On the futility of evidence-based apologetics

[gaara4158]

Actually, what I would prefer to do is to watch an atheistic review OF the Mike Winger and Matt Dillahunty debate, such as the one which PineCreek did a few days after the debate [see below].....and then evaluate and critique all five individual conceptions about "the evidence" which are encapsulated in the totality of PineCreek's video.

That’s a great idea, I’ll be checking that out tomorrow and then we can discuss it all.

 

[gaara4158]

Actually, what I would prefer to do is to watch an atheistic review OF the Mike Winger and Matt Dillahunty debate, such as the one which PineCreek did after the debate [see below].....and then evaluate and critique all five individual conceptions about "the evidence" which are encapsulated in the totality of PineCreek's video.

So I listened to this review twice just to make sure I absorbed everything worth mentioning, and before I get into the main takeaways I should note that this exchange is in reference to the veracity of a specific historical event, not on the existence of God. The problems I outlined in my OP won’t necessarily apply to their discussion, even if it shares an underlying theme or two.

The biggest refrain we saw from Matt, which was affirmed by the commentators, was that it is not the fault of sound epistemology that the claims of the Bible cannot rise to the standards necessary to warrant belief.
One subtlety I’m glad they covered is the fact that even if Matt has no explanation for the evidence of the resurrection, that doesn’t make Mike’s supernatural explanation any more likely. It’s not Mike’s explanation vs Matt’s explanation, it’s *any* explanation held against sound epistemology, and if it doesn’t pass it doesn’t pass. Of course, this is the point at which it might become necessary to examine exactly what constitutes a sound epistemology.
Another thing that came up and I agree with was the fact that even if we could successfully prove that the resurrection happened, that still wouldn’t tell us *how* it happened. Trickster gods, aliens, time travelers and the like are all on the table until reason emerges for us to believe one over the others.

As I said, this isn’t apologetics strictly speaking, but it still serves as a window into different epistemological errors, which ties into my OP well enough.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

So I listened to this review twice just to make sure I absorbed everything worth mentioning, and before I get into the main takeaways I should note that this exchange is in reference to the veracity of a specific historical event, not on the existence of God. The problems I outlined in my OP won’t necessarily apply to their discussion, even if it shares an underlying theme or two.

The biggest refrain we saw from Matt, which was affirmed by the commentators, was that it is not the fault of sound epistemology that the claims of the Bible cannot rise to the standards necessary to warrant belief.
One subtlety I’m glad they covered is the fact that even if Matt has no explanation for the evidence of the resurrection, that doesn’t make Mike’s supernatural explanation any more likely. It’s not Mike’s explanation vs Matt’s explanation, it’s *any* explanation held against sound epistemology, and if it doesn’t pass it doesn’t pass. Of course, this is the point at which it might become necessary to examine exactly what constitutes a sound epistemology.
Another thing that came up and I agree with was the fact that even if we could successfully prove that the resurrection happened, that still wouldn’t tell us *how* it happened. Trickster gods, aliens, time travelers and the like are all on the table until reason emerges for us to believe one over the others.

As I said, this isn’t apologetics strictly speaking, but it still serves as a window into different epistemological errors, which ties into my OP well enough.

Ha! Well, you've beaten me to the punch on that one, gaara! I haven't had a chance to finish my first time through since I've been busy researching for that 'other' thread on slavery. Sorry, I'll have to catch up and finish watching PineCreek and his partners so you and I can talk. (Geesh! It's 2 hours and 47 minutes long..............egads!)

I will say just at the get go here that ........ I don't really believe there is such a thing as a 'sound epistemology' where religion is concerned, so I'll just indicate that I'll probably be pretty hard not only on the Christian Apologist, but on any Tom, Dick or Harry---of whatever caste or mold----who thinks mainstream epistemology has a whole load of weight to throw around up and against the Bible.

So, if you have some ideas about what constitutes a 'sound epistemology,' feel free to toss them out there for me to tear ap...........I mean, to consider. Also, if you want, you can let me know what parts of the video you found to be exceptionally strong on the part of PineCreek and friends.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

So I listened to this review twice just to make sure I absorbed everything worth mentioning, and before I get into the main takeaways I should note that this exchange is in reference to the veracity of a specific historical event, not on the existence of God. The problems I outlined in my OP won’t necessarily apply to their discussion, even if it shares an underlying theme or two.

