Pragmatic Argument for God's existense

[devolved]

you could be a Neo-Aristotelian naturalist and start theorizing that reality is teleologically ordered towards specific ends, and that the human ability to reason reflects this. This would involve grounding the fundamental assumption that reality is intelligible in a metaphysics that actually allows it to be intelligible.

I personally don't see how this is a "way out" (in a sense that we would no longer be talking about materialism here), because one would almost have to conceive a "fractal" type of mechanism by which one would need to explain as to how an entity with attribute X would interact with entity with attribute Y at the level of "awareness" of what either is doing in time and space without any intentional arrangement for doing so... just due to some intrinsic qualities.

Thus, it no longer sounds like materialism to me. At least not in a sense that one presupposes the "intelligence continuum" in matter not as an aggregate, but as an atomized potential moving towards some aggregate.

A "colloquial equivalent" of such view would be that a collection of processes assembled into living matter, because each individual particle "meant to do that" in terms of its "intent embedded into a property", and thus it has some "awareness" of how to properly react with its surroundings.

Therefore, it only looks like some "external intelligence" directs the process, but in reality these pieces "know" how to behave in "larger context" because of some inherent attributes (which would actually mean..."little brains" for every piece of matter in existence)

Sure, we can certainly presuppose that, but I'm not sure we could label such as a form of materialism. Perhaps some concept of Aristotelian "holographic constructivism" ... by which I mean individual pieces of matter possess innate intelligence and intent to drive the process of reality to certain end.

 

[gaara4158]

Of course it can, that is why I am saying that it is more probably false than true. If there are two contents that result in the same behavior than the likelihood that the correct content has acquired is 50%. Add one more and it's less likely. So if we experience a high degree of success that is counter indicative of a naturalistic ontology.

Then it's also counterindicative of whatever specific deity you've placed at the bedrock of your understanding of the universe. It's not naturalism that's self-defeating, it's your particular line of reasoning.

You can define truth as hamburger if you want, but then we are not talking about the same thing are we? Your definition is of truth is self effete for two reasons....
1. It's relative to you, not me per your own definition
2. It doesn't establish any objective epistemological ground that can substantiate it's own merit. It is self referential in a non axiomatic way and self falsifying under conditions of it's own utility.

If you're looking for an objective epistemological ground that can substantiate its own merit, you're going to have a bad time. My pragmatism is designed to operate within the inescapable subjectivity of my experience. You are aware, of course, that true objectivity is completely out of reach to subjective entities such as ourselves?

I believe that a true belief is an intentional state which is identical with reality, basically what everyone has meant by the term for at least the last 5 millenniums. And I can actually say that without defeating my own statement. From what I gather you will only tell me the truth wherein there is a utility for you. As I don't know what you define as utility or whether this circumstance is static in regards to our conversation I can only assume that everything you say has a partial 50% probability of being true. So now you're in good company with the argument I presented at the start. I warned you it would be tragic.

You can define truth as that which comports with reality, but then you run into the problem of your fundamental separation from reality itself. You do not experience reality at any time. You experience what your brain feeds you through your senses, and you assume your senses are working in conjunction to give you a fairly accurate representation of reality. But you can never transcend the barrier of subjectivity. So, if you define truth as the same as reality, as many philosophers have done in the past, then you've just defined truth as something you can never really apprehend. Reality is truth and truth is reality, both of which are fundamentally unavailable. That's fine, but then why be so concerned about holding true beliefs and rejecting false ones? How could you even tell which was which?

This brings me to what I mean by utility. It all comes back to what you can do with true beliefs. A belief's truth, or usefulness, is determined by its ability to make accurate predictions about the future, and its negation to fail to do so. For example, I believe alcohol gets me drunk. If it's true that alcohol gets me drunk, I will become drunk after consuming alcohol, and I will not become drunk after not consuming alcohol. If it's false that alcohol gets me drunk, I will not become drunk after consuming alcohol and I may become drunk at any time without it. So I conduct an experiment. I take three shots of alcohol. I become drunk. I wait a while and the effects go away. I don't drink more alcohol. I do not become drunk again. I conduct this experiment many, many times and it yields the exact same results every time. I can now say it's true that alcohol gets me drunk. In the future, if I wish to become drunk, I know that all I need is a few shots of alcohol.

You can suspect I'm lying about something in this conversation if you wish, but it won't help you. I'm using logic, not giving anecdotes.

Good you have googled this so we could move forward. Analytic thought does reveal synthetic truths about the world. That is why the Higgs/Boson was predicted before it was discovered as a synthetic truth. All of science relies on analytic thought predictions, whose experiments bear out their synthetic truths. It is led first by analytic thought, absolutely and without a doubt. Synthetic observation does not, on it's own lead to knowledge, only when it's coupled by Analytic thought does it lead to knowledge

Analytic thought does not reveal synthetic truths about the world on its own. Analytic propositions only dictate what must logically follow IF its synthetic premises are true, and the truth of synthetic propositions is determined through rigorous observation. You can't come to any synthetic truth if you don't already have some. And under your definition of truth, that's a dead end due to our fundamental separation from reality.

