Omniscience and quantum mechanics

[Wiccan_Child]

Wiccan_Child, do you believe in Spirituality?

That's a rather vague question. I believe spirituality exists in that people can be spiritual. I believe spirituality exists in that all human cultures are inundated with spiritual beliefs and practices.

To be honest, I'm not entirely sure what it is you're asking.

 

[Chesterton]

So what determines morality? To what is a moral label applied? The result, or the act? The means, or the ends?

Morality is deeper than acts and results, or means and ends. Morality is what a man is in his heart, but at that level, it's not really referred to as "morality", more just "what a man is". And that's not just a Christian idea, I could cite ideas from Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Hinduism, etc. for that.

But what determines morality for you as an atheist? I suspect it would have to mean purely results, because what else could it mean? Imagine the scenario again: a man hears that there's a child trapped inside a nearby burning building. For some reason, he rushes toward the building to help the child. While doing so he trips and breaks his ankle, so he can't reach the child in time, and the child dies. The man acheived no results, so he couldn't have done a moral act.

The same scenario, and the man successfully saves the child. You have to say the man was merely obeying his evolutionarily conditioned impulse to preserve some of his species' genes. Nothing moral there.

In either case, for an atheist, there's no morality involved, as traditionally understood. That's why "atheist morality" is a contradiction in terms. "Atheist morality", correctly translated, would mean "obeying behavioral conditioning which cannot help but be obeyed". If biochemical laws dictate what I do, then what I do cannot be called "good"; there is no "good".

True, but the way in which he does it is so convoluted, and the offer is so indistinguishable, that he may as well not offer it at all. We come back to the eternal question: if Christianity is true, why is it no different from all the other religions? If God is willing to interfere as he did when Jesus was born, why not just click his fingers and say "Right, you're all saved. No one's going to Hell, because that place is just nasty"? I don't understand why belief in Jesus is so important. If nothing else, why not save the morally good, rather than just those who were lucky enough to be born into a Christian nation?

Being born into a Christian nation is a help, but is no guarantee of being Christian. Being born in Muslim nation is a hindrance, but is likewise no guarantee. Even if where one is born was completely determinative, God is still in charge of such things.

Being saved requires something on the part of a man. If a man is drowning, there are two things involved in his being saved: someone must extend a rope or a hand, or something to save him, but secondly, the drowning man must accept the rope or the hand which is extended to him. Being saved may involve swallowing some pride. Salvation is only potential salvation if it's unaccepted.

Well, thoughts about things can still be true or false. My thoughts about mathematics may ultimately arise from biochemical reactions in my brain, but that doesn't mean that when I think "1 + 1 = 2", the statement is void of a truth value. The origin of our thoughts doesn't determine whether their true or false; that's determined on our own merits.

It's like saying that Shakespeare wasn't an author because all he did was splash fat and oil onto tree pulp.

I disagree. That our brains are biochemical doesn't change the fact that they can perform science. There is an inherent uncertainty that we're just making it all up as we go along, but that epistemological detail is always there, even if our thoughts are somehow supernaturally 'real'.

I didn't say we couldn't perform science, I said we have no idea if science is true or means anything. You say there's an uncertainty, but I would say it stronger as Haldane did: that if your thinking is pure biochemistry, you have no reason at all to suppose what you think you know is true. I'll grant that there's still an uncertainty even if our thoughts are supernaturally real, but the important point is that, being supernaturally real is the only way our thinking can be true in the way we think and feel it is.

What it means to be human isn't a particularly special thing. What, really, is so good about us?

I didn't say there was anything so good about us, I just said I can't imagine what it's like to be anything else. Although I do say it's special to be human, for what it's worth. Birds are special in that they can fly, but we humans have our own unique traits, such as making art and science, among other things.

I suppose it doesn't actually matter what we believe about Dawkins' beliefs.

True, although I wish we could agree that they are beliefs, so that we don't mistakenly think of them as "findings" or "discoveries".

We can't derive the metaphysical from the physical. And I know you, like others, say you agree with that, and will say that science doesn't do that, but still, it creeps into these types of conversations, just as it forms the foundation of a book like The God Delusion. You tell me you don't positively believe there's a God, or any supernature, because there's no evidence for it. In saying that, you are linking scientific knowledge (or lack of it) to a claim which doesn't depend on scientific knowledge.

How so?

I was intentionally terse because I didn't know if you want to get political, but...I don't like the idea of the State having any but the most basic responsibility for children (their physical well-being). Parents love their children, the State does not love its citizens. Because of love, the goal of a parent will be to raise a good person, whereas the goal of the State will be to raise a good (useful) subject. The difference between a parent and a government is like the difference between a mother hen and a farmer: the mother hen would raise her chicks to be good chickens, the farmer would raise his chicks to be good meals.

