Is science at odds with philosophy?

[Landon Caeli]

Which only says that it would probably be a good idea to be at least as much of an expert in a relevant area as Einstein in mathematics before one takes their "new idea" as interesting.

...One method of learning is 'probing'. Everyone thinks and learns a bit differently - some like to have it all layed out, others pick at areas of interest in a way that might seem unorthodox, but works better for them.

That's why we should be patient with people who think in different ways than we do.

...And I'm sure Einstein would have admitted that he was learning even up to his final breath.

 

[sjastro]

I don't suppose Albert Einstein was parroting things already known when he came up with new ideas.

...I read once that his ideas were so successful because he was not only an expert mathematician, but he was able to mentally visualize things better than most people.

Einstein was not the gifted mathematician as some would think.

Marcel Grossman was the brains behind the maths of general relativity.

In another example while Einstein originated the concept of gravitational waves he grew cold of the idea by the 1930s.
Einstein's mathematics in disproving gravitational waves was destroyed by Howard Robertson one of the founders of the Big Bang Theory.
Even Einstein Doubted His Own Gravitational Waves

 

[SelfSim]

Einstein was a visionary, and understood philosophy at a young age
....
I would say it was his abilities at being an expert mathematician and a philosopher that made him the true polymath that he was.
..
One method of learning is 'probing'. Everyone thinks and learns a bit differently - some like to have it all layed out, others pick at areas of interest in a way that might seem unorthodox, but works better for them.

That's why we should be patient with people who think in different ways than we do.

...And I'm sure Einstein would have admitted that he was learning even up to his final breath

I've been thinking about these posts and I think you might be trying to distinguish the human aptitude for conceptual learning, (or how easily someone achieves some level understanding of a new concept)?

Beyond just recognising the basic cognitive aptitude we all clearly have however, you are also advocating more respect (patience) for the widely varying modes of thinking people employ in their attempts at climbing those conceptual mountains/hills?

The thing is, understanding most of the counterintuitive concepts in science or mathematics, requires thinking in very specialised, constrained (and disciplined) ways.
Philosophies, in general, embrace completely different, much broader approaches in thinking about everything. That approach however, tends to result in a loss of focus on the goal of understanding the counterintuitive concepts we're confronted with, in science's frequently complex models for the universe/nature.

Its not easy to loosen the attachments people acquire for their own preferred philosophies/worldviews. If they really are interested in wielding scientific thinking and concepts, their pre-assumptions about reality have to be relaxed in order to absorb, hence understand, what science produces when it has something to say about reality/existence.
That is of course, in the case where they are more interested in doing that, as opposed to the rather futile attempt at 'defeating' it.

 

[Landon Caeli]

I've been thinking about these posts and I think you might be trying to distinguish the human aptitude for conceptual learning, (or how easily someone achieves some level understanding of a new concept)?

Beyond just recognising the basic cognitive aptitude we all clearly have however, you are also advocating more respect (patience) for the widely varying modes of thinking people employ in their attempts at climbing those conceptual mountains/hills?

The thing is, understanding most of the counterintuitive concepts in science or mathematics, requires thinking in very specialised, constrained (and disciplined) ways.
Philosophies, in general, embrace completely different, much broader approaches in thinking about everything. That approach however, tends to result in a loss of focus on the goal of understanding the counterintuitive concepts we're confronted with, in science's frequently complex models for the universe/nature.

Its not easy to loosen the attachments people acquire for their own preferred philosophies/worldviews. If they really are interested in wielding scientific thinking and concepts, their pre-assumptions about reality have to be relaxed in order to absorb, hence understand, what science produces when it has something to say about reality/existence.
That is of course, in the case where they are more interested in doing that, as opposed to the rather futile attempt at 'defeating' it.

Yes, trying to constantly defeat things is just a bad practice, IMO, even though it's hard not to sometimes. That's why I like the idea of 'appreciating differences of opinions', because later on, if one holds onto that appreciation, he can use it if his perceptions change... But to cut it off completely, out of total rejection, might remove the chance of using it later on with continued learning.

Also, I find that fitting counterintuitive, scientific concepts into 'big picture' philosophies can be done with some level of optimism, and doesn't necessarily require scrapping entire ideas. It just means more care needs to be taken. And I also think it's bad practice to try and force someone into adopting the counterintuitive concepts against their will... For instance, I would never, ever tell Mickey Hart that sound waves and vibrations are meaningless. It would break his heart and wouldn't be helpful for anyone if he's onto something new.
From the big bang to cosmic vibrations, Grateful Dead’s Mickey Hart plays the rhythm of the universe

...Good points you bring up, for sure.

