Morality without Absolute Morality

[Fervent]

Also, 'to persist' doesn't equate to being selected for. For example dog breeders often select for certain desirable traits, but will also get hip problems, breathing problems, and heart problems as unintended consequences. Simply because something persists in the population doesn't mean that it was selected for, it simply means that what was selected for comes with benefits sufficient to outweigh the deleterious consequences that come along with it. In the case of human sexual reproduction, pair bonding is what was selected for, and rape is the unintended consequence.

You seem to be conflating a teleological process in selective breeding with a supposedly ateleological process in natural selection. What, other than persistence, indicates selection in natural selection to maintain such a teleological view?

 

[Fervent]

Indeed I did, and you've presented nothing to refute it.

Why do you suppose @Hans Blaster sought to make the distinction he made in denying that he made any such claim?

 

[partinobodycular]

Why do you suppose @Hans Blaster sought to make the distinction he made in denying that he made any such claim?

Because the connection had nothing to do with what he was asserting, and so I can hardly blame him for distancing himself from it. Although I value @Hans Blaster's opinion deeply I don't live and die by it.

 

[Fervent]

Because the connection had nothing to do with what he was asserting, and so I can hardly blame him for distancing himself from it. Although I value @Hans Blaster's opinion deeply I don't live and die by it.

And why would he distance himself from it, and instead assert a much lower claim?

The question isn't whether you live or die by it, but when even someone who is in general agreement with your worldview appears to tacitly support that you've been contravened.

But then again, you can't even seem to escape the completely irrational position of solipsism so your ability to reason is suspect from the start.

 

[partinobodycular]

What, other than persistence, indicates selection in natural selection to maintain such a teleological view?

It only seems teleological in hindsight. There are theories as to why evolution tends toward complexity but none of them involve intent. Unless you want to invoke theistic evolution which you're perfectly free to do.

 

[Fervent]

It only seems teleological in hindsight. There are theories as to why evolution tends toward complexity but none of them involve intent. Unless you want to invoke theistic evolution which you're perfectly free to do.

Your explanation implies teleology, because you were distinguishing between persistance and some mysterious intent in selection. Which is why I asked what distinguishes things that survive in such a way that you can assign a sense of intent in selection.

 

[partinobodycular]

And why would he distance himself from it, and instead assert a much lower claim?

Because he's smart.

But then again, you can't even seem to escape the completely irrational position of solipsism so your ability to reason is suspect from the start.

Your opinion on the rationality of solipsism is duly noted, but hardly germane to the subject at hand.

 

[Fervent]

Because he's smart.

And why is it smart to distance himself from your claim and instead seek to establish a much lower claim?

Your opinion on the rationality of solipsism is duly noted, but hardly germane to the subject at hand.

Considering you have provided your assessment of my argument, your rationality is certainly germane. If you can't even establish a rational starting point, then how can any of your subsequent judgments be trusted?

 

[partinobodycular]

And why is it smart to distance himself from your claim and instead seek to establish a much lower claim?

Considering you have provided your assessment of my argument, your rationality is certainly germane. If you can't even establish a rational starting point, then how can any of your subsequent judgments be trusted?

Sorry, going back into lurker mode in the hopes that this thread will get back on subject.

@Hans Blaster et al, you have the floor.

 

[Fervent]

Sorry, going back into lurker mode in the hopes that this thread will get back on subject.

Sure glad you made such an announcement, we were waiting with baited breath.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Yes, that was a direct counter to the claim that fitness equates with morality.

It wasn't. You introduced "fitness" to the discussion.

Besides the point.

It is quite to the point. You provided a source that did not back your claim, nor is it even relevant to the general claim about "morality and fitness".

You may not have made that claim, but @partinobodycular did.

I had to go back 2 days and 80 posts to find something resembling that. (And I ran into an invocation of the 3rd chapter of genisis first.) When I did find it it was about innate "objective" morality.

There may be benefits to the cooperative nature of morality,

There is no point to morality with out the cooperative nature of the human lifestyle. Non-social animals don't need a "morality".

but that doesn't mean we can ground morality in evolution without simply engaging with the naturalistic fallacy.

