Pragmatism, Idealism, and Skepticism

[Percivale]

To me, pragmatism and idealism (in the colloquial sense) are closely woven together. Idealism I define as having high hopes about the ultimate things in life, believing in or pursuing things because they are good and valued, not just because of factual evidence. Pragmatism is making decisions based on what works to attain a desired end, and the basic end to desire is a fulfilled life. So I consider it a pragmatic choice to be idealistic in how I view some things, if doing so contributes to my well-being.

I don't actually put this into practice all that much, since one of my primary values is searching out truth based on evidence. That is a fulfilling, praiseworthy, and useful pursuit we should all engage in, especially those with my personality and position. But if I hit a wall in seeking evidence, and just don't know which of two or more options is true, I believe choosing the belief my ideals lead to is the most logical choice, rather than adopting skepticism. This is mainly true if the decision affects actual choices concerning action--in the case of Pascal's wager, the action in question was whether to go to Mass and participate in the rites. (I'm not a proponent of the wager, but it gives some food for thought).

Skepticism has value regarding epistemology: there really is a lot we don't know for sure, and recognizing that can pave the way to new discoveries, and protect us from bigotry. But as a philosophy of life, skepticism is just not very pragmatic or ideal. It boils down to accepting the negative answer to every question, which is actually a choice in itself, and usually the less fulfilling or useful one. I also find it annoying when skeptics act so sure of their skepticism, like Hume did, building his whole philosophy around it. I prefer being skeptical of skepticism, especially in practical life, but also in philosophical questions; keep the option open as to how sure we can be about the issue under discussion.

An essay I like on the issue is William James' The Will to Believe. Check it out if interested.

 

[Paradoxum]

It sounds like it could be used as an excuse to believe in fairy tales without good reason.

Not that it's necessarily that way with you. I suppose there is a place for a balance of skepticism, idealism, and pragmatism. The problem is that if you sway too far away from skepticism then you may end up ignoring a more reasonable line of argument.

Can you give an example?

 

[Percivale]

It sounds like it could be used as an excuse to believe in fairy tales without good reason.

Not that it's necessarily that way with you. I suppose there is a place for a balance of skepticism, idealism, and pragmatism. The problem is that if you sway too far away from skepticism then you may end up ignoring a more reasonable line of argument.

Can you give an example?

I guess the main example is that I'd probably continue to believe in God if all my evidence for him was refuted, (though not if it was somehow proved that he does not exist) because of how that belief is related to so many of my values (including humanism--how can one be a good humanist and yet deny there is any basis to something as universal to humanity as religion?)

I recognize the importance of not denying things that are clearly proven (like that the earth is about 4.5 billions years old), but can one show, from a skeptical point of view, that it is wrong to believe fairy tales, if they do not include denying known truth? Not that I condone that, just giving you something to work on.

 

[Paradoxum]

I guess the main example is that I'd probably continue to believe in God if all my evidence for him was refuted, (though not if it was somehow proved that he does not exist) because of how that belief is related to so many of my values

If there's no good reason to believe in God, you shouldn't believe in God. Especially when we live in a world where children die of cancer.

If you believe in God without good reason, I'd say that doesn't make you a reasonable person. There's no difference between that and believing in fairies.

(including humanism--how can one be a good humanist and yet deny there is any basis to something as universal to humanity as religion?)

Why do you need religion for humanism?

I recognize the importance of not denying things that are clearly proven (like that the earth is about 4.5 billions years old), but can one show, from a skeptical point of view, that it is wrong to believe fairy tales, if they do not include denying known truth? Not that I condone that, just giving you something to work on.

Well you wouldn't be basing your belief on reason, which is anti-truth.

It seems like you want to be a reasonable person, but you also want a defense against seriously doubting your faith. I think you should reconsider. There is integrity in caring about truth, even if it potentially means losing beliefs your hold dear.

I used to be a committed Christian, and losing faith hurt me alot, but I think that being willing to losing your belief shows, in some sense, that your belief and principles are genuine.

There seems to be some shallowness in protecting beliefs from doubt. As if it's all about how it makes you feel.

Not that I'm calling you shallow, I'm just saying what I think on the issue.

 

[Percivale]

If there's no good reason to believe in God, you shouldn't believe in God. Especially when we live in a world where children die of cancer.

