Then this may be a 'brain-twirler' for you then(?)I'm open to arguments. But my current position is that it doesn't exist.
Which of the axioms do you think isn't real?The free will theorem of John H. Conway and Simon B. Kochen states that if we have a free will in the sense that our choices are not a function of the past, then, subject to certain assumptions, so must some elementary particles.
It's above my pay grade, Self. I may read up on that.Then this may be a 'brain-twirler' for you then(?)
Free will theorem:
Which of the axioms do you think isn't real?
I think it would be of little value to argue that someone's reasons for making a choice weren't their reasons(?)Yes - randomness apart, I don't understand how or why you could or would make a choice without having some basis for it. It seems to me that expressing one's 'will' is to act on some causal history of preference, desire, need, etc. IOW you choose something because <some reason(s)>. If my choices weren't based on my personal experiential history, they wouldn't be my choices.
I think it would be of little value to argue that someone's reasons for making a choice weren't their reasons(?)
A choice might be made with no foresight, knowledge, or experiential causal history. (The chooser might just not know). Inspiration may not need a personal experiential history. Excitement might be generated in the moment simply by making a choice .. for no particular reason(?)
Which is why I didn't say any of that ... (or did I)?It would be your reason if you make a choice. But it must be based on previous and current circumstances. Otherwise it would be truly random and not in any way free will.
Make a decision and it will always be because X, Y and Z. Is it not valid to say that X, Y and Z caused the decision?
It would be your reason if you make a choice. But it must be based on previous and current circumstances. Otherwise it would be truly random and not in any way free will.
Make a decision and it will always be because X, Y and Z. Is it not valid to say that X, Y and Z caused the decision?
If it's not random, then it was caused.The most confusing part of free will debates is that people think that randomness is the secret ingredient that gives you free will. I really and truly don't get it.
Well yes, obviously - when you take any action as a result of a choice, you are influencing something with that action.So where you make a choice, say, as in a quantum experiment, you are involved in the process of how it unfolds because of your choices in how you conducted that experiment, then?
OK - I wasn't considering accidental or reflex actions as choices... did you have something else in mind?A choice might be made with no foresight, knowledge, or experiential causal history. (The chooser might just not know).
Can you give an example?Inspiration may not need a personal experiential history. Excitement might be generated in the moment simply by making a choice .. for no particular reason(?)
The point is that QM (2 slit duality, entanglement, etc) provides ways to break the causal closure of classical physics thinking, which can produce acausal consequences for the classical physics thinking brain especially when it comes to measurement/observation. This completely alters the way we think about the concept of free will.Well yes, obviously - when you take any action as a result of a choice, you are influencing something with that action.
Not sure what you're getting at here.
.. Which is not surprising .. given that no-one 'gets' what QM's experimental results are leading us towards either, eh?The most confusing part of free will debates is that people think that randomness is the secret ingredient that gives you free will. I really and truly don't get it.
.. All statements which completely ignore the intrinsic uncertainties inherent in its various assertions .. as well as the results of the 2 slit experiment.If it's not random, then it was caused.
And if it was caused, then it was not chosen, except by the original cause.
You'll have to explain why the stochastic nature of QM outcomes (assuming a non-deterministic interpretation) is relevant to free will. I don't see how inserting a random component helps free will.The point is that QM (2 slit duality, entanglement, etc) provides ways to break the causal closure of classical physics thinking, which can produce acausal consequences for the classical physics thinking brain especially when it comes to measurement/observation. This completely alters the way we think about the concept of free will.
My description is causal, deterministic, and so a necessarily compatibilist one. So there's no problem with how it might be realised. Whether one accepts that as a valid description of free will is moot - I think most philosophers would say it's as close as you're going to get. Some, e.g. Sam Harris, don't think it is; others, e.g. Dan Dennett, do think it is.The focus shifts from what free will is, (which leads to statements like: 'If my choices weren't based on my personal experiential history, they wouldn't be my choices') to how free will might be realised (the latter of which, is a scientific enquiry, whereas the former points to a philosophical one, which, historically, goes nowhere fast).
Is there any evidence that 'the mind plays its subtle influences on the outcomes'? If that was the case, we would expect the outcomes to deviate from the expectation values of the Schrodinger equation under those subtle influences, but they don't appear to.By avoiding the import of QM's results, one ends up going back around the causal loop which just promotes inane conversations leading back to concepts like 'First Cause' as a conclusion, 'which must therefore, be true'.