No "naturalistic falacy" nor is morality "grounded in evolution". Morality is no more grounded in evolution than air breathing, bipedalism, internal gestation, or cardiovascular systems, yet each are the product of evolution. Evolution is the process of change in living populations and the scientific frameworks that explain the process.

Explaining how behaviors came to be is a different animal from answering the more primitive questions about the nature of moralistic beliefs and how we ground them.

Evolution of social animals explains the need for organizing principles and why mental facilities like a "theory of mind" (the ability to build a model of what someone else's mental state, motivations, and intentions are), empathy, and sense of fairness might have "fitness" and be favored in populations. It are these evolved mental properties (instincts) of humans upon which we build our moral systems.

Sure, but it speaks to the inappropriateness of grounding questions of how things ought to be in what happens to be the case.

What we "ought" to do depends on what we value that interacts with our base moral and social instincts.

That fitness can be improved by behaving in ways counter to moral/social systems shows that fitness is not an appropriate point to ground morality since the sole determinant of whether a behavior increases fitness is whether or not it improves reproductive success.

Even if someone else is making that claim, I am not. Fitness, as it would apply here is to the evolutionary benefit of having the basis for having moral opinions and the instincts that shape them. That does not make evolved moral bases grounded on "fitness". (It is a misuse of the term.)

To be crass, "should I do this?" and "Will this get me laid?" are two totally unrelated questions.

 

[Fervent]

It wasn't. You introduced "fitness" to the discussion.

Might want to look back to @partinobodycular claims

It is quite to the point. You provided a source that did not back your claim, nor is it even relevant to the general claim about "morality and fitness".

Nope, it doesn't have anything to do with the issue at hand.

I had to go back 2 days and 80 posts to find something resembling that. (And I ran into an invocation of the 3rd chapter of genisis first.) When I did find it it was about innate "objective" morality.

Must have missed it.

There is no point to morality with out the cooperative nature of the human lifestyle. Non-social animals don't need a "morality".

Sure, but the question is whether human morality is a univeral or if it is particular to specific social settings. For example, was the holocaust morally wrong or was it acceptable because it was legitimate in that social setting?

No "naturalistic falacy" nor is morality "grounded in evolution". Morality is no more grounded in evolution than air breathing, bipedalism, internal gestation, or cardiovascular systems, yet each are the product of evolution. Evolution is the process of change in living populations and the scientific frameworks that explain the process.

Attempts to defend morality from an evolutionary heritage are clearly attempts to ground morality in evoltution, and are a clear example of the naturalistic fallacy. You may not be making that mistake, but several of your compatriots have.

Evolution of social animals explains the need for organizing principles and why mental facilities like a "theory of mind" (the ability to build a model of what someone else's mental state, motivations, and intentions are), empathy, and sense of fairness might have "fitness" and be favored in populations. It are these evolved mental properties (instincts) of humans upon which we build our moral systems.

Considering there is no current theory that adequately explains minds, it is quite the reach you are making here.

What we "ought" to do depends on what we value that interacts with our base moral and social instincts.

But are these universal, or do they only depend on the social setting we find ourselves in?

Even if someone else is making that claim, I am not. Fitness, as it would apply here is to the evolutionary benefit of having the basis for having moral opinions and the instincts that shape them. That does not make evolved moral bases grounded on "fitness". (It is a misuse of the term.)

You may not be, but you entered into an ongoing discussion where that was the central contention. There are two separate issues, one that evolution is capable of explaining to a certain degree(behavioral factors) and one that it simply cannot, which is the more primitive question of how we establish and defend that things are moral rather than simply social conventions.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Also, 'to persist' doesn't equate to being selected for. For example dog breeders often select for certain desirable traits, but will also get hip problems, breathing problems, and heart problems as unintended consequences. Simply because something persists in the population doesn't mean that it was selected for, it simply means that what was selected for comes with benefits sufficient to outweigh the deleterious consequences that come along with it.

I'm not a biologist, so I don't know if that "persistence" is the same thing technically as "selected for", though I think it might be. (Selected for doesn't have to mean ubiquitous.) For example sickle cell trait is selected for by the advantage it gives with a single copy in protection from malaria, but two copies messes up the blood cells and severely limits the survival to reproduction. The inclination to impose sexual contact on another is not likely to be so simple and I would suspect it arises from groups of genes related to the desire to reproduce and aggression/violence.

