Neurologist outlines why machines can’t think

[Silmarien]

Right, and is your Vedic conception of Intellect compatible with self-conscious AI on the supposition that Intellect is necessary for self-consciousness? I am not too familiar with Hinduism. What precisely about the Western tradition of Intellect do you find lacking?

I kind of think the entire Western tradition was destroyed by Descartes, whose influence stretches both backwards and forwards so that it is very difficult to approach the mind conceptually without falling into his categories.

One of my major problems is the lack of clarity over what we mean by materialism and immaterialism. People can say that such-and-such is the product of materialistic processes, but can we reduce any process to a pure material cause? It seems to me that materialism either morphs into hylomorphism or collapses into a very odd sort of nihilism. (Actually, if they were not allergic to pre-modern philosophy, the dialectical materialists could probably run with this and look at prime matter as pure potentiality pulling itself into existence.)

With this in mind, what is Intellect? It seems physical to me in that it can probably be reduced to the way that the brain processes information, but at the same time, information processing in general seems to be strongly immaterial in nature--more so than other processes, certainly.

I probably am a hylomorphist of some shape or form, but the West's tendency to see Intellect as something uniquely immaterial troubles me. I agree with the Vedic tradition that the only thing that is truly immaterial is the light of awareness itself (though I disagree with them that this is the self).

I will have to read more about panpsychism. Is it more than a mere solution to 'the interaction problem'?

I think so, yes. They seem to be mostly materialists who jumped ship but are still trying to figure out how to naturalize the mind.

I've noticed that as well. Presumably you also find them both lacking. What do you think it means? Does it present a case for some kind of dualism?

A kind of dualism, yes, though the ones that I would sign onto are the God/world, God/self, and world/self dualisms, which usually go without saying in the West but are less well regarded in the East. Perhaps this eventually collapses into a mind/body dualism, but I haven't been convinced of that so far.

I agree, but are naturalists in the habit of claiming that we are evolutionarily unequipped? Maybe they should be, but that's beside my question.

Actually, the New Mysterians are! Their argument is that the human brain is not evolved enough to solve certain problems, and that consciousness is one of them. It has a nice, neat naturalistic solution, but we may never know what it is!

Yet I really admire your intellectual verve and it's fun to revisit such things. Further, my question about Neoplatonism was inevitably related to my current interests, as it tends to implicate mysticism more than Aristotelianism and Scholasticism do.

Fun for me too. I think you're the only Thomist around here... or at least the only one that ever emerges from the Catholic subforum. I remembered seeing one a while ago, but I'm pretty sure now that it was you.

But yeah, Neoplatonism is pretty major when it comes to mysticism.

 

[zippy2006]

I just want to begin with the disclaimer that you have a more recent and comprehensive sense of philosophy of mind than I do.

I kind of think the entire Western tradition was destroyed by Descartes, whose influence stretches both backwards and forwards so that it is very difficult to approach the mind conceptually without falling into his categories.

One of my major problems is the lack of clarity over what we mean by materialism and immaterialism. People can say that such-and-such is the product of materialistic processes, but can we reduce any process to a pure material cause? It seems to me that materialism either morphs into hylomorphism or collapses into a very odd sort of nihilism. (Actually, if they were not allergic to pre-modern philosophy, the dialectical materialists could probably run with this and look at prime matter as pure potentiality pulling itself into existence.)

I think I understand what you are saying with the morphing into hylomorphism, but what do you mean by the "odd sort of nihilism"?

Here's a fun quote, "...In short, the Marxist position amounts to a formal identification of matter and privation. Dialectical materialism subscribes to the Platonic error" (Connell, Matter and Becoming, 168). Granted, I hope it doesn't pique your interest too much because I haven't read that book in a long time.

With this in mind, what is Intellect? It seems physical to me in that it can probably be reduced to the way that the brain processes information, but at the same time, information processing in general seems to be strongly immaterial in nature--more so than other processes, certainly.

I probably am a hylomorphist of some shape or form, but the West's tendency to see Intellect as something uniquely immaterial troubles me. I agree with the Vedic tradition that the only thing that is truly immaterial is the light of awareness itself (though I disagree with them that this is the self).

Fair enough. I don't have any big problems with the immateriality of the intellect despite the fact that I probably haven't explored the topic in the same depth that you have. The Cartesian paradigm is hard to shake, and the pieces don't all fit together perfectly, but I find hylomorphism largely satisfying.