It is literally an explanation. "God did it" is just as much a coherent semantic statement as God didn't do it.

Yes, because zero equals zero. It's completely meaningless. Which god did it? How do you know?

So if what you say is true you can't even disagree with me, which is a rather humorous position you have retreated to. There are properties that are a mystery about God, but there are also properties that are not a mystery, same with you and yet I wouldn't call you incoherent. The properties involved with the explanatory power are understood, that God is an intelligent, unmoved, mover. This is just another silly little slogan people have come up with to stall the conclusion because they do not want the conclusion. You have 1 lifetime to hide your mind from God, then your time is up. Spend it wisely.

Of what use to me is the proposition "God did it?" Can you demonstrate it?

 

[Sanoy]

Then it's also counterindicative of whatever specific deity you've placed at the bedrock of your understanding of the universe. It's not naturalism that's self-defeating, it's your particular line of reasoning.

Umm, no. I'm not postulating a complete set of random events but an intelligence.

No, I'll have the same great time people have had for at lest 5 millennia. Your pragmatism is meaningless to me. You say "true objectivity is completely out of reach to subjective entities such as ourselves". Well that is either a subjective claim, and therefore meaningless to me, or it's an objective claim and so self defeating. You live inconsistent with your own beliefs.

You say that if I believe I can acquire truths about the world then "I run into the problem of (your) fundamental separation from reality itself". Well that is a definite reality claim which you are telling me can't be made. Lets list everyone of your reality claims and expose your inconsistency.

1. "I run into the problem of (your) fundamental separation from reality itself"
2. "You do not experience reality at any time."
3. "You experience what your brain feeds you through your senses"
4. "you can never transcend the barrier of subjectivity"
5. "truth and truth is reality, both of which are fundamentally unavailable"

Thats 5 reality claims you just made to show that we can't know truths about reality. In other words you defeated your own claim. I am truly blown away by your thinking here. How in the world did you get to this position in life, who told you these things?

Your drunk experiment perfectly displays the necessity of analytic thought and synthetic observation. But it requires a foundation for analytic thought that you don't have... I don't suspect you're lying, I take it as a 50/50 probability that you are lying due to your admission that you don't find telling the truth to be innately coercive and consequently would lie to me if you found utility in it. If I thought you were a frequent liar that probability would go up, but as it stands I only know that you are a partial liar due to your own admission.

No, analytic thought factually does reveal knowledge about synthetic reality, which becomes justified by synthetic observation, or analytic proof. This idea that we can't know reality is demonstrably false. You know that you exist, it's an indubitable thought. And I'd love to hear you explain otherwise simply for consequences that result in that claim.

If you are going to reply "which God did it" then you admit the semantics are coherent contrary to the phony slogan that it isn't.

If our cognitive faculties are capable of determining truths about the world then God is the best explanation for that fact. That is abductive, which you can deny by providing a better explanation.

 

[Silmarien]

I personally don't see how this is a "way out", because one would almost have to conceive a "fractal" type of mechanism by which one would need to explain as to how an entity with attribute X would interact with entity with attribute Y at the level of "awareness" of what either is doing in time and space without any intentional arrangement for doing so... just due to some intrinsic qualities.

Thus, it no longer sounds like materialism to me. At least not in a sense that one presupposes the "intelligence continuum" in matter not as an aggregate, but as an atomized potential moving towards some aggregate.

Well, not all naturalists are materialists. I really don't think we have a coherent enough definition of what materialism actually is to determine whether or not the Neo-Aristotelians qualify--some seem to identify as materialists, and others reject the label completely and are pretty committed to challenging materialist assumptions. There are atheists out there who are quite happy to go all out and claim that matter does possess protoconsciousness (Chalmers is fantastic), but I think Neo-Aristotelians are more likely to focus on the fact that structure is as basic an element of physical reality as matter is. Stress the priority of structure and self-organization and you might be able to come up with an emergent theory of mind that actually makes sense.

I personally suspect that all Aristotelians are going to fall prey to Aquinas's Five Ways at some point or another, because it is a bit odd to think that things could be ordered towards ends in the absence of previously existing ends, but more power to any committed naturalist who realizes that you need order and function to make sense of reality.

 

[devolved]

... more power to any committed naturalist who realizes that you need order and function to make sense of reality.

I certainly think that we need more mature and nuanced discourse when it comes to a wider range of philisiophical models.

I'm curious as to what would be your take as it relates to religious history of humanity and subsequently Biblical hermeneutic approaches one can take? It would seem to me that the biggest beef between various atheistic / theistic models in respect to Christianity generally relates to that issue.

 

[Silmarien]

I certainly think that we need more mature and nuanced discourse when it comes to a wider range of philisiophical models.

I'm curious as to what would be your take as it relates to religious history of humanity and subsequently Biblical hermeneutic approaches one can take? It would seem to me that the biggest beef between various atheistic / theistic models in respect to Christianity generally relates to that issue.

