Morality without Absolute Morality

[Fervent]

Yeah, ain't it funny how the puddle always manages to fit the hole?

So you say.

Well lets take a trip back to the ancient Middle East, wherein slavery was perfectly moral. A perfect example of the puddle fitting the hole.

Slavery is an economic issue, the moral aspects cannot be separated from the economics. Regulations don't imply agreement, just an acceptance of a reality.

As you wish. I wouldn't want to stress you out with fallacious ideas.

When you come up with ideas that aren't fallacious, go ahead and get back to me.

 

[partinobodycular]

Slavery is an economic issue, the moral aspects cannot be separated from the economics. Regulations don't imply agreement, just an acceptance of a reality.

Correct. It was an economic catalyst that manifested itself as morals.

you act as if your preferences are objective and in need of enforcement. If you were consistent in maintaining that they were subjective preferences and nothing more, you'd have no reason to act because there's no reason anyone should prefer your preferences.

His preferences are objective in the sense that they align... not just with his preferences, but with what works to maintain a stable functioning 21st century society. You're free to try another set of morals if you want to, but they probably won't work out very well, and we'll rapidly return to what seems intuitively to be the correct set.

 

[Fervent]

Correct. It was an economic catalyst that manifested itself as morals.

Not quite, it has always been challenged morally but economic necessity perpetuated it.

His preferences are objective in the sense that they align... not just with his preferences, but with what works to maintain a stable functioning 21st century society. You're free to try another set of morals if you want to, but they probably won't work out very well, and we'll rapidly return to what seems intuitively to be the correct set.

'correct set'? If they are just subjective preferences, how can there be a correct set?

 

[partinobodycular]

Not quite, it has always been challenged morally but economic necessity perpetuated it.

Ah, well then, show me the old testament scripture that forbids it... never mind, scripture battles are never fruitful, nor educational.

'correct set'? If they are just subjective preferences, how can there be a correct set?

Uhm, didn't I just explain that? They're 'correct' in the sense that they're what work to maintain a stable and functioning 21st century society. @Stopped_lurking didn't get to decide that they were correct, survival did that, and it embodied its descendants with an intuitive feeling for what those 'correct' morals are. Hence we just intuitively know what's correct, or as we define it... moral. And if by magic the puddle continues to fit neatly into the hole.

 

[Fervent]

Ah, well then, show me the old testament scripture that forbids it... never mind, scripture battles are never fruitful, nor educational.

you're requiring something that isn't cogent to the question.

Uhm, didn't I just explain that? They're 'correct' in the sense that they're what work to maintain a stable and functioning 21st century society. @Stopped_lurking didn't get to decide that they were correct, survival did that, and it embodied its descendants with an intuitive feeling for what those 'correct' morals are. Hence we just intuitively know what's correct, or as we define it... moral. And if by magic the puddle continues to fit neatly into the hole.

And why should we prefer a "stable and functioning 21st century society"? What makes the moral values of our contemporary culture preferable to any other social organization? Just sounds like chauvinism to me, and as I stated earlier it appears more to be your reasoning operating how a lawyer reasons by finding justification for a starting conclusion rather than moving from premises to a conclusion.

 

[partinobodycular]

And why should we prefer a "stable and functioning 21st century society"?

It's not about what we prefer, it's about what survival prefers. We're just involuntary passengers.

What makes the moral values of our contemporary culture preferable to any other social organization?

Ah, we didn't die. That's pretty much it.

Just sounds like chauvinism to me,

You'll have to take that up with evolution, but the last I checked, it really isn't keen on explaining things to people. We're pretty much left to figure it out on our own.

and as I stated earlier it appears more to be your reasoning operating how a lawyer reasons by finding justification for a starting conclusion rather than moving from premises to a conclusion.

Actually, if you recall, I'm a solipsist. My whole thing is about reasoning from what little can be known, to whatever inevitably follows. It's that 'whatever inevitably follows' part that you seem to have a problem with.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

you act as if your preferences are objective and in need of enforcement. If you were consistent in maintaining that they were subjective preferences and nothing more, you'd have no reason to act because there's no reason anyone should prefer your preferences.

This is just you trying to force me to believe that there must be some objectivity. The reason I act is because I feel it distasteful.

 

[Fervent]

This is just you trying to force me to believe that there must be some objectivity. The reason I act is because I feel it distasteful.

I'm not trying to "force" anything. I'm pointing out that it is inconsistent to claim that they are just subjective preferences while treating them as if there is a real reason to prefer them. You find it distasteful enough to act because you must believe on some level that it is actually wrong and not just your subjective preference.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

I'm not trying to "force" anything. I'm pointing out that it is inconscistent to claim that they are just subjective preferences while treating them as if there is a real reason to prefer them.

My feelings are real to me.

You find it distasteful enough to act because you must believe on some level that it is actually wrong and not just your subjective preference.

This just you restating your position. Why do I must believe "it is actually wrong", why can't I act on my "subjective preference"? You often add qualifiers like "actually" as if they mean something, what is the difference between wrong and actually wrong?

 

[Fervent]

My feelings are real to me.

No one said they weren't, but being private to you they have no relationship with the world beyond your mind.

This just you restating your position. Why do I must believe "it is actually wrong", why can't I act on my "subjective preference"? You often add qualifiers like "actually" as if they mean something, what is the difference between wrong and actually wrong?

You tell me, what makes your preference wrong in a non-objective manner? How can something be wrong, but only be a subjective preference with no objective content?