Why so? Not believing in God doesn't make any less children die of cancer. Yes, it is potential evidence that there is not a god, but that doesn't affect the pragmatics of the belief. Those who do believe in God have throughout history done more to defeat disease than those who don't, from what I've seen.

If you believe in God without good reason, I'd say that doesn't make you a reasonable person. There's no difference between that and believing in fairies.

True. I'm just arguing that it doesn't automatically make you unreasonable, if you have good practical reasons for doing so.

Why do you need religion for humanism?

If humanism means valuing human traits and helping humans flourish, then ignoring or denying a universal human trait that many people value deeply is not a humanistic attitude. Maybe you could craft a religion that is more scientific or works better, but something must be done with the human need for religion.

Well you wouldn't be basing your belief on reason, which is anti-truth.

It seems like you want to be a reasonable person, but you also want a defense against seriously doubting your faith. I think you should reconsider. There is integrity in caring about truth, even if it potentially means losing beliefs your hold dear.

I used to be a committed Christian, and losing faith hurt me alot, but I think that being willing to losing your belief shows, in some sense, that your belief and principles are genuine.

There seems to be some shallowness in protecting beliefs from doubt. As if it's all about how it makes you feel.

Not that I'm calling you shallow, I'm just saying what I think on the issue.

What you say is reasonable and I respect your position, but from an atheistic perspective, why do you value truth? I'd think your morals would have to be strictly utilitarian if you don't believe in God.

 

[Paradoxum]

Why so? Not believing in God doesn't make any less children die of cancer. Yes, it is potential evidence that there is not a god, but that doesn't affect the pragmatics of the belief.

Well if God probably doesn't exist, you shouldn't believe in God. Whether a belief makes you feel good shouldn't be relevant.

Those who do believe in God have throughout history done more to defeat disease than those who don't, from what I've seen.

Well most people have been theists.

True. I'm just arguing that it doesn't automatically make you unreasonable, if you have good practical reasons for doing so.

I think it does make you unreasonable. You should have a good intellectual reason for belief, not just that you like the belief.

I get it if you're living in absolute poverty and need something to cling to, but for everyone else it seems unreasonable.

If humanism means valuing human traits and helping humans flourish, then ignoring or denying a universal human trait that many people value deeply is not a humanistic attitude. Maybe you could craft a religion that is more scientific or works better, but something must be done with the human need for religion.

Humans don't need religion, and can live just as well without it.

What you say is reasonable and I respect your position, but from an atheistic perspective, why do you value truth? I'd think your morals would have to be strictly utilitarian if you don't believe in God.

Truth is meaningful to me. It means I care about something real that is bigger than myself. I also think it helps people.

I wouldn't say my morality was necessarily utilitarian. My morality is mostly about respecting others, and not violating them.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

If there's no good reason to believe in God, you shouldn't believe in God. Especially when we live in a world where children die of cancer.

If you believe in God without good reason, I'd say that doesn't make you a reasonable person. There's no difference between that and believing in fairies.



Why do you need religion for humanism?



Well you wouldn't be basing your belief on reason, which is anti-truth.

It seems like you want to be a reasonable person, but you also want a defense against seriously doubting your faith. I think you should reconsider. There is integrity in caring about truth, even if it potentially means losing beliefs your hold dear.

I used to be a committed Christian, and losing faith hurt me alot, but I think that being willing to losing your belief shows, in some sense, that your belief and principles are genuine.

There seems to be some shallowness in protecting beliefs from doubt. As if it's all about how it makes you feel.

Not that I'm calling you shallow, I'm just saying what I think on the issue.

Para,

I think we need to change your name to "Ms. Clifford." How about that?

 

[TillICollapse]

Why so? Not believing in God doesn't make any less children die of cancer.

Some Jehovah's Witnesses I've known didn't accept blood transfusions. I've also been in situations where I could not treat Muslim female patients, because their family standing by didn't want any males helping. I had to wait for females to arrive, even during emergency situations. If I really thought hard about it, I've probably even encountered issues where people have died due to refusing treatment, based on religious grounds. Now those people's belief in God specifically may not have been the issue, however factors with their religious practices they identified with may have helped to contribute to their own physical detriment and potential death.

If humanism means valuing human traits and helping humans flourish, then ignoring or denying a universal human trait that many people value deeply is not a humanistic attitude. Maybe you could craft a religion that is more scientific or works better, but something must be done with the human need for religion.