I'm assuming you're talking about the common atheistic argument that religion is a matter of choosing between a million different gods? If so, I slam my head against a wall whenever I hear it, as it's pretty clear to me that the vast majority of theistic philosophy, Western and Eastern alike, is talking about the same thing, even if there's some disagreement concerning its actual nature. The question is whether there is a transcendent dimension to reality or not, and if there is, what if anything we might be able to say about it, not which of the countless local pagan deities we would like to pay cult to.

As for biblical hermeneutics, if Scripture is a genuine revelation, I would favor the idea of progressive revelation--that the Old Testament represents religious truth in the measure that the ancient Israelites were capable of understanding it, with a great deal of cultural baggage tossed in. I would be more conservative with the New Testament, though--it's a snapshot of an actual event, if taken at a distance of 30-60 years, and the divine self-revelation that can be used to interpret everything else. If the Gospel is true, I would suspect that you can find an echo of it an all morally productive religious traditions, and I'm actually more interested in the ways in which it might fulfill certain schools of thought outside of Judaism, since I am a bit of a 4th century pagan.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Well... you would then dare to jump into the ocean of absurdity without any justification for doing that either . It's a very brave, but not a very sensible thing to do.

I don't think it's absurd at all.
I'm perfectly okay with finding my own subjective meaning in life.

I don't see the point of simply assuming/asserting "cosmic purpose" for no reason at all other then holding on to a belief that is somehow "comforting".

I don't have such a need.
If you have actual objective evidence of "cosmic purpose" - fine.
But you don't have that, do you?

I would argue that the only way that an intelligent process like the brain could function IS by contextualizing purpose.

Why?

For example, if we look at some object, like a hat, we don't look at it nominally. Our brain contextualizes it with some "end goal" in mind. The hat is something that you place on your head, to keep you warm, or protect you from the sun, or to express your uniqueness and dominance in some societal context.

That's a function of a manufactured object.
And it's also a subjective function that we super-impose on it.
I could also easily re-purpose such an object for an entirely different function.
I could for example use it as a basket to collect mushrooms in the forest.

Whatever it may be, our brain contextualizes the entirety of a "brain map" of what the hat is in respect to its purpose. It's not arbitrary invention. It's how our brain works as a process.

Yes, our brains are wired to find patterns and intent everywhere - even where it doesn't exist.

It's actually the very basis of superstition, pareidolia, false positives, etc.

In fact, in describing the above, I actually contextualizing the purpose and meaning of the brain as a process. Thus it can't be something that we "invented", because we didn't invent our brain function. We merely recognize it conceptually, and label it (hence we get self-awareness).

And the above only touches the brain part of the argument. We didn't even get to the concept of coherence of how our brain functions relate to reality, and we are already neck-deep in absurdity. Let's keep going though.

What you seem to be implying is that at some point of time our brains did not have that function, and then we invented, or let's say it was some evolutionary selection that happened to select brains that "invented" that function to survive better.

I'ld say that it is a side product of becoming more intelligent and aware of our own mortality.

Even in that case, you would have to admit that either:

a) Such concepts would allow brains to better map reality

or

b) That such concept is merely a delusion

You can't claim A and B at the at the same time, and here's why.

If B is the case, then it would mean that our functional map of the world is not grounded in reality, and it's merely a delusion. If you claim B, then you essentially giving up reason, logic, and scientific enterprise all together, because the implication is that any purpose-centric statement (in context of meaning) would be a delusion of the brain. There is no actual purpose in reality. We are just correlating the consitent absurdity and pretending that it works.

I think I already addressed this.
I already told you, in the very post you are replying to, that I don't have any reason to assume that there is such a thing as "cosmic purpose" that exists independently of humans.

And I don't consider it absurd at all. What is absurd, is to assume the existence of things for which no evidence exist.

We create our own meaning and purpose in life. And my meaning and purpose will differ considerably with your meaning and purpose. That in and of itself, already underlines my point: it is subjective.

And that's perfectly okay and not absurd at all.

For example, I think mac and cheese is delicious. My friend thinks it's disgusting.
Mac and cheese is not "objectively" delicious or disgusting.

That doesn't make it absurd for me to enjoy a nice meal of mac and cheese.
Why should my subjective experience of my life be any different?

If you claim that A is the case, then it means that you are not merely projecting meaning on otherwise absurd reality, but that reality inherently has some meaning and purpose and our brain recognizes it, and thus there is a sufficient grounds to build reasoning, logic, and scientific enterprise on.

I'd invite you to really think about about the implications of what you are saying beyond writing a couple of sentences that seemingly validate your view.

I invite you to understand that simply asserting that a universe without "cosmic purpose" is absurd by definition, does not make it true.

And if you think it is, then try to argue it rationally with evidence instead of simply asserting it.

 

[gaara4158]

(Hit send by accident, please ignore.)

 

[devolved]

I invite you to understand that simply asserting that a universe without "cosmic purpose" is absurd by definition, does not make it true.

And if you think it is, then try to argue it rationally with evidence instead of simply asserting it.

We'll have to agree to disagree then. But I can relate where you are coming from.

 

[gaara4158]

Umm, no. I'm not postulating a complete set of random events but an intelligence.