Each to their own, I guess. I can't make myself believe something, if only because I don't want to. If I actively lie to myself, I'd be undermining the principles I base my life on, and I don't exactly want to do that .

What principles do you base your life on?

Besides, if we explained the inexplicable with some superstitious fluff, we'd have nothing left to explore. We'd have explained everything.
Science works by acknowledging the gaps. Bunging them up with fluff doesn't advance our knowledge.

You needn't come up with a lie to explain anything, just to feel good. You could still go on exploring everything. If you're just going to exist on Earth for less than a century, you might as well feel good, right? I mean, how can you argue against that - what are you, some kind of Puritan?

I disagree. The naturalist can quite easily say the garden is beautiful without saying that beauty actually exists. He can explain the garden's beauty, he can say why he considers it beautiful, but that doesn't change the fact that, to him, it is beautiful.

I think that's a contradiction. If I say "the ball is red", "red" must actually exist, or else I'm not really saying anything.

If the naturalist explains the garden's beauty in terms of biological evolution and the functioning of vision and neural pathways, he has in fact explained that there is no beauty. After that, saying "the garden is beautiful to me" is the same as saying "I am deluded".

Which refers back to my immediately preceding point above: why don't naturalists make up lies to feel good? Well, in fact, that is what they do. And again, I admire genuine, old school nihilists, who honestly deny all meaning, more than modern atheists who fabricate meaning, who want to have their cake and eat it too.

If we all have this little voice, why do we disagree on what is bad? Why is our concept of morality so very dependant on where we grew up?

Because, with some notable exceptions, exactly what is bad is not really as important as the fact that we all recognize some things are bad. I forget which, but one of the Lewis science fiction books has a character trying to define sin for a race of aliens who have never sinned. The closest he can come is the word "bent". If you think of sin as being bent out of the shape you're supposed to be, it doesn't really matter how you're bent, only that you're bent.

Bare-breasted girls in public in Tahiti are not immoral. Bare-breasted girls in public in England or America would be immoral, because we have different standards of modesty, and it would offend those standards. Having different standards for subsets of morality, is not the same as having altogether different moralities.

The laws of mathematics are more general than that, to the point where quantum mechanics is logically valid. It is common sense, not mathematics, that says something can't be in two places at once. Mathematically, there's no reason why it couldn't be.

Then a God could be in three places at once. Or be three persons at once.

But they can be true or false. Our perception of reality is, at the end of the day, either true or false: either what I see really is what exists, or it isn't. Whether my perception is ultimately spiritual or biochemical doesn't change that fact.

Like what? Name an event or process which can be true or false. If you can't name one other than human thought itself, then on what grounds is the process of human thought so special that it can be what nothing else in reality can be?

Again, the logic of logic is self-evident (and tautologous).

Yep, or so it seems.

I disagree. While it's simply a matter of opinion what exactly is called 'moral' (the act or the intent or what have you), it's not necessarily the case where an attitude 'towards God' will tend towards life, health and happiness. There are a variety of studies that attempt to index happiness and prosperity, and they all tend to show that secularised nations of sceptical atheists cool are the happiest. I think Norway is the top of a lot of happiness tables.

That doesn't mean religious people are necessarily unhappy. But rather, religion doesn't really make someone that much happier.

The only studies I've ever heard of in that regard claimed to show the opposite, that religious people were happier. Be that as it may, I was speaking more of where we are headed eternally, because the primary goal of morality is not temporal happiness, and indeed, doing the right thing is sometimes the most unpleasant thing. Christ said to follow him, we must take up our cross, which is a very unpleasant metaphor. He didn't say following him was all peaches and cream.

 

[98cwitr]

That's a rather vague question. I believe spirituality exists in that people can be spiritual. I believe spirituality exists in that all human cultures are inundated with spiritual beliefs and practices.

To be honest, I'm not entirely sure what it is you're asking.

let me be more specific. Do you believe that a person can be spiritual beyond their own manifestations and perception?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

let me be more specific. Do you believe that a person can be spiritual beyond their own manifestations and perception?

I still don't understand the question. What do you mean by 'spiritual'? That might be where I'm getting confused... but I make no promises .

 

[Jesusfreak93]

I think the prophet Isaiah describes well the ways of God in Chapter 55.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I think the prophet Isaiah describes well the ways of God in Chapter 55.

Isaiah 55:9-10: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways," declares the LORD. "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.

That doesn't really describe them, does it. It just says they're above us, and implies that we don't know them.

 

[98cwitr]

I still don't understand the question. What do you mean by 'spiritual'? That might be where I'm getting confused... but I make no promises .

from dictionary.com

"...of or pertaining to the spirit or soul, as distinguished from the physical nature."

 

[Wiccan_Child]

from dictionary.com

"...of or pertaining to the spirit or soul, as distinguished from the physical nature."