A person ignoring or denying a human trait of another is ... human. So actually I *may* argue that the very thing you point out as not being humanistic is in fact humanistic.

What you say is reasonable and I respect your position, but from an atheistic perspective, why do you value truth? I'd think your morals would have to be strictly utilitarian if you don't believe in God.

Belief in God and morality are two separate things.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

To me, pragmatism and idealism (in the colloquial sense) are closely woven together. Idealism I define as having high hopes about the ultimate things in life, believing in or pursuing things because they are good and valued, not just because of factual evidence. Pragmatism is making decisions based on what works to attain a desired end, and the basic end to desire is a fulfilled life. So I consider it a pragmatic choice to be idealistic in how I view some things, if doing so contributes to my well-being.

I don't actually put this into practice all that much, since one of my primary values is searching out truth based on evidence. That is a fulfilling, praiseworthy, and useful pursuit we should all engage in, especially those with my personality and position. But if I hit a wall in seeking evidence, and just don't know which of two or more options is true, I believe choosing the belief my ideals lead to is the most logical choice, rather than adopting skepticism. This is mainly true if the decision affects actual choices concerning action--in the case of Pascal's wager, the action in question was whether to go to Mass and participate in the rites. (I'm not a proponent of the wager, but it gives some food for thought).

Skepticism has value regarding epistemology: there really is a lot we don't know for sure, and recognizing that can pave the way to new discoveries, and protect us from bigotry. But as a philosophy of life, skepticism is just not very pragmatic or ideal. It boils down to accepting the negative answer to every question, which is actually a choice in itself, and usually the less fulfilling or useful one. I also find it annoying when skeptics act so sure of their skepticism, like Hume did, building his whole philosophy around it. I prefer being skeptical of skepticism, especially in practical life, but also in philosophical questions; keep the option open as to how sure we can be about the issue under discussion.

An essay I like on the issue is William James' The Will to Believe. Check it out if interested.

It really boils down to whether you value seeking the truth as the highest pedestal or whether you have other values which are higher on the list.

For example, you say that even if it could be shown that all evidence for God were invalid, you would still believe. So you essentially place your belief in God on a higher level than seeking the truth.

 

[quatona]

Well if God probably doesn't exist, you shouldn't believe in God. Whether a belief makes you feel good shouldn't be relevant.

I do not agree. What can you bring to the table in order to try to convince me of these maximes?

I think it does make you unreasonable.

I am under the impression that metaphysics aren´t the field of reason, anyway. Just like music and art aren´t.

You should have a good intellectual reason for belief, not just that you like the belief.

Why (and I am asking specifically about metaphysical beliefs here)?

Humans don't need religion, and can live just as well without it.
[...]
Truth is meaningful to me. It means I care about something real that is bigger than myself. I also think it helps people.

What if we step away from the claim that humas need religion, and replace it by the claim that to some religion (or transcendence, or metaphysics, or spirituality) is meaningful, and that it helps some people?

On a more general note: Do you think that metaphysical "truth" is accessible?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I guess the main example is that I'd probably continue to believe in God if all my evidence for him was refuted, (though not if it was somehow proved that he does not exist)

Which is exemplary of faith: remaining committed to one's theology regardless of whatever reason brings to bear on the matter.

because of how that belief is related to so many of my values (including humanism--how can one be a good humanist and yet deny there is any basis to something as universal to humanity as religion?)

It's understandable that many people continue to associate moral values with religion, due to their historical entanglement. However, bear in mind that valuing is a human act, not necessarily a religious one. Some people's valuing is guided or directed by their religious thinking, but that is not say that values must therefore be anchored in religion.

I recognize the importance of not denying things that are clearly proven (like that the earth is about 4.5 billions years old), but can one show, from a skeptical point of view, that it is wrong to believe fairy tales, if they do not include denying known truth? Not that I condone that, just giving you something to work on.

An interesting question. I can only offer a very provisional answer at present. I need to think about it some more.

It depends on (1) whether the belief encourages actions that affect the lives and wellbeing of other people, and (2) whether the individual claims that other people are somehow intellectually obligated to believe the same. (1) acknowledges that beliefs are not without consequence. (2) is an epistemological matter.

Why so? Not believing in God doesn't make any less children die of cancer.

Likewise, believing in and praying to a god does not appear to affect childhood cancer rates.