If you believe naturalism is true, you must believe that naturalistic processes are capable of producing minds with the ability to come to true beliefs. That’s not circular reasoning, that’s internal self-consistency. Your insistence that naturalism and true beliefs about naturalism are likely mutually incompatible is an a priori assumption, unless you can somehow demonstrate it to be so. Similarly, your postulation of an intelligence behind reality is completely out of left field.

No, I'll have the same great time people have had for at lest 5 millennia. Your pragmatism is meaningless to me. You say "true objectivity is completely out of reach to subjective entities such as ourselves". Well that is either a subjective claim, and therefore meaningless to me, or it's an objective claim and so self defeating. You live inconsistent with your own beliefs.

You say that if I believe I can acquire truths about the world then "I run into the problem of (your) fundamental separation from reality itself". Well that is a definite reality claim which you are telling me can't be made. Lets list everyone of your reality claims and expose your inconsistency.

1. "I run into the problem of (your) fundamental separation from reality itself"
2. "You do not experience reality at any time."
3. "You experience what your brain feeds you through your senses"
4. "you can never transcend the barrier of subjectivity"
5. "truth and truth is reality, both of which are fundamentally unavailable"

Thats 5 reality claims you just made to show that we can't know truths about reality. In other words you defeated your own claim. I am truly blown away by your thinking here. How in the world did you get to this position in life, who told you these things?

Seriously? You’re blown away by the problem of skepticism? My friend, this is something that manifests empirically every time you dream, hallucinate, or simply misremember something. Every epistemology worth its salt, pragmatism included, acknowledges this problem and attempts to work around it. If yours doesn’t you’re claiming to be the one person in the world who has achieved perfect epistemic certainty. If that’s the case, I’d like to sit on your lap and ask you about the universe.

Your drunk experiment perfectly displays the necessity of analytic thought and synthetic observation. But it requires a foundation for analytic thought that you don't have.

Analytic reasoning doesn’t need a foundation. It’s foundational in itself. What makes it worth anything is whether empirical observations match up with what your analytic reasoning predicts. That’s how synthetic propositions are labeled either “true” or “false.”

No, analytic thought factually does reveal knowledge about synthetic reality, which becomes justified by synthetic observation, or analytic proof. This idea that we can't know reality is demonstrably false. You know that you exist, it's an indubitable thought. And I'd love to hear you explain otherwise simply for consequences that result in that claim.

The problem of skepticism applies to the external world only. As Descartes rightly pointed out, internal world skepticism is absurd and self-defeating (although some cheeky philosophers will argue otherwise). However, I still can’t say anything with epistemic certainty about the external reality that presumably has produced my internal world. The best I can do is observe how things seem to work in my existential bubble and try to form a predictive model of reality. That’s what science does.

If you are going to reply "which God did it" then you admit the semantics are coherent contrary to the phony slogan that it isn't.

...no, that question is meant to highlight the meaninglessness of your proposed solution. It’s three letters. You need to nail down some properties or empirical manifestations to your god-thing before I can assign any meaningful truth value to it.

If our cognitive faculties are capable of determining truths about the world then God is the best explanation for that fact. That is abductive, which you can deny by providing a better explanation.

Abductive? It’s a vapid statement. Define God.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Good, so you do recognize that the only distinctions that matter are those that can affect future outcomes. This is why I harped so much on a god being unnecessary to a good epistemology. The mark of a good epistemology is reliability, not an unfalsifiable, unsupported foundational claim.

And that is what all my conversations with presuppositional apologists come down to.

 

[Sanoy]

If you believe naturalism is true, you must believe that naturalistic processes are capable of producing minds with the ability to come to true beliefs. That’s not circular reasoning, that’s internal self-consistency. Your insistence that naturalism and true beliefs about naturalism are likely mutually incompatible is an a priori assumption, unless you can somehow demonstrate it to be so. Similarly, your postulation of an intelligence behind reality is completely out of left field.



Seriously? You’re blown away by the problem of skepticism? My friend, this is something that manifests empirically every time you dream, hallucinate, or simply misremember something. Every epistemology worth its salt, pragmatism included, acknowledges this problem and attempts to work around it. If yours doesn’t you’re claiming to be the one person in the world who has achieved perfect epistemic certainty. If that’s the case, I’d like to sit on your lap and ask you about the universe.



Analytic reasoning doesn’t need a foundation. It’s foundational in itself. What makes it worth anything is whether empirical observations match up with what your analytic reasoning predicts. That’s how synthetic propositions are labeled either “true” or “false.”


The problem of skepticism applies to the external world only. As Descartes rightly pointed out, internal world skepticism is absurd and self-defeating (although some cheeky philosophers will argue otherwise). However, I still can’t say anything with epistemic certainty about the external reality that presumably has produced my internal world. The best I can do is observe how things seem to work in my existential bubble and try to form a predictive model of reality. That’s what science does.


...no, that question is meant to highlight the meaninglessness of your proposed solution. It’s three letters. You need to nail down some properties or empirical manifestations to your god-thing before I can assign any meaningful truth value to it.


Abductive? It’s a vapid statement. Define God.