 

[SelfSim]

To illustrate how even popular philosophies like Philosophical Realism and beliefs in associated articles of faith in that, are irrelevant to science, imagine two electricians:

They both have to make the lights go on in a house. One applies a model for electricity because it might be true, or truly exists, in some "material" (or physical) reality. The other uses the same model because it has proven to make lights come on, but is well aware that is a working model and does not think it "refers to" some material/physical reality, which truly exists independently from him.

Does anyone really think there's any demonstrable difference there, in how they get the lights on?

So if someone thinks there is a difference, it is purely because of some article of faith they hold in Philosophical Reality. I see no difference other than that one person likes to believe in the key principle of Philosophical Realism, even if they don't know it exists, and the other does not add that article of faith, knowing that it has no evidence-based effect on getting the lights on.

The real reason we use all these models is they work, not because they "might refer" to something which exists "in material (or physical) reality". The latter notion is just superfluous.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I'll call ya on that from time to time y'know .. (No complaining about that from now on then, eh?)

Sure, it's just a rule of thumb. It's best to avoid assumptions and beliefs if you want to avoid the potential problems they can entail.

I don't recall complaining about it, although I might argue the point.

It's worth distinguishing between unconscious assumptions (belief-lite) and conscious assumptions, ('for the sake of discussion'). Often in philosophy, and also in science, conscious assumptions are unstated, under the also unstated assumption that it's understood that they're useful in the context.

 

[SelfSim]

It's worth distinguishing between unconscious assumptions (belief-lite) and conscious assumptions, ('for the sake of discussion'). Often in philosophy, and also in science, conscious assumptions are unstated, under the also unstated assumption that it's understood that they're useful in the context.

Surely all assumptions are consciously made? Any assumptions I make when I'm unconscious are just dreams!?

The important distinction there, (IMO), is whether an assumption has actually been distinguished by the assumer, or hasn't. Some assumptions which the assumer is relying upon, whether they recognise it or not, can be traceable back to beliefs, (perhaps philosophical). In that case, there's likely to be big arguments.
For example, (from my last post and one of my favs), take the assumption that material (or physical) things actually exist independently from our minds when there is exactly zip objective evidence for that. In that case, someone, (ie: the assumer), may well just not recognise that their entire argument is based on that belief.

I don't understand what you mean by 'belief lite', I guess(?) A belief is still a belief, no matter how 'lite' you believe it as being. I say: 'Man up and admit its a belief' .. its ok by me to believe in things .. just acknowledge that's what it is, then move on!
Almost never see that happen though .. always the claim on reality ensues(?)

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

So the question we should be asking is, why does it work so well to imagine that chairs possess a property of facilitating sitting, and why the measurement of said facilitation can be regarded as something objective?

We value sitting, and 'chair' is a signifier of something that facilitates sitting. The measurement of such facilitation is experiential and associative - we have sat on something similar, we can imagine sitting on it, or we have been told we can sit on it; typically, we infer that it was made for sitting on.

Clearly none of that holds until one has already a concept of useful degree of precision for measuring such a property .. which is of course, the key concept that underpins all of quantitative science.

I'm not sure an explicit concept is generally necessary. All activities require a useful degree of precision in some respect, but it rarely needs conceptualising as such. Certainly, science makes it explicit.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Surely all assumptions are consciously made? Any assumptions I make when I'm unconscious are just dreams!?

By unconscious assumptions, I mean the things we assume without consciously thinking about them; things we take for granted, like water coming out of the tap when you turn it on.

The important distinction there, (IMO), is whether an assumption has actually been distinguished by the assumer, or hasn't.

If by 'distinguished', you mean explicitly acknowledged, or become aware of, then that is the same distinction I'm making.

I don't understand what you mean by 'belief lite', I guess(?) A belief is still a belief, no matter how 'lite' you believe it as being.

I mean implicit assumptions, things we take for granted, like if we park our car outside the house it will still be there in the morning. Contrasted with the beliefs that form the foundations of our worldviews.

 

[stevevw]

Armchair philosophy isn't going to tell you what nature is.

I'm not saying philosophy is going to tell us anything. Its more so it will ask the question. My point was that a scientific materialists view will try and tell us what nature is which is beyond the scientific measure.

Ultimately some questions are meaningless, such as asking what the fundamental stuff of reality or nature is made of, or questions about what such abstractions are. They're useful abstractions, defined in vague terms of what we observe and how we categorise those observations.

I agree.

What is a chair, really? What is a game, really? These concepts are also just useful abstractions, e.g. something you can sit on (defining a game is not so easy).

I actually said computer screen. I was using them as examples to say that these are what we think of as representing reality because we can feel and see them. But matter is not necessarily a true representations of reality because for all we know we could be in some simulation. Or as some scientists have claimed everything is mental so we are only percieving this as what we call real.

