Ooo, how
did I miss this
Hmm. I could take that several different ways.
Most people use Hume's definition that a miracle is a violation of physical law, but Lewis' definition is that a miracle is an interference in the physical world. I think that is an important distinction. It means that God doesn't reserve some right to do whatever he pleases - to behave according to whatever whim grabs his fancy in the moment, as if he had some bad tea one morning and in his grumpiness decided to wipe out Pharoh and his army. Rather (however one wants to view physical "law" - as a necessary expression of his nature, as something he invented, etc.) God makes a promise to interact with us in a specific way and he keeps that promise.
I think it is important to note that this idea is Biblical (Psalm 33:4), and it is an idea that extends beyond miracles to the promise of salvation, the problem of evil, etc.
It also explains why unbelievers can easily dismiss miracles - they will always have an explanation in physical law. I'm not saying that to give myself an excuse. Rather, I say it to acknowledge the challenge of discussing miracles.
It also means that God must be "outside" in some manner. If God were merely part of the material world, then any action he would take (no matter how powerful) would be a consequence of physical law rather than an interference in the physical world. And this is where the conversation starts to diverge - where AlexBP's comments on definition become important. It's where I repeat the same thing I've said many times.
The traditional Scolastic/Thomist approach is to next ask for definitions of God, definitions of material/immaterial. That's fine. I'm willing to play that game. But I want to know what the objective of my counterpart is in taking this approach. Is it to see how far philosophy can go, what it reveals, what it can claim, what questions it raises? That can be an interesting discussion. I enjoy it and I think such a discussion has benefits (see note*).
Or is it to find a flaw in my theology? Not gonna happen because this isn't the basis of my theology. Is it to better understand why I believe in miracles? Again, not gonna happen because this isn't my basis. I think this is what AlexBP is trying to say. If you're curious about why
I believe in miracles, you need to ask different questions.
*Note: I think this approach has one fatal flaw - an issue I've raised several times that is a tautological-type dilemma for both sides. Earlier I used a door as an example. Suppose there is someone who believes a door can be closed (which equates to believing in the material), but doesn't believe it can be open (which equates to not believing in the immaterial). If we successfully agree on a definition of "closed", by default the unbeliever is forced to accept that anything that isn't "closed" is "open". IOW, by the mere acceptance of a definition, a strong possibility for the alternative is admitted. As such, I don't think the argument over the definition will ever end.
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[edit] I forgot to add that we need to separate out some colloquial uses of the word "miracle" that AlexBP and quatona alluded to. Some people use "miracle" to mean something that was pleasantly unexpected, or something that happened which is beyond their understanding or beyond their ability. I don't think that is what the OP intended to discuss.