I don't believe naturalism is true or capable of fullifing the duties it has been tasked. Even nontheists find Naturalism lacking as an explanation for what exists and it's "shut up and believe" forcefulness has failed to be adequate to overcome the unsatisfying scope of what it has attempted to explain. I was just reading one of "Atheist Hopeful" Thomas Nagels books last night and read his own confirmation of the argument I gave. I gave you the demonstration in my opening post which you have yet to deny. The conclusion undermines the assumption, that is a problem you have yet to tackle.

I was blown away that you refuted yourself at such a tremendous level that it went unnoticed. It went unnoticed due to your tremendous skepticism of anything but your own beliefs. Skepticism isn't an epistemological method, it is merely a method of world view preservation.

You say "Analytic reasoning doesn’t need a foundation." That is another reality claim. It does need a foundation, you imply it by that very claim. It has to be grounded in something if it is to be used in an epistemological process. You are not using truth the same way I am using truth. I mean it as referring to the actual world, you are not using it to refer to the actual world but to the value it produces. This undermines everything you say as nothing you say can be taken as a reality claim. You refute yourself at every step. You have created a near complete set of self demolition. You have a 50% probably of not lying to me, you admit that you can't make reality claims, you admit you have no epistemological foundation, and you refute yourself regularly. It is stretching my imagination to predict how you could possibly undermine your position, and self really, any further than you have already done. You are far greater and more wonderful than you realize or allow yourself to be.

You say "The problem of skepticism applies to the external world only." Which is yet another reality claim. You are conflating reality, with the external world. I spoke of reality which includes ourselves and the actual state of affairs of the external world.

"God did it" is not a meaningless statement, which you reveal by changing it to "which". That switch entails that it contains properties. So you can no longer make your original claim. There are properties of God that are mystery, but the relavent properies are part of the explanation some of which I listed.

Abductive is essentially the appeal to the best explanation. And since God remains the best explanation, per your lack of an alternate, your statement of it being vapid means naturalism is worse than vapid. And it truly is when it fails to even convince Nontheists.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Good, so you do recognize that the only distinctions that matter are those that can affect future outcomes. This is why I harped so much on a god being unnecessary to a good epistemology. The mark of a good epistemology is reliability, not an unfalsifiable, unsupported foundational claim.

Actually, the various criteria by which the mark of a good epistemology is evaluated will depend upon the philosopher you talk to ... and since there isn't really a consensus on exactly which criteria are trumps, that just makes the act and process of justifying our beliefs to others that much more complicated, yet still interesting.

It could also imply that we may not want to rush into slapping each other over the head for what we think is another person's inattention to some "obvious" epistemological reality, particularly when it comes to Christianity. And when I say this, I think this advice applies to Christians in their efforts to do Apologetics just as much as it does to Skeptics who want to contest the beliefs of the Christian faith.

 

[gaara4158]

I do not understand why you think that the concept of truth only has any meaning in regards to what use you might personally find for it. Let's look at something like quantum mechanics--there may ultimately be no empirical difference between the various interpretations tossed about to explain it, but this doesn't mean that objective reality is up for grabs and all of the interpretations are equally true. Presumably, quantum physics does work in a particular way--the Copenhagen interpretation is either true or false; multiple universes either exist or they do not. It may make no practical difference to us whether any model actually matches up to reality, but this doesn't mean that reality doesn't exist. This doesn't mean that a God's eye view would not reveal that certain models match up better to reality than others. Their truth or falseness does not depend upon our ability to differentiate between them.

Your account of truth does away with this most important aspect of truth altogether. You have declared reality irrelevant to the notion of truth--all that matters is our subjective impressions. If you want to say that genuine truth does not matter, that is fine (though you might not like some of the consequences), but you should not redefine truth in ways that make it the polar opposite of what it has always been understood to be. You can practice pragmatism, but you shouldn't call it truth.

You know, you're right. I've been saying that truth = a useful belief for a while now, but it's occurred to me that this isn't quite accurate. You don't need to find some practical use for a belief in order to call it true, and finding a use for it doesn't make it true. However, in order for a belief to eventually be of some practical use, it should at least contain some reasonable approximation to the truth, right? There's a correlation between truth and usefulness that, while not an equivalence, we can't ignore.

Yes, there is. Even for an atheist, as I pointed out earlier: you could be a Neo-Aristotelian naturalist and start theorizing that reality is teleologically ordered towards specific ends, and that the human ability to reason reflects this. This would involve grounding the fundamental assumption that reality is intelligible in a metaphysics that actually allows it to be intelligible. This is an example of a non-theistic framework that makes rational thought coherent. We are not asking for proof. We are asking for coherent, consistent metaphysical models. That is all.

Could you explain what you mean by this? I'm afraid you've lost me in philosophical jargon again. I don't necessarily disagree.

 

[gaara4158]

Actually, the various criteria by which the mark of a good epistemology is evaluated will depend upon the philosopher you talk to ... and since there isn't really a consensus on exactly which criteria are trumps, that just makes the act and process of justifying our beliefs to others that much more complicated, yet still interesting.

