Mind-Body Problem?

[Philosoph]

So,

I was just curious what a christian response to John Searle's currently undefeated solution to the classic mind-body problem would be? Do you agree? Disagree? Has he successfully defended Materialism? Are minds simply biological products of human brains?

I've been following this development and as far as I've seen their hasn't been a good dualist response to Searle. Has he dealt the death blow to the dualist position?

Hey, this is my first post. Any tips from any of you veterans?

Thanks,
God Bless

 

[vajradhara]

Namaste,


thank you for the post.

one tip... since you are dealing with a wide variety of individuals on this site, it may be easier to engender responses to your post should you explain the two positions briefly to frame the discussion a bit.

 

[openeyes]

Is this an argument on how all of our thoughts are just chemical reactions that differ due to other chemical reactions that have been produced by past stimuli?
That may be the root biological explaination, but there is a root biological explaination for conception too. Those that are spiritual have a far deeper look at both of these.

 

[Lifesaver]

Indeed, perhaps you could direct us to a good explanation of this argument, because in my (very little, so far) knowledge of philosophy Searle thinks that consciousness cannot be reduced to physical and chemical reactions and states. Isn't that correct?

Anyway, I have a question for materialists, which I also have never seen answered:

Look at a red ball. You have, in your mind, the image of this red ball you're looking at. However, this image exists nowhere in the physical world. It is not in your neurons (a scientist dissecting your brains would see such and such synapses as you look at the ball, but he would not see the ball) and it is not on the ball itself (the ball needn't even be there for you to see it, as happens with memory and hallucinations).
So, this image (and all other mental phenomena) definately does not take place anywhere in the physical world. It is purely mental.

 

[professor frink]

Anyway, I have a question for materialists, which I also have never seen answered:

Look at a red ball. You have, in your mind, the image of this red ball you're looking at. However, this image exists nowhere in the physical world. It is not in your neurons (a scientist dissecting your brains would see such and such synapses as you look at the ball, but he would not see the ball) and it is not on the ball itself (the ball needn't even be there for you to see it, as happens with memory and hallucinations).
So, this image (and all other mental phenomena) definately does not take place anywhere in the physical world. It is purely mental.

The image does exist between the red ball and the eye as red photons that have been reflected by the ball. They can be detected and interpreted using a photomultiplier tube and some other hardware

 

[Lifesaver]

The image does exist between the red ball and the eye as red photons that have been reflected by the ball. They can be detected and interpreted using a photomultiplier tube and some other hardware

Is it?
What if the ball is a hallucination?

Then there are no photons for the image, are there?

 

[professor frink]

Is it?
What if the ball is a hallucination?
Then there are no photons for the image, are there?

Thats what the second line of my post deals with. If there are photons, they can be detected with a pmt.

 

[Lifesaver]

But how can "red photons that have been reflected by the ball" be detected if there is no ball to reflect them in the first place (as it is with a hallucination)?

This has not been answered.

Plus, it misses the point that the photons are not the image. They must be interpreted by the mind to become an image. People with sensory disfunctions can be subjected to those same photons and instead of seeing a red ball they see a grey one (daltonics).

 

[professor frink]

But how can "red photons that have been reflected by the ball" be detected if there is no ball to reflect them in the first place (as it is with a hallucination)?This has not been answered.

You said that the image exists nowhere in the physical world. I explained that if there is an image, it exists between the ball and the eye as photons. I can't comment on the nature of hallucinations, because I am not a neurophysiologist.

Plus, it misses the point that the photons are not the image. They must be interpreted by the mind to become an image.

No. The photons are indeed the image. If those photons hit a light sensative film, there will be a chemical reaction. This can eventually be developed into a photograph, but that is not necessary. I could take that film, analyse it chemically and deduce what the image likely was, without ever actually seeing the image. Granted this would be very hard, but given enough time and patience, I could do it.

People with sensory disfunctions can be subjected to those same photons and instead of seeing a red ball they see a grey one (daltonics).

They still see the ball though. They just interpret red differently that you or I. Nonetheless, as I stated, I am no neuroscientist, so I cannot address what goes on in the brain.

 

[Lifesaver]

You said that the image exists nowhere in the physical world. I explained that if there is an image, it exists between the ball and the eye as photons. I can't comment on the nature of hallucinations, because I am not a neurophysiologist.

Well, if the situation with the photons (seeing an actual ball) and without them (hallucinating) have the exact same sensory experience and generate the same exact image (there is no difference in the mind between a hallucination and the real thing), then it is pretty clear that the image does not take place in the physical world at all, but only in the mind.

No. The photons are indeed the image. If those photons hit a light sensative film, there will be a chemical reaction. This can eventually be developed into a photograph, but that is not necessary. I could take that film, analyse it chemically and deduce what the image likely was, without ever actually seeing the image. Granted this would be very hard, but given enough time and patience, I could do it.

