I get everything you're saying, even though I'm not familiar with the details of the given schools of thought, and I totally agree that people can and do twist quotes of given fathers to come up with what they think to be the teachings.
I think I'm speaking more broadly than the obvious examples, though. I'm increasingly convinced that the very mode of thought itself which undergirds much of 20th c. Orthodox systematic theology (and its derivatives, including what we tend to find in internet Orthodoxy like TAW or other places), is itself deeply flawed and not really in keeping with the very theology of the figures it purports to imitate.
In trying to imitate them
synthetically as a
unity or collective, to encounter a deeper mind of the Church "behind" the phenomena of their individual writings - a mind which is timeless, essential, and on some level knowable (even if only intuitively and imperfectly) - this is Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl applied it in the 1930's to literature / art and authorial intent; Florovsky picked it up (either intentionally or not) and applied it to the phenomena of Orthodox history (artifacts from tradition) and the Mind of the Church. The "canonical" sources of tradition (saints writings, icons, liturgy, conciliar decrees, etc.) functioned like the art or literature; the Mind of the Church like the "author" whose intent the interpreter (the modern theology) sought after.
But Florovsky, like other essentialists, didn't know what to do with non-conforming artifacts, so he rather invented the idea of the "Latin Captivity" to explain away the awkward Orthodox Tradition of the 15th through 19th centuries, before the "recovery" of the "real" Orthodox voice by the Neo-Patristic Synthesis in the 20th century. We parrot this line of thought rather automatically today, and it would have been unthinkable to Orthodox thinkers during the so-called "Latin Captivity" (or, for that matter, Orthodox thinkers of the Late Byzantine period, or any other period other than Florovsky's).
And what you say next, for that matter, confirms how deeply these ideas now exist within Orthodox theology...
There IS a really simple test for some things, though it requires a broad familiarity with literature and history, and preferably of a traditionally Orthodox nation as well as the US or England's, and that test is to ask what was held practically all of the time in those nations.
I think, given a fallen world, that this isn't a good test. What people
have considered True or Moral does not seem like a good starting point for asking what they
ought to consider True or Moral.
It's the naturalist fallacy, in short. Stating what is does not confirm what ought to be.
This can also be demonstrated historically, since there are plenty of examples of seismic shift in human behavior or belief (e.g. the movement from hunter-gatherer to husbandry to neolithic economic systems). There's good evidence from times when those lifestyles lived side by side (e.g. early urban society through mid 1st millenium BC) that the different groups very much did moralize about their behaviors. Semi-nomadic groups regarded the city-dwellers as immoral liberals for abandoning what had "always" been the proper way of life of human beings, and viewed agriculture as a human attempt to supplant God's proper order. Note the story of Cain and Abel, where one offers grain and the other offers sheep, and the one offering grain is refused and goes on (after committing murder) to become the father of city dwellers and urbanites. There's actually several more OT examples, but that one always seems so striking to me.
The Luddite argument against industrialization runs along a similar vein. It is true that until the time of industrialization, there was not industrialization. It does not follow that industrialization is de-facto evil or ungodly, and ought to be resisted.
There are also examples of changing cosmologies, changing anthropologies, changing soteriologies, changing theologies, changing epistemologies, changing scriptural hermeneutics, changing understandings of biology and physics, changing understandings of the relationship of the phenomena (biology and physics) to the epiphenomena (anthropology and cosmology) or even which one IS the phenomena and the epiphenomena. There's a good case to make that we've reversed everything today so that we imagine the biological or physical to be the stable reality (the phenomena) which then needs interpretation (epiphenomena), when there's really solid evidence that the ancient and late-antique societies (Grecco-Roman, including deep into the era of Orthodox Christianity) had it the other way around: the social order (anthropology, cosmology) was the stable phenomena and the physical world (including biology) was diversely "invented" as an interpretation of (and justification for) that existing reality of social and cosmological order.
We lost that sense of social-cosmic stability when we realized that it's a genuine fantasy (at least on the level of anthropology). Social order changes continuously. So when that became apparent (around modernity), ethicists, theologians, and philosophers shifted from interpreting human biology according to the needs of the social order and instead began to try to justify the social order according to the "inherent" qualities of human biology.
