Language and discourse, and, while we're at it, reality

[wryan]

Hey Fiendishjester,

When I say cause and effect, I’m using this as an illustration to show that language does work on a certain level, which you agree with. I do see your point about circular reasoning in perception of a word... hmmm...let me try and clarify a bit more where I believe our differences lie.

You said

“Now, for Wryan, when I say language is a foundationless system, I'm not saying it doesn't work, there are probably billions of examples showing that it does. I'm simply saying it has no foundation.”

My thoughts are that if language does work, on any level, then to me that would point to some sort of a foundation between our individual perceptions of certain things. Like the example I used earlier. Let’s say we were looking at a toy block that we both agreed was blue. Now, what I call blue and what you call blue might be completely different inside of our own minds’ perception. The same thing goes with the terms “block”and “toy”. However, if we’re sitting in a room with this toy block and I ask you, “Fiendishjester, please hand me the blue, toy block.” and you hand it to me, than something meaningful has taken place. Despite our differences in perception, we both understood each other enough to perform a desired action. I would say that if their was no foundation, no bridge between our individual perceptions, than their would be absolutely no understanding of any kind between us, let alone enough to perform what seems like such a simple task. I would argue that in this instance you perceived enough to know that I wanted whatever it was that we were talking about. Whether the block appeared red and round to you, or green and triangular, you knew enough to know that what you gave me was what I was asking for.

Now I cannot define with exact parameters where our perceptions are alike or different, but I can see that somehow they seem to be linked in one way or the other. Not just linked to themselves like a dictionary term, but linked in something physical that we can see or touch. Cause and effect is simply the method of examining this. I asked for the block(cause), and you gave it to me(effect). At the very least, we can agree that I was asking, and that was understood. You might say we might not agree on just what “asking” means, but you understood enough to give me the block, and that shows a link, a bridge, a foundation that is outside our unique perceptions enough to branch into at least a minimal form of understanding between us. If it was totally baseless, then that is to say that the whole of language and communication is merely an elaborate illusion which to me seems very unlikely. Perhaps I’m just misunderstanding here. When I think of a “base” I’m thinking of something that connects our individual perceptions to each other in enough of a way that we can communicate on some level. If their was nothing that connected or was alike in our individual perceptions than it seems impossible to me that we could have even the illusion of communication.

Well, I hope this clarifies what I was trying to say with cause and effect. Thanks for listening. Bill

 

[Brimshack]

To some extent I would say that the commonalities in linguistic practice should be approached as a behavioral issue. Yes, we seem to use the word 'blue' to describe the same range of colors, and we can even use scientific analysis to examine the spectral qualities of the colors so described. So, we can make a maximal case for a link here between linguistic practice and the natural world. This must be qualified in two ways:

1) Their is a gap in our evidence about the private perceptions at issue. The fact that we use'blue' to describe the same range of hues on the color spectrum tells us that we are each able to distinguish them; it does not exactly tell us anything about the experiential quality that each of usassociates with the color. (it's exactly that quality which we can't explain to a blind man that we cannot explain to ourselves either.) All we do know is that we both use the word to denote the same range of hues.

2) To the extent that their is a common element it is precisely created by language. It is our language that tells us how to chop the color spectrum (and the rest of the world) up into various clusters of meaningful concepts. A common language language is what created the commonality in the first place, by giving us a common tenmplate by which we can organize information. Thus the ability to communicate affectively about such matters mey tend to illustrate the idea of language shaping reality. And since language is NOT a private phenomenon, it makes sense that it would involve shared usages. So, the real problem is not whether or not individuals share common experiences through language, but to what degree to different linguistic communities have common experiences? And to what degree are they different?

 

[wryan]

To some extent I would say that the commonalities in linguistic practice should be approached as a behavioral issue. Yes, we seem to use the word 'blue' to describe the same range of colors, and we can even use scientific analysis to examine the spectral qualities of the colors so described. So, we can make a maximal case for a link here between linguistic practice and the natural world. This must be qualified in two ways:

1) Their is a gap in our evidence about the private perceptions at issue. The fact that we use'blue' to describe the same range of hues on the color spectrum tells us that we are each able to distinguish them; it does not exactly tell us anything about the experiential quality that each of usassociates with the color. (it's exactly that quality which we can't explain to a blind man that we cannot explain to ourselves either.) All we do know is that we both use the word to denote the same range of hues.