No, you couldn't. You could infer that the person was seeing a red ball, but the image itself you have no access to.

Think of bats: you can analyze their brains and the sound waves they receive and come to the conclusion the bat is sensing, through eco-location, a pillar ahead of him. However, you have no idea of the bat's experience of this pillar (it uses a sense we don't even possess). The same is true with the vision of others. You know what they are seeing, but you have no access to their vision.

They still see the ball though. They just interpret red differently that you or I. Nonetheless, as I stated, I am no neuroscientist, so I cannot address what goes on in the brain.

Indeed, and I have made it pretty clear all along that I'm talking about the image of the ball, and not of the ball.
It's the same ball for two people, but one sees it red, the other sees it grey. The photons and neurons are all the same, yet the experience is different. And it is this experience (the image of the ball), that I'm talking about. Not the physical elements which cause it to happen (photons).

There is a certain kind of photon that is called red, and everyone agrees that they produce an experience of something everyone calls red. But this red may be experienced differently by everyone. And this experience (the images, the smells, the sounds; NOT the photons, molecules and vibrations) does not exist in the physical world.

Basically, I think we both agree, but while I was using the subjective definition of image (what each person actually sees, experiences) you were referring to the physical definition.

 

[Philosoph]

Okay, first I think you have a misunderstanding of what materialism is and what a materialist believes. Greg Koukl makes the same error when he defends dualism by saying and I quote:

"Happiness, love, friendship, education, knowledge, ideas, virtues of all sorts. All of those things are not physical."

The misunderstanding is this, a materialist doesn't believe that all things are physical. It deals with the notion of the soul (mind, spirit, these three words are often seen as synonyms) and whether or not it is a spiritual thing or a physical thing. Searle says that minds (souls, spirits) are simply products of brains. Not that we don't have minds, but that minds are the physical product of physical things.

This "red ball" example you bring up isn't even a valid argument, because the red ball that you're thinking of is a concept. Just like "happiness, love, friendship, education, knowledge, ideas." There are many "concepts"; math is conceptual, no materialist is going to claim that the number 8 exists somewhere, because the number 8 is a concept. Granted, it can be represented in the real world in many ways (8 apples, 8 people), but those representations aren't the number 8. Because it's conceptual, just like thoughts.

Also your claim that you have never seen your "red ball" question answered is interesting, because it was a problem presented by dualists a while ago, and a while ago, it was answered.

Another point is this, science is only now coming to understand very rudimentary things about the inner workings of the brain. What is known is that when a person thinks about something certain things occur in the brain, chemical things, and what we can assume about those things is that those chemical things are what "a red ball" looks like when translated into information the brain can process.

I'll use the example of pictures. A picture. I can hold a picture. I can also put a picture onto a disk, and put that disk into a computer and see that picture on the screen, but it would be preposterous to think that the picture of my girlfriend on the screen is actually her standing inside my monitor. What it would be, as you know, is my girlfriend, translated onto celluloid, translated into binary, and displayed on my computer screen as tiny dots of light, organized into an image.

Does this clear up some of the issues?

God bless.

 

[Lifesaver]

The misunderstanding is this, a materialist doesn't believe that all things are physical. It deals with the notion of the soul (mind, spirit, these three words are often seen as synonyms) and whether or not it is a spiritual thing or a physical thing. Searle says that minds (souls, spirits) are simply products of brains. Not that we don't have minds, but that minds are the physical product of physical things.

Are you sure that Searle doesn't say that the cause of consciousness is physical but that the relation of brain states and mental states mutually cause each other?
What we know today is that when some phenomenom takes place in the mind, another one takes place in the brain, and that certain brain stimuli (electric shocks) can cause mental states.

This "red ball" example you bring up isn't even a valid argument, because the red ball that you're thinking of is a concept. Just like "happiness, love, friendship, education, knowledge, ideas." There are many "concepts"; math is conceptual, no materialist is going to claim that the number 8 exists somewhere, because the number 8 is a concept. Granted, it can be represented in the real world in many ways (8 apples, 8 people), but those representations aren't the number 8. Because it's conceptual, just like thoughts.

Why does the concept of a red ball make the argument invalid?

Also your claim that you have never seen your "red ball" question answered is interesting, because it was a problem presented by dualists a while ago, and a while ago, it was answered.

Haven't seen it.
I know that Colin McGinn still held a similar argument in his 2002 auto-biography The Making of a Philosopher.

Another point is this, science is only now coming to understand very rudimentary things about the inner workings of the brain. What is known is that when a person thinks about something certain things occur in the brain, chemical things, and what we can assume about those things is that those chemical things are what "a red ball" looks like when translated into information the brain can process. I'll use the example of pictures. A picture. I can hold a picture. I can also put a picture onto a disk, and put that disk into a computer and see that picture on the screen, but it would be preposterous to think that the picture of my girlfriend on the screen is actually her standing inside my monitor. What it would be, as you know, is my girlfriend, translated onto celluloid, translated into binary, and displayed on my computer screen as tiny dots of light, organized into an image.

