ToHoldNothing
Well-Known Member
- May 26, 2010
- 1,730
- 33
- Faith
- Buddhist
- Marital Status
- In Relationship
- Politics
- US-Libertarian
How is my statement above a "red herring"? My response above was to your rather off-point remark about empathy/sympathy being one possible source for an atheist's morality. This may be a source for an atheist's morality, but this doesn't change or challenge my observation that the source for an atheist's morality creates serious problems in asserting that morality in the public sphere. Whether it is empathy or some other source, an atheist's morality has no objective, universally-authoritative grounding.
The misuse or lack of empathy/sympathy does not suggest that it cannot have a proper use. And objectively, it makes sense that empathy/sympathy works as an ethical/moral principle, universally. Difficulties do not imply that it is useless, only that it requires us to think on it deeper. You seem to purposely define an objective, universally authoritative grounding in such a way that it can only apply to God,which is a tautology and hardly conducive to a genuine discussion. Can you justify your defining this type of moral grounding in such a way through an argument?
Again, you fail to argue this beyond a presumption that a lack of God belief implies the impossibility of affirming an objective moral principle that happens to not involve God belief, but nonetheless a belief in an objective principle for ethical behavior.Morality may be applied in a subjective way, but for a Christian at least, his morality is obtained from an objective, universally-authoritative Source (God). Actually, this is true for all the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity). An atheist cannot anchor his morality to any such source.
Difference can imply they are superior or inferior by comparison, but only in regard to a particular principle of what is considered ethical objectively. I don't claim to have a perfect ethics, only an ethics that is accessible.And this is the problem with not being able to ground one's morality in anything objective and universally-authoritative: When different moralities clash, it is not possible to assert that one is better than another, only that they are different from each other.
This is your understanding of morality. It rests upon the practice of virtue (whatever you mean by that) and "getting along reasonably with other people." Other people, however, take different views on what constitutes morality. Who is to say yours is better? On what basis can you assert that your morality is binding upon others? You have no greater authority as a human being than the next person.
It's not always about who says which is better, it's about what demonstrates which is better. If my ethics involves treating people as they wish to be treated then it follows that an ethics that doesn't involve treating people as they wish to be treated would lead to more problems and general conflicts that didn't need to exist. I'm not invoking myself as an authority in my ethics, I'm invoking a principle that can be considered logically and applied to ethical situations as the authority in a consideration of ethics and morality.
Personal gratification as qualified to the exclusion of the consideration of the gratification of others is dangerous in a logical consideration of merely the consequences, let alone the conflict of the intent and motive with a principle that enables people to benefit both themselves and others more often than not. If people just followed their own self directed desires, they would no doubt cause people to suffer losses beyond what can naturally occur, people would therefore become less likely to survive and even feel a need to live, and thus society would crumble by virtue of the innate authoritarian structure that only preserves itself by destroying others.So what? Why is the reduction of suffering something to be valued? Why shouldn't personal gratification take precedence over avoiding causing unnecessary suffering for another? One can, from an atheistic standpoint, make a good argument that personal gratification should be the prime directive of a person's life.
Explaining why something is bad does in part imply explaining what the act is in contrast to other acts that are considered acceptable. Two people having consensual sex is distinct from one person raping another in non consensual sex. The distinction of consent is the principle whereby we see that one act is innately bad because it ignores the other person's natural requirement to assent to an act upon their person which is how we have civil involvement with each other, not just in terms of sexual acts, but through economic or leisurely activities as well.You explain why rape is bad by explaining what rape entails. This is like explaining how a murder was done by explaining what murder is. This is a kind of circular reasoning, which fails to justify why rape is, in fact, bad or immoral. You are asserting that rape is bad by asserting that "might makes right" and "over-riding a person's choice and consent" are bad. What you have yet to do, however, is establish why the things you are asserting here are, in fact, bad. You appear to assume a priori that they are.
What gives me the right is the basic consideration that they do more harm than good in an overall consideration. I never said the fact that we come into being in a way that, I never actually said was mindless impersonal, mechanical or amoral, may very well be amoral implies that we should behave as if morality doesn't exist. Morality is something implied within human interactions. It's commonly called the social contract theory. Basically, it says that in order for society to persevere, we have to accept that we have basic rules in place in order that society does not collapse.Again, you're taking it as a given that genocide, stealing, murder, etc are bad. What gives you the right to do so? How can you as an atheist who believes that everything has come into being through mindless, impersonal mechanical, and amoral natural processes assert some basic, over-arching morality? Please show me how such impersonal, amoral processes can manufacture morality.
I never denied we could see possible consequences, but one cannot have absolute certainty that those possibilities will be actualized.But this doesn't mean that there are no potential outcomes of a particular ethic that can be anticipated. Not being able to see all possible consequences of adopting a particular ethical code does not mean one cannnot see any possible consequences.
