Morality is Non-Rational

[Tree of Life]

This discussion has emerged here and there across a few different threads so I thought it would be fun to bring it out into the open.

Coming into this discussion it will be helpful to assume that moral concepts have some meaning to all of us. No matter what we believe about where morality comes from or whether or not we're moral realists, all of us deal with moral considerations and make moral judgements on a daily basis. If you disagree with this assumption then that can also be a fun conversation but it's probably best discussed in a different thread.

So we would all generally agree with many of the moral commands expressed in the 10 commandments - at least their moral validity. Stealing is wrong. Murder is wrong. Lying is wrong. Violating promises is wrong. But what is the justification of such moral claims? Where do they get their authority from?

I'd like to say here, representing Hume's Is/Ought problem, that moral sentiment cannot be derived from rationality alone. Reason is certainly useful in applying moral norms (that we already have) to various situations. Reason is also useful for discerning inconsistencies in our moral systems. But values cannot be derived from reason alone. Reason and morality interact, but one is not derived from the other.

Hume's Is/Ought problem is one way of defending this assertion. Basically Hume tried to demonstrate that in order to have a moral conclusion, one needed a moral premise. In other words, an "ought" statement cannot logically be derived from an "is" statement. This often occurs in moral arguments, though. Here's an example of an invalid argument that commit's Hume's Is/Ought fallacy.

1. Stealing harms people
2. Internet piracy is stealing
3. Therefore we ought not pirate materials from the internet

Now whether or not you agree with the soundness of this argument is another thing. But even if this argument is sound it is technically invalid. Since there is no "ought" in the premises there can be no "ought" in the conclusion. Of course, you could say that there is an implicit "ought" in the premises and redesign the argument to go like this:

1. Stealing harms people
2. We ought not harm people
3. Internet piracy is stealing
4. Therefore we ought not pirate materials from the internet

Now this argument is indeed valid, but notice that there's a moral sentiment in the premises. We're assuming morality in order to prove morality. This goes to show that morality is simply there. We reason with it, but we cannot derive it from reason alone.

Some, in defense of a rationalistic approach to morality, have tried to suggest that morality comes from our goals and can be rationally derived from our goals. In other words, if we want to live a long life then we ought to behave in a certain way. The imperatives are authoritative because they're based on desires and goals that we actually hold. We can then use reason to determine how to best meet these goals. And this becomes our morality.

But this is an unsatisfying account. As Wittgenstein noted in his famous lecture on ethics, some "ought" claims are clearly hypothetically imperative. If I notice that you're a horrible tennis player and I say: "you really ought to practice more often", you can easily escape the imperative statement by saying: "but I don't really care about being a better tennis player." But this does not seem to be the case with moral claims. If you're a liar and I say: "you really ought to tell the truth" you cannot escape the imperative by saying: "but I don't really care about being a moral person!" In the second scenario it stills seems that you ought to care about being a moral person. The imperative still seems authoritative in spite of your goals (or lack-thereof).

So what this all adds up to is that morality is clearly part of our lives, but it cannot be derived from reason. It's already there and we reason from it.

 

[quatona]

Now this argument is indeed valid, but notice that there's a moral sentiment in the premises. We're assuming morality in order to prove morality. This goes to show that morality is simply there. We reason with it, but we cannot derive it from reason alone.

Some, in defense of a rationalistic approach to morality, have tried to suggest that morality comes from our goals and can be rationally derived from our goals. In other words, if we want to live a long life then we ought to behave in a certain way. The imperatives are authoritative because they're based on desires and goals that we actually hold. We can then use reason to determine how to best meet these goals. And this becomes our morality.

Emphasis added.

In the second scenario it stills seems that you ought to care about being a moral person. The imperative still seems authoritative in spite of your goals (or lack-thereof).

I don´t think that "it seems" belongs in a logical deduction.

So what this all adds up to is that morality is clearly part of our lives, but it cannot be derived from reason.

Indeed, the moralities we develop can´t be derived from reason alone.

It's already there and we reason from it.

(emphasis added)
Doesn´t follow. At all.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Sorry if I'm struggling with what you're getting at here...but what's wrong with thinking that we reason our morals based upon circumstances at the moment we consider morality?

 

[bhsmte]

What we find moral at any moment in time, is what we can reconcile with our conscious as acceptable.

What we are able to reconcile, comes from our life's experiences and how those experiences have formed our individual psyche.

 

[Gene2memE]

[FONT=&quot]In your example with internet piracy, you’re taking an absolutist position and ignoring graduations.