(Relatedly, Feser's most recent blog post links to a lecture he gave on the immateriality of the mind, but it is largely introductory in nature.)

A kind of dualism, yes, though the ones that I would sign onto are the God/world, God/self, and world/self dualisms, which usually go without saying in the West but are less well regarded in the East. Perhaps this eventually collapses into a mind/body dualism, but I haven't been convinced of that so far.

I should have been more clear: I was referring to a softer mind-body dualism than Cartesian dualism, such as hylomorphism. Some philosophers accuse hylomorphists of dualism. Since it's tricky to untangle that issue completely, I am somewhat comfortable calling it 'soft' dualism--whatever that means!

At times I've wondered if the problematic parallels between reductive idealism and reductive materialism just point to the truth of some kind of dualism (world/self at the least, but probably matter/thought). But having a skeptical inclination myself, I don't often go swimming in the ontological depths.

Actually, the New Mysterians are! Their argument is that the human brain is not evolved enough to solve certain problems, and that consciousness is one of them. It has a nice, neat naturalistic solution, but we may never know what it is!

I'm willing to grant this for the sake of argument, but what percentage of naturalists are New Mysterians?

On the other hand you said:

Though it was actually New Mysterianism that made me stop wondering if I was missing something as far naturalism was concerned--if you're going to simultaneously hold that we are evolutionarily unequipped to tackle the question of consciousness and that it must have a naturalistic explanation, we are clearly into the realm of dogma.

This made me infer that New Mysterianism shied away from a naturalistic explanation being necessary. If that's so, can they really be called thoroughgoing naturalists?

Fun for me too. I think you're the only Thomist around here... or at least the only one that ever emerges from the Catholic subforum. I remembered seeing one a while ago, but I'm pretty sure now that it was you.

There is a lot of casual interest in Thomas on the forum but most of it doesn't reach into foundations. I am happy to be called a Thomist but I am not as strict as some, such as the so-called "Thomists of the Strict Observance." Early in my philosophy courses I was skeptical of the Thomist environment and took up a Scotistic thesis in a formal disputation just to spite the Thomists! ...But yeah, the weathered old-hand Thomists eventually converted me after much wailing and gnashing of tooth.

 

[Silmarien]

I think I understand what you are saying with the morphing into hylomorphism, but what do you mean by the "odd sort of nihilism"?

The only Marxist I've read is Slavoj Zizek, who had a bit of a wild debate with Anglican theologian John Milbank. I don't have it anymore, since I gave it to my Episcopal priest, but it was a lot of Hegelian materialism. He was pretty explicitly trying to collapse his materialism into some sort of scientific nihilism where matter is actually non-existent, because anything else was mysticism. Insert half a dozen Marxist slurs about any other approach. Like I said, it was wild.

(Relatedly, Feser's most recent blog post links to a lecture he gave on the immateriality of the mind, but it is largely introductory in nature.)

Yes, I saw! Haven't watched it yet, but I'll have to. What I'd like to see is a Thomist with a background in cognitive science address the issue, because I'm not sure how to square the philosophy with modern neuroscience. There are people out there who do physics or biology from a Thomistic perspective, but this is something I haven't come across before.

Speaking of Feser, there was an extremely interesting comment on his post from 8/18 about Bernard Lonergan and the argument that what the pure sciences study is intelligible form and not matter at all. Another Catholic philosopher for the reading list!

I should have been more clear: I was referring to a softer mind-body dualism than Cartesian dualism, such as hylomorphism. Some philosophers accuse hylomorphists of dualism. Since it's tricky to untangle that issue completely, I am somewhat comfortable calling it 'soft' dualism--whatever that means!

At times I've wondered if the problematic parallels between reductive idealism and reductive materialism just point to the truth of some kind of dualism (world/self at the least, but probably matter/thought). But having a skeptical inclination myself, I don't often go swimming in the ontological depths.

Actually, there was a book review over at the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews that I came across recently that breaks down the various approaches pretty nicely: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/how-the-mind-uses-the-brain-to-move-the-body-and-image-the-universe/

I'm on the Radical side of that divide. I like idealism and I like dual-aspect monism, and my only problem with liberal naturalism is that it draws the line right before things get interesting.

I do kind of think, in dual-aspect fashion, that thought and matter are two sides of the same coin. (Though if we go back to the idea that what we're studying in the cognitive sciences is form instead of matter, we're back at thought being equated with form, which is what the hylomorphist would expect in the first place.)