Agreed 100%. Brings to mind the Elephant Man movie years ago where he tried to teach his blind girlfriend colors by her sense of touch. Red=hot, blue=cold, etc.

2) To the extent that their is a common element it is precisely created by language. It is our language that tells us how to chop the color spectrum (and the rest of the world) up into various clusters of meaningful concepts. A common language language is what created the commonality in the first place, by giving us a common tenmplate by which we can organize information. Thus the ability to communicate affectively about such matters mey tend to illustrate the idea of language shaping reality. And since language is NOT a private phenomenon, it makes sense that it would involve shared usages. So, the real problem is not whether or not individuals share common experiences through language, but to what degree to different linguistic communities have common experiences? And to what degree are they different?

Very interesting point. If I'm understanding correctly, you're saying that language is a template that we place our perceptions into in order to share them(our perceptions) with others, even though our understandings of different concepts may be totally different apart from the shared template. This might shape individual reality, in that my initial perceptions may be altered in order to fit them into the template of language, which just might change the way I view the world. The commonality is that as a group we all molded our individual perceptions into the template. The commonality is not neccesarily the individual perceptions themselves, but the template their placed into.

As for the last two questions you asked, can you give some examples? I have some ideas, and another question I might want to add but I want to be sure I'm understanding your point before I jump in too deep. Thanks Brimshack. Talk to you soon. Bill

 

[Brimshack]

A common element: Negation. Every language has a way to say 'no'. This may be evidence of something like a universal.

Different: Eye contact (a form of paralinguistic communication). To some cultures eye contact is a form of aggression. In such cultures, to look an authority in the eye is an act of defiance. In others eye contact is a sign of respect. In such cultures to look an authority in the eye is aknowledgement that you are listening to them. People raised according to these different standards will perceive a simple gesture in radically different terms.

I fired those off fast. Let me know if they don't work, and I'll try to think of something else.

 

[wryan]

These examples work fine Brimshack, thanks.

You mentioned "universal" here and this is along the lines of what I was questioning after your last post. Let's again use "negation" as an example.

I would say that every language that has a way to say "no", also has a way to say "yes". When we're saying "universal" here, are we saying that something like antithesis(yes/no, good/evil, right/wrong) is possibly universal to human perception, or that something like antithesis is universal as applied to truth or reality outside of perception?

What I'm asking is are we to view these examples of similarity between languages as evidence of universal truth, or evidence of universal perception(which could be two very different things)?

Going along with these thoughts, the question I wanted to add to your last two was how is language formed? My guess is that even though in practice language is a template that our perceptions are molded into, at it's beginning it is an individual's(or group's) perception that is used to create the template in the first place. Do you think I'm looking too deep into these things, or off track?

Look forward to hearing your thoughts. Bill

 

[Brimshack]

I would say that negation is purely a function of language, not perception. So, that would be an example of a possible universal in language, not in any kind of pre-linguistic perception.

As to how language is formed, I'm not sure what you mean. If you mean by that what forces created language, I'm afraid that I have no clue, and I suspect that most competent linguists would decline to say that have an answer themselves. If you mean how is it formed as a general matter, i.e. what sort of process is it, then the answer would vary depending on the school in question. Behavioralists used to say it was formed via operant conditioning. The MIT school would claim it was due to an innate faculty of language, and Language and Culture types would simply wish to emphasize the role of social processes in the generation of language forms. Take you pick.

 

[wryan]

Hey Brimshack,

Thanks for bearing with me here.

you said.

I would say that negation is purely a function of language, not perception. So, that would be an example of a possible universal in language, not in any kind of pre-linguistic perception.