In the case of human sexual reproduction, pair bonding is what was selected for, and rape is the unintended consequence.

In humans it probably isn't the pair bonding that goes wrong, but rather the modest amount of consentual extra-pair "bonding" behaviors.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Might want to look back to @partinobodycular claims

Nope, it doesn't have anything to do with the issue at hand.

Must have missed it.

I track replies backward starting from your post about rape and fitness that lead to the posting of that paper title to post #800 (I didn't read any intervening posts that were not on the direct backward line):

hanks to evolution, almost all humans have been ingrained with an innate sense of acceptable human behavior.

We can then use this 'innate sense' of acceptable human behavior as an OBJECTIVE standard.

In other words, morality is that which falls within acceptable human behavior, and humans are specifically endowed by nature with an ability to recognize and apply this standard.

You're welcome, you now have an objective standard for morality.

Which as you can see is about "innate senses of acceptable behavior" as "objective standards for morality. I have a slightly different take on the relation between morality and evolved mind properties.

Sure, but the question is whether human morality is a univeral or if it is particular to specific social settings.

It is clear that morality is not universal. The base instincts are present in all societies, but not all individuals. Morality is what we build on top of those instincts.

For example, was the holocaust morally wrong or was it acceptable because it was legitimate in that social setting?

Not going to discuss examples.

Attempts to defend morality from an evolutionary heritage are clearly attempts to ground morality in evoltution, and are a clear example of the naturalistic fallacy.

Sigh. I am not grounding morality in evolution. Evolution is merely the process that shaped the natural moral instincts. As for this "fallacy" nonsense. I am not defending any specific moral position. I am discussing the process from which non-absolute morality arises. Given the things I have stated, it should be clear why I don't consider the concept of an absolute morality as even coherent.

You may not be making that mistake, but several of your compatriots have.

Then tell them that, not me. I'm not interested in your problems with them. I've got enough issue with your implying things to me from my posts that I didn't say or imply. I don't need what ever you think they have done.

Considering there is no current theory that adequately explains minds, it is quite the reach you are making here.

One does not need a detailed description of how minds arise to determine that individual humans are able comprehend what others are, or might be, thinking anymore than you need a detailed theory of gravity to determine that the Earth is spherical. You seem to be confusing Theory of Mind with philosophy of mind. Theory of mind is key to empathy, strategic thinking, interpersonal relations, etc., and everyone uses it all the time.

But are these universal, or do they only depend on the social setting we find ourselves in?

Stated above.

You may not be, but you entered into an ongoing discussion where that was the central contention. There are two separate issues, one that evolution is capable of explaining to a certain degree(behavioral factors) and one that it simply cannot, which is the more primitive question of how we establish and defend that things are moral rather than simply social conventions.

I wrote a post about an academic paper (and not one I found particularly persuasive or impressive). You aren't even close to demonstrating that absolute morality is even possible. I think the notion is laughable.

 

[Fervent]

I track replies backward starting from your post about rape and fitness that lead to the posting of that paper title to post #800 (I didn't read any intervening posts that were not on the direct backward line):



Which as you can see is about "innate senses of acceptable behavior" as "objective standards for morality. I have a slightly different take on the relation between morality and evolved mind properties.

I can't be bothered to trace it back myself, but if you look at @partinobodycular's subsequent posts you will see that they accepted my assessment of their perspective.

It is clear that morality is not universal. The base instincts are present in all societies, but not all individuals. Morality is what we build on top of those instincts.

I'm not sure it is so clear, as the question is not what individuals recognize but whether there are universal standards that can be applied.

Not going to discuss examples.

Oh? Any particular reason?

Sigh. I am not grounding morality in evolution. Evolution is merely the process that shaped the natural moral instincts. As for this "fallacy" nonsense. I am not defending any specific moral position. I am discussing the process from which non-absolute morality arises. Given the things I have stated, it should be clear why I don't consider the concept of an absolute morality as even coherent.

You may not be, but the poster I was interacting with was.