I'm willing to grant this for the sake of argument, but what percentage of naturalists are New Mysterians?

Not many. I only know of Colin McGinn, who is a New Mysterian as well as a self-identified anti-theist.

This made me infer that New Mysterianism shied away from a naturalistic explanation being necessary. If that's so, can they really be called thoroughgoing naturalists?

From what I understand, what differentiates New Mysterianism from Old Mysterianism is that the former holds that there's a naturalistic explanation that we can't know, whereas the latter thought it was non-natural. So the New ones seem to be genuine naturalists, just not necessarily physicalists. (Though if they think the mind is not equipped to handle these types of questions, I don't know how they can be naturalists at all...)

There is a lot of casual interest in Thomas on the forum but most of it doesn't reach into foundations. I am happy to be called a Thomist but I am not as strict as some, such as the so-called "Thomists of the Strict Observance." Early in my philosophy courses I was skeptical of the Thomist environment and took up a Scotistic thesis in a formal disputation just to spite the Thomists! ...But yeah, the weathered old-hand Thomists eventually converted me after much wailing and gnashing of tooth.

Defending Scotus to a group of Thomists, hm? That sounds dangerous.

 

[zippy2006]

The only Marxist I've read is Slavoj Zizek, who had a bit of a wild debate with Anglican theologian John Milbank. I don't have it anymore, since I gave it to my Episcopal priest, but it was a lot of Hegelian materialism. He was pretty explicitly trying to collapse his materialism into some sort of scientific nihilism where matter is actually non-existent, because anything else was mysticism. Insert half a dozen Marxist slurs about any other approach. Like I said, it was wild.

Wow, that sounds interesting! It would be fun to page through something like that.

Yes, I saw! Haven't watched it yet, but I'll have to. What I'd like to see is a Thomist with a background in cognitive science address the issue, because I'm not sure how to square the philosophy with modern neuroscience. There are people out there who do physics or biology from a Thomistic perspective, but this is something I haven't come across before.

The first place I would look is the Eastern Dominican Province in general and the Thomistic Institute in particular. A quick search brought up Dr. Daniel De Haan, who seems to be a central voice on the topic.

Speaking of Feser, there was an extremely interesting comment on his post from 8/18 about Bernard Lonergan and the argument that what the pure sciences study is intelligible form and not matter at all. Another Catholic philosopher for the reading list!

Yep, I am embarrassed for not mentioning him. He is a very big name who probably falls within the Transcendental Thomism camp. Right up your alley.

Actually, there was a book review over at the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews that I came across recently that breaks down the various approaches pretty nicely: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/how-the-mind-uses-the-brain-to-move-the-body-and-image-the-universe/

Thanks so much for that link. It's tricky though because I'm not sure the Aristotelian form-matter distinction even counts as property dualism. Perhaps Thomistic anthropology is simply too obscure for "Orthodox Contemporary Philosophy of Mind." I'm not sure if you're familiar with Alfred North Whitehead, but a Lutheran friend of mine really likes him and we've had some interesting conversations. He definitely brings a Platonic and Aristotelian mindset to contemporary problems.

I'm on the Radical side of that divide. I like idealism and I like dual-aspect monism, and my only problem with liberal naturalism is that it draws the line right before things get interesting.

I do kind of think, in dual-aspect fashion, that thought and matter are two sides of the same coin. (Though if we go back to the idea that what we're studying in the cognitive sciences is form instead of matter, we're back at thought being equated with form, which is what the hylomorphist would expect in the first place.)

I will have to read more about dual-aspect monism.

From what I understand, what differentiates New Mysterianism from Old Mysterianism is that the former holds that there's a naturalistic explanation that we can't know, whereas the latter thought it was non-natural. So the New ones seem to be genuine naturalists, just not necessarily physicalists. (Though if they think the mind is not equipped to handle these types of questions, I don't know how they can be naturalists at all...)

Right, that is my question as well.

Defending Scotus to a group of Thomists, hm? That sounds dangerous.

Yes, and fun.

I will say that my main obstacle to Thomism related to free will and predestination, and I see that you've had similar issues in conversations with Quid est Veritas?. I only mention this so that it doesn't take you off guard.

 

[Aaron112]

This article is an interesting discussion about why it is not AI that is a threat to humanity. Rather it is humanity that may use AI to destroy itself.

To sum up, to clarify, in other words humanity is destroying itself /like it was before the flood/ ,
and AI is simply one of the things humans use toward that conscious or unwitting end ?