The biggest refrain we saw from Matt, which was affirmed by the commentators, was that it is not the fault of sound epistemology that the claims of the Bible cannot rise to the standards necessary to warrant belief.
One subtlety I’m glad they covered is the fact that even if Matt has no explanation for the evidence of the resurrection, that doesn’t make Mike’s supernatural explanation any more likely. It’s not Mike’s explanation vs Matt’s explanation, it’s *any* explanation held against sound epistemology, and if it doesn’t pass it doesn’t pass. Of course, this is the point at which it might become necessary to examine exactly what constitutes a sound epistemology.
Another thing that came up and I agree with was the fact that even if we could successfully prove that the resurrection happened, that still wouldn’t tell us *how* it happened. Trickster gods, aliens, time travelers and the like are all on the table until reason emerges for us to believe one over the others.

As I said, this isn’t apologetics strictly speaking, but it still serves as a window into different epistemological errors, which ties into my OP well enough.

So, I've watched and logged the first hour and 5 minutes. I'll be watching the rest of the video over the next day or so, but I thought there were some interesting bits in that first hour. I can't say that I'd agree with these guys, or with the Christian Apologist, because I think they're utterly ignoring some conceptual 'data' that exists fragmentarily within the biblical texts that affect how a person, any person, might come to believe in the truth of the Christian faith.

But on your side of things, Gaara, you brought up a good initial point, and that was that we may need to examine what constitutes a 'sound' epistemology. Any ideas on this?

 

[gaara4158]

So, I've watched and logged the first hour and 5 minutes. I'll be watching the rest of the video over the next day or so, but I thought there were some interesting bits in that first hour. I can't say that I'd agree with these guys, or with the Christian Apologist, because I think they're utterly ignoring some conceptual 'data' that exists fragmentarily within the biblical texts that affect how a person, any person, might come to believe in the truth of the Christian faith.

But on your side of things, Gaara, you brought up a good initial point, and that was that we may need to examine what constitutes a 'sound' epistemology. Any ideas on this?

Yes. I do not think it is wise to expect an epistemology to offer perfect certainty, nor can we expect to be able to investigate all claims equally effectively, but I consider an epistemology sound if it produces reliably accurate predictions about empirical observations. This means that anything that isn’t testable isn’t going to be knowable in the same way as things that are.

We can get into the details of how an epistemology like this can be constructed, but for now I’d like to see if we agree on this.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes. I do not think it is wise to expect an epistemology to offer perfect certainty, nor can we expect to be able to investigate all claims equally effectively, but I consider an epistemology sound if it produces reliably accurate predictions about empirical observations. This means that anything that isn’t testable isn’t going to be knowable in the same way as things that are.

We can get into the details of how an epistemology like this can be constructed, but for now I’d like to see if we agree on this.

Just take it in stride when I say I respect your vision, but I think you'll have a difficult time actually constructing a really great epistemology. Call me skeptical, or better yet, just call me a Critical Realist who thinks epistemology is mainly about having a system or framework for defining and demonstrating one's processes of justification.

But who knows? Maybe you've got some good ideas percolating and I'd be unwise to do the ol' chop-chop on them until I've actually heard them; things could turn into a discussion that is productive for both of us.

 

[zippy2006]

Yes. I do not think it is wise to expect an epistemology to offer perfect certainty, nor can we expect to be able to investigate all claims equally effectively, but I consider an epistemology sound if it produces reliably accurate predictions about empirical observations. This means that anything that isn’t testable isn’t going to be knowable in the same way as things that are.

We can get into the details of how an epistemology like this can be constructed, but for now I’d like to see if we agree on this.

I think empirical observation is a good starting point for epistemology, but in the context of the OP it isn't just testability that is problematic, but also the empirical approach itself. If our epistemology is not capable of identifying immaterial, non-empirical realities, then it will certainly not be capable of identifying God. This would be true even if God were "testable."

Ideally the dialogue partners would identify a middle term: a non-empirical reality that could be accounted for by using an agreed-upon epistemology. Once this is done they could then turn to God.