"While many scientists presume materialism to be true, we believe that quantum mechanics may provide hints that our reality is a mental construct.
https://bigthink.com/surprising-sci...elf-into-existence?rebelltitem=7#rebelltitem7

So that is why philosophy is meaningful in questioning what actualy makes up reality. As mentioned there is a common 'belief' that under the materialist view which seems to be the common position for most scientists that matter is all there is.

So scientists make assumptions about what nature is based on this and measure accordingly. But its the further claim by many scientists that materialism is the only way we can determine things that is a philosophical and metaphysical claim and they cannot possibly make that claim.

 

[The Barbarian]

Most scientists will tell you that science is only methodologically naturalistic, and can't even comment on the possibility that the supernatural exists. It can't deny such things.

On the other hand, philosophy does include things that are also the province of science. There was a time when philosophers were also competent scientists. The Ionian Greeks, for example were so scientifically astute that they would have been puzzled by the OP question. Science grew out of philosophy. The issue is that science turned out to be a method so very capable of explaining natural phenomena, that philosophy seems weak and divided compared to science.

But it's not so. Until recently, biologists were expected to have a grasp of philosophy. Something Ernst Mayr mentions in What Evolution Is.

Philosophy, like science, depends on facts and reason. And science depends on philosophy, particularly in the areas of epistemology and logic.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I'm not saying philosophy is going to tell us anything. Its more so it will ask the question. My point was that a scientific materialists view will try and tell us what nature is which is beyond the scientific measure.

I already explained why that isn't the case. It's an equivocation to confuse two different meanings or usages of the word 'nature'.

... matter is not necessarily a true representations of reality because for all we know we could be in some simulation. Or as some scientists have claimed everything is mental so we are only percieving this as what we call real.

Who is suggesting that matter is 'necessarily a true representations of reality'? What is that even supposed to mean?

Scientists come up with all kinds of untestable fringe ideas about the fundamental nature of reality, which make no difference at all to either physics or everyday life. Most people take what they perceive to be real, unless they have good reason to think otherwise.

I think the available evidence suggests consciousness is a brain activity, so I give very low credence to ideas involving panpsychism, but the idea that information could be self-organising is not so far-fetched - plenty of systems are self-organizing and information is fundamental in that, but as it is, it's too vague to comment. But why anyone thinks that a (pseudo)scientific idea being compatible with ancient Hermetic and Indian philosophy is noteworthy, I don't know.

So that is why philosophy is meaningful in questioning what actualy makes up reality.

Philosophy has always questioned the nature of reality - it's called metaphysics.

So scientists make assumptions about what nature is based on this and measure accordingly.

Nope, as previously explained.

But its the further claim by many scientists that materialism is the only way we can determine things that is a philosophical and metaphysical claim and they cannot possibly make that claim.

Of course they can make the claim - many scientists claim a belief in the supernatural, which is generally a theological claim - so what?

 

[Ophiolite]

I actually said computer screen. <snip>

So that is why philosophy is meaningful in questioning what actualy makes up reality.

I've juxtaposed these two separate elments in your post because they prompted a thought in my mind.

Computer screens used to IIRC function with an electron beam striking a phosphor dot, causing it to emit photons that were captured by the viewers eye. Now we've got some sophisticated system of LED's or what not (I've not kept up to date). But the perception is the same, regardless of the mechanics. I'm not sure that what's behind the scene matters all that much. I view reality in much the same way.
It would be interesting to disentangle the mechanism, the underlying reality, but I'm not much troubled that we haven't yet done so. I'm much more interested in the details of what we perceive: how important is pore pressure in nappe formation, does the 'D' layer rugosity have any impact on mantle plume formation; will Berretini defeat Djokovic; have I run out of smoked salmon?

 

[SelfSim]

By unconscious assumptions, I mean the things we assume without consciously thinking about them; things we take for granted, like water coming out of the tap when you turn it on.

Ok. I call those hidden assumptions. Ie: they're hidden, or missing from a given conversation, (for whatever reason).

Assumptions can be based on the process by which we create beliefs, or they can be based on the combination of logic applied to ideas which have already been objectively tested via the scientific method.
The important thing to note there, is the respectively dissimilar methods underpinning the assumptions and not so much that they're assumptions.

If by 'distinguished', you mean explicitly acknowledged, or become aware of, then that is the same distinction I'm making.

Cool .. (I think we're on the same page there, then). Distinctions are way more useful than definitions.

I mean implicit assumptions, things we take for granted, like if we park our car outside the house it will still be there in the morning. Contrasted with the beliefs that form the foundations of our worldviews.

Well I know of people who have woken up and found their car was missing, so those people wouldn't see much contrast there now, would they?
(I would say the water out of the tap example you gave above however, provides the contrast you mean there.)