My guess, and all I can do here is guess, would say that negation is a part of pre-linguistic perception. I say this just because an individual wanting, or not wanting something seems very basic to me. Even as a new born we determine likes and dislikes before we can neccesarily communicate them. Whenever a decision confronts us at any age, we have to choose to say yes to some things, and no to others, even without any communication of these decisions to the outside world. I don't know that I can prove this, and again I apologize if I'm simplyfying this too much, or am off track. It's obvious you know more about linguistics than me, but I am trying to learn, so that's why I ask.

You said.

As to how language is formed, I'm not sure what you mean. If you mean by that what forces created language, I'm afraid that I have no clue, and I suspect that most competent linguists would decline to say that have an answer themselves. If you mean how is it formed as a general matter, i.e. what sort of process is it, then the answer would vary depending on the school in question. Behavioralists used to say it was formed via operant conditioning. The MIT school would claim it was due to an innate faculty of language, and Language and Culture types would simply wish to emphasize the role of social processes in the generation of language forms. Take you pick.

My belief's at this point are probably a mix of MIT and Language/Culture in that I do believe it's innate, but I also believe the form it takes is influenced by social processes. I appreciate your insight here. Bill

 

[Brimshack]

Thanks Bill, as to negation being prelinguistic, you may be right, but I wouldn't necessarilt say its a part of perception. One doesn't see a whole bunch of nots:

My computer is not a lizard.
My computer is not Liza Manelli (who is thankfully not singing).
My computer is not an amoeba.
My computer is not an artichoke.

No, I perceive my computer as it is, and when someone suggests otherwise, negation enters the picture as a way of denying the utterance I have just encountered. I think negation doesn't begin until some kind of speech gets the issue on the table. But it must be a fundamental part of meaning to be so ubiquitous in the range of human languages. It is of course possible to reduce language to binary systems. It may be that negation is a fundamental component of all sign systems. The meaning of a word not just a question of what it refers to. It is also a question of what it excludes.

 

[wryan]

Thanks Bill, as to negation being prelinguistic, you may be right, but I wouldn't necessarilt say its a part of perception. One doesn't see a whole bunch of nots:

My computer is not a lizard.
My computer is not Liza Manelli (who is thankfully not singing).
My computer is not an amoeba.
My computer is not an artichoke.

No, I perceive my computer as it is, and when someone suggests otherwise, negation enters the picture as a way of denying the utterance I have just encountered. I think negation doesn't begin until some kind of speech gets the issue on the table. But it must be a fundamental part of meaning to be so ubiquitous in the range of human languages. It is of course possible to reduce language to binary systems. It may be that negation is a fundamental component of all sign systems. The meaning of a word not just a question of what it refers to. It is also a question of what it excludes.

Hey Brimshack,

Your right on track with where I was going when you mention binary systems. I also see your point with the computer analogy, and agree that the world is a much better place without Liza Manelli singing , but how about decision making?

For instance, if I decide I want to take a walk right now, am I not also deciding not to write on the computer? We can take the analogy down to newborns(or before language is understood), and still I would think that in order to choose yes to anything, one must also choose no to whatever other options are considered. The question is, is negation simply a bi-product of acceptance or a conscious decision that must operate in order for us to choose or accept anything?

Bringing perception into the mix, I would think that preference(which I'm assuming is a part of individual perception) must involve both acceptance and denial. The newborn likes banana flavored baby food, but dislikes the carrot flavor. So when faced with a choice between the two(and whether or not the new born can adequately express it) if it had a choice between banana and carrot it would say yes to banana, and no to carrot. This is why I'm thinking that acceptance, as well as negation, are present in perception even before the advent or understanding of language. Put simply, because negation seems neccesary for acceptance to exist in decision making of any kind. Bill

 

[Fiendishjester]

(In the voice of the incompetent doctor from the Simpson’s)
Hello everybody!

Well, I'm finally back, sorry for not posting for so long, but I've been a tad pre-occupied with packing for my summer vacation and what not. But, as I said, I'm back, so, not to fear, Ben is here, lol. Well, I still have this to say, although language usually obtains the desired effect of getting food and what not, I still think its "competence" (for lack of a better word) is artificial.