It could also imply that we may not want to rush into slapping each other over the head for what we think is another person's inattention to some "obvious" epistemological reality, particularly when it comes to Christianity. And when I say this, I think this advice applies to Christians in their efforts to do Apologetics just as much as it does to Skeptics who want to contest the beliefs of the Christian faith.

Well yeah, we're all just sharing our opinions here. Maybe opinions should come with warnings. lol.

 

[Silmarien]

However, in order for a belief to eventually be of some practical use, it should at least contain some reasonable approximation to the truth, right?

I'm honestly unconvinced. The correct set of wrong beliefs could under certain circumstances add up to an understanding of reality that leads to positive practical results, if for all the wrong reasons. I wouldn't call something that goes wrong in just the right ways a reasonable approximation.

Could you explain what you mean by this? I'm afraid you've lost me in philosophical jargon again. I don't necessarily disagree.

Sure, crash-course in Aristotle time.

In antiquity, causality was understood as being a matter of four separate causes working together, of which we've only really retained two in modernity:

Material cause: the substance something is made of.
Efficient cause: the thing apart from the object itself that act as an agency upon it.
Formal cause: the arrangement of matter, giving it its form.
Final cause: the end to which a physical change is directed, or its function.

For an example, we can look at water boiling over a stove. The material cause would be the actual water itself, the efficient cause would be the heat beneath it, the formal cause I suspect would be the molecular structure, both of the water and of the steam it is going to turn into, and the final cause would be the reality that it is in the nature of water that when heated up, it will boil. The water will not turn into a bouquet of flowers when put over a stove, nor will it freeze. It will boil.

The problem in modernity is that science can talk about material and efficient causes, but neither of the other two causes can really be empirically observed--we know that structure exists, we know that something like DNA is a type of blueprint, but unless you are going to bite the bullet and say that self-organization is an intrinsic aspect of physical reality, that matter does not exist except in some arrangement or another, it is hard to make sense of where structure and form comes from at all. The same goes for final causes, but the situation there is even more dire, because Hume was a brilliant sophist who managed to convince everyone that things do in fact just happen for no reason. Combine that with a propaganda campaign that was waged against Aristotelian teleology--people tend to think that it means that there are mystical purposes built into objects, or that they're making decisions or something along those lines. But basically teleology just means that it is in the nature of substances to behave in a specific way: strike a match and it will produce flame, not freeze. (Whether teleology necessarily leads to theism is up for debate, but I don't think that's a good reason to wilfully insist that reality is unintelligible, which seems to me to be the consequence of denying it.)

So broadly speaking, a Neo-Aristotelian account of nature would hold that things do not actually happen by chance. The universe is in some sense purposeful simply because it is configured in such a way that causes lead to effects, and these effects are ultimately grounded in the nature of matter (and structure) itself, not somehow imposed from outside or happening for no actual reason. Chemical evolution to produce life is not surprising, nor is the evolution of organs, because function has always been an aspect of reality and not something that inexplicably first sprung into existence with cells. The human brain is not imposing an illusion of order upon a chaotic world--rationality is possible because the brain is a product of an intelligible natural order which it can in turn grasp.

(Actually, Thomas Nagel, who @Sanoy mentioned as an atheistic philosopher who has doubts about naturalism, seems to be moving towards this form of naturalism, though he does not seem to be consciously part of the intellectual movement.)

 

[gaara4158]

I don't believe naturalism is true or capable of fullifing the duties it has been tasked. Even nontheists find Naturalism lacking as an explanation for what exists and it's "shut up and believe" forcefulness has failed to be adequate to overcome the unsatisfying scope of what it has attempted to explain. I was just reading one of "Atheist Hopeful" Thomas Nagels books last night and read his own confirmation of the argument I gave. I gave you the demonstration in my opening post which you have yet to deny. The conclusion undermines the assumption, that is a problem you have yet to tackle.

Ugh. Let's go through this again:

The issue with the condition I stated is one of self defeat. If naturalism is true then the content of our belief about naturalism is more probably false. So naturalism is most likely not true and we can drop that belief.

I've been waiting for you to explain how this logically follows but all you do is keep bleating that its conclusion undercuts its first premise. You never explain how. I'm not going to make your argument for you and then dismantle it. You have to do your part. You would have to start by defining naturalism, defining reason, then explaining why ina naturalistic world, reason couldn't lead people to the correct conclusion that naturalism is true. You haven't done that, so there's nothing for me to tackle yet.

I was blown away that you refuted yourself at such a tremendous level that it went unnoticed. It went unnoticed due to your tremendous skepticism of anything but your own beliefs. Skepticism isn't an epistemological method, it is merely a method of world view preservation.

You say "Analytic reasoning doesn’t need a foundation." That is another reality claim. It does need a foundation, you imply it by that very claim. It has to be grounded in something if it is to be used in an epistemological process. You are not using truth the same way I am using truth. I mean it as referring to the actual world, you are not using it to refer to the actual world but to the value it produces. This undermines everything you say as nothing you say can be taken as a reality claim. You refute yourself at every step. You have created a near complete set of self demolition. You have a 50% probably of not lying to me, you admit that you can't make reality claims, you admit you have no epistemological foundation, and you refute yourself regularly. It is stretching my imagination to predict how you could possibly undermine your position, and self really, any further than you have already done. You are far greater and more wonderful than you realize or allow yourself to be.