 

[gaara4158]

I think empirical observation is a good starting point for epistemology, but in the context of the OP it isn't just testability that is problematic, but also the empirical approach itself. If our epistemology is not capable of identifying immaterial, non-empirical realities, then it will certainly not be capable of identifying God. This would be true even if God were "testable."

Ideally the dialogue partners would identify a middle term: a non-empirical reality that could be accounted for by using an agreed-upon epistemology. Once this is done they could then turn to God.

Actually, the point Matt makes is that it’s not the empirical approach that’s problematic, but the non-empirically-manifesting nature of God. We can’t throw away our epistemology just because it can’t tell us everything. There are a handful of non-testable assumptions we make pragmatically, but other than those I know of no way to justify a belief without empirical evidence or logical proof. What kind of alternative epistemology did you have in mind?

 

[gaara4158]

Just take it in stride when I say I respect your vision, but I think you'll have a difficult time actually constructing a really great epistemology. Call me skeptical, or better yet, just call me a Critical Realist who thinks epistemology is mainly about having a system or framework for defining and demonstrating one's processes of justification.

But who knows? Maybe you've got some good ideas percolating and I'd be unwise to do the ol' chop-chop on them until I've actually heard them; things could turn into a discussion that is productive for both of us.

Remember, we’re not aiming for “great,” we’re aiming for “sound.” Would you agree that predictive reliability is the best available measure of an epistemology? If not, are you just interested in hearing my reasons why I think it is?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Remember, we’re not aiming for “great,” we’re aiming for “sound.” Would you agree that predictive reliability is the best available measure of an epistemology? If not, are you just interested in hearing my reasons why I think it is?

I'm not sure about the centrality of 'predictive reliability' being the best available measure of an epistemology. You see, gaara, it is at this point that in order for any of us to actually demonstrate that we indeed 'have' in our mental possession such a thing as a 'sound epistemology,' we need to identify which epistemology we are essentially dealing with. We can't just say, "a sound epistemology will do such and such." No, we have to designate whether we're working in Foundationalism, or Coherentism, or Reliabalism, or Pragmatism, or some other, and so on and so forth.

Additionally, as @zippy2006 has already implied, when we are dealing with the concept of God, particularly the biblical concept(s) of God, then one's theory about testability flies out the window. Sure, we could more or less apply some pragmatism to our Techne when building a spacecraft to take us to Mars or to make the world's best vegetable juicer; and I would heartily recommend taking scientific measures when doing so. But when we're dealing with the biblical God, not only do we have the problem of His not being directly testable by us (other than perhaps on those few issues dealing with designated epistemic "buckets" in the video you and I are evaluating above), but we also have to deal with the limitations set by the bibically indicated epistemic technicalities that God says He will control, this and the fact that for us to even begin to 'test' God, we have to also allow that Hermeneutics plays a role in our correctly identifying phenomena within the Bible that we 'think' we might possibly control so as to test God on those very phenomena.

For instance, if prayer isn't a phenomena that is what we have traditionally been told that it is, it's going to be quite rocky going for any one of us to test prayer pragmatically when we have a very incorrect understanding of what it is and what it is supposed to accomplish for us ... especially if God isn't going to cooperate with our wishes in all cases, or if He happens to think that prayer is mainly about 'His wishes' rather than ours.

 

[gaara4158]

I'm not sure about the centrality of 'predictive reliability' being the best available measure of an epistemology. You see, gaara, it is at this point that in order for any of us to actually demonstrate that we indeed 'have' in our mental possession such a thing as a 'sound epistemology,' we need to identify which epistemology we are essentially dealing with. We can't just say, "a sound epistemology will do such and such." No, we have to designate whether we're working in Foundationalism, or Coherentism, or Reliabalism, or Pragmatism, or some other, and so on and so forth.

Why? Shouldn't the task of identifying the best available epistemology force you to choose between those options, or some mix-and-match combination thereof? I understand that there's no agreed-upon "right" answer to this in philosophy, and it's possible that (as per my OP) you and I might not be able to agree either. But I do not believe that we can effectively measure the value of an epistemology until we agree what an epistemology is supposed to do for us. I've stated what I think, and I'm waiting to hear what you think.