Realism coupled with the casual loop closure presented by classical physics is not the way to solve problems where the mind apparently plays its subtle influences on the outcomes. Until the mind's influences become distinguished (and thence its influences incorporated into scientific models, rather than being arbitrarily discarded), the scientific picture of reality will only be a partial and incomplete view.
I wasn't focused on 'randomness' (Ie: I believe you just introduced that into the conversation .. no, what I'm focused on here, are the philosphical implications of QM's experimental outcomes for classical mechanics, the latter of which does not allow for free will because it is causally closed.FrumiousBandersnatch said:You'll have to explain why the stochastic nature of QM outcomes (assuming a non-deterministic interpretation) is relevant to free will. I don't see how inserting a random component helps free will.SelfSim said:The point is that QM (2 slit duality, entanglement, etc) provides ways to break the causal closure of classical physics thinking, which can produce acausal consequences for the classical physics thinking brain especially when it comes to measurement/observation. This completely alters the way we think about the concept of free will.
Moot or not, its an attempt at taking a purely philosophical position whilst ignoring the basis of support from physics.FrumiousBandersnatch said:My description is causal, deterministic, and so a necessarily compatibilist one. So there's no problem with how it might be realised. Whether one accepts that as a valid description of free will is moot - I think most philosophers would say it's as close as you're going to get. Some, e.g. Sam Harris, don't think it is; others, e.g. Dan Dennett, do think it is.
I'm referring to the QM Measurement problem, Schrodinger's Cat, Entanglement, Wigner's Argument and recent 'in principle' counter arguments such as this one, (for eg).FrumiousBandersnatch said:Is there any evidence that 'the mind plays its subtle influences on the outcomes'? If that was the case, we would expect the outcomes to deviate from the expectation values of the Schrodinger equation under those subtle influences, but they don't appear to.
You talked about 'acausal consequences' - acausality is generally equated with randomness, and observational outcomes in QM are stochastic (although the process as a whole may be deterministic, depending on your preferred interpretation).I wasn't focused on 'randomness' (Ie: I believe you just introduced that into the conversation ..
What must the present be able to be different from?what I'm focused on here, are the philosphical implications of QM's experimental outcomes for classical mechanics, the latter of which does not allow for free will because it is causally closed.
As far as the free will connection goes, what I logically argued previously, was the counterintuitive statement that:
'For free will to be possible, the present must be able to be different .. which is actually a counterfactual statement in classical physics'.
Compatibilism is just the various ways of acknowledging that human experience is of making choices and treating others as choice-making agents, whether the universe is deterministic or not. IOW in practice, everyone lives as if they, and others, have free will - as Isaac Bashevis Singer memorably said, "We must believe in free will, we have no choice".I don't care for Compatibilism .. in fact I don't have a clue what such arguments are about, and neither do I think scientists care about them either(?)
These are all examples of what happens when quantum systems interact, become entangled and, in turn, become entangled with the environment - and we are quantum systems - and yes, it does contradict intuitive, classical ideas of the nature of reality; but that doesn't imply that 'the mind plays ...subtle influences on the outcomes' any more than it does in classical physics. The conclusion of the Phys Org article pretty much makes that point.I'm referring to the QM Measurement problem, Schrodinger's Cat, Entanglement, Wigner's Argument and recent 'in principle' counter arguments such as this one, (for eg).
No. Free will is essentially your ability to think or not. To focus your mind or drift. Free will is not about randomness on my view. The concept random as it is usually used means denotes our lack of ability to predict something. If by random you mean an exception to the law of causality, I would point out that free will or choice is not an exception to causality but an instance of it.Think about it, when you`re having a massage the only reason it feels so good is because it`s random, right, so a machine couldn`t do the same thing, don`t that prove that the randomness in the movement of hands prove that the person has free will?
Its a pity the so-called 'law of causality' there, isn't any law of Physics, (I might add) ..No. Free will is essentially your ability to think or not. To focus your mind or drift. Free will is not about randomness on my view. The concept random as it is usually used means denotes our lack of ability to predict something. If by random you mean an exception to the law of causality, I would point out that free will or choice is not an exception to causality but an instance of it.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?