I could argue likewise:

Sticking needles in people harms them
We ought not to harm people
Vaccinating a child involves sticking a needle in them
Therefore we ought not to vaccinate children (or get blood tests, or apply tattoos, or allow diabetics to check their blood sugar levels)

This is a logical, but obviously absurd conclusion. The minor harm of sticking a needle in a child is vastly outweighed by the potential reduction of future harm, by immunising them against measles, mumps, polio, hepatitis and any other range of potentially harmful diseases.

[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Moral pronouncements – such as the 10 Commandments - allows for no graduation of moral behaviours. They are not moral systems, but an immovable set of rules that allow no consideration of situation.

Is stealing always wrong? Is it a greater moral wrong to steal a set of keys to free yourself from wrongful imprisonment, or to allow that imprisonment to continue? What about a car instead of a set of keys?
Is lying always wrong? Is it worse to lie to a hostage taker about the locations of other people in a building, or to tell them the truth?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Is withholding someone’s liberty always wrong? Is it better to lock up a murder or rapist or allow them their freedom? Is it right to lock up a thief? Or a graffiti artist?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Morality is about the welfare and outcomes of the actions of thinking beings. We are most strongly associated with our own in-groups (cultural, religious, professional, familial, social ect), so we are most concerned with their welfare.

[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Morality has a clear basis in nature. All it really requires is empathy: we understand that we don’t like certain things to happen to us and have the ability to realise that these same behaviours and outcomes, generally speaking, are equally disliked by others.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Moral philosophy – aka ethics – has a rational basis. We even see pre-moral sentiments behaviours in primates, dolphins, dogs and corvids. Experimentally, we can see that other animals possess the rudiments of empathy, compassion and fairness (which is more than I can say for some humans I’ve known).[/FONT]

 

[Tree of Life]

[FONT=&quot]In your example with internet piracy, you’re taking an absolutist position and ignoring graduations.

I could argue likewise:

Sticking needles in people harms them
We ought not to harm people
Vaccinating a child involves sticking a needle in them
Therefore we ought not to vaccinate children (or get blood tests, or apply tattoos, or allow diabetics to check their blood sugar levels)

This is a logical, but obviously absurd conclusion. The minor harm of sticking a needle in a child is vastly outweighed by the potential reduction of future harm, by immunising them against measles, mumps, polio, hepatitis and any other range of potentially harmful diseases. [/FONT]

I wanted to avoid this kind of tangent. I don't actually care about the content of the argument I put forth. I'm trying to make a point about its logical validity. Point being, you cannot logically derive an "ought" from an "is".

[FONT=&quot]Moral pronouncements – such as the 10 Commandments - allows for no graduation of moral behaviours. They are not moral systems, but an immovable set of rules that allow no consideration of situation.

Is stealing always wrong? Is it a greater moral wrong to steal a set of keys to free yourself from wrongful imprisonment, or to allow that imprisonment to continue? What about a car instead of a set of keys?
Is lying always wrong? Is it worse to lie to a hostage taker about the locations of other people in a building, or to tell them the truth?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Is withholding someone’s liberty always wrong? Is it better to lock up a murder or rapist or allow them their freedom? Is it right to lock up a thief? Or a graffiti artist?[/FONT]

This is also a tangent that I don't care much about in this discussion. It's not the point I'm getting at.

[FONT=&quot]Morality is about the welfare and outcomes of the actions of thinking beings. We are most strongly associated with our own in-groups (cultural, religious, professional, familial, social ect), so we are most concerned with their welfare.

[/FONT]

This is a bit more relevant to the topic at hand. Your claim is that "good" is basically identical with that which promotes the welfare of our group. I agree with this. We ought to promote the welfare of our group. But did we derive that sentiment using rationality alone? I don't think so. It seems we just feel that way. Then we reason from that moral assumption.

[FONT=&quot]Morality has a clear basis in nature. All it really requires is empathy: we understand that we don’t like certain things to happen to us and have the ability to realise that these same behaviours and outcomes, generally speaking, are equally disliked by others.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]

I agree with your moral sentiment. We ought to treat other as we would want to be treated. But how did we arrive at that conclusion? Rationality alone doesn't seem to have helped us. It seems that we simply accept that sentiment as such. We simply feel that it is right. And then we reason from that moral assumption.

[FONT=&quot]Moral philosophy – aka ethics – has a rational basis. We even see pre-moral sentiments behaviours in primates, dolphins, dogs and corvids. Experimentally, we can see that other animals possess the rudiments of empathy, compassion and fairness (which is more than I can say for some humans I’ve known).[/FONT]

I don't think that this is correct. I've demonstrated why I believe morality does not derive from rationality. I don't think you've successfully demonstrated otherwise.

 

[Tree of Life]

Sorry if I'm struggling with what you're getting at here...but what's wrong with thinking that we reason our morals based upon circumstances at the moment we consider morality?