 

[Stopped_lurking]

No one said they weren't, but being private to you they have no relationship with the world beyond your mind.

You tell me, what makes your preference wrong in a non-objective manner? How can something be wrong, but only be a subjective preference with no objective content?

That is how it feels. Others sometimes feel differently (very seldom though when asked).

 

[Fervent]

That is how it feels. Others sometimes feel differently (very seldom though when asked).

A quote from Chisholm's Problem of the Criterion seems appropriate to explain the issue I am pointing out:

"It is one thing to say, objectively, that one state of mind is to be prefered to another. It is quite another thing to say, subjectively, that one state of mind is in fact preferred--that someone or other happens to prefer the state of mind to the other. If state of mind A is to be prefered to state of mind B, if it is, as I would say, intrinsically preferrable to B, then anyone who prefers A to B is mistaken in his preference."

The problem is, you're presenting your moral feelings as being objectively preferable such that those who disagree are implied to be mistaken. So you're trading on objectivity while trying to hide behind subjectivity to sidestep defending the objectivity. If it were merely a subjective preference, then it couldn't be wrong or right it could only be whatever it is.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

"It is one thing to say, objectively, that one state of mind is to be prefered to another. It is quite another thing to say, subjectively, that one state of mind is in fact preferred--that someone or other happens to prefer the state of mind to the other. If state of mind A is to be prefered to state of mind B, if it is, as I would say, intrinsically preferrable to B, then anyone who prefers A to B is mistaken in his preference."

Intrinsically preferable? I just said that others have different feelings sometimes. Did Chisholm talk about moral feelings when he wrote to that.

The problem is, you're presenting your moral feelings as being objectively preferable such that those who disagree are implied to be mistaken.

I'm explicitly not presenting my moral feelings as being preferable to any one but me. That doesn't stop me from acting on them. Also are you using objectively as synonymous with intrinsically now?

 

[Fervent]

Intrinsically preferable? I just said that others have different feelings sometimes. Did Cushion talk about moral feelings when he wrote that?

He was talking about any discussion involving normativity.

I'm explicitly not presenting my moral feelings as being preferable to any one but me. That doesn't stop me from acting in them. Also are you using objectively as synonymous with intrinsically now?

Not quite, objectivity in this sense is on their normative value. It may not stop you from acting, but it makes you inconsistent when you deny that there is any objective element to your preferences. You act on them because you believe that your feelings truly reflect how things should be, the question is why do you insist on denying as much?

 

[Stopped_lurking]

He was talking about any discussion involving normativity.

He doesn't present an argument for why it would apply to ethics in the Problem of the Criterion. He just present it as fact. You do realise that there exists many metaethic theories, finding one that agrees with you is not enough.

Not quite, objectivity in this sense is on their normative value. It may not stop you from acting, but it makes you inconsistent when you deny that there is any objective element to your preferences. You act on them because you believe that your feelings truly reflect how things should be, the question is why do you insist on denying as much?

I act on them because acting on moral feelings is in itself satisfactory to me. But where is the need for objectivity?

 

[Fervent]

He doesn't present an argument for why it would apply to ethics in the Problem of the Criterion. He just present it as fact. You do realise that there exists many metaethic theories, finding one that agrees with you is not enough.

I am well aware, but your protest isn't really relevant. It's not about metaethics, either, it's a metaepistemological treatise. It just happens that his point about objectivity and normativity is salient to our discussion.

I act on them because acting on moral feelings is in itself satisfactory to me. But where is the need for objectivity?

Do you, or do you not, treat it as if when you are correcting a wrong you are in fact addressing something that is wrong? What is it that is giving you satisfaction when you act on such feelings?

 

[Stopped_lurking]

I am well aware, but your protest isn't really relevant. It's not about metaethics, either, it's a metaepistemological treatise. It just happens that his point about objectivity and normativity is salient to our discussion.

He also separates "is preferable" from "to be preferable". I'm making no claims that something is "to be preferable".

Do you, or do you not, treat it as if when you are correcting a wrong you are in fact addressing something that is wrong?

I'm correcting something that feels wrong to me. No objectivity needed.

What is it that is giving you satisfaction when you act on such feelings?

Dopamin, I guess. Serotonin? A certain mix of the two, I don't know.

 

[Fervent]

He also separates "is preferable" from "to be preferable". I'm making no claims that something is "to be preferable".

So you don't believe that morals are normative?

I'm correcting something that feels wrong to me. No objectivity needed.

Feels wrong? What does it mean for something to feel wrong without recognizing it as wrong? It seems to me you're going to extreme pains to deny what is obvious.

Dopamin, I guess. Serotonin? A certain mix of the two, I don't know.

nice dodge, but not an answer to my question.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

So you don't believe that morals are normative?

I never argue like this "I feel A, therefore you should feel A".

Feels wrong? What does it mean for something to feel wrong without recognizing it as wrong? It seems to me you're going to extreme pains to deny what is obvious.

I don't even understand the difference when it comes to moral feelings, something is wrong when it feels wrong.

nice dodge, but not an answer to my question.

Feelings come to me immediately, I don't understand your question.

 

[partinobodycular]

Feels wrong? What does it mean for something to feel wrong without recognizing it as wrong?

Thanks to evolution, almost all humans have been ingrained with an innate sense of acceptable human behavior.

We can then use this 'innate sense' of acceptable human behavior as an OBJECTIVE standard.

In other words, morality is that which falls within acceptable human behavior, and humans are specifically endowed by nature with an ability to recognize and apply this standard.

You're welcome, you now have an objective standard for morality.