First let me add to how I think language was created. Obviously, I, like everyone else, do not know for sure, but this is what I think. From a purely evolutionary perspective, I would say that it was developed so that humans could communicate more specific ideas with each other, instead of saying, there is food, we could say, there is foot thirty paces north east, or, there is a snake near your foot Ben, instead of saying, Snake!. I would think then, that the main point of language would be to communicate ideas.

Now, as I have said before, I would think it would be impossible to actually communicate your fuoll idea, while I might say such and such is, hot, I have never reallyexplained what hot is, and therefore when i say when you touch something hot and it hurts, well, i have never really said what hurt is. I think the same would apply for negation. The same way date rapers say "when you say no, you really mean yes" yes and no also become meaningless, no can mean any number of different things, but in the end, lkike all other words, it doesn't mean anything, I think it's a futile attempt at conveying what you feel/think/percieve. Now, like I said before, it gets the job done, if you want food or something, you can ask for it, and most likely get it, but, there will always be a lack, you will never truly get across what you wanted to another person or thing.

I still think reality doesn't exist, but I have run into a slight problem, I can't seem to explain spontinuity. I think you both believe in reality, so I'm probably just giving ammo to the enemy(although you two are far from my enemy, you're just of the different (and wrong ) opinion) but do you have any explinations for it. The best i could come up with is that we make up rules for our own reality (or unreality) and so we inadvertantly create spontaneous things, but, any ideas are appreciated.

Feels good to be back,
Ben.

 

[sad astronaut]

While you folks ponder these questions, I'm perfectly happy spending my days working my job, playing x-box, and drinking chocolate milk.

Read Ecclesiastes sometime. Interesting book.

 

[Brimshack]

I'm short on time, so I'll reread all these later, but as to believing in reality, I have very little use for such an abstraction. But I would add that using discourse analysis as a means of deconstructing reality is no more nor less constructing a form of reality. If both ways are fashions of speaking, then why oppose metaphysical implications, except that its a fashion of speaking indexically grounded in certain collegiate milieu?

 

[Fiendishjester]

erm, k, a couple of questions

1: what does "indexically" mean, I tried looking it up and no results were found.
2: instead of "except" did you mean "accept", if not, could you please clarify the sentence, because it is very confusing.
3: What metaphysical implications are you tlking about.

after you answer these questions, I'd be happy to respond, but at this momentand time, I am proud to report that I am thoroughly confused.

 

[Brimshack]

Interesting, Wryan:

"…and still I would think that in order to choose yes to anything, one must also choose no to whatever other options are considered."

I think this sentence is the key to your current question, or at least i will use it to illustrate the point of my response.

Note that you mention other options considered. This entails some cognitive awareness of the other options. Since all human cognition as we understand it involve the influence of language, this means that the choice is already linguistic. I would argue that this is even the case with respect to the baby (semiotic might be a better word, but I'm already leaning too hard on jargon). This is because whatever associations the baby has formed of the food will serve as meaning structures by which the decision will be made. Perhaps the child hates carrots, and perhaps he just hated the fact that his diaper hadn;t been changed and his mommy was yelling the last time she tred to feed him something with that taste. In such cases secondary meaning formations and arbitrary relationships are already being formed. But more importantly, the decision requires some awareness of the options. Those optionsnot recognized are not negated in the strong sense of the term, the are not consciously selected against. So, the act of weighing different options would require something beyond mere perception, and that gets language its foot in the door.

 

[Brimshack]

FJ:

A) I think your acount of language is too object-centered. You are asserting that the point of language is to enable people to talk about the object world in which they find themselves. (Talk about believing in 'reality'!) What you overlook in this explanation is the role that language plays in helping people relate to one another. Words like 'mother' and 'father' describe types of relationships, gestures and paralinguistic communication communicate emotion - often towards thee person you are talking to, and even descriptions of the object world are often about social relations (thus myths often inscribe social patterns into an account of the world itself - dreamtime narratives spell out land claims, Genesis tells us how family life works, etc.). It is at least as possible that the driving force in early language was this interpersonal function, rather than the descriptive function that you have …er, described.