Yes, it is potential evidence that there is not a god, but that doesn't affect the pragmatics of the belief. Those who do believe in God have throughout history done more to defeat disease than those who don't, from what I've seen.

On what basis did your reach this conclusion and how is it relevant? Does the upstanding moral character of some believers add truth value to their claims somehow? Could they not continue the battle against disease without a theology to guide them?

If humanism means valuing human traits and helping humans flourish, then ignoring or denying a universal human trait that many people value deeply is not a humanistic attitude. Maybe you could craft a religion that is more scientific or works better, but something must be done with the human need for religion.

You need to define 'religion' precisely if you are going to argue that it's a genuine human need. I don't think that it is. To claim that religion is a human need is to suggest that we cannot live without it, which seems entirely false given that many people are capable of living without it. I would agree that human beings have spiritual needs, but the word 'spiritual' need not connote the supernatural in any way.

What you say is reasonable and I respect your position, but from an atheistic perspective, why do you value truth? I'd think your morals would have to be strictly utilitarian if you don't believe in God.

I'm sorry, but sometimes being asked questions like this irritates me. Why do some theists assume that, without a belief in God, a person cannot value truth, beauty or goodness?

 

[Paradoxum]

Para,

I think we need to change your name to "Ms. Clifford." How about that?

What do you mean?

I do not agree. What can you bring to the table in order to try to convince me of these maximes?

Why do you disagree?

If you don't care about truth, perhaps you are beyond help, and should just be considered the crazy guy who doesn't care about reality.

If you care about truth, you should want to be reasonable, since reason is the best way to truth (where reason includes evidence too).

If you care about truth, I'd think you'd want to avoid believing in fairies tales if they aren't true. So you shouldn't believe in God if there isn't good reason to believe in God.

Believing things because they feel good is likely to make you biased and not believe the truth. It also doesn't follow the path of reason, which is needed if you care about truth.

(And if you don't care about truth, I'd think that means you lose any justification for complaining about suffering or rights violations... because morality and fair law require a consideration of the facts or likely facts).

I am under the impression that metaphysics aren´t the field of reason, anyway. Just like music and art aren´t.

I don't get why you would compare metaphysics and art. You can apply reason to metaphysics (because it's about truth claims), but you can't to art.

Why (and I am asking specifically about metaphysical beliefs here)?

Because using reason is caring about the truth. If you don't care about the truth, you destroy the foundation of everything. If you pick and choose when to care about the truth, you don't really care about the truth.

What if we step away from the claim that humas need religion, and replace it by the claim that to some religion (or transcendence, or metaphysics, or spirituality) is meaningful, and that it helps some people?

What is the question?

Some people might find being racist meaningful. I don't think being racist is the only way to have a meaningful life though. They could be just as happy not being racist. I'd say the same of religion.

I agree that religion can do good for people, but that can come from non-religious sources too.

On a more general note: Do you think that metaphysical "truth" is accessible?

I think you can have more and less reasonable views on it.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Para,

Originally Posted by 2PhiloVoid

Para,

I think we need to change your name to "Ms. Clifford." How about that?
​

What do you mean?

Para,

You really need to start studying your epistemology lessons, girl! Then, you'll know what I mean. Here's a further hint: W.K. Clifford.

Peace

 

[quatona]

Why do you disagree?

Hey, you made the assertion.

If you don't care about truth,

I didn´t say that. I asked you to support your maxime specifically in the field of metaphysics.

perhaps you are beyond help, and should just be considered the crazy guy who doesn't care about reality.

Pathologizing those who do not accept your premises without support isn´t an argument.

If you care about truth, you should want to be reasonable, since reason is the best way to truth (where reason includes evidence too).

I don´t think "truth" is accessible in metaphysical questions. That makes it different from everyday life, in which I can see the validity of your postulate.

If you care about truth, I'd think you'd want to avoid believing in fairies tales if they aren't true. So you shouldn't believe in God if there isn't good reason to believe in God.

Now, I didn´t ask you to repeat your postulate. I asked you to give reasons why "caring about truth" trumps everything, in your opinion.

Believing things because they feel good is likely to make you biased and not believe the truth. It also doesn't follow the path of reason, which is needed if you care about truth.

You keep appealing to your postulate, which isn´t the same as substantiating it.