I think the problem with this is that morals cannot be derived from reason alone. Logic and empirical data alone cannot tell us what's right or what's wrong. We've got to bring moral assumptions to the table.

A moral assumption would be something like: "we ought to treat others like we would want to be treated." I think that this is a fantastic moral assumption. We can certainly reason from moral assumptions like this. This assumption, combined with reason, can tell us a great many things about what we should or should not do.

But no amount of brute reason can get us to this assumption. We must simply begin with it.

 

[Tree of Life]

What we find moral at any moment in time, is what we can reconcile with our conscious as acceptable.

What we are able to reconcile, comes from our life's experiences and how those experiences have formed our individual psyche.

The issue of conscience is an interesting one (I assume that's what you meant). We've even given a name to this "moral organ", if you will. We've got a moral feeler within us that is distinct from purely rational processes.

 

[Davian]

 

[Tree of Life]

I don´t think that "it seems" belongs in a logical deduction.

No. "Seems" is not an argument. But it is worth taking account of. Any explanation of reality has to also explain how reality "seems" and why it "seems" that way.

Doesn´t follow. At all.

By "there" I don't necessarily mean something is there outside of the subject. I mean that morality is simply "there" - whether something objective or something within the subject.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I think the problem with this is that morals cannot be derived from reason alone. Logic and empirical data alone cannot tell us what's right or what's wrong. We've got to bring moral assumptions to the table.

A moral assumption would be something like: "we ought to treat others like we would want to be treated." I think that this is a fantastic moral assumption. We can certainly reason from moral assumptions like this. This assumption, combined with reason, can tell us a great many things about what we should or should not do.

But no amount of brute reason can get us to this assumption. We must simply begin with it.

Well I'd disagree...I think we can arrive at moral opinions without any assumptions at all. In fact, I think moral conflict occurs directly because of moral assumptions.

Take your "murder is wrong" example...is this a conscious thought you carry around with you? It's doubtful it ever crosses your mind. Instead what occurs is you come across a situation where someone kills another and then you decide, for yourself, if it was morally "wrong" or "right".

 

[Tree of Life]

Well I'd disagree...I think we can arrive at moral opinions without any assumptions at all. In fact, I think moral conflict occurs directly because of moral assumptions.

I would be interested to see how you would arrive at a moral conclusion without starting with a moral premise.

Take your "murder is wrong" example...is this a conscious thought you carry around with you? It's doubtful it ever crosses your mind. Instead what occurs is you come across a situation where someone kills another and then you decide, for yourself, if it was morally "wrong" or "right".

"Do not murder" is certainly a moral abstraction. But, at least in my own case, I evaluate specific situations according to abstract principles that I hold. I would only consider a specific case of killing to be wrong if it fit my understanding of "murder". Indeed it's difficult to not make moral abstractions. We can't simply decide morality case by case with no abstract commonalities between cases. As soon as we ask: "what was wrong about this case?" we will begin to drift into moral abstraction.

Furthermore, what standard would we be using to evaluate individual cases? As soon as we have a standard, we have an abstraction.

 

[poolerboy0077]

Point being, you cannot logically derive an "ought" from an "is".

Sure you can. It's done all the time. This is-ought "problem" is quite frankly just bad philosophy.

Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Suppose you come across a chemist lecturing about how water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. Further suppose you express skepticism to this chemist of this claim. What could this scientist do to try to convince you? Well, the chemist may be inclined to demonstrate this by way of performing simple experiments. However, in doing so, the scientist has appealed to certain normative values: the values of empiricism and rationality. But say you don't immediately accept these. What evidence could the scientist provide you that proves you should value evidence? Or what logical argument could be given to you to show you that you should value logic? The thing is, descriptive "is" statements rest on implicit "oughts".

 

[Tree of Life]

Sure you can. It's done all the time. This is-ought "problem" is quite frankly just bad philosophy.

I'm eager to see your rebuttal. I'll try to follow you closely here.

Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Suppose you come across a chemist lecturing about how water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen.

Got it. I'm in her lecture hall now.

Further suppose you express skepticism to this chemist of this claim.

Done.

What could this scientist do to try to convince you? Well, the chemist may be inclined to demonstrate this by way of performing simple experiments. However, in doing so, the scientist has appealed to certain normative values: the values of empiricism and rationality.

The scientist assumes that we both share these values. She assumes that we both believe that we ought to believe that which accords with physical evidence and that our sense instruments are trustworthy enough. Got it.

But say you don't immediately accept these. What evidence could the scientist provide you that proves you should value evidence? Or what logical argument could be given to you to show you that you should value logic?

The only thing that could be done would be for the scientist to demonstrate that I already value evidence and already value logic based on my other beliefs. If this can be shown then I ought also to accept the evidence that she is presenting or else be inconsistent.

