is omnipotence logically possible?

[tcampen]

We're faced then with a conundrum then huh? If the God we call aint omni-anything, it ain't much of a God.

It's cool that you're questioning these kinda things, but some things in life that ARE INSOLUBLE ... like WHY I AM THIS, WHY I AM THAT, WHY DO MORALS EXIST, WHY DO I LIVE, WHY DIDN'T GOD MAKE JESUS EUROPEAN, HOW CAN AN OMNIPRESENT/OMNISCIENT/OMNIPOTENT GOD EXIST WHEN IT FAILS TO MEET STANDARDS OF LOGIC?

I CONSIDER ALL THESE TO BE PERIPHERAL ISSUES BECAUSE KNOWLEDGE ON ALL THESE WOULDN'T BE CONDUCIVE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF SALVATION, ANYWAY!!!

Like I've been saying, I have no problem with those who recognize these issues and openly admit belief in something that is not logically supported. We all have those aspects in our lives. My problem is with those who claim such insolvable dilemmas do make sense.

to a skeptical mind, there will be issues upon issues, heaps of em, to resolve...and unless THEY ARE WHOLLY RESOLVED, a conception of GOD or to push the issue further, a JUST GOD, will ALWAYS appear INCONCEIVABLE to a skeptical mind ...

It's not just "inconceivable to the skeptical mind" as the issue, but inconceivable to ANY reasonable mind. This is where faith bridges the gap between the knowable and unknowable, the logical and illogical, the reasonable and unreasonable. However, faith is a matter of individual determination. I have issue with those who claim such a subjective matter can and should be readily accepted by all people as an objective reality. That's just silly.

My skepticism doesn't deny individual religious experience. In fact, I celebrate it.

Wasn't it Einstein who MADE THE MATHEMATICAL APPROXIMATION that we possess 1 percent of the 1 percent of knowledge ther is to attain????? MIND YOU, this is the very man who ENGINEERED THE ATOM BOMB!!!

I'm a big fan of Einstein, and he most certainly did NOT engineer the atom bomb. He proposed the theory of E=mc2, among other atomic principles. Oppenheimer is credited with engineering the bomb based on much of Einstein's theories. As far as percentages of knowledge to attain, I wouldn't look to Einstein as an authority for such a premise, necessarily, tho I don't disagree with the statement. In fact, knowledge is increasing exponentially. It is not a finite quantity that can be measured, but a growing, dynamic thing which I doubt human knowledge could ever catch up to.

But even with all that said, I still don't see the problem analyzing claims that pertain to important issues. If someone claims that my eternal existence depends on me committing to very particular spiritual beliefs, why on Earth would I take such a claim lightly? When there are many who make such claims, why should I just jump to one, and blindly accept it? Why shouldn't such a claim be subject to intense scrutiny?

If I propositioned you with a claim of eternal salvation that was different from your current beliefs, would you immediately abandon all you hold to be true and join me without some examination? Wouldn't you require something pretty extraordinary to persuade you? I have to think you look at other religious beliefs with at least as much skepticism as I do with yours. So what's wrong with that?

 

[Philosoft]

It's cool that you're questioning these kinda things, but some things in life that ARE INSOLUBLE ... like WHY I AM THIS, WHY I AM THAT, WHY DO MORALS EXIST, WHY DO I LIVE?

These aren't insoluble, they're meaningless. When you ask "Why?" you probably mean, "For what purpose?" If so, you beg the question that a purpose exists for these things in the first place.

to a skeptical mind, there will be issues upon issues, heaps of em, to resolve...and unless THEY ARE WHOLLY RESOLVED, a conception of GOD or to push the issue further, a JUST GOD, will ALWAYS appear INCONCEIVABLE to a skeptical mind ...

Well, a just God who denys us the ability to comprehend divine justice, at least. In any case, you don't appear to have any idea what skepticism entails.

 

[Hunose]

>>Calvinists believe the same thing. The idea gets around the omniscience vs. free will issue, but leaves us as pretty hopeless individuals.>>

Ah! "Calvinist"! A term I understand. But you misunderstand their view. However, as you have said, one issue at a time.

Perhaps it would be helpful if you define for me "free will". We don't seem to be talking about the same concept. I define it as "the ability to make choices without coercion". Or, perhaps, "the ability to choose what you do within the realm of possibility." It would be helpful if you define what you're talking about, because I don't see how knowing (even perfectly) the outcome of something prevents choices within that event.