Future results as a secondary consideration commonly, not the primary consideration of their present results as far as the present is considered in a progressing state of time and not things that are far into the eventual progression of time, such as a year from now or even a month from now. The effect I have on a person by helping them take their groceries home is not done primarily because I think of what will happen a year from now,but because it makes sense to help someone if you have the capacity to aid them.Nonsense. Keeping an eye on the future doesn't lessen one's participation in the present. Not at all. For example, the anticipation of heaven, for a Christian, heightens their involvement in the here-and-now because their present righteous living has a direct bearing on the future rewards they can expect in heaven. And this is more or less the case with all moral actions. They are inevitably performed, consciously or unconsciously, with a view to future results.
You're missing my point. A religion perseveres because people see it as compelling and thus the fact that some people choose to take it to political extremes and die as a result does not negate that the religion will persist because people find it so compelling that it makes a person so courageous in the face of death in relation to the martyr exampleThere is no religion if its believers are all dead! LOL! There is no more "functional" a consideration than whether or not one's beliefs are fatal! LOL!
Perhaps I should qualify as I tried above that functionality of a religion is moreso how compelling it is to a potential believer. In no way is the functionality of a religion defined as to how much it enables a believer to stay alive, since clearly martyrdom is always a possibility when the religion involves such an explicit belief in an afterlife that is blissful (72 virgins, hm?). People flocked to the Christian faith for the same reason people flock to it now; it functions as a compelling worldview for people who feel that everything else is inadequate for their feelings of anomie.How does a faith that at its inception often resulted in one's death gain any traction with people? It is obvious that a horrible death is not a selling point for a religion. So, why were people flocking to the Christian faith even though they ran the very serious risk of being eaten by lions or burned at the stake? Clearly, their prime concern wasn't the religion's "functionality."
Their rationale doesn't necessarily benefit anyone but themselves. I can argue how an ethics of sympathy/empathy benefits everyone within a society in a similar way I can argue for a social contract ethics. If we don't behave in a somewhat empathetic/sympathetic way towards people, we run a demonstrable risk of people behaving in violent tendencies to advance their own agendas and desires they feel haven't been adequately recognized.This is why you think your morality is good, but it doesn't explain why others who have a different view of morality should abandon their morality in favor of yours. They can offer a rationale for their view, too.
You seem to ignore howone distinguishes a principle from its practice. Murder can be defined in principle as taking of an innocent life,but it can be qualified in practice to only apply to sentient beings as opposed to when you extend it in qualification to zygotes or such rubbish.Oh no? How are the two practically distinct? If I think murder in principle is wrong, I'm obviously going to think murder in practice is wrong! LOL!
See aboveUh huh. And what does this have to do with the difference between disagreeing in principle and practice?
There's no logical principle underlying that that makes any sense. The time of day I decide I should kill some random person walking down the street doesn't negate the fact that I just decided to violate their right to live, whether I do it at midnight or high noon.My point wasn't concerned with the example, but with the principle underlying it.
They are fused to theism in the sense that they use theism as a basis for the ethics that would otherwise be derived purely from a cultural preference. They invoke this creator deity in order to justify the religious worldview and ethics implied. We have Zoroastrianism, Sikhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Baha'i all invoking some form of the theistic system. On the other hand, we have Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Satanism and Secular Humanism (distinct from Humanism that can be theistic, such as from the Renaissance) that use atheism as the general metaphysical position that their system in some sense relies upon.Please show me how the Abrahamic religions were "fused in" to theism like atheism is fused to naturalism and materialism, or Buddhism and humanism.
We're talking about a descriptive, albeit tentatively so, way to understand a system, not anything that implies particular teachings. Theism only implies a belief in something like a "God" or "god", not anything like Christianity or Judaism or Islam teaches explicitly. Similarly so with Buddhism and Secular Humanism
There are atheistic Christians (a minority) and there are theistic Christians, similarly with atheistic Satanists and theistic Satanists. There are Christian humanists, there are secular humanists.Why not? We understand that they are "formalized systems" distinct from one another by the difference in terms we use to identify and describe them. Atheism is atheism and humanism is humanism.
One gospel does not justify what is a tradition that says that all the gospels are supposed to line up with each other. John doesn't necessarily line up ideally with the other 3.Read the Gospel of John.
In a scripture written by people who believed the same. Where is an objective consideration for why you should call "God" your father in any sense?God calls Himself my Heavenly Father. He doesn't seem to find the title "ridiculous." I think the idea of God being my Heavenly Father carries tremendous meaning. If anything, my understanding of my God is made more concrete and sensible by placing my relationship to Him within a parent-child framework.
Only if you already assume humans are somehow superior in every way shape and form as opposed to having accidental, albeit significant, distinct abilities from domesticated or wild animals, of which we are technically a part of in genus at least. Genus of animals that isThis is silly. Why does this work in only one direction? Why can't calling God my Heavenly Father elevate the human relationship we have with our earthly parents? Why can't I use the perfect example of my Heavenly Father to counteract the bad examples of parenting that exist?
Not purely my preference, but an argument from my observations that empathy and sympathy along with social contract ethics benefits everyone moreso than just authoritatively asserting that you should do it because someone else knows what's best for you, e.g. GodYes, I can. Unlike you, I can anchor my morality to an objective, universally-authoritative Source. All you can ultimately argue for in relation to your morality is your personal preference.
Upvote
0