Which doesn't exactly clear up the question, "Do you believe that a person can be spiritual beyond their own manifestations and perception?"

If 'spiritual' is anything that pertains to the spirit or soul, what does it mean to say that a person is spiritual? The definition would imply that the person is 'of or pertaining to the spirit or soul'.

I'm still lost as to what it is you're asking me. What does it mean to say that a person is 'of the spirit'? What do you mean by 'their own manifestations and perception?

 

[heymikey80]

Why not?

I said why not. And you ask?

In any event, the point behind this is that the argument you're making to eliminate pain isn't valid as ethics. But we knew that, in fact it's been known that since the 18th century at least when philosophers determined that emotions were not the basis for ethics.

Which is an entirely subjective opinion, no more valid than my own. To declare it a fact is naïve at best.

No. It's not a subjective opinion, WC, it's an objective conclusion, hundreds of years old. To jump from objective to subjective is a mistake at best. Philosophers noted the difference hundreds of years ago.

May I suggest you try reading something about how ethics got to the Dark Ages it's in today?

None of which can't be achieved without suffering, especially for an omnipotence like God.

So you think omnipotence permits God to avoid suffering.

The premise is that we minimise suffering. If we do something that leads to greater suffering, then how have we minimised suffering?

The premise isn't agreed on.

And I disagree that halting suffering altogether is different from minimising suffering: the former is the logical extreme of the latter.

So you can't simply minimize suffering. You must put people to a non-suffering death throughout the world, because they are all potentially going to suffer -- yet, dead, they certainly shall not suffer.

Go ahead. Perform your prime directive. Kill them all -- however humanely. The ideal of this principle is universal, humane destruction. To me that's not ethical, WC. To me that's entirely unethical. Therefore, I reject this position as inconsistent with the definition of what's good.

Your reasoning rests on the very shaky premise that God should have created. Well, why should he have? As anyone can plainly see, the world is a violent place filled with evil and suffering. If I were an omnipotent being, I would do my best to ensure that no one suffered, but God conspicuously doesn't.

ROFL! No, my reasoning rests on the premise that creation exists. Shaky? Only as shaky as its existence.

It was a kitsch phrase to emphasise a point.

Apparently it's not emphasizing a point you can carry on objective grounds.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

No. It's not a subjective opinion, WC, it's an objective conclusion, hundreds of years old. To jump from objective to subjective is a mistake at best. Philosophers noted the difference hundreds of years ago.

An objective ethical conclusion? God you make me laugh. I said that it is good to minimise suffering. You then said that philosophers have long ago objectively demonstrated that emotions aren't the basis of ethics.
So go on them. Give this demonstration. Show me the proof that my subjective opinion is wrong.

So you think omnipotence permits God to avoid suffering.

Yes. An omnipotent being can do anything within the bounds of logic. If God wants a world without suffering, he need only snap his fingers and click his heels three times.

The premise isn't agreed on.

It's the premise of a hypothetical scenario. It's not something you agree on, it's something that simply is. You presented a scenario in an attempt to show that my minimisation of suffering could in fact lead to more suffering. I the pointed out that if I was minimising suffering.

It's a premise. So long as the premise holds, the conclusion necessarily follows.

So you can't simply minimize suffering. You must put people to a non-suffering death throughout the world, because they are all potentially going to suffer -- yet, dead, they certainly shall not suffer.

Indeed. If there are no humans, there is no pain.

Go ahead. Perform your prime directive. Kill them all -- however humanely. The ideal of this principle is universal, humane destruction. To me that's not ethical, WC. To me that's entirely unethical. Therefore, I reject this position as inconsistent with the definition of what's good.

Inconsistent with your definition. Since my definition is the minimisation of suffering, it's entirely consistent.

ROFL! No, my reasoning rests on the premise that creation exists. Shaky? Only as shaky as its existence.

You said:

"Ah, but there's the point. If minimal suffering is all there is to ethics -- God shouldn't have created. So it's not all there is, there must be ethical motivations beyond and more important than suffering."

You conclude that there is more to ethics than the minimisation of suffering because, if there isn't, God wouldn't have created. Since he did, there is. And therein lie the hidden assumptions: that a) God created, and b) God should have created despite the increase in suffering it caused.

As you may have guessed, I reject both of those premises, so I also reject this as a valid refutation of my argument. Until you can justify those two premises, my argument stands.

 

[heymikey80]

An objective ethical conclusion? God you make me laugh. I said that it is good to minimise suffering. You then said that philosophers have long ago objectively demonstrated that emotions aren't the basis of ethics.
So go on them. Give this demonstration. Show me the proof that my subjective opinion is wrong.

It's not always good to minimize suffering. I've already demonstrated that. Your subjective opinion is therefore wrong. The sole example is plenty. Would you like more?