You say "The problem of skepticism applies to the external world only." Which is yet another reality claim. You are conflating reality, with the external world. I spoke of reality which includes ourselves and the actual state of affairs of the external world.

I would indeed be a ridiculous person if I walked around saying I couldn't say anything. The problem we're having is we have not established a meaningful distinction between reality, truth, and the external world. You have thus taken my posts using these words to be self-contradictory in spectacular ways instead of taking the time to understand what I actually meant by them. Oops, that was a "reality claim" I just made. Guess I just contradicted myself again. Silly me.

"God did it" is not a meaningless statement, which you reveal by changing it to "which". That switch entails that it contains properties. So you can no longer make your original claim. There are properties of God that are mystery, but the relavent properies are part of the explanation some of which I listed.

Wonderful, so now you're going to tell me what I meant when I said something. We have a mind reader over here. No. I am perfectly capable of provisionally accepting the premise of an answer I do not accept (God) in order to explore its implications (that it must be a specific god). This requires no actual concession that a god can or must exist. It seems implausible to me that you didn't understand this.

Abductive is essentially the appeal to the best explanation. And since God remains the best explanation, per your lack of an alternate, your statement of it being vapid means naturalism is worse than vapid. And it truly is when it fails to even convince Nontheists.

I'll ask this in a different way, since I'm still not getting answers out of you: What makes God the best explanation for the intelligibility of reality?

 

[gaara4158]

I'm honestly unconvinced. The correct set of wrong beliefs could under certain circumstances add up to an understanding of reality that leads to positive practical results, if for all the wrong reasons. I wouldn't call something that goes wrong in just the right ways a reasonable approximation.

Sure, but these circumstances are presumably less common than others, right? Like I said, pragmatism isn't a perfect method of sussing out truth, but I'm open to something better if you've got it. In the meantime, I'd like to bounce this off you. It's something I ran into during my research into epistemic philosophies and it's part of what really compelled me to look into pragmatism:

1) Beliefs drive actions. 2) Actions have consequences. 3) Consequences are objective. Therefore, the "truth" of a belief (in particular, synthetic propositions) only makes sense if we can ultimately tie it to actions and consequences. It doesn't have to be immediate, and it doesn't have to be obvious. But if you're not going to make decisions somehow, then who on Earth cares? Seriously, either a) You agree with me, in which case you are a pragmatist. We can finally have a real discussion that appeals to objective observations for settlement of truth claims. Or, b) Your beliefs have no attachment whatsoever to your decisions and their consequences. If you honestly choose (b), then fine. You just argued yourself into pure irrelevance. I can agree with everything you say and absolutely nothing in my life has to change as a result. I don't have to exercise a single decision in my entire life any differently than I would have otherwise. So what's it going to be? Are you a pragmatist? Or are you irrelevant? There is no other option. The choice is yours.

Thank you for your Aristotelian crash course, as always I appreciate your effort to accommodate my ignorance. I will take some time to mull it over before we continue that thread of our discussion.

 

[Silmarien]

Sure, but these circumstances are presumably less common than others, right? Like I said, pragmatism isn't a perfect method of sussing out truth, but I'm open to something better if you've got it. In the meantime, I'd like to bounce this off you. It's something I ran into during my research into epistemic philosophies and it's part of what really compelled me to look into pragmatism:

Well, I agree with it in part: beliefs do drive actions, actions do have consequences, and consequences are objective, but I am not sure how a feasible notion of "truth" can be derived from this. The very concept seems to have been lost. Nor do I know how conversation could be possible between two pragmatists who have different ideas about what beliefs lead to desirable consequences.

For example, I tend to take a very Pascalian approach to Christianity. I have no opinion on whether or not it's true, but I think that a well reasoned, humanistic Christian belief system is the best framework for living a meaningful, productive life. Are these consequences objective? Yes. Do they have anything to say about the truth value of Christianity? Not necessarily. Could you tell me that I was not being appropriately pragmatic for using it in this fashion? Presumably, but you would be hard pressed to back that up, since we're into subjective judgments about what consequences justify what beliefs, and we can't get out of that with yet more subjectivism.

I think pragmatism can work for justifying beliefs, but I don't see how it can get us anywhere at all in determining whether or not there is a reason for thinking that any particular belief is actually true. Except perhaps in those realms of knowledge where things are significantly more clear cut (the belief that you can fly is unlikely to lead anywhere good), but the difference between pragmatism and empiricism there becomes somewhat academic.

I would consider the combination of rationalism and empiricism to be most effective, particularly in conjunction instead of being pitted against each other. Reason and observation, alongside a commitment to a qualified version of realism whereby our minds actually can grasp reality.

Thank you for your Aristotelian crash course, as always I appreciate your effort to accommodate my ignorance. I will take some time to mull it over before we continue that thread of our discussion.

No problem. Take your time.