Additionally, as @zippy2006 has already implied, when we are dealing with the concept of God, particularly the biblical concept(s) of God, then one's theory about testability flies out the window. Sure, we could more or less apply some pragmatism to our Techne when building a spacecraft to take us to Mars or to make the world's best vegetable juicer; and I would heartily recommend taking scientific measures when doing so. But when we're dealing with the biblical God, not only do we have the problem of His not being directly testable by us (other than perhaps on those few issues dealing with designated epistemic "buckets" in the video you and I are evaluating above), but we also have to deal with the limitations set by the bibically indicated epistemic technicalities that God says He will control, this and the fact that for us to even begin to 'test' God, we have to also allow that Hermeneutics plays a role in our correctly identifying phenomena within the Bible that we 'think' we might possibly control so as to test God on those very phenomena.

For instance, if prayer isn't a phenomena that is what we have traditionally been told that it is, it's going to be quite rocky going for any one of us to test prayer pragmatically when we have a very incorrect understanding of what it is and what it is supposed to accomplish for us ... especially if God isn't going to cooperate with our wishes in all cases, or if He happens to think that prayer is mainly about 'His wishes' rather than ours.

That's true, but it doesn't really bother me. It appears to me that the complaint you both lodge against the type of epistemology I espouse is that it does not contain a path by which to rationally justify belief in God, prayer, etc. As I've been saying in this thread, that's not the epistemology's problem, it's your belief's problem. I am sure you do not choose your epistemology based on what it allows you to believe, but I think it's time you share what exact criteria you do use to judge them.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Why? Shouldn't the task of identifying the best available epistemology force you to choose between those options, or some mix-and-match combination thereof?

No, the task of identifying some 'best' epistemology shouldn't 'force' any choice on our part. We don't want a cavalierly (or conveniently) drawn together presupposition about what a 'best' epistemology should be when we're wanting our passenger jets to stay in the air or our cars to not explode on ignition. We want actual knowledge in such cases, not hunt, peck and hopeful theories that "it works."

As epistemologist Baergen (1995) states:

...Traditionally, epistemology has been an armchair sport; theorists worked out their answers to the questions raised...by thinking about how we ordinarily use words, what the average person has in mind when defending beliefs, and so forth. But there is a growing trend to draw heavily upon work being done in the laboratories of psychologists and neurologists. The contrast between these approaches brings up various questions about the nature of the epistemic enterprise: Are we engaged solely in conceptual analysis? Would a correct epistemological theory be necessarily or contingently true? Should we concentrate on simply working out truth conditions for various kinds of epistemic claims? All of this takes us even deeper, raising questions about whether it is possible to do epistemology at all... (p. 2)
​

And in this convolution and technicality of epistemic endeavor, I remain skeptical that epistemology can be applied very effectively, relevantly, or deeply ...... by anyone when it is done not for scientific purposes but to somehow corral religious belief on one side (by atheists) or to indemnify it on the other side (by Christians).

Reference
Baergen, Ralph. (1995). Contemporary Epistemology. Forth Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

I understand that there's no agreed-upon "right" answer to this in philosophy, and it's possible that (as per my OP) you and I might not be able to agree either.

Yes, and as we see in the video during just the first hour alone, even in the discussion between PineCreek and his friends, they deliberate over the thoughts of Matt Dillahunty and find some epistemological differences between themselves and him----yet strangely, they're all atheists. In light of this and the fact that Christians also disagree epistemologically among themselves, I think you would do well to realize 'why' there are no agreed upon answers on epistemology among philosophers; nor even [really] among scientists as a whole, especially since scientific praxis gets rather bogged down by easily assumed notions about epistemology that many practicing scientists really have little 'right' to assume where religion is concerned.

But I do not believe that we can effectively measure the value of an epistemology until we agree what an epistemology is supposed to do for us. I've stated what I think, and I'm waiting to hear what you think.

Sure. This is a common enough recognition at the beginning of any attempt to start epistemolo-gizing.

That's true, but it doesn't really bother me.