Then tell them that, not me. I'm not interested in your problems with them. I've got enough issue with your implying things to me from my posts that I didn't say or imply. I don't need what ever you think they have done.

You stepped into an ongoing conversation, so my reply to you depended on that context.

One does not need a detailed description of how minds arise to determine that individual humans are able comprehend what others are, or might be, thinking anymore than you need a detailed theory of gravity to determine that the Earth is spherical. You seem to be confusing Theory of Mind with philosophy of mind. Theory of mind is key to empathy, strategic thinking, interpersonal relations, etc., and everyone uses it all the time.

I think the confusion here is I took your use of theory of mind to be speaking of a scientific theory of mind, rather than a personal one. We all may have a sense of other minds but the nomenclature you chose to use leaves much to be desired.

Stated above.

Not quite, because when I say universal I don't necessarily mean absolute. Universal just means that we can consistently develop the same standards and apply them across the board, regardless of culture or current social milieu.

I wrote a post about an academic paper (and not one I found particularly persuasive or impressive). You aren't even close to demonstrating that absolute morality is even possible. I think the notion is laughable.

I don't intend to make any such demonstration, my position is one of skepticism towards bootstrapping morality because of the is-ought problem and the related naturalistic fallacy.

 

[partinobodycular]

I have a slightly different take on the relation between morality and evolved mind properties.

I'd be shocked if you didn't.

The base instincts are present in all societies, but not all individuals.

It's precisely those base instincts that I was referring to when I suggested that morality is an evolutionary adaptation. As with any other genetic trait they're expressed to a greater or lesser degree in each individual. But barring severe genetic deviations those 'base instincts' are fairly uniform across all societies and cultures.

Morality is what we build on top of those instincts.

I couldn't agree more. Hence the same base instincts get expressed differently in 2000 BCE than they do today. But they're the same instincts, and it's those base instincts that can be used as an objective standard, even though the expression thereof may change. We haven't suddenly become more moral simply because we've re-evaluated slavery. The times have simply allowed us to see things in a way that our forefathers couldn't.

The problem with codifying morality in a book is that you sometimes end up conflating someone else's circumstances with your own, and not allowing for growth, but rather being perpetually stuck where you were.

 

[Hans Blaster]

I can't be bothered to trace it back myself, but if you look at @partinobodycular's subsequent posts you will see that they accepted my assessment of their perspective.

You can't be bothered to know what was being responded, but I need to read all your conversations with several posters and assess a third party. I'm not interested in discussing a third person when I am in a dialog.

I'm not sure it is so clear, as the question is not what individuals recognize but whether there are universal standards that can be applied.

You don't see how morals are demonstrably different in different societies? Get real.

Oh? Any particular reason?

Do ya think someone might not want engage in examples when the very first one offered is the morality of the Holocaust? Examples aren't needed here.

You may not be, but the poster I was interacting with was.

Argue with my positions when you reply to me, not others. If you don't know what I think, ask.

You stepped into an ongoing conversation, so my reply to you depended on that context.

I commented on a post about an academic paper (one that you have twice told me in *our* conversation is irrelevant and you won't discuss) that you described. I didn't think much of the paper or what it was claiming. You then responded to me 8 MINUTES after I posted not in reply to you and included several concepts that were not in my post into your reply. This is you, not me.

I think the confusion here is I took your use of theory of mind to be speaking of a scientific theory of mind, rather than a personal one. We all may have a sense of other minds but the nomenclature you chose to use leaves much to be desired.

Theory of mind is what psychologists call our understanding of the mental states of others. I used the term correctly in context. As I noted when I did, a theory of mind is one of the features that allows us to understand how our actions might make others feel and this is a key component underlying the construction of moral systems.

Not quite, because when I say universal I don't necessarily mean absolute. Universal just means that we can consistently develop the same standards and apply them across the board, regardless of culture or current social milieu.

Those are the moral instincts. Moral systems require the addition of values and principles placed on top of the instincts.

I don't intend to make any such demonstration, my position is one of skepticism towards bootstrapping morality because of the is-ought problem and the related naturalistic fallacy.

"oughts can only be determined after the goals have been.