That's where you get the attempt to justify things like white supremacy through biology. Europeans clearly had superior economies and technologies; so if that were to be maintained then it MUST be an epiphenomenon that rested on a biological inherency - a phenomenon. The interpreted ethical "norm" that white (males) should hold the highest place in the world order must be based on scientifically valid biology.
The ancients would have gone the other way. They would have literally made up the "biology" to justify the social order. That's how you get Romans (or Greeks) variously describing those they conquer as biologically less manly than them (since they were capable of being conquered - of having their lands militarily penetrated like effeminates).
Again, though, if the social order is inherent (and biology conforms to it), then we have zero explanation for the high degree of changeability in social orders. Romans no longer control the European economy, nor do Greeks. Whites no longer have a massive technological and economic edge. Nor did they have ANY edge whatsoever during the 1100's AD, or the 500's BC, or several of any other centuries one wishes to pick.
But once one asserts that biology is stable and must give rise to a proper social order, then one begins to realize just how "made up" the biological explanations were and how hollow they sound. There is no inherent advantage in being "white" that makes one a superior administrator or some such nonsense. The social order had other, non-biological, causes (namely geography - basically, luck). Because of that, no social order (of the sort that imperialists wanted to justify) could be predicated on biology OR social reality. Social realities change, and biology didn't in fact support their program. Hence you get the push towards racial equality in the 19th through 21st century and beyond.
I'm picking "race" as the exemplar because I feel it is an area we are more likely to agree. That is, I've never heard you assert that one race is superior to another or any such thing, so it seems a safe "premise one" from which to begin.
TO SUMMARIZE: key ethical norms, AND their underlying justifications, can and do change over time. The mere fact that such-and-such norm has not yet undergone such a change does not mean the underlying justifications have not changed (they have; our anthropology, even in Orthodoxy, is radically different from the anthropology of early Christianity). Further, it does not mean that such-and-such norm or belief will not change in the future.
Predicating truth claims (ethical or not) on "non-variability" - on the stability of a belief over time - is therefore fallacious.
At most, I'd be (and am) quite willing to say that an old or long-held cultural norm is best approached with reverence and caution, since there is likely a good reason it has endured so well.
While you may not get fine theological points this way, you can get a lot of broad ones, and moral teachings will be obvious.
I think if you limit yourself to JUST Orthodox "cultures" and within those cultures JUST "canonical" sources (e.g. saints), you'll get Florovsky's Neo-Patristic Synthesis method. If you don't make those limitations, you'll get chaos, because human society is just that diverse.
Deviant sexual activity is an obvious one. There really IS a rule, a line from which wrong ideas and actions really deviate.
Um... nope. Sorry. That's one of the ones that has changed the most over time. Better to pick something like "murder is evil" or "honor your father and mother." But there are polygamist cultures and monogamous cultures, cultures that celebrate pederasty and cultures that condemn it, cultures that morally justify rape and cultures that condemn it, cultures that permit divorce and cultures that deny it entirely, and just about everything in between. There are cultures that allow or celebrate male-male intercourse and one's that allow or celebrate female-female intercourse. And the cultures that I'm thinking of in these examples would likely surprise even someone as historically educated as yourself. I struggle to think of a single sexual norm that is universal to all cultures across all times.
Even when I limit myself to Christian cultures, and even to Orthodox Christian cultures (though the degree and type of variance obviously goes down the more one limits one's sources, since numerically there is less that can vary and cultural proximity increases the likelihood of stability).
In other words, to refer not only to what individuals in the Church said, but what the varying populaces held in common as true over time. Divorce has really always been uncool, for example, and something very much to be avoided, and our time is a glaring exception to the rest of Christian history.
They were debating it in Jesus' own time, and it remained controversial in the 10th c. Byzantine court when the emperor wanted to remarry a third time, and it remained controversial for Henry VIII (who saw it as a matter of national security / stability). Our time has its own distinctiveness, but no - Roman Law was actually pretty liberal with respect to divorce (since marriage was a contract and could be dissolved as easily).