.... it should, especially if and when we're analyzing our epistemology in reference to the Christian faith, and for the reasons, again, that I've stated in the previous post. Add to those complications that little(?) point Baergen touched upon in the quote I wrote from him above in that there are some psychological complexities as they are tied into sensory complexities that get in the middle of this entire endeavor. Add to this, as well, the additional complexities that come on top of all of this by why of further sociological considerations that the Philosophical Hermeneuticists (Critical Realists) recognize. Once this is done, a reliance upon a merely pragmatic or foundationalist epistemic set of terms denotes a position of superficiality that ignores quite a number of nuances in our epistemic reality (or realities?).

It appears to me that the complaint you both lodge against the type of epistemology I espouse is that it does not contain a path by which to rationally justify belief in God, prayer, etc. As I've been saying in this thread, that's not the epistemology's problem, it's your belief's problem.

No, it's not the "belief's" problem; it would be if the 'religious belief' were an epistemology, and I can understand how all of this religious talk from Christians and atheists can confuse the issues because often the term 'FAITH' gets conceptually saddled as being a form of epistemology ---- WHICH IT IS NOT!

I am sure you do not choose your epistemology based on what it allows you to believe, but I think it's time you share what exact criteria you do use to judge them.

As I've said before, I'm skeptical [moderately] and I'm a Critical Realist, but my position involves a praxis that recognizes the complexity (and therefore the ambiguity) between various human epistemological points of view. This isn't a contest between competing human perceptions. Rather, where Christian religion is concerned, it's an existential matter that each of us will Subjectively [as Kierkegaard and/or Critical Realists would define it] deal with as we grapple together with our attempts to be Objective with the world around us.

Are you wanting to build a spacecraft? Let's just 'do' science. But if you're wanting to touch the 'face of God' in Christ, science and Pragmatism aren't going to be your epistemic allies. In fact, they might even become emotionally laden liabilities.

 

[gaara4158]

No, the task of identifying some 'best' epistemology shouldn't 'force' any choice on our part. We don't want a cavalierly (or conveniently) drawn together presupposition about what a 'best' epistemology should be when we're wanting our passenger jets to stay in the air or our cars to not explode on ignition. We want actual knowledge in such cases, not hunt, peck and hopeful theories that "it works."

As epistemologist Baergen (1995) states:

...Traditionally, epistemology has been an armchair sport; theorists worked out their answers to the questions raised...by thinking about how we ordinarily use words, what the average person has in mind when defending beliefs, and so forth. But there is a growing trend to draw heavily upon work being done in the laboratories of psychologists and neurologists. The contrast between these approaches brings up various questions about the nature of the epistemic enterprise: Are we engaged solely in conceptual analysis? Would a correct epistemological theory be necessarily or contingently true? Should we concentrate on simply working out truth conditions for various kinds of epistemic claims? All of this takes us even deeper, raising questions about whether it is possible to do epistemology at all... (p. 2)
​

And in this convolution and technicality of epistemic endeavor, I remain skeptical that epistemology can be applied very effectively, relevantly, or deeply ...... by anyone when it is done not for scientific purposes but to somehow corral religious belief on one side (by atheists) or to indemnify it on the other side (by Christians).

Reference
Baergen, Ralph. (1995). Contemporary Epistemology. Forth Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

Yes, and as we see in the video during just the first hour alone, even in the discussion between PineCreek and his friends, they deliberate over the thoughts of Matt Dillahunty and find some epistemological differences between themselves and him----yet strangely, they're all atheists. In light of this and the fact that Christians also disagree epistemologically among themselves, I think you would do well to realize 'why' there are no agreed upon answers on epistemology among philosophers; nor even [really] among scientists as a whole, especially since scientific praxis gets rather bogged down by easily assumed notions about epistemology that many practicing scientists really have little 'right' to assume where religion is concerned.

Sure. This is a common enough recognition at the beginning of any attempt to start epistemolo-gizing.

.... it should, especially if and when we're analyzing our epistemology in reference to the Christian faith, and for the reasons, again, that I've stated in the previous post. Add to those complications that little(?) point Baergen touched upon in the quote I wrote from him above in that there are some psychological complexities as they are tied into sensory complexities that get in the middle of this entire endeavor. Add to this, as well, the additional complexities that come on top of all of this by why of further sociological considerations that the Philosophical Hermeneuticists (Critical Realists) recognize. Once this is done, a reliance upon a merely pragmatic or foundationalist epistemic set of terms denotes a position of superficiality that ignores quite a number of nuances in our epistemic reality (or realities?).

