Mathematics

[quatona]

4. God's knowledge that Johnny will do x did not cause Johnny to do x.

Just in case this has escaped you even after having been pointed out numerous times:
This is not what´s being claimed.

 

[cOde_xix]

There are no sound arguments against free will.

Is there a sound argument for freewill?

 

[Patzak]

Super. Yes, I think we could agree on these 3 things.

I will add these:

4. God's knowledge that Johnny will do x did not cause Johnny to do x.

Fine. It doesn't really follow from any of the above, but it doesn't have any bearing on my argument either.

Hmm... Again, we may just have a communication gap. Omnipotence, as virtually all theology I read, has meant that that God has the maximum amount of power possible. It does not mean that he in fact does every single possible act, but simply that he has the power to do all acts. A much easier way of looking at this. I have the power of jumping. And yet I do not jump every second of every day despite having that power. God, if he is omnipotent, has the power to create life, create universes, create time, love, etc... If God doesn't create a universe every second then it doesn't diminish the fact that he does in fact have the power to create universes. If he creates a create that he can "operate" as a puppeeter would a puppet, then it doesn't necessitate that he actually operates it like a puppet. There still lies the possiblity that he could give the creature the ability to operate itself.

Yes, my inclusion of omnipotence might have been unnecessary; now that I think about it, it seems quite irrelevant to the issue - except perhaps that it ensures against the appearance of any additional causes that would go against God's will. I didn't mean to argue that because of his omnipotence God is the direct cause of every action we take. However, as the creator he is the only possible indirect cause for it.

So, if I rephrase, I could also say it like this:
The possibility of omniscience or perfect knowledge of the future implies that the future is somehow determined. I think you'd have to agree that if I am supposed to know something about the future ("know" as in really know, know with absolute certainty - which I suppose is the way God knows everything), that something has to be fixed and not susceptible to change. Again, at this point, it doesn't matter how the future is determined, only that it has to be already determined at the point when the prediction is made.

So it follows that if God is omniscient and thus not limited by time in any way, his perfect knowledge of the future (that he had even before creation - or, if you think speaking of "before creation" is meaningless, at its precise moment) implies a totally deterministic universe. And since it was all determined before creation or at its precise moment, the only possible cause that determined it was God himself.

It's the ability for the creature to operate itself within certain limits that makes that creature "free" (as I am using the term).

Different definitions of free will are probably the root cause of this argument. The way you phrase it here, I'd have to agree with you - I'm not arguing against the ability of a creature to operate itself; my brain certainly operates my body and some parts of my brain operate the other ones, etc.. Although I'm arguing for determinism, I don't feel like a puppet - I feel myself in control of most of my actions - it's just that I think that this feeling of control is ultimatelly an illusion, that there is no soul or whatever that would be exempt from universal causality. Although, interestingly enough, my materialistic view of the universe could possibly include such occurences (random acausal events), while your theistic view that includes an omniscient creator doesn't seem to allow them.

I'm sorry. you glossed over whether or not a creature is capable of deciding it's own actions. If God has the ability to control us, and if God sees us act at every moment in time, it still does not logically suggest or even imply that he has decided to control our actions.

Again, I'm not trying to argue for a God that continuously has to control everything we do; only that perfect knowledge of the future at the point of creation implies a deterministic future with creation being the only possible determining cause.

 

[quatona]

Is there a sound argument for freewill?

Is there a clear and consistent definition of freewill, to begin with?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Is there a clear and consistent definition of freewill, to begin with?

It is the effort to have things both be deterministic and indeterministic at the same time.

 

[Code-Monkey]

So, if I rephrase, I could also say it like this:
The possibility of omniscience or perfect knowledge of the future implies that the future is somehow determined. I think you'd have to agree that if I am supposed to know something about the future ("know" as in really know, know with absolute certainty - which I suppose is the way God knows everything), that something has to be fixed and not susceptible to change. Again, at this point, it doesn't matter how the future is determined, only that it has to be already determined at the point when the prediction is made.

My argument is that from God's perspective, there isn't a "future". He doesn't "know" something that will happen tomorrow. From his perspective it's as if he sees everything in the present. So essentially we are saying, God sees us make choices, therefore we do not have choices. It simply doesn't follow.

It's the same thing when we look at stuff in the past. From that context it's extremely easy to see how knowledge of an event did not determine that event to happen. It has no bearing on whether or not that event could have happened differently. The knowledge that x happened is only correct if in fact x did happen. It's extremely easy for us to understand that for the past and for the present. But when we speak of events that are going to happen in the future, all of a sudden it no longer makes sense to people and our knowledge somehow determines events. It just simply doesn't follow.

If I know Bob chooses x in the future, then yes, Bob chooses x in the future. Whether or not Bob could have made a different choice is irrellevant to the fact that Bob must choose something in the future. Both determinism and free will directly imply that if looking into the future is possible, then we would see Bob choose x, and if we watched time progress and Bob comes to that moment in time, then he will choose x. Free will necessitates that to be the case.

So it follows that if God is omniscient and thus not limited by time in any way, his perfect knowledge of the future (that he had even before creation - or, if you think speaking of "before creation" is meaningless, at its precise moment) implies a totally deterministic universe. And since it was all determined before creation or at its precise moment, the only possible cause that determined it was God himself.