Laughter in the face of fact demonstrates something else that is ethically undesirable.

Yes. An omnipotent being can do anything within the bounds of logic. If God wants a world without suffering, he need only snap his fingers and click his heels three times.

Can and should are two different things.

A world without suffering does not exist. Therefore, now that I've read your position below -- I'd say the following to your conclusions. You're under the mistaken impression that an ethos exists anyway. I reject that position. Don't come crying to me about your sentimental feelings about suffering, when the reality is that suffering exists. I have no reason to take pity on your emotions, and I have no use for compassion, because your passions will cease with your death, and they only drag me down. That is ultimately the result of breaking the idea of an unmoving ethical center. I've no use for you, and the only thing that would do such is if you were to bully me into it. But that would cause me suffering. So -- the position is inconsistent, again.

In that case the world is simply a playoff of greater and greater powers. Which has no answer to why "should" is even a concept in this world. At best it's a lie. So I'd adjure you on this point, to tell the truth. Of course you can simply lie again, because there's no such thing as "should". But let's face it: meaning disappears on those grounds, as does thought. You're essentially saying everything is useless except whether I can beat you in arm-twisting.

And tying your hands about suffering is kind of silly in that world. Obviously the person who can inflict more suffering should be the winner, because people naturally respond to suffering. Neitszche pointed that one out (more forcefully than other forerunners).

Of course, that was also attempted, in German / European history one time. But maybe humans will try it again? After all, there is ultimately no ethos except the will to power.

It's the premise of a hypothetical scenario. It's not something you agree on, it's something that simply is. You presented a scenario in an attempt to show that my minimisation of suffering could in fact lead to more suffering. I the pointed out that if I was minimising suffering.

No. I presented a scenario in which your attempt to reduce suffering (1) wasn't ethical, and (2) in fact should be considered not a reduction in suffering but may actually increase suffering, and thus should be reconsidered. That is, your attempt was not really an attempt to minimize suffering -- it was an attempt to do something else.

My point is to the inconsistency of what you're saying you'll do. It doesn't actually achieve the purpose you say it does, and therefore your expressed purpose executes a break with reality.

It's a premise. So long as the premise holds, the conclusion necessarily follows.

The reality is that the action doesn't achieve the result.

Indeed. If there are no humans, there is no pain.

I'll try to avoid you in person then.

Inconsistent with your definition. Since my definition is the minimisation of suffering, it's entirely consistent.

Reread the thread.

You said:

"Ah, but there's the point. If minimal suffering is all there is to ethics -- God shouldn't have created. So it's not all there is, there must be ethical motivations beyond and more important than suffering."

You conclude that there is more to ethics than the minimisation of suffering because, if there isn't, God wouldn't have created. Since he did, there is. And therein lie the hidden assumptions: that a) God created, and b) God should have created despite the increase in suffering it caused.

As you may have guessed, I reject both of those premises, so I also reject this as a valid refutation of my argument. Until you can justify those two premises, my argument stands.

To follow your ethos, you'd have to be preparing to wipe life off the face of the earth.

You're not.

Until you can answer that conclusion, my argument is that you're engaging in vacuous thought.

To your issues:

(a) No thing observed to date with the senses is indestructible -- nor in times past has anyone made any assertion its existence extended eternally into the past. You reject that there's a cause to these caused existences. =shrug=. Your position flies in the face of fact. Spontaneous generation, on the other hand, has not been observed nor experienced. Your position is thus based on an unseen phenomenon, one which flies in the face of all experience, and which has no clear mechanism for occurring in reality. Your position is no better supported than a position about God. Why do you hold it, and not a position about God?

The interrelation of caused things points back to something common as their source. Once again, this is largely because it's been observed consistently that things that relate to one another on some grounds, have some causal connection with one another. Their existence in this constructed physical reality, is something they hold in common. Of course, "cause" itself is a malleable term, but ultimately, if such a term is unreal, it has such immense success in the physical world that something like the concept must emerge as real.

So -- the common cause, God, exists.

(b) Your position throughout this discussion has been that there's some kind of principle, some kind of ethos, on which you should be able to influence the thoughts and decisions of others. If it doesn't exist, walk away. If you don't have a position to influence my position from a constant principle of ethics, then your argument collapses in a confusion of inconsistencies. There is no premise of suffering, because there is no premise.

So if you're to talk coherently about ethics, accept ethics as real. Otherwise, lose this part of the argument.

Combine (a) & (b) and you'll see why the ethos must originate with the cause of beings who are ethical. Otherwise, ethical beings wouldn't exist.

So either the ethos doesn't exist, and there's no premise to talk about (so minimizing suffering is excluded as an ethos) -- or the ethos does exist, with God is its originator.