I'd grant you that most "canonical" Christian sources would say that divorce is less than ideal - but to what degree, and how to respond to it, varies considerably. Further, the selection of the canonical sources is ex-post-facto. Finally, your point was about culture broadly-speaking as a source of natural law, and that frankly just doesn't work (at least not with divorce).
When I look at ECF commentary, I find them to be in line with the general attitude and atmosphere of both the Christian East and West, and this confirms the consensus.
This is where you start sounding more significantly "neo-patristic" or "phenomenological." How do you
know or come to
understand what you here call the "ECF"s, the "general attitude and atmosphere" (mind / essence) of the Christian "East" and "West"? Where are those categories coming from? How did you arrive at them or derive them?
Even just speaking of "the ECF's" is problematic, because it assumes consensus / synthesis as part of (in the particular case of our conversation here) an attempt to justify consensus / synthesis.
And the attempt to preserve that synthesis or consensus, to defend that essence / mind
behind a given phenomenon (e.g. Melito's Paschal Homily), inherently invites anachronism and distortion, as one is already
looking at the phenomena with the assumption of synthetic possibilities - and not just possibilities, but realities. The synthesis is assumed, then found in the evidence, and this (circularly) confirms the synthesis, and then any discordant evidence is in some way dismissed (e.g. Latin Captivity, the errors of an individual saint, our fallen world poking through, the unknowability of the Mind we seek, etc.) so that the circularly justified and already assumed synthesis can be preserved.
What I find deeply ironic is that I don't see much evidence of this synthetic methodology in precisely the sources from which we seek the synthesis. There's a reason the 19th and 20th century had to "invent" Orthodox systematic theology.
(That's why Chesterton is right and his (gradual) conversion to the RCC is irrelevant to that - and I would add that, in reflecting that, we can dispense with any charges of being merely "a man of his time", or as you put it, being "historically contextualized".
It is literally impossible for a person to be anything other than a historically contextualized human. Unless you'd like to claim that Chesterton is Godlike in being beyond time and infinite in his knowledge. If he is finite in his knowledge, then the extent and reach of his knowledge is contextualized to what was available to him in his culture and historical locality. If he is "within" time rather than beyond it, then he is subject to change and inconsistency, and the forces which worked on him to produce that change would be determined by the time period in which he lived.
Not that I'm trying to start a debate on that here; what I'm saying is that there are broader considerations than only the intellectual voices of the Church, even the ECF's, let alone Florovsky, Meyendorf and so on. And that some things really ARE simple.
One is Simple: God. Everything else (really, every "thing" since God is not a thing) is inherently complex. We are ignorant, finite beings bound by subjective perspectives, biases, etc. There is nothing simple about Orthodox history, nor Orthodox faith. This may be my own personal problem, but to me simplicity is the temptation towards idolatry - towards something I can wrap my head around and control. I think you're right that complexity can also be a cover for idolatry - a cover for obfuscating the manipulation of verbal symbols (words) in an attempt to control the world. Sometimes, philosophers and witch doctors aren't that different, in this respect.
I think over-intellectualizing to be as real a danger as provincial ignorance.
The only danger in over-intellectualizing is if it is not accompanied by ascesis, prayer, and sacrament. That is, the exemplary Cappadocian fathers (all educated at the best facilities in the ancient world and thoroughly invested in academics for their entire life), St Photius of Constantinople, St Maximus the Confessor, and even St Gregory Palamas (among many, many others) show a long and vibrant allowance for the absolute pinnacle of intellect within even the most venerable canonical sources of Orthodox theology. Nyssa's Life of Moses does a nice job of pulling Moses as an OT exemplar of someone who combined the best of intellectual pursuits with an ascetic life of mystical prayer.
There is absolutely nothing under-intellectualized about Nyssa's
Contra Eunomium or Maximus's
Ambigua. They utilized the best available philosophical and literary tools in addressing the problems of their day. So did Florovsky, for that matter. But the tools have continued to change (we are no longer neo-Platonists like those of Nyssa's time, nor Husserl-Phenomenologists like Florovsky's time).
In Christ,
Macarius