No, it's not the "belief's" problem; it would be if the 'religious belief' were an epistemology, and I can understand how all of this religious talk from Christians and atheists can confuse the issues because often the term 'FAITH' gets conceptually saddled as being a form of epistemology ---- WHICH IT IS NOT!

As I've said before, I'm skeptical [moderately] and I'm a Critical Realist, but my position involves a praxis that recognizes the complexity (and therefore the ambiguity) between various human epistemological points of view. This isn't a contest between competing human perceptions. Rather, where Christian religion is concerned, it's an existential matter that each of us will Subjectively [as Kierkegaard and/or Critical Realists would define it] deal with as we grapple together with our attempts to be Objective with the world around us.

Are you wanting to build a spacecraft? Let's just 'do' science. But if you're wanting to touch the 'face of God' in Christ, science and Pragmatism aren't going to be your epistemic allies. In fact, they might even become emotionally laden liabilities.

It looks like we need to back up even further to reach the point where we both agree, then. If I understand you correctly - and I’ll put this in simpler terms for my own sake - you have different standards for how “sure” you need to be before you proceed as though something is concretely, objectively true, depending on what type of claim you are evaluating. Jet engines, seat belts, and the like need to be backed up with the maximal degree of certainty in their effectiveness, but the benefits of bath bombs can be left up to the imagination. As such, you won’t apply the same type of “testing” to these problems. Is this more or less where you stand?

If so, I understand, and I agree to a certain point. What we’re concerned about is not so much how we determine what’s really true (which will almost certainly be meaningless to us as creatures who conceive of the universe in terms of our inescapably animal perspective) but rather what makes something worth believing. In this light it’s understandable that you and others would cite existential reasons for your belief in Christianity, but maybe you can help me understand something else. Given your existential reasons for belief, do you think yours are more valid than anyone else’s existential reasons for believing other religions or philosophies?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

It looks like we need to back up even further to reach the point where we both agree, then. If I understand you correctly - and I’ll put this in simpler terms for my own sake - you have different standards for how “sure” you need to be before you proceed as though something is concretely, objectively true, depending on what type of claim you are evaluating. Jet engines, seat belts, and the like need to be backed up with the maximal degree of certainty in their effectiveness, but the benefits of bath bombs can be left up to the imagination. As such, you won’t apply the same type of “testing” to these problems. Is this more or less where you stand?

If so, I understand, and I agree to a certain point. What we’re concerned about is not so much how we determine what’s really true (which will almost certainly be meaningless to us as creatures who conceive of the universe in terms of our inescapably animal perspective) but rather what makes something worth believing. In this light it’s understandable that you and others would cite existential reasons for your belief in Christianity, but maybe you can help me understand something else. Given your existential reasons for belief, do you think yours are more valid than anyone else’s existential reasons for believing other religions or philosophies?

Whether or not I think my reasons are objectively valid in the case of comparative religious type beliefs, or as to whether I think my reason are more valid, will depend upon whether or not we are referring to the field of Epistemology [knowledge] (and Metaphysics [truth]) OR instead to the field of Aesthetics. The former involve matters of validity, while the latter involves matters of 'taste.'

So, if I present to you an Aesthetic Argument, such as I have in another thread, I'm giving you an argument that partially prevents the application of the OTF to myself, but it does not decisively determine the objective 'truth' of Christianity as being a superior entity of religious value; no, it is Subjective even if at the same time it is rational (just not rational, or tasteful, for you, perhaps).

As for epistemology, I'm going to assert with Pascal, with Kierkegaard, and with the Critical Realist, among others, that your epistemic evaluations about Christianity don't cut the mustard since they are not wholistic in nature. I mean this: IF we have a hard time discerning the nature of supposed phenomena that appear within the pages of the Bible---such as prayer for instance, and I refer to that because it is so often the spiritual Boogeyman in many cases of atheistic malcontent---then we will also be hard pressed to indeed move into a valid position by which we are then be able to 'test' those very phenomena since we can't (or won't, really) correctly identify the nature of what we're handling conceptually.