Finally, add the fact, things exist which do not minimize suffering. The actuality of such things would conclude that the ethos does not demand the extinction of suffering. The constant addition of suffering would conclude that the ethos does not demand the minimization of suffering.

So either the ethos doesn't exist; or if it does, it does not demand the minimization of suffering.

The common cause, God, did bring about existence of dependent things. God did originate any true ethos that does exist (that is, that holds the definition of "ethos"). So the point is what? That something a-ethical could come up with something ethical? Y'ever seen that occur? You'll find you never see that. You can't get from a statement of fact to a statement of ethics. There must always be an ethical premise implicit in any argument that concludes with an ethical value. The originator of an ethos is thus ethical.

God's ethical. God did indeed originate a world including and increasing in suffering. That God originated such a world impacts on the real ethos.
​

 

[98cwitr]

Which doesn't exactly clear up the question, "Do you believe that a person can be spiritual beyond their own manifestations and perception?"

If 'spiritual' is anything that pertains to the spirit or soul, what does it mean to say that a person is spiritual? The definition would imply that the person is 'of or pertaining to the spirit or soul'.

I'm still lost as to what it is you're asking me. What does it mean to say that a person is 'of the spirit'? What do you mean by 'their own manifestations and perception?

do you believe that you yourself possess a spirit or soul? Spirituality is the recognition of such possession (imu).

 

[Wiccan_Child]

do you believe that you yourself possess a spirit or soul?

As I understand the terms, no, I do not believe I have a spirit or soul.

Spirituality is the recognition of such possession (imu).

There are certainly people that believe they have a spirit or soul, so people can be spiritual in that sense.

 

[heymikey80]

As I understand the terms, no, I do not believe I have a spirit or soul.

Might I ask -- what's your definition of "life"? In general does it have any ultimate value?

Same question about love, relationship, good, reality, thought, will, truth, meaning (hm, and with it, reason). Just about everything that doesn't derive or statistically build from the five senses.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

It's not always good to minimize suffering. I've already demonstrated that. Your subjective opinion is therefore wrong.

Which is a logically fallacy. I've defined 'good' to be the minimisation of suffering.
Besides, I've yet to see any demonstration that the minimisation of suffering is not always good.

Can and should are two different things.

Which begs the question: why shouldn't he?

No. I presented a scenario in which your attempt to reduce suffering (1) wasn't ethical, and (2) in fact should be considered not a reduction in suffering but may actually increase suffering, and thus should be reconsidered. That is, your attempt was not really an attempt to minimize suffering -- it was an attempt to do something else.

My point is to the inconsistency of what you're saying you'll do. It doesn't actually achieve the purpose you say it does, and therefore your expressed purpose executes a break with reality.

No, you simply asserted that it wasn't ethical. You may no attempt to justify that claim.
Moreover, since we take the option that minimises suffering, how can you criticise it for increasing suffering? By definition, suffering has gone down, not up. If the action taking ultimately increases suffering, then quite clearly suffering has not gone down, and the action is immoral.
Finally, I never once said that it's a practical moral code. Any idiot can see that we don't know the full repercussions of an action; saving a child could lead to the death of millions.

However, it doesn't matter that it's impractical for us, because we're not talking about us: we're talking about God, who does know the full repercussions.

The reality is that the action doesn't achieve the result.

The action is whichever action minimises suffering. Therefore, it necessarily does achieve the result.

Your scenario was thus:

"It's all theory to you until you confront someone intent on inflicting great suffering -- maybe yours -- and you let him, because to stop him would cause him to suffer a little. Or a lot. Who knows."

You said that I let him inflict great suffering. But would I? By the ethics I've espoused, why would I let him do something that would ultimately increase suffering? I would do whatever action minimises suffering.

Reread the thread.

I have. What's your point?

To follow your ethos, you'd have to be preparing to wipe life off the face of the earth.

You're not.

Really? Where did I said that, exactly?

Might I ask -- what's your definition of "life"?

Any metabolic descendant of a metabolic replicator.

In general does it have any ultimate value?

Same question about love, relationship, good, reality, thought, will, truth, meaning (hm, and with it, reason). Just about everything that doesn't derive or statistically build from the five senses.

Any ultimate value? What do you mean by that?

 

[98cwitr]

As I understand the terms, no, I do not believe I have a spirit or soul.


There are certainly people that believe they have a spirit or soul, so people can be spiritual in that sense.

thank you, you have answered my question...sorry for the confusion(s).

 

[Wiccan_Child]

thank you, you have answered my question...sorry for the confusion(s).

We got there in the end .

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Morality is deeper than acts and results, or means and ends. Morality is what a man is in his heart, but at that level, it's not really referred to as "morality", more just "what a man is". And that's not just a Christian idea, I could cite ideas from Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Hinduism, etc. for that.

