includes moral goodness and always choosing to do what is in the best interests of those concerned.
The definition of evil can be ambiguous and vague. Some take it to mean a lack of goodness, some do not believe it to be a substance in its own right, and others even dispute the idea that evil exists at all. These opinions, I believe, can be dismissed as “pain is not simply the absence of pleasure”. Therefore I will be treating evil as a substance in its own right and as a sweeping term to cover all types of suffering, be it caused directly by people (for example: war), or by natural means (for example: an earthquake). The former will be referred to as moral evil, the latter as natural evil.
Finally, the meaning of free will and all it entails must be clarified. In the context of the Free Will Defence I take free will to refer to the ability of every mentally sound person to act in accordance with his or her desires without God’s intervention.
Now that the terms are defined the Free Will Defence can be explained. This argument seeks to nullify the problem of evil through showing that the trio of incompatible elements (i.e. God’s omnipotence, God’s benevolence and the existence of evil) are able to co-exist without causing a logical impossibility. As evil has been classified into two categories, so the Free Will Defence has two lines of argument. One confronts moral evil; the other is to explain natural evil. Both arguments begin on the common ground of the notion that humans were given free will by God, but then take slightly different routes in explaining how that free will causes the two different types of evil.
Despite Plantinga’s claim that theodicies are a priori impossible because humans may lack the capacity to understand why evil occurs, he is one of the major exponents of the Free Will Defence. His argument deals primarily with moral evil and how it is caused by human free will. It is Plantinga’s claim that in having free will people are sometimes in a position were they can choose to do either the right action or the wrong; and it is a necessary condition of this freedom that they are able to choose the wrong. If they were only able to choose the right action then they would not be in possession of free will. Due to this it is impossible for God to intervene and stop an agent’s evil action whilst still maintaining that agent’s free will.
This line of reasoning is not without its detractors. One such person, J.L. Mackie, put forward the following argument: It is logically possible that people can always freely choose to do right, and god (being omnipotent) can bring about all that is logically possible so, “…why would he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?”
The Free Will Defence has two replies to this refutation. The first is that it is logically necessary, if an agent be truly free, for their ability to do evil be sometimes realised. The second (and Plantinga’s reply) is that it is logically impossible to cause a free action. Here is where, I believe, the waters are muddied due to the fact that the debate now rests on the contentious issue of the definition of free will. It can be argued that every free action is caused by something and so saying that it is logically impossible to cause a free action is not a convincing counter-argument to Mackie’s objection. However, if the definition used is the one described above, the argument does have a valid basis as it is this libertarian freedom that Plantinga suggests is morally significant.
The question of freedom versus determinism is a complex issue and has a strong bearing on the problem of evil’s strength. Whilst one can argue that it is counter-intuitive to propose free will does not exist because even if we act in accordance with our desires we do not choose our desires, the circumstances in which we sometimes find ourselves nor the options available to us, it is still a possibility that free will is no more than an illusion Dismissing free will altogether in favour of a determined universe is a radical but by no means ridiculous theory and if it is held the Free Will Defence completely disintegrates. Therefore I can neither accept nor dismiss the Free Will Defence for moral evil based solely on the argument thus-far.
If, however, the notion of free will is adhered to, there are further arguments against the Free Will Defence.
One such objection is that God could have given humans a stronger inclination towards choosing the right action, making us less disposed to commit evil acts. Those subscribing to the Free Will Defence have two replies to this. The first and weakest of the two is that if our dispositions were any stronger they would be inconsistent with freedom. This reply is highly debatable as there are people with a very strong disposition to do good and others with an equally strong disposition towards evil. It seems that if God could allow one person a strong inclination towards acting in the right way, He could have bestowed upon everybody an equal disposition. The second argument is somewhat stronger and suggests that one could always have a better disposition. If one were 90% likely to choose the right option there is still room for improvement up until one opts for the good 100% of the time and this is back to the previous argument that God couldn’t make us freely always choose the right. This second reply is, in my opinion, a sufficient response to the objection from greater disposition.