 

[devolved]

For example, I tend to take a very Pascalian approach to Christianity. I have no opinion on whether or not it's true, but I think that a well reasoned, humanistic Christian belief system is the best framework for living a meaningful, productive life. Are these consequences objective? Yes. Do they have anything to say about the truth value of Christianity? Not necessarily. Could you tell me that I was not being appropriately pragmatic for using it in this fashion? Presumably, but you would be hard pressed to back that up, since we're into subjective judgments about what consequences justify what beliefs, and we can't get out of that with yet more subjectivism.

I'm a fan of Tarkovky, who was probably the best philosopher-filmmaker we've ever had when it comes to framing archetypes to communicate certain non-verbal truths. What he helped me understand is that we never actually discuss anything apart from the baggage of archetypes that we recognize via bio-memetic mechanism of our brain.

I think it's worth noting that (given that one agrees with evolutionary model of human development, although at the level of "results we get" it would be equivalent of the creationist model) most of our history was a non-verbal history. All of the context of "meaning" that we developed was encoded at the level of contextual experience that we repeated billions of times, filtered out what worked, sexually selected those who benefited from what worked, and re-enforced it as a bio-memetic archetype that would be very difficult to verbalize and unpack in a few books or scientific papers.

Hence, when Tarkovky frames the context of an image, he is communicating something that I can understand at a level that transcends verbal expression. It's essentially the same concept with religion. It's a transcendent type of communication that can only make sense at the level of archetypal story, but does not make sense at the level of scientific reductionism.

There were some experiments in psychology to see how children collectively invented rules of a game. The idea was to give 4 year olds some marbles. They had to invent a game, and then all play by the rules of that game. The kids did, and they played and modified the rules as they went on. They collectively "understood" the rules, and collectively were able to play by these rules without invoking complex language as communication.

Now, let's imagine that we have a tournament with a billion brackets of these games, rules of which are decided organically as the game went on. First it would be a silent game. There would be some gesturing about the rules, and the players could select some hierarchy of leaders they could emulate.

(what the above would exemplify are bio-genetic archetypes)

After that, we'd get another million brackets, but now the players can speak to each other, but in such a way that each successive player gets to make up some "hero" story about what they think exemplifies a successful player from previous bracket. (or bio-memetic archetypes)

What would likely happen by the time we get to the final, is some form of "super-rules" which are re-enforced by a "super-story" of what it takes to successfully play and win in context of these rules. Hence, it would be an idea of a "super-player" that played and won every game, all the way up to the finals. If the rest of the player were "watching" all along (or inheriting bio-archetypes in this analogy), it would mean certain habitual patterns of behavior emulated in context of the most successful player/stories/rules.

That's what religion is if we model it from purely materialistic perspective. It still has exactly the same societal base-values in context of the player/stories/rules that were proven to be the most successful a series of bio-memetic archetypes that have 10s of millions of years of trial/error history.

Now, imagine someone who lived a 100 years, and then woke up and decided to discard most, if not all, of the previous experience in light of few thoughts he/she had at the moment. That's how absurd the historical context that we are living in.

What seems to have happened in 18-1900s is what I would label a "semantic context switch". I don't see it as inherently conspiratorial, but Darwinism shifted paradigm towards naturalism, Marx took that paradigm as basis for socio-economic idealism, and it got popular at the turn of the 20th century. What followed in the academia was a bias towards "deconstructionist" concepts like post-modernism.
Ironically, what's at the heart of the debate is exactly what we are discussing in the OP, and what Bible discusses in its own "OP" - the concept of teleological viability of archetypes. That's what Genesis opens up with.

I think most us would grasp the story of Genesis at the level of archetypal significance. But, due to semantic context switch towards reductionism, we end up focusing on individual details and miss the significance of the archetypal story here.

The generic concept is that each successive generation essentially:

1) Is "created" by "God" of the previous generation in a sense that they inherit all of the prior knowledge in context of the "telos", or inherent meaning of concepts that's accepted based on trust. Such God gives structure for their world, and places them in the "garden" where they don't have to work hard to get that "telos" knowledge.

2) The concept of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the concept of the "inherent teleological meaning" at the level of faith in bio-memetic experience that we inherit. We can either trust it and build on it, or we can reject it and face hardship, death and ruin.

3) So, the day that we choose to reject the concept entirely, and bite into that fuit, rejecting the inherent "telos" by means of trust... is the day that we "die" as humanity, in context of the entirety of the experience that we carried up to that point. At that moment, we "exit the garden of creation" where fruits of our previous experience are ready to eat, and instead we start over by digging around in the dirt.

Today such enterprise may be very viable in context of the "running on fumes of previous generation", but I really believe that any culture that ends up rejecting the past bio-memetic past of 100-million year development ... is a subject to be eventually displaced by the culture that didn't.

There's plenty of talk about viability of scientific reductionism, and pragmatic application of science, but what we seem to ignore is that what we have is a mere blip on the extremely long timeline of experience that we are essentially rejecting because it talks the language that we are incapable to understand via a model of scientific reductionism, especially the one that's lead by post-modern deconstructionism... into oblivion.