No disagreements there.
We agree that a mind, separated from the brain and the physical world, exists (it would be impossible to deny it). What we disagree over is whether the relation between brain and mind is that of one-way cause and effect or whether both share a connection more complex than that.

Does this clear up some of the issues?

Yes.

God bless you too.

 

[professor frink]

Yeah, I think we do agree, and just took a really long road to figure that out. I concur that the experience of seeing doesn't exist outside the body. As a scientist I sometimes have trouble thinking of the perception since I am always trying to eliminate the influence of perception from experiments.

 

[Philosoft]

Well, if the situation with the photons (seeing an actual ball) and without them (hallucinating) have the exact same sensory experience and generate the same exact image (there is no difference in the mind between a hallucination and the real thing), then it is pretty clear that the image does not take place in the physical world at all, but only in the mind.

I don't think such a conclusion is justified. It's possible that rhodopsin activation in rods and cones is a discrete process - that individual photons are capable of differentially affecting pigments in those sensory cells in a pattern congruent with the physical matter in one's field of view.

Think of bats: you can analyze their brains and the sound waves they receive and come to the conclusion the bat is sensing, through eco-location, a pillar ahead of him. However, you have no idea of the bat's experience of this pillar (it uses a sense we don't even possess). The same is true with the vision of others. You know what they are seeing, but you have no access to their vision.

Well, we're still working with limited data. We can't yet analyze the physical interactions of photons and rhodopsins at atomic or quantum levels. I think at least we ought to wait until nanotech gives us this capability before we pronounce mental images separate from the physical realm.

Indeed, and I have made it pretty clear all along that I'm talking about the image of the ball, and not of the ball.
It's the same ball for two people, but one sees it red, the other sees it grey. The photons and neurons are all the same, yet the experience is different. And it is this experience (the image of the ball), that I'm talking about. Not the physical elements which cause it to happen (photons).

What do you mean the "neurons are all the same"? That is inarguably false. This is where we get into philosophical trouble - we look at the gross similarity of individual human brains and just blithely assume everyone is working with substantively identical equipment at all relevant levels.

There is a certain kind of photon that is called red, and everyone agrees that they produce an experience of something everyone calls red. But this red may be experienced differently by everyone. And this experience (the images, the smells, the sounds; NOT the photons, molecules and vibrations) does not exist in the physical world.

I think this asks for a level of scientific reduction that may not be possible. We have decided in advance that anything physical must be reducible to matter/force interaction but it isn't clear why subjective experience violates this postulate.

 

[Philosoph]

The red ball example is invalid because "the red ball" is a concept and concepts are obviously immaterial (which materialists would agree on).

Also, I never said that a mind exists apart from a body. As Searle would say minds are physical products of phyical brains. A mind can't be separated from a body.

I believe that Searle says that the relationship between brains and minds is reciprocal, but that the mind is initially caused by the brain.

The materialist would say that the mind is nothing more than the chemical reactions and electrical impulses in the brain. The Mind (soul, spirit) isn't non-physical.

God bless.

 

[professor frink]

The red ball example is invalid because "the red ball" is a concept and concepts are obviously immaterial (which materialists would agree on).

Also, I never said that a mind exists apart from a body. As Searle would say minds are physical products of phyical brains. A mind can't be separated from a body.

I believe that Searle says that the relationship between brains and minds is reciprocal, but that the mind is initially caused by the brain.

The materialist would say that the mind is nothing more than the chemical reactions and electrical impulses in the brain. The Mind (soul, spirit) isn't non-physical.

God bless.

How is a red ball a concept?

 

[Philosoph]

I'm not saying that red balls are concepts. I'm saying that the concept of red balls is a concept (ie: thinking about a red ball is a concept).

 

[professor frink]

ahh. I see.

 

[Lifesaver]

well, if it is not non-physical, the problem I raised remains. It needn't be with a red ball. Just choose any object right in front of you. Actually, pick any experience you have.
This experience, as it is, does not take place in your brain. A translated version of it does take place there (neurological synapses), but this is not what we call our experience.
To use your computer example, the binary version of the picture is translated into the screen version. Likewise, the brain version (neurons) is translated into the mental version (experience), or vice-versa, or both happen at the same time.

Leaving relations of causality aside, there is no denying that the neurons are not our experience; both are distinct things. Our experience is not the physical reactions of our brain.

I know you have a problem with this, but I can't understand what it is.

 

[professor frink]

I don't think the nature of thought is well understood by anybody. It is not yet known how the processes result in what we know as consciousness.