But what determines morality for you as an atheist? I suspect it would have to mean purely results, because what else could it mean? Imagine the scenario again: a man hears that there's a child trapped inside a nearby burning building. For some reason, he rushes toward the building to help the child. While doing so he trips and breaks his ankle, so he can't reach the child in time, and the child dies. The man acheived no results, so he couldn't have done a moral act.

He tried to save the child, which is a moral act. Had he actually saved the child, his act would be more moral. This can be concluded from either my arbitrary, relativistic moral code, or from evolutionary principles.

The same scenario, and the man successfully saves the child. You have to say the man was merely obeying his evolutionarily conditioned impulse to preserve some of his species' genes. Nothing moral there.

Unless I define that as being moral. Who's to say I'm wrong?

In either case, for an atheist, there's no morality involved, as traditionally understood. That's why "atheist morality" is a contradiction in terms. "Atheist morality", correctly translated, would mean "obeying behavioral conditioning which cannot help but be obeyed". If biochemical laws dictate what I do, then what I do cannot be called "good"; there is no "good".

But as you said, there's not traditional morality. Atheists still have their own understanding of what 'morality' means.

Being born into a Christian nation is a help, but is no guarantee of being Christian. Being born in Muslim nation is a hindrance, but is likewise no guarantee. Even if where one is born was completely determinative, God is still in charge of such things.

Being saved requires something on the part of a man. If a man is drowning, there are two things involved in his being saved: someone must extend a rope or a hand, or something to save him, but secondly, the drowning man must accept the rope or the hand which is extended to him. Being saved may involve swallowing some pride. Salvation is only potential salvation if it's unaccepted.

And salvation isn't salvation at all if the offer is hidden among false offers. The way I see it is this: I'm in a room with a hundred people. One person says the room is on a boat, the boat is sinking, and I must go with him to the lifeboats. Someone else says that the room is in a plane, and I must put on his parachute. Another person says that the room is actually in a house that's on fire, and I must run with him through the basement exit. There are also people who say that the room is just fine and we're in no danger. And to top it off, most of the people offering salvation () refuse to help me if I accept the help of someone else. The man with the parachute will only help me if I reject the lifeboat-man's offer, for example.

So, while salvation is being offer, it's hidden among the reeds. If God isn't going to make it at least clear what must be done in order to accept salvation, I think I'm justified in called the system decidedly unfair.

I didn't say we couldn't perform science, I said we have no idea if science is true or means anything. You say there's an uncertainty, but I would say it stronger as Haldane did: that if your thinking is pure biochemistry, you have no reason at all to suppose what you think you know is true. I'll grant that there's still an uncertainty even if our thoughts are supernaturally real, but the important point is that, being supernaturally real is the only way our thinking can be true in the way we think and feel it is.

I disagree that it's the only way, and that it even constitutes a way itself. But in any case, if my thinking is pure biochemistry, I still have my thoughts. Wherever they came from, they're there. I have to work from them. You have to do the same. We cannot know where they came from, not with any certainty.

I didn't say there was anything so good about us, I just said I can't imagine what it's like to be anything else. Although I do say it's special to be human, for what it's worth. Birds are special in that they can fly, but we humans have our own unique traits, such as making art and science, among other things.

True, we seem to be unique at that.

True, although I wish we could agree that they are beliefs, so that we don't mistakenly think of them as "findings" or "discoveries".

We can't derive the metaphysical from the physical. And I know you, like others, say you agree with that, and will say that science doesn't do that, but still, it creeps into these types of conversations, just as it forms the foundation of a book like The God Delusion. You tell me you don't positively believe there's a God, or any supernature, because there's no evidence for it. In saying that, you are linking scientific knowledge (or lack of it) to a claim which doesn't depend on scientific knowledge.

The claim doesn't depend on scientific knowledge, but it's still a claim that's subject to scientific scrutiny. It's not my fault if it fails science's standards.

I was intentionally terse because I didn't know if you want to get political, but...I don't like the idea of the State having any but the most basic responsibility for children (their physical well-being). Parents love their children, the State does not love its citizens. Because of love, the goal of a parent will be to raise a good person, whereas the goal of the State will be to raise a good (useful) subject. The difference between a parent and a government is like the difference between a mother hen and a farmer: the mother hen would raise her chicks to be good chickens, the farmer would raise his chicks to be good meals.

I think that's a rather pessimistic view of the State. Ultimately, it's just made up of people. If the State didn't love people, why do the social services exist?

What principles do you base your life on?

Freedom is paramount, infringement of free will is immoral, suffering is immoral, etc.

You needn't come up with a lie to explain anything, just to feel good. You could still go on exploring everything. If you're just going to exist on Earth for less than a century, you might as well feel good, right? I mean, how can you argue against that - what are you, some kind of Puritan?