Although I'm arguing for determinism, I don't feel like a puppet - I feel myself in control of most of my actions - it's just that I think that this feeling of control is ultimatelly an illusion, that there is no soul or whatever that would be exempt from universal causality. Although, interestingly enough, my materialistic view of the universe could possibly include such occurences (random acausal events), while your theistic view that includes an omniscient creator doesn't seem to allow them.

Anytime a claim is made and people are asked to believe that everyone is experiencing some sort of illusion, I have to say that I'm simply skeptical. That frankly is the biggest hurdle the determinism idea has (from my perspective).

The bottom line seems to come down to these questions::

If I see you do x at the moment you do x, then is it possible that you freely chose? (for this I think the answer is pretty easily Yes)

If I guess that you will do x and then you do x, then is it possible that you still freely chose? (I think we can all definitely answer Yes to this too)

When God "looks into the future", does he see it as it happens, or is he sort of "guessing" what will happen?

If God sees it as it happens as he looks into the future, then clearly free will is possible.

If God is simply guessing (and he's a perfect guesser) at what will happen in the future but he doesn't actually see it happen, then there is still no real threat to the idea that people are freely choosing their actions.

The only way we can say there is no free will (for people) is to start with the assumption/premise that it is impossible for an agents to make uncaused choices (uncaused by anything external to that agent). Of course this then implies that we must have an infinite regression of cause/effects. But in the end it's just an asserted assumption that we must be asked to accept in order to follow the determinism argument.

 

[Code-Monkey]

Is there a sound argument for freewill?

free will is the default view. there are no sound arguments for determinism. There are good inductive arguments against determinism as far as people's actions go.

 

[quatona]

free will is the default view.

Is it?

there are no sound arguments for determinism.

Not?

There are good inductive arguments against determinism as far as people's actions go.

That statement finally convinced me.

 

[quatona]

From that context it's extremely easy to see how knowledge of an event did not determine that event to happen.

I understand that it is easier for you to refute this claim rather than the one made, but now that you have been reminded of the fact that this is not the claim made roughly ten times in this thread alone, I think this gets a little boring. Just my opinion.

 

[Code-Monkey]

I understand that it is easier for you to refute this claim rather than the one made, but now that you have been reminded of the fact that this is not the claim made roughly ten times in this thread alone, I think this gets a little boring. Just my opinion.

It is unfortunate that people just don't understand how occam's razor works. If knowledge adds nothing to the causation of the action, then we cannot consider it.

So the argument against free will is the exact same as saying, God, who has no idea what will happen in the future, creates agents, who must in turn do what God wants them to do, and thus they cannot act on their own accord.

Do you understand why this reduces the "no free will" argument to a mere assertion?

It does get boring when people will admit something but then refuse to apply logic to what they just admitted.

 

[Code-Monkey]

I understand that it is easier for you to refute this claim rather than the one made, but now that you have been reminded of the fact that this is not the claim made roughly ten times in this thread alone, I think this gets a little boring. Just my opinion.

I do also happen to find it curious when people argue against free will as if others had a choice in the matter. Maybe if we get more rain then I'll buy into your argument, right?

 

[quatona]

It is unfortunate that people just don't understand how occam's razor works. If knowledge adds nothing to the causation of the action, then we cannot consider it.

I think you are mistaken here. If it rains we will conclude that there are clouds in the sky (although the rain doesn´t cause them). Indication, not causality.

 

[quatona]

I do also happen to find it curious when people argue against free will as if others had a choice in the matter. Maybe if we get more rain then I'll buy into your argument, right?

Maybe, if rain inspires your brain activity.
Whilst usually, it´more like if your arguments (in relation to all other factors involved) leave me no choice but accepting them, I will accept them.
Mere change doesn´t make a good argument for choice.

 

[:æ:]

My argument is that from God's perspective, there isn't a "future".

From his perspective it's as if he sees everything in the present.

Either there is a future, or there isn't a future. If there isn't a future from God's perspective, then despite all appearances from our perspective there isn't a future either. What seems to be past, present and future is merely an illusion.

If there isn't a future in reality, then time doesn't exist, and all events exist at once. If God created the universe, then He created all of the events to exist at once. God therefore caused all of the events in the universe at once.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

free will is the default view. there are no sound arguments for determinism. There are good inductive arguments against determinism as far as people's actions go.

Indeterminism screws free will just as well.

 

[Natro]

Either there is a future, or there isn't a future. If there isn't a future from God's perspective, then despite all appearances from our perspective there isn't a future either. What seems to be past, present and future is merely an illusion.

If there isn't a future in reality, then time doesn't exist, and all events exist at once. If God created the universe, then He created all of the events to exist at once. God therefore caused all of the events in the universe at once.

thats one of the problems of being timeless.

 

[one love]

I don't know why the title to this discussion is "Mathematics". But let me comment, if go d exist, he must be able to do something impossible by human standards such as constructing an impossible planar triangle or multiply two primes with the result a prime, etc.....

 

[Natro]

I don't know why the title to this discussion is "Mathematics". But let me comment, if go d exist, he must be able to do something impossible by human standards such as constructing an impossible planar triangle or multiply two primes with the result a prime, etc.....

If God is able to do illogical things then God is pure choas.