B) The full idea that you cannot communicate as you say is actually a quality of experience. No that cannot be communicated, but is that ever the intent of communication? The word 'beer' denotes a kind of liquid, and its meaning is defined socially. When I speak of beer I am only occassionally trying to describe my sensory experience of beer. Most of the time I am just trying to call people's attention to a class of liquids that can be defined objectively (with varying degrees of accuracy). So, the irreducibility of experience may be an interesting phenomenon, but it is seldom central to the analysis of communication. Language is public; it is learned, and it is learned from others. No one speaks a private language, at least not as a native speaker. So, the significance of language is always found in public interaction, not in the ineffible qualities of private experience.

C) In answer to your last set of questions:

2) No, I meant 'except'.

3) The metaphysical implications that I was talking about were belief in reality, which you appear to attribute to me and Wryan, and yet deny yourself. This seems very much in keeping with the MO for Foucault fans, and I was responding by way of saying that no such metaphysical implications need be…

a) …implied from our own speech.
b) …denied in order to accept that discourse shapes reality.

Reality is an abstract collection of all the res (things) in the world (another abstraction). As such reality is not merely a real, as it were, entity, but an ideological construction, subject to the same discursive affects as any other. One may assume that objects are real in that they appear to resist some discursive possibilities (e.g. you may say that food is merely matter, or that it has spiritual qualities, and either way you will be fine, but if you choose to believe it should never be eaten, this discourse-world will die along with you …assuming you act on that.) without accepting any naieve belief in an objectively real world or reality.

1) An index is a sign that points to the context of the speech act which produces it. They are also called deictic markers (deixis is Greek for 'to point'). They serve to generate an interactive framework around whatever is talked about. Examples of deictic markers are pronouns ('I' refers to the speaker of the sentence using it, not to any specific person, 'you' to the person addressed, 'he/she/it' to someone not present, or someone we wish to insult by speaking as though they were not there, …or perhaps compliment by speaking as if they were so powerful their legacy eclipsed all personal relations), locatives ('Here/There', 'Now/Later'), or even some aspects of grammer (e.g. Tense and Aspect - Past tense = prior to this moment, present tense = at this moment, future aspect = modal 'will' + present tense of the verb and thus a reference to THIS MOMENT) and other demonstratives (this, that). My point was that when one speaks of discourse as a fashion of speaking and reduces a world view to a convention of social practice (a very Foucaultrian thing to do, no?), then one is of course engaing in a social practice onself. And hence it is fair to suggestion that the insistence that 'reality' be reduced to the conventions of a given social milieu (Sp?) is little other than another metaphical representation (of reality as reducible to social practice) that is, as it were, reducible to the conventions of a given social milieu.

Stuff that in your non-pipe and smoke it, Frenchie!!!

 

[wryan]

Interesting, Wryan:

"…and still I would think that in order to choose yes to anything, one must also choose no to whatever other options are considered."

I think this sentence is the key to your current question, or at least i will use it to illustrate the point of my response.

Note that you mention other options considered. This entails some cognitive awareness of the other options. Since all human cognition as we understand it involve the influence of language, this means that the choice is already linguistic. I would argue that this is even the case with respect to the baby (semiotic might be a better word, but I'm already leaning too hard on jargon). This is because whatever associations the baby has formed of the food will serve as meaning structures by which the decision will be made. Perhaps the child hates carrots, and perhaps he just hated the fact that his diaper hadn;t been changed and his mommy was yelling the last time she tred to feed him something with that taste. In such cases secondary meaning formations and arbitrary relationships are already being formed. But more importantly, the decision requires some awareness of the options. Those optionsnot recognized are not negated in the strong sense of the term, the are not consciously selected against. So, the act of weighing different options would require something beyond mere perception, and that gets language its foot in the door.