(And if you don't care about truth, I'd think that means you lose any justification for complaining about suffering or rights violations... because morality and fair law require a consideration of the facts or likely facts).

Which is not the field that´s subject to the discussion.
On another note, I don´t see how "truth" is the foundation my ethical convictions.

I don't get why you would compare metaphysics and art. You can apply reason to metaphysics (because it's about truth claims), but you can't to art.

I don´t think metaphysics is necessarily about truth claims. That´s the very point of our discussion.

Because using reason is caring about the truth. If you don't care about the truth, you destroy the foundation of everything.

I´d just destroy the foundations of those fields that are about truth claims.

If you pick and choose when to care about the truth, you don't really care about the truth.

I care about truth in certain fields, and I don´t think truth is a valid category in others.
So, yes, truth isn´t a holy cow where I come from.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Quatona,

I think Para needs to review her Metaphysics lessons as well. She's been stuck on an 'ethics' binge for....a while now.

 

[quatona]

I think you can have more and less reasonable views on it.

As far as I can tell, metaphysical ideas are - by their very nature - not testable, not verifiable, not falsifiable.
I fail to see how statistical data or probabilities can be calculated in this field, and even if they could, statistics and probabilities do not equal "truth" (the probability of winning the lottery is extremely low - yet someone wins it every week).
Metaphysics is the field of speculation and assumptions.
"Truth" is not accessible here (at least not in the form of knowing the truth).

So the crucial question is: Even if we agree that reason is a preferable means of dealing with things - what is the reasonable thing to do in such a field in which the scientific approach doesn´t work?

That´s why I compared it to art or music. I think it´s perfectly legitimate and reasonable to listen to music that makes you feel good, and to avoid listening to music that makes you feel bad.
If taking a hot shower makes me feel good this is a perfectly good reason to take a hot shower.
Likewise, it´s perfectly reasonable to hold beliefs in fields that - by their very nature and definition - escape scientific scrutinity and knowledge, simply for the reason that serve your needs best. I can´t think of a better reason.


I value "seeking the truth" for the fact that it keeps reality from eventually clashing with my assumptions and my resulting behaviour (I´d like to know whether the plate is hot or not because I don´t want to burn my hands. The reason I want to know it is not the abstract ideal of "truth").
In the metaphysical field such risks don´t exist.

IOW, seeking the truth is a means to an end (or ends) where I come from - not an end in itself. In a field where seeking the truth does not and can not serve these ends, reason and seeking the truth aren´t equatable in the way you equate them.

The criterium I use when it comes to evaluating metaphysical ideas is their aesthetics, not their truth content which I can´t tell, anyway.

Please note also, that we started with the keyword "beliefs", and after a short while you changed it to "truth claims" - which is something entirely different.

 

[Paradoxum]

Hey, you made the assertion.

I didn't know I wasn't allowed to ask questions, like a discussion.

I didn´t say that. I asked you to support your maxime specifically in the field of metaphysics.

Well you said that later on in the post.

Pathologizing those who do not accept your premises without support isn´t an argument.

I know. Though if not caring about truth makes you a crazy person, that could be a reason to care about truth. A personal reason, not an intellectual one.

I know you are limiting it to metaphysics now though.

I don´t think "truth" is accessible in metaphysical questions. That makes it different from everyday life, in which I can see the validity of your postulate.

So we shouldn't talk about metaphysics?

I'd say some metaphysical claims can be expected to have evidence on earth. Eg: 'God is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect and loving'. If there is great pointless suffering on earth, is that not a reason to reject that idea of God?

We might argue over what 'morally perfect and loving' means, but that's a different issue.

So isn't it fair to say you can have reasonable opinions on some metaphysics?

Now, I didn´t ask you to repeat your postulate. I asked you to give reasons why "caring about truth" trumps everything, in your opinion.

Well I didn't know exactly what your position was, and what you wanted me to explain specifically. What is it your asking about? Caring about truth in general? Or just metaphysics?

I suppose, if you don't care about truth, there's no basis for anything else. I'd think even acting in on desires requires you to think you have feelings which can be satisfied in certain ways.

But then you could say that you only care about truth so far as it serves your desires.

I'd say that caring about truth all the time is more meaningful because you are part of something bigger than yourself, and that not caring about truth is living a fake life.

I suppose it's down to what the individual cares about in the end.

On another note, I don´t see how "truth" is the foundation my ethical convictions.