Oh, I'm all for pleasure and hedonism. But I'm also for the pursuit of knowledge. And if I want to continue in that pursuit, I have to remain objective.

I think that's a contradiction. If I say "the ball is red", "red" must actually exist, or else I'm not really saying anything.

I disagree. You're describing the ball, not affirming that 'red' exists as a physical object.

Because, with some notable exceptions, exactly what is bad is not really as important as the fact that we all recognize some things are bad. I forget which, but one of the Lewis science fiction books has a character trying to define sin for a race of aliens who have never sinned. The closest he can come is the word "bent". If you think of sin as being bent out of the shape you're supposed to be, it doesn't really matter how you're bent, only that you're bent.

Bare-breasted girls in public in Tahiti are not immoral. Bare-breasted girls in public in England or America would be immoral, because we have different standards of modesty, and it would offend those standards. Having different standards for subsets of morality, is not the same as having altogether different moralities.

I can understand that we all have a concept of 'bad', but what you've described is moral relativism: what actually constitutes immoral behaviour varies from place to place. A moral objectivist would say that topless women are immoral, and that's that; cultural norms and taboos don't come into it.

Then a God could be in three places at once. Or be three persons at once.

Sure. But if God is three people at once, then those three people must necessarily be each other at once. Identity is reflexive.

Like what? Name an event or process which can be true or false. If you can't name one other than human thought itself, then on what grounds is the process of human thought so special that it can be what nothing else in reality can be?

God's existence. Either it's true (God exists) or it's false (God doesn't exist). The nature of our perception is irrelevant.

The only studies I've ever heard of in that regard claimed to show the opposite, that religious people were happier. Be that as it may, I was speaking more of where we are headed eternally, because the primary goal of morality is not temporal happiness, and indeed, doing the right thing is sometimes the most unpleasant thing. Christ said to follow him, we must take up our cross, which is a very unpleasant metaphor. He didn't say following him was all peaches and cream.

So what, to you, does it mean to be moral? What is the end result of morality?

 

[heymikey80]

Which is a logically fallacy. I've defined 'good' to be the minimisation of suffering.

Defining a word to mean something it doesn't is the logical fallacy.

Sorry, y'can't redefine a category of philosophy to mean something you happen to want it to mean. People have tried that numerous times; it's just trying to blind oneself to the problem of ethics.

Besides, I've yet to see any demonstration that the minimisation of suffering is not always good.

Chicks die when you minimize their suffering. Fairly promptly, in fact.

Minimize the suffering of someone recovering from a crash or limb surgery and you incapacitate them for the rest of their lives.

Minimize the suffering of a serial killer and you free him to kill again, and quite possibly supply him with victims.

The position is gone.

Which begs the question: why shouldn't he?

Because suffering is not an undesirable end to itself.

No, you simply asserted that it wasn't ethical. You may no attempt to justify that claim.

See above, now reiterated for ya. It's not ethical, unless you believe that disabling people is good, that killing beings is good, that alleviating a murderer's murderous suffering is good.

Moreover, since we take the option that minimises suffering, how can you criticise it for increasing suffering? By definition, suffering has gone down, not up. If the action taking ultimately increases suffering, then quite clearly suffering has not gone down, and the action is immoral.

As your point about it being a practical moral code you're attacking on your own, you know that's how I can criticize it. By definition the suffering has not gone down, and the morality of the action is thus questionable -- unless it's extreme.

Finally, I never once said that it's a practical moral code. Any idiot can see that we don't know the full repercussions of an action; saving a child could lead to the death of millions.

Ah, but it is practical in the extreme instance.

However, it doesn't matter that it's impractical for us, because we're not talking about us: we're talking about God, who does know the full repercussions.

But if you're not operating toward this singular good, then why expect anyone else to? A principle unapplied is not a principle: it's a fond thought.

I pointed out your definition is not reasoned-out from even a minimal understanding of ethics. The principle of "least suffering" doesn't qualify as the greatest good; it certainly doesn't qualify as the only good. If only qualifies as good, when other goods are not affected (e.g., life extension, health improvement in the cases above). So it falters as the sole definitive ethical principle.

The action is whichever action minimises suffering. Therefore, it necessarily does achieve the result.

Stacked deck. Sufferers exist; they wouldn't have existed if no thing existed; therefore suffering would've been minimized if no thing existed. Yet sufferers exist.

Your scenario was thus:

"It's all theory to you until you confront someone intent on inflicting great suffering -- maybe yours -- and you let him, because to stop him would cause him to suffer a little. Or a lot. Who knows."

You said that I let him inflict great suffering. But would I? By the ethics I've espoused, why would I let him do something that would ultimately increase suffering? I would do whatever action minimises suffering.

Well, in this case I doubt you would take matters into your own hands, if the suffering were yours, or if there were a greater risk to yourself.