Hey Brimshack,

Your thoughts here seem to be grounded in language going hand in hand(or having influence) with human cognition from/during the formation of cognition itself, which I hadn't thought of. My view to this point has been that cognition begins as something mutally exclusive apart from language, but as language is introduced it's influence changes the way an individual's cognition is organized so that the two become almost interchangeable when trying to study what influenced what. I guess it's alot like a "what came first the chicken or the egg" question. Is cognition a direct result of language's influence, or does cognition exist before language is introduced, and then changed/molded as the child begins to use language as a way of re-organizing his/her thoughts?

Either way, your points about association are still valid, and something I didn't take into account. I thought about how I always associate the smell of the ocean to my childhood.

Going along, I agree with you that options one is not aware of cannot neccesarily be considered an act of negation(as you said their not consciously selected against). My problem, as I said, is I'm not sure that the cognition of options is always intertwined with language(I'm talking about before language is introduced/understood here). My feeling is that possibly, their was a point before language is understood by an infant when perceptual associations are made, but then, as language is introduced, these associations are more clearly defined as the child grasps for a way to communicate and understand them.

Can you see where I'm coming from here?

Talk to you soon. Bill

 

[Brimshack]

Hello Wryan:

More or less, but I would consider such a prelinguistic phase pretty close to beyond understanding, and if it does exist at any stage, then it may be sufficiently unrelated to adult cognitive operations that any conclusions drawn about it may not help us understand adult cognition. I would also add that even a baby has some linguistic competencies. I don't know how psycholinguists determined this, but they say that a baby can recognize the language of his parents when it is first born. Also the dance of facial expressions between a baby and his mother. These are not only expressions of emotions, but of a social relation. Within the first 6 monbths the baby should already be learning to link his own smile with a response from his mother. Thus he is already learning pair-part structures, a principle that flows into regular language exchange:

"Have you got the time?"
"Yeah, it's 7:30."

If someone just says 'yes' as an answer your expectation is violated in much the same way that a baby cries when he smiles at his mother and gets no response.

A baby can also communcate a lot with tone, and he can recognize tone as well. These are a fundamental part of communication as well.

So, you see I am reluctant to draw any conclusions about a non-linguistic or prelinguistic form of consciousness, whether its in a baby OR an adult. I just see to many elements of language in all areas of human behavior.

 

[wryan]

While you folks ponder these questions, I'm perfectly happy spending my days working my job, playing x-box, and drinking chocolate milk.

Read Ecclesiastes sometime. Interesting book.

Sad Astronaut,

I hate to steal your thunder, but I'm Christian and have read Ecclesiastes many times. You might note that according to Ecclesiates working your job, playing your xbox, and drinking your chocolate milk are all folly and vanity, so with the way you worded your post, your charges seem a bit out of place. I'm not saying these things are wrong, I do the same thing(although I don't like my job so much and I prefer a good pepsi over chocolate milk), it's just that if you would have pointed out that philosophy doesn't interest you, or that you think it's un-Godly(and shown just why you think so) your point might have been better recieved. Another thing is you didn't point out just what part of Ecclesiates you were referring to.

Take a look at this passage.

CCLES 12:9 And further, because the Preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge; yea, he pondered, and sought out, `and' set in order many proverbs.
ECCLES 12:10 The Preacher sought to find out acceptable words, and that which was written uprightly, `even' words of truth.
ECCLES 12:11 The words of the wise are as goads; and as nails well fastened are `the words of' the masters of assemblies, `which' are given from one shepherd.
ECCLES 12:12 And furthermore, my son, be admonished: of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.
ECCLES 12:13 `This is' the end of the matter; all hath been heard: fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole `duty' of man.
ECCLES 12:14 For God will bring every work into judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.

Remember that the entire book of Ecclesiates is about Solomon's quest for truth, which is precisely what we're all seeking here. My thoughts are that in the passage above Solomon is not saying it is wrong to seek after truth. He is saying that we must keep in mind that fearing/seeking God and keeping His commandments are important facets of finding truth, and without this comes "much weariness of flesh."