Well if you want to say that murder is wrong, you need to believe in humans and things like guns, don't you? If you don't think it's true that humans exist, why would you be talking about them?

I don´t think metaphysics is necessarily about truth claims. That´s the very point of our discussion.

Well if someone says 'God exists', that's claiming something is true... isn't it? If that isn't a 'truth claim', what do you mean by the phrase?

I´d just destroy the foundations of those fields that are about truth claims.

How do you buy food if you don't think shops exist?

I care about truth in certain fields, and I don´t think truth is a valid category in others.
So, yes, truth isn´t a holy cow where I come from.

By the last sentence, do you mean you don't think truth applies everywhere (like art), or that you wouldn't care about truth if you didn't feel like it?

 

[Paradoxum]

Quatona,

I think Para needs to review her Metaphysics lessons as well. She's been stuck on an 'ethics' binge for....a while now.

Is caring about ethics bad?

 

[Paradoxum]

As far as I can tell, metaphysical ideas are - by their very nature - not testable, not verifiable, not falsifiable.
I fail to see how statistical data or probabilities can be calculated in this field, and even if they could, statistics and probabilities do not equal "truth" (the probability of winning the lottery is extremely low - yet someone wins it every week).
Metaphysics is the field of speculation and assumptions.
"Truth" is not accessible here (at least not in the form of knowing the truth).

Do you think you can count things out, like my previous example of a perfectly moral God?

So the crucial question is: Even if we agree that reason is a preferable means of dealing with things - what is the reasonable thing to do in such a field in which the scientific approach doesn´t work?

That´s why I compared it to art or music. I think it´s perfectly legitimate and reasonable to listen to music that makes you feel good, and to avoid listening to music that makes you feel bad.
If taking a hot shower makes me feel good this is a perfectly good reason to take a hot shower.
Likewise, it´s perfectly reasonable to hold beliefs in fields that - by their very nature and definition - escape scientific scrutinity and knowledge, simply for the reason that serve your needs best. I can´t think of a better reason.

Why not withhold judgement?

It's not like art because art doesn't need truth claims. If you have a belief about something, then that is a truth claim, and so potentially true or false.

If you don't agree that beliefs are truth claims, I don't understand how you're using those words.

I value "seeking the truth" for the fact that it keeps reality from eventually clashing with my assumptions and my resulting behaviour (I´d like to know whether the plate is hot or not because I don´t want to burn my hands. The reason I want to know it is not the abstract ideal of "truth").
In the metaphysical field such risks don´t exist.

IOW, seeking the truth is a means to an end (or ends) where I come from - not an end in itself. In a field where seeking the truth does not and can not serve these ends, reason and seeking the truth aren´t equatable in the way you equate them.

Don't you think it's meaningful to care about truth in itself?

The criterium I use when it comes to evaluating metaphysical ideas is their aesthetics, not their truth content which I can´t tell, anyway.

Please note also, that we started with the keyword "beliefs", and after a short while you changed it to "truth claims" - which is something entirely different.

I suppose I value not being the delusional person believing in invisible intangible fairies, even if that felt nice.

Would you be in favour of that, if it really appealed to you? If you thought it would make your life better?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Is caring about ethics bad?

Para,

Caring about ethics is definitely a 'good' for us to consider, and like you, I realize that our species has, even through various trials and errors (sins), been able to use social value judgements for the better.

So, I'm not knocking your focus on ethics, Para. It just seems that sometimes you focus on ethics/axiology at the expense of the other two fields of philosophy (i.e. epistemology and metaphysics), and I think a more holistic approach in evaluating our lives makes for a more coherent philosophical position.

One way in which the other two fields can be seen to tie-in together is in Kant's philosophy. His metaphysical and epistemological structures feed directly into, and are synthetic with, his ethical structures. This can also be said for Utilitarians such as Mill. In fact, it is the case for those who uphold a Christian type of 'Ethics of Care' as well.

Moreover, it seems to me that although you have shared your ideas about epistemology in these forums, you sometimes cling a bit too firmly to Evidentialism, and I think you do this in that you profess its basic tenets without seeming to evaluate it's weaknesses.

Anyway, this is why I said 'tongue-in-cheek' that we should start calling you Ms. Clifford, since W.K. Clifford was one of the original (agnostic) philosophers who articulated the Evidentialist position.

Peace