Another objection to the Free Will Defence is that it was morally wrong of God to create humans with free will, knowing the consequences this freedom would cause. God therefore could not be benevolent. Richard Swinburne disagrees with this idea and likens God to a parent who lets their child make mistakes rather then impinge on their freedom. Other believers in the Free Will Defence would concur with this as they claim that it is better to have a free world with evil than for everybody to be mindless automata. Leibniz suggested that free will was an integral part of the best possible world and that moral evil was a result of this. Whilst the most militant of Free Will Defence objectionists might dispute this idea and profess a preference for a robotic world, theirs is not a theory that attracts many supporters. There might, on the other hand, be some credence in the Buddhist view that it would have been better had the world not have been created at all. Although not generally accepted, it may have an element of truth about it that does indeed cast doubt over God’s decision to create a world where such a high degree of freedom is valued above the prevention of the terrible consequences it sometimes causes.
Following from this comes the objection that God could have made a world in which we have free will but that when evil prevails there is no consequence for others. In other words, humans would have the freedom to make their own choices and those choices would affect only the chooser. Once again, Swinburne rejects this as a valid refutation of the Free Will Defence and says that “…the price of possible passive evils for other creatures is a price worth paying for agents to have great responsibilities for each other.” Prizing responsibility above impeding evil is, for me, highly questionable and so I do not find Swinburne’s defence compelling. However, I also find it difficult to imagine a world in which the impact of our actions was limited to ourselves.
The final objection to the Free Will Defence for moral evil is that the definition of omnipotence is severely restricted. Plantinga asserted that it was impossible for God to cause a free agent to always choose the right. This puts a limit on what an omnipotent being can do and this seems to be a contradiction in terms. One can argue that if God created logic he surely is not required to bind himself to those laws. Christians arguing against this fact should note several Bible verses that uphold the strict definition of omnipotence, for example: Luke 1:37, which says, “For with God nothing shall be impossible.”
Therefore I can not accept the Free Will Defence for moral evil is a sufficient argument against the problem of evil.
The problem of natural evil is more difficult for the Free Will Defence advocate as it proposes to explain evil indirectly through free will. One can see where the Free Will Defence has a valid argument in terms of moral evil as it can be obvious that free actions of people directly cause the suffering of others. However, using free will to explain something which humans do not control is a much more difficult task.
There are three main theories put forward by the Free Will Defence to explain natural evil. One, argued by Mark Sainsbury, is that it is the making of wrong choices that causes suffering. He states that God has given us the free will and the resources to eradicate disease and warn of natural disaster but we do not take advantage of what is available to us. Instead of building warning systems to prevent suffering from natural disasters we build nuclear weapons; instead of spending money on a cure for disease we use it to buy unnecessary luxuries. This argument goes some way in explaining why we haven’t solved the problems natural evil presents, but it does not explain why the natural evil was put here initially. Not only that, but it seems to promote the idea that if we gave the time and money to it, we could cure death – the ultimate form of suffering. Neither does Sainsbury explain how this theory could be applied to times before advances in technology. For example, one could not expect Neanderthals to be able to cure disease or blame them for not choosing the right course of action to warn of an on-coming disaster. Whilst Sainsbury’s argument explains why we are still suffering from natural evil, it does not provide a solution to the problem of natural evil.
The second argument is that humans are ultimately responsible for the natural evil in the world and that somehow human depravity is tied by God to the workings of the natural world. This view is contested even by some other theists, notably Herbert McCabe, who wrote, “Let us be clear that by no stretch of the imagination can [natural evil] be attributed to the viciousness of men and women”. The view does seem highly unlikely and Swinburne himself admits that it cannot explain animal pain suffered before the existence of man. He therefore puts forward another proposal, (one that is also held by Plantinga), which is that natural evil is due to the free will, not of humans, but of fallen angels or demons. He argues that it is possible these non-human free agents were trusted with the care of the material world and have abused that power, causing the natural evil suffered today. This can be (and frequently is) regarded as totally irrational. I also feel that it is a last ditch effort in an unsuccessful attempt to justify his belief in an omnipotent, benevolent God who allows otherwise inexplicable suffering. That fact the he says his argument is not “clearly [sic] false” (with emphasis on the word ‘clearly) indicates to me that he is aware of his argument’s shortcomings but is unwilling to accept the problem of evil is good evidence against God.
The last theory the Free Will Defence suggests is that natural evil was due to The Fall. The story of Adam and Eve’s original sin in the Bible is used to explain why the world deteriorated. This view can be discounted by using the Bible itself, however, as Jesus states in the New Testament that a son is not accountable for his father’s actions.