Here's the thing, both Brimshack and Ben are not Christian. Chances are you can quote the bible to both of them until your blue in the face, but I don't think that would change things. What you can do is meet them where their at and share why you believe what you do and let them make their own decisions on their own terms. Look up Paul's expierience at Antioche if you want a biblical refrence to what I'm saying. The truth is I'd be very happy if both Brimshack and Ben became Christians, but I'm not here to shove my beliefs and ideologies down their throat, and I'll respect and like them just the same no matter what road they choose.

Now I'm not posting all of this just to jab back at you Sad Astrounaut, I'm trying to hold the mirror you put on us back on yourself so you can see where I'm coming from and why I get so frustrated at things like this. I apologize if this post comes across as mean spiritied, I didn't mean it to be that way. The truth is that I get very frustrated because I see many of my fellow Christians treating non Christians as 1.evil heathens or 2.notches on their salvation post ,and I'm strongly opposses to both attitudes. Their is nothing wrong with disagreeing with the views you see here. All I ask is that you take the time to show just why you disagree and just what you think would be a better way to go about things. Ask yourself was the point of your post to condemn us, or to show what you feel God's view is? I hope it was the latter, and if so, all I ask is that you approach it a little differently, you might be suprised. Thanks for listening. Bill

 

[wryan]

hmmm. I wrote my last post assuming sarcasm in your post sad astronaut. Looking at it this morning I'm thinking you could have been sincere and I just mistook you. If so, please let me know, I'll have no problem eating crow. Lord knows sometimes I think I was born with my foot in my mouth.lol Bill

 

[vajradhara]

Namaste all,

i've read all the posts in this thread and found them quite fascinating.

i would like to offer this bit to the collective thread topic:


Phonetics, Phonology, and the Middle Way

Among other things, the Buddhist tradition has excelled in metaphysics, ie. the investigation into the nature of reality and the awareness of it through knowledge and experience. What I want to do here is introduce my favorite system of Buddhist metaphysics, the Madhyamika (Sanskrit, adj., "Middle Way"), and demonstrate the applicability of its concepts to some issues that currently engage the modern field of linguistics, particularly the delimitation between the fields of phonetics and phonology.

I. A Brief Synopsis of Madhyamika

Madhyamika originated as a dialectic method to explain apparent contradictions in early Buddhist pedagogy and, in doing so, to more convincingly articulate Buddhist views on ontology and epistemology. The argument goes something like this:

If one wishes to expound on Truth, as all religions and philosophies do, then one must first justify the source and derivation of that Truth. Upon consideration, such derivation can only come from two sources: materialism and idealism. In the former, the laws that govern physical reality are the Absolute Truth from which higher phenomena proceed; atheism and "scientific determinism" are examples of this view. In idealism, a non-physical entity such as mind, consciousness, the soul, or a transcendent god/s are an Absolute Truth which projects an experiental world perceived as real. Revealed religions and solipsism exemplify this second view.

Madhyamika proponents argued that the correct view would have to meet certain criteria which defined Absolute Truth:

* An Absolute Truth would have to be absolute in the sense that it is infinite, having neither beginning nor end.

* It would also have to be independent, not depending on any causes or conditions for its existence, meaning that it cannot be reduced to constituent parts.

* Further still, it would have to be eternal and unchanging, for if not it would mean that Truth would be moving between two or more Absolute states (each with a different set of attributes), meaning that none of these states would really be absolute.

The Madhyamika dialectic (and, in practice, meditative) method demonstrates that these criteria defeat both materialism and idealism -- neither view can logically reach a point at which an infinite, independent, and immutable Truth is posited. Materialism will always end with some physical particle that is still inextricable from a contextual system; idealism will always end with an infinite regress of speculated intangible entities beyond either knowledge or experience. Both results are illogical. Therefore, all religions and philosophies that try to rationalize their claims to know Absolute Truth are also illogical, because they are all predicated on one of these two flawed views.

Opponents of this analysis protest on the grounds that reality must be true in some sense, because it is known and experienced. To this the Madhyamika school proposes its "doctrine of two truths": There are relative truths by which the perceived world exists through causes and conditions, and there is Absolute Truth, which is beyond causes and conditions. Because all of our knowledge and reason is composed of only relative truths, it can never be employed to reveal Absolute Truth.