 

[Philosoft]

Perhaps it would be helpful if you define for me "free will". We don't seem to be talking about the same concept. I define it as "the ability to make choices without coercion".

Let's go with this one.

It would be helpful if you define what you're talking about, because I don't see how knowing (even perfectly) the outcome of something prevents choices within that event.

It's a temporal issue. Suppose being B knows at time T that being S will do action A at time T+n (where n is any nonzero, positive amount of time). If it is a true statement that, "B perfectly knows at T that S will do A at T+n," then it follows that, "S will unavoidably do A at T+n." So, by B's perfect foreknowledge we have removed the possible world, "S does ~A at T+n." And, unless I am greatly mistaken, philosophically, a choice entails a possible world. Thus, without possible worlds, there cannot be choices.

 

[tcampen]

>>Calvinists believe the same thing. The idea gets around the omniscience vs. free will issue, but leaves us as pretty hopeless individuals.>>

Ah! "Calvinist"! A term I understand. But you misunderstand their view. However, as you have said, one issue at a time.

Perhaps it would be helpful if you define for me "free will". We don't seem to be talking about the same concept. I define it as "the ability to make choices without coercion". Or, perhaps, "the ability to choose what you do within the realm of possibility." It would be helpful if you define what you're talking about, because I don't see how knowing (even perfectly) the outcome of something prevents choices within that event.

Fine - here's Webster's:

Main Entry: free will
Function: noun
Date: 13th century
1 : voluntary choice or decision <I do this of my own free will>
2 : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

I would like to add that it requires that a person's future decisions and choices are not absolutely known by any entity. Because while perfect knowledge of a future decision may not force that decision to be made directly, the decider is equally powerless to do otherwise. Thus, functionally, there is no difference anyway.

Can we move the discussion along now?

 

[Hunose]

Fine - here's Webster's:

Main Entry: free will
Function: noun
Date: 13th century
1 : voluntary choice or decision <I do this of my own free will>
2 : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

I would like to add that it requires that a person's future decisions and choices are not absolutely known by any entity. Because while perfect knowledge of a future decision may not force that decision to be made directly, the decider is equally powerless to do otherwise. Thus, functionally, there is no difference anyway.

Can we move the discussion along now?

Oh, now you're adding to the definition? Because you can see that numbers 1 and 2 in your response are not negated by foreknowledge.

I just wanted to try this from another direction, float another idea to see if it sinks. Let's assume that I was really smart (I know, a stretch, but pretend with me) and I could remember every decision I made yesterday. It would seem obvious to me (and not necessarily to anyone else) one simple fact: I had free will to make those decisions. I had the "voluntary choice" that was not determined by "prior causes". Knowing what they were does not change that. Now, if there is a being not bounded by time who can go to the end, look at the choices that will be made, then return to the beginning, how can it be said that this being "eliminated free will" in some sense?

 

[tcampen]

Oh, now you're adding to the definition? Because you can see that numbers 1 and 2 in your response are not negated by foreknowledge.

Ohhhhhhhhhhh, so now you're going to say I can't stack the deck in my favor? How dare you!!!!!!

I just wanted to try this from another direction, float another idea to see if it sinks. Let's assume that I was really smart (I know, a stretch, but pretend with me) and I could remember every decision I made yesterday. It would seem obvious to me (and not necessarily to anyone else) one simple fact: I had free will to make those decisions. I had the "voluntary choice" that was not determined by "prior causes". Knowing what they were does not change that. Now, if there is a being not bounded by time who can go to the end, look at the choices that will be made, then return to the beginning, how can it be said that this being "eliminated free will" in some sense?

Unfortunately is sinks. Here's why - and answer is in the hypothetical you present. When you look at all your past decisions, you are powerless to change any of them. They are fixed in time. If a being not bound by time goes into the future and sees every decision you make, just as you did looking at your past, those events are equally fixed in time. You are equally powerless to change any of those decisions any more than if they were decisions you made yesterday. That powerlessness itself is a lack of free will.

Now, whether you are privy to that being's knowledge of your future choices is irrelevant, and your lack of this knowledge only makes your belief in free will an illusion.

Hope this helps.