Moreover, atheistic arguments also become at least partially disabled and unusable in epistemological fashion if I, the ardent philosophical scourge by deconstruction and dissemblance, find in atheistic arguments reasonable shortfalls that play into the various atheistic tropes of evaluations made against the Christian faith. At the very least, what happens in my case, from my Subjective point of view, is that even IF Christianity hasn't been 'proved,' (which again, I don't think it can be or is supposed to be), then I found (not created) a space for Christian Faith.

What I would recommend to you, gaara, at this point, is to become a little more egalitarian in your willingness to actually engage fuller treatments of philosophy rather than run in deductive circles in an atheistic (or a reductively pragmatic) vacuum of epistemolgical assumption. This means broaden your horizons in exploration and actually read longer academic treatments in all philosophy, even Christian Philosophy, rather than spinning your wheels merely with the proffering of either ardent Atheists or simplistic Christian Apologists. It also helps to add a helping of Hermeneutical study as well to all of this.

(p.s. I'll try to get around to watching at least the 2nd hour of the video today from PineCreek and friends, and maybe even the 3rd hour as well. )

 

[gaara4158]

Whether or not I think my reasons are objectively valid in the case of comparative religious type beliefs, or as to whether I think my reason are more valid, will depend upon whether or not we are referring to the field of Epistemology [knowledge] (and Metaphysics [truth]) OR instead to the field of Aesthetics. The former involve matters of validity, while the latter involves matters of 'taste.'

So, if I present to you an Aesthetic Argument, such as I have in another thread, I'm giving you an argument that partially prevents the application of the OTF to myself, but it does not decisively determine the objective 'truth' of Christianity as being a superior entity of religious value; no, it is Subjective even if at the same time it is rational (just not rational, or tasteful, for you, perhaps).

As for epistemology, I'm going to assert with Pascal, with Kierkegaard, and with the Critical Realist, among others, that your epistemic evaluations about Christianity don't cut the mustard since they are not wholistic in nature. I mean this: IF we have a hard time discerning the nature of supposed phenomena that appear within the pages of the Bible---such as prayer for instance, and I refer to that because it is so often the spiritual Boogeyman in many cases of atheistic malcontent---then we will also be hard pressed to indeed move into a valid position by which we are then be able to 'test' those very phenomena since we can't (or won't, really) correctly identify the nature of what we're handling conceptually.

Moreover, atheistic arguments also become at least partially disabled and unusable in epistemological fashion if I, the ardent philosophical scourge by deconstruction and dissemblance, find in atheistic arguments reasonable shortfalls that play into the various atheistic tropes of evaluations made against the Christian faith. At the very least, what happens in my case, from my Subjective point of view, is that even IF Christianity hasn't been 'proved,' (which again, I don't think it can be or is supposed to be), then I found (not created) a space for Christian Faith.

What I would recommend to you, gaara, at this point, is to become a little more egalitarian in your willingness to actually engage fuller treatments of philosophy rather than run in deductive circles in an atheistic (or a reductively pragmatic) vacuum of epistemolgical assumption. This means broaden your horizons in exploration and actually read longer academic treatments in all philosophy, even Christian Philosophy, rather than spinning your wheels merely with the proffering of either ardent Atheists or simplistic Christian Apologists. It also helps to add a helping of Hermeneutical study as well to all of this.

(p.s. I'll try to get around to watching at least the 2nd hour of the video today from PineCreek and friends, and maybe even the 3rd hour as well. )

Sure, and this is the point at which I find myself completely out of my depth, a situation I described in my OP. Despite the brevity of my response I am absorbing the things you’re saying, I just feel that my background in philosophy isn’t nearly where it needs to be in order to add anything meaningful to this conversation from here. I’m a very slow reader so it’s unlikely that I will be reading books on this subject anytime soon, but are there any videos or audiobooks exploring all sides of this you’d recommend?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Sure, and this is the point at which I find myself completely out of my depth, a situation I described in my OP. Despite the brevity of my response I am absorbing the things you’re saying, I just feel that my background in philosophy isn’t nearly where it needs to be in order to add anything meaningful to this conversation from here. I’m a very slow reader so it’s unlikely that I will be reading books on this subject anytime soon, but are there any videos or audiobooks exploring all sides of this you’d recommend?