(Though we have now said what we needed to say about Madhyamika dialectics at this point, I will go ahead and complete the argument instead of leaving the curious reader guessing. Feel free to skip down to Part II if you want.)

The importance of this analysis becomes apparent when placed within the context of Buddhist soteriology; it needs to demonstrate the non-Absoluteness of phenomena to validate its moral doctrine. Because all material or ideal phenomena are relative rather than Absolute, any hope of attaining Absolute happiness and fulfillment through them are doomed to failure. Thus, the satisfaction of desire always remains incomplete, and the subsequent desire leads to further suffering. The end of suffering can only be achieved by the relinquishing of desire, and the relinquishing of desire can only be achieved by recognizing that the object of any desire has no Absolute reality to it.


II. Interdependent Origination as a Linguistic Principle

What does any of this have to do with linguistics?

The idea that no phenomenon exists unconditionally (without reference to another) is termed "interdependent origination" or "mutual co-arising" in Madhyamika literature (Sanskrit
pratityasamutpada). This means that no category is entirely discrete, because some of its features are derived from other categories.

Phonetics and phonology have traditionally been thought of as discrete ways of approaching the study of linguistic articulation. Phonetics is described as cross-linguistic, segmental, and quantifiable. Phonology, in contrast, is described as language specific, procedural, and rule-governed. Because of this complementary distribution of attributes, linguists have been content to see and use them as separate domains, each with its own governing rationale. Yet the problem has always been that they ultimately study the same thing -- language. How can it be that two opposites conceptualize the same object?

Madhyamika offers us a different perspective. We need not think of phonetics and phonology as two different methods describing one object, but rather one object with a set of attributions ("causes and conditions" if we want to continue using Madhyamika terms) from which each method selects to suit its own purposes. So the question perhaps is not whether a language is ultimately constituted of forms or rules, but rather, what is the sum of forms that constitute a language and what rules arrange those forms into a meaningful whole?

As the reader is aware by now, the utility of the interdependent origination concept is not limited to the phonetics-phonology debate. If we can get in the habit of seeing language as a set of attributions give function and structure by various analytical methods, instead of an absolute objective phenomenon reducible to only one interpretation, then we give ourselves as linguists a little more license as we trangress the boundaries that separate the various sub-disciplines of our field. In point of fact, we already do it anyway, so it serves our purposes to justify it!

III. Summary with Analogies from Physics

To reiterate: Linguistics has traditionally treated language as an object whose defining characteristics will be revealed through methodical study. In practice, different, though equally valid, methodologies have yielded different answers. This has been regarded as something of a paradox, because we expect language to be one definite thing with one definite set of characteristics.

By applying the Madhyamika perspective, we can instead treat language a different way. Instead of an object separate from the methodology which investigates it, we should recognize that the object (language) is in part constituted of the methodology, because the methodology in part determines the attributes of the object. For example, phonetics looks for discrete units of articulation, so it finds them; phonology looks for productive rules of articulation, so it finds them.

It may seem unacceptable to admit to this paradox, but it might be more palatable when we see that analogous situations work just fine in physics. For many years physicists debated how light traveled, in waves or in particles. Now we know that both wave mechanics and quantum mechanics work fine in explaining different properties of light, the "better" explanation depending on what property one chooses to study at a particular time and for a particular purpose.

The electron is another good example. In the standard model of the atom, it is a particle that orbits the nucleus. More current models prefer to see the electron as an obital cloud expressed by a probability function. Again, which model is better or "truer" depends on what one wants to see.

Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle states that the motion of a quantum particle can never be known, because the act of observation necessarily disturbs that motion. Perhaps language is the same way: To use one methodology may yield the answer to one arbitrarily isolated facet of language, but it does so at the cost of alienating other parts -- the observation of one part disturbs the whole.

The Madhyamika admonition against the positing of absolutes is thus well taken. The properties of language are likely interdependent both among its constituents as well as upon its observers -- linguists. Language is not reducible to fundamental parts but rather to fundamental relationships. And to understand it in an absolute way would be as impossible as explaining Absolute Truth.

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