But if I clearly don't value empirical evidence or logic in any way (which would be almost quite impossible) then nothing can be done for me. The scientist should dismiss me and leave me alone.

The thing is, descriptive "is" statements rest on implicit "oughts".

I don't see how you got here at all. This is just tagged on at the end but it doesn't follow from your example.

 

[poolerboy0077]

But if I clearly don't value empirical evidence or logic in any way (which would be almost quite impossible) then nothing can be done for me. The scientist should dismiss me and leave me alone.

Indeed, but that's the whole point of axioms.

To say that morality is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that the well-being of conscious creatures is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that a rational understanding of the universe is good.

No one really bothers with people who don't accept such axioms. We need not bother entering into these philosophical dead-ends. Making "is" statements depends upon assuming certain axioms -- many of which are normative as shown in the example above. Otherwise you couldn't even have a conversation of anything of value.

 

[Tree of Life]

Indeed, but that's the whole point of axioms.

To say that morality is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that the well-being of conscious creatures is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that a rational understanding of the universe is good.

I don't believe that morality is arbitrary, culturally constructed, or merely personal. So you're not communicating with my views here.

I'm simply saying that morals cannot be derived from rationality alone. I've not seen an answer to this one yet.

No one really bothers with people who don't accept such axioms. We need not bother entering into these philosophical dead-ends. Making "is" statements depends upon assuming certain axioms -- many of which are normative as shown in the example above. Otherwise you couldn't even have any conversation of anything of value.

So you're suggesting that we all begin with certain axioms and some of these axioms are moral axioms. Great. We are in agreement. Morality, then, is a starting assumption (axiom) and not derived from reason.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I would be interested to see how you would arrive at a moral conclusion without starting with a moral premise.

Well, you certainly have a lot of variables that go into it...

You've got a set of external societal-cultural-religious-other constructs telling you what is right and wrong.

You've got a set of internal constructs which you probably feel stronger about than the external constructs... and they will overlap in places with the external...other places, they won't. I'd guess these internal constructs are largely experience based.

They way down beneath them you have emotional constructs... which are partly based upon experience... partly upon biology. These change probably a lot slower and are felt more strongly than the other two.

Then way at the bottom...a set of very primitive urges...which are almost certainly entirely biological...extremely difficult to ignore...extremely difficult to go against. An example of this would be the urge to survive.

I imagine a moral judgement is largely a complex "negotiation" between all these sets...based entirely upon circumstances. Things as basic as proximity, personal knowledge, age, etc etc.

The result is an entirely personal opinion that reflects all of these things in some way and is unique and relative to each individual. Would you describe that process as "non-rational"? Because to me it seems entirely rational.

 

[Tree of Life]

Well, you certainly have a lot of variables that go into it...

You've got a set of external societal-cultural-religious-other constructs telling you what is right and wrong.

You've got a set of internal constructs which you probably feel stronger about than the external constructs... and they will overlap in places with the external...other places, they won't. I'd guess these internal constructs are largely experience based.

They way down beneath them you have emotional constructs... which are partly based upon experience... partly upon biology. These change probably a lot slower and are felt more strongly than the other two.

Then way at the bottom...a set of very primitive urges...which are almost certainly entirely biological...extremely difficult to ignore...extremely difficult to go against. An example of this would be the urge to survive.

I imagine a moral judgement is largely a complex "negotiation" between all these sets...based entirely upon circumstances. Things as basic as proximity, personal knowledge, age, etc etc.

The result is an entirely personal opinion that reflects all of these things in some way and is unique and relative to each individual. Would you describe that process as "non-rational"? Because to me it seems entirely rational.

I would describe it as non-rational. In saying this I do not mean that we are not reasoning at all. I mean that we start with moral feelings and then reason from those feelings to more concrete decisions.

As a contrast, we do not start with no moral feelings, do some brute reasoning, and then arrive at moral conclusions.

So rationality interacts with moral sentiment. But moral sentiment is not derived from reason alone.

 

[Tree of Life]

But then again, what you may be describing is a process of choosing which voices you'll allow to prevail in the given situation. Will you obey your primal urges? Will you submit to the pressures of culture? Will you listen to your past experience and emotional connections?

What standard would one use to guide them through such a complex decision? Whatever that standard is, it's something like a moral norm and you did not get it from rational processes.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

I don't believe that morality is arbitrary, culturally constructed, or merely personal. So you're not communicating with my views here.

I'm simply saying that morals cannot be derived from rationality alone. I've not seen an answer to this one yet.

So you're suggesting that we all begin with certain axioms and some of these axioms are moral axioms. Great. We are in agreement. Morality, then, is a starting assumption (axiom) and not derived from reason.

I agree with you. However, what are the implications of this realization for you? Are there any important implications?