It also clearly emerges that we're not talking about "seeking its own level" kind of minimization, right? You're asserting you act to minimize suffering overall now, not just the suffering you stumble over, immediately at hand?

I have. What's your point?

Your definition is self-inconsistent.

Really? Where did I said that, exactly?

Which assertion?

Any metabolic descendant of a metabolic replicator.

To what extent? One-celled organisms, multicellular, conscious?

Are we talking about suffering on any relative scale with respect to different life forms?

Any ultimate value? What do you mean by that?

A final, total, fundamental, and/or conclusive value in its existence.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Defining a word to mean something it doesn't is the logical fallacy.

Of course I can. I can define a word to mean whatever I want.

Sorry, y'can't redefine a category of philosophy to mean something you happen to want it to mean. People have tried that numerous times; it's just trying to blind oneself to the problem of ethics.

... seriously?

I think you need to take another look at linguistics. A word can mean whatever you want it to mean. I can define anything to mean whatever I want. Ayn Rand defined the word 'axiom' to fit her philosophy, while mathematicians define the word 'axiom' to mean something else.

Chicks die when you minimize their suffering. Fairly promptly, in fact.

Minimize the suffering of someone recovering from a crash or limb surgery and you incapacitate them for the rest of their lives.

Minimize the suffering of a serial killer and you free him to kill again, and quite possibly supply him with victims.

In the first case, you presume that the death of the chick is immoral. Why?
In the second case, the incapacitation of a person is an increase in suffering; suffering is minimised by giving them (say) working limbs. How is that immoral?
In the third case, minimising the suffering of the serial killer isn't the only factor: he is causing suffering to others. By minimising his suffering, there is a net increase in suffering; thus, suffering has not been minimised.

The axiom is to minimise suffering. This doesn't mean minimising suffering for one particular person at the expense of everyone else.

Because suffering is not an undesirable end to itself.

I disagree. It serves no unique purpose other than to worsen our lives. As an end unto itself, it is a very bad one. This is pretty much why Hell is envisioned to be a place of eternal suffering: because suffering is bad.

See above, now reiterated for ya. It's not ethical, unless you believe that disabling people is good, that killing beings is good, that alleviating a murderer's murderous suffering is good.

If suffering is minimised, then I believe it is good. Euthanasia is an example of where I think death is moral. Disabling people, on the other hand, gives them great suffering, so how can it be considered to be minimising suffering?

Ah, but it is practical in the extreme instance.

Except it's not: how do you painlessly exterminate everyone?

But if you're not operating toward this singular good, then why expect anyone else to? A principle unapplied is not a principle: it's a fond thought.

I disagree. A principle is a principle even if it's unworkable. Idealism is basing your life on principles, instead of pragmatic compromises thereof.

I pointed out your definition is not reasoned-out from even a minimal understanding of ethics. The principle of "least suffering" doesn't qualify as the greatest good; it certainly doesn't qualify as the only good. If only qualifies as good, when other goods are not affected (e.g., life extension, health improvement in the cases above). So it falters as the sole definitive ethical principle.

All of which I've discussed above. Your attempts to counter my principle stem from a) a misunderstanding of the principle, and b) a conflation of our separate definitions of the word 'good'.
'Least suffering' doesn't qualify as the greatest good only if you have a different definition of 'good' to me. To me, 'least suffering' is the greatest good. That's my very definition of 'good'.

Stacked deck. Sufferers exist; they wouldn't have existed if no thing existed; therefore suffering would've been minimized if no thing existed. Yet sufferers exist.

Agreed, though it's worth pointing out that suffering would also be minimised if no living creature felt suffering; we could still exist, just without suffering.

Well, in this case I doubt you would take matters into your own hands, if the suffering were yours, or if there were a greater risk to yourself.

It also clearly emerges that we're not talking about "seeking its own level" kind of minimization, right? You're asserting you act to minimize suffering overall now, not just the suffering you stumble over, immediately at hand?

It is better to minimise suffering overall rather than suffering locally, when the two contradict each other.

Your definition is self-inconsistent.

Only with your definitions, which shouldn't be a surprise.

Which assertion?

That doesn't answer my question. Where did I say I would not be prepared to end life on Earth?

To what extent? One-celled organisms, multicellular, conscious?

All are instances of life if they are metabolic.

Are we talking about suffering on any relative scale with respect to different life forms?

Ostensibly not, though different organisms have different capacities to suffer. It is doubtful that a sponge can feel anything, while it is undeniable that a dog feels pain.

A final, total, fundamental, and/or conclusive value in its existence.

Not as far as I can tell. Nothing we do, nothing that exists or could exist, really matters. Nothing we do has any ultimate effect, insofar as there is no 'ultimate effect' than can be effected.