 

[SelfSim]

I've juxtaposed these two separate elments in your post because they prompted a thought in my mind.

Computer screens used to IIRC function with an electron beam striking a phosphor dot, causing it to emit photons that were captured by the viewers eye. Now we've got some sophisticated system of LED's or what not (I've not kept up to date). But the perception is the same, regardless of the mechanics. I'm not sure that what's behind the scene matters all that much. I view reality in much the same way.

Don't you mean when you describe the perception the screen(s) are giving you there, as being your meaning of reality in that viewing moment .. which differs a lot from saying that you're viewing, (or looking onto), reality "in much the same way"? Ie: it all starts with the perception there and who know's what's going on behind that (it doesn't really matter)?

It would be interesting to disentangle the mechanism, the underlying reality, but I'm not much troubled that we haven't yet done so. I'm much more interested in the details of what we perceive: how important is pore pressure in nappe formation, does the 'D' layer rugosity have any impact on mantle plume formation; will Berretini defeat Djokovic; have I run out of smoked salmon?

So you're saying that its the perception then, which, when articulated, conveys to others what's real to you based on that perception (as you just demonstrated there)?

 

[SelfSim]

.. And science depends on philosophy, particularly in the areas of epistemology and logic.

I was agreeing with you there, until I got to your above final conclusion.

I would say that the steps in Logic originally distilled by ancient philosophers, has been seconded and made useful in the fields of science and mathematics. Logic's posits (or its so-called 'Laws of Thought') are a different matter entirely. Logic steps, inarguably (IMO), provides the consistency in science's repository of objective knowledge (and the same in math's repository of theorems, tautologies, etc).

The classical philosophical definition/meaning of Epistemology however, has undergone major reworking after being considered from within the scientific method. Philosophers may look into science's research and visualise the essence of Epistemology but Science, more or less by necessity, has now largely replaced it, (IMO). Its a case of: acknowledge the historical sources of the field, but recognise that it has now evolved fundamentally, because of science.

In the above, hopefully clarified sense, and for what its worth, I can't agree with the generality implied in the statement: 'science depends on philosophy, particularly in the areas of epistemology and logic'.

 

[The Barbarian]

I would say that the steps in Logic originally distilled by ancient philosophers, has been seconded and made useful in the fields of science and mathematics.

Yes.

Logic's posits (or its so-called 'Laws of Thought') are a different matter entirely.

Yes. In particular, quantum mechanics and brain function would seem to be problematical for the law of the excluded middle at least.

Logic steps, inarguably (IMO), provides the consistency in science's repository of objective knowledge (and the same in math's repository of theorems, tautologies, etc).

Agreed.

The classical philosophical definition/meaning of Epistemology however, has undone major reworking after being considered from within the scientific method. Philosophers may look into science's research and visualise the essence of Epistemology but Science, more or less by necessity, has now largely replaced it, (IMO). Its a case of: acknowledge the historical sources of the field, but recognise that it has now evolved fundamentally, because of science.

In the above, hopefully clarified sense, and for what its worth, I can't agree with the generality implied in the statement: 'science depends on philosophy, particularly in the areas of epistemology and logic'.

Like Popper's notion about what can be done with a theory?

 

[SelfSim]

Like Popper's notion about what can be done with a theory?

As an aside: Apologies .. that section I wrote contained an autocorrected word: 'undone', instead of what I meant which was 'undergone'. (Now edited in that post).

Can I ask specifically what you meant in your above question? (Not sure which parts of Popper you're referring to there).

 

[The Barbarian]

As an aside: Apologies .. that section I wrote contained an autocorrected word: 'undone', instead of what I meant which was 'undergone'. (Now edited in that post).

The context was clear enough that I saw what you meant.

Can I ask specifically what you meant in your above question? (Not sure which parts of Popper you're referring to there).

If I understand Popper correctly, he believed that the one thing scientists could do with theories is refute them. That's useful because when a theory is refuted, it opens the door for further understanding as a new and more accurate theory, consistent with new information, can be constructed.

 

[SelfSim]

If I understand Popper correctly, he believed that the one thing scientists could do with theories is refute them. That's useful because when a theory is refuted, it opens the door for further understanding as a new and more accurate theory, consistent with new information, can be constructed.

Oh .. ok.
So if I understand, your general line of query there might be: Has Popper's falsification of scientific theories concept been replaced, (ie: sort of overwritten), by the complexities inherent in the myriad-mesh of interrelated scientific theories?
If so, then think it has .. and any results hinting at falsification of a specific theory buried in amongst that mesh, are sort of glossed over in the positivistic rumble towards the view that the future will likely sort out those point discrepencies.
(Mind you, that's also one reasonable way of looking at those issues too, I think? IMHO.)