Videos that explore all sides? I'd like to see that myself. I'm not sure there are, but I'll see what I can dig up. In the meantime, I'll continue reviewing the PineCreek video. If anything, I'm learning some specifics about Matt Dillahunty's 'sound epistemology' that I hadn't been "in the know" about before.

 

[gaara4158]

Videos that explore all sides? I'd like to see that myself. I'm not sure there are, but I'll see what I can dig up. In the meantime, I'll continue reviewing the PineCreek video. If anything, I'm learning some specifics about Matt Dillahunty's 'sound epistemology' that I hadn't been "in the know" about before.

Yeah, Matt believes that Hume is the be-all-end-all of epistemology, but I’ve never seen him go through and explain why. I’ve never seen any theist vs. atheist debate get deep into epistemology (besides presuppositionalism, I guess) and I’ve never heard anyone put it quite like you did. That’s why I’m interested to hear what more there is to understand about all the different forms of epistemology and the roles they play in a well-founded worldview. All the stock arguments we usually see in professional atheist vs. theist debates skip right past epistemology and go straight into their arguments, often encountering the pitfalls I’ve described.

 

[HitchSlap]

Yeah, Matt believes that Hume is the be-all-end-all of epistemology, but I’ve never seen him go through and explain why. I’ve never seen any theist vs. atheist debate get deep into epistemology (besides presuppositionalism, I guess) and I’ve never heard anyone put it quite like you did. That’s why I’m interested to hear what more there is to understand about all the different forms of epistemology and the roles they play in a well-founded worldview. All the stock arguments we usually see in professional atheist vs. theist debates skip right past epistemology and go straight into their arguments, often encountering the pitfalls I’ve described.

Tom Jump just had a decent discussion with Eric Hernandez on epist/ont.

 

[gaara4158]

Tom Jump just had a decent discussion with Eric Hernandez on epist/ont.

Nice! I’ll check that out.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yeah, Matt believes that Hume is the be-all-end-all of epistemology, but I’ve never seen him go through and explain why.

I agree with Matt that Hume is substantive, but I wouldn't say that Hume's views are the be-all-end-all of epistemological inquiry. And from what I've seen so far of the discussion in the PineCreek video alone, up and through the first hours and a half (...I'm at 1:30 now), there doesn't appear to be a 'perfect' epistemological agreement among the atheists therein.

I’ve never seen any theist vs. atheist debate get deep into epistemology (besides presuppositionalism, I guess) and I’ve never heard anyone put it quite like you did.

Most likely, our finding a debate that goes ultra-deeply into epistemology will be a very rare occurrence. The reason why is because it would take more time that the typical debate time will allow, and such a level of discussion would more or less require an entire course to even venture through just to become familiar with the various positions, explanations, and discussions involving conflicting issues among the various positions.

As for your not having 'heard' what I've shared, that probably because the field of Philosophical Hermeneutics is a relatively 'newer' position in the ongoing discussion ...

That’s why I’m interested to hear what more there is to understand about all the different forms of epistemology and the roles they play in a well-founded worldview. All the stock arguments we usually see in professional atheist vs. theist debates skip right past epistemology and go straight into their arguments, often encountering the pitfalls I’ve described.

Yes, and that shortcoming in depth likely won't be put to an end any time soon since there is some level of political drive pushing each of the respective epistemic polarities between the Atheists/Skeptics on one side and the more Fundamentalistic Christian view of Apologetics on the other other side.

I've attempted to find either a free video or free audio-book that treats this 'comprehensively,' I'm still looking. On my part, I'll just say that my position isn't drawn strictly from 'one source' but is rather a conglomeration of various sources that I've found, contemplated, and drawn together through the years. But, I'll keep looking. As an alternative, I probably could offer you various individual video sources, but you'd have to understand that this avenue of exploration comes in 'pieces,' some of which may be kind of dry in places.

I thought it was interesting how PineCreek admitted that he thought part of the problem is that there the different assumptions on each side seem to be due to different worldviews, a comment that ties into the thrust of what you've said in your OP.

So, at this point, I'm still working on getting through the video. Have you had any thoughts on all of this over the past day or two that have made you question further the epistemological positions presented in the PineCreek video (even that of Matt Dillahunty)?