 

[Hunose]

When you look at all your past decisions, you are powerless to change any of them. They are fixed in time. If a being not bound by time goes into the future and sees every decision you make, just as you did looking at your past, those events are equally fixed in time. You are equally powerless to change any of those decisions any more than if they were decisions you made yesterday. That powerlessness itself is a lack of free will.

Now, whether you are privy to that being's knowledge of your future choices is irrelevant, and your lack of this knowledge only makes your belief in free will an illusion.

Well, it would seem that we will simply disagree. Since you added to the definition of "free will" to include "without prior knowledge", it becomes circular to try to argue that free will could exist with prior knowledge.

So, let's try this out. We'll say that, as a matter of definition, existence cannot include the login name of tcampen. Therefore, logically, you can't exist. Now, if you try to deny that, you're merely defying the definition of existence, so clearly you're mistaken.

How about this? Can you agree that if you did not include the foreknowledge prohibition in your definition of free will -- that is, you only used the dictionary definition -- that there is no logical contradiction in omniscience? I'm speaking purely in terms of logic, as opposed to say understanding or full comprehension.

 

[revolutio]

I personally think omnipotent entities cannot exist. It is so easy to write the word on paper, but an actual being that can control everything would not make sense after all they would be able to control their own emotions hence invalidating any reason for them to do anything. Every action we take is an attempt to bring ourselves happiness. An omnipotent entity would them be able to administer happiness at will thus making any action pointless.

 

[tcampen]

Oh, now you're adding to the definition? Because you can see that numbers 1 and 2 in your response are not negated by foreknowledge.

I just wanted to try this from another direction, float another idea to see if it sinks. Let's assume that I was really smart (I know, a stretch, but pretend with me) and I could remember every decision I made yesterday. It would seem obvious to me (and not necessarily to anyone else) one simple fact: I had free will to make those decisions. I had the "voluntary choice" that was not determined by "prior causes". Knowing what they were does not change that. Now, if there is a being not bounded by time who can go to the end, look at the choices that will be made, then return to the beginning, how can it be said that this being "eliminated free will" in some sense?

You will notice I did NOT use that foreknowledge definition in my analysis. I dealt with your hypothetical head on, and analyzed it logically. So enough with the red herrings, please, I don't care for fish.

But if there is a flaw in my reasoning, by all means point it out.


(btw, you'll notice I was poking fun at myself with the extra definition, and deliberately avoided it in my analysis. I'm surprised you didn't catch that.)

 

[Hunose]

Here's why - and answer is in the hypothetical you present. When you look at all your past decisions, you are powerless to change any of them. They are fixed in time. If a being not bound by time goes into the future and sees every decision you make, just as you did looking at your past, those events are equally fixed in time. You are equally powerless to change any of those decisions any more than if they were decisions you made yesterday. That powerlessness itself is a lack of free will.

But were not those decisions made freely? The hypothetical being would see them as fixed, but it wouldn't negate in your time line your freedom of choice, would it?

 

[Hunose]

Let's go with this one.

It's a temporal issue. Suppose being B knows at time T that being S will do action A at time T+n (where n is any nonzero, positive amount of time). If it is a true statement that, "B perfectly knows at T that S will do A at T+n," then it follows that, "S will unavoidably do A at T+n." So, by B's perfect foreknowledge we have removed the possible world, "S does ~A at T+n." And, unless I am greatly mistaken, philosophically, a choice entails a possible world. Thus, without possible worlds, there cannot be choices.

I'm sorry. I didn't see this earlier. You would define "free will" as "possible worlds"?

The definition of God's omniscience that I hold is "God knows all contingencies, but knows nothing contingently." Okay, so that definition goes beyond "omniscience", but it includes the concept of "possible worlds".

Is it necessary that there be real possible worlds for free will to exist, or do they only need to be perceived? Does being S need to believe there are possible worlds, or do there actually have to be possible worlds? Philosphically speaking.

 

[tcampen]

But were not those decisions made freely? The hypothetical being would see them as fixed, but it wouldn't negate in your time line your freedom of choice, would it?

The individual making the decision may not be aware that his/her decision is fixed in time, but that doesn't make it any less fixed. Whether you know it, I know it, or a supreme being knows it is irrelevant so long as it is known at all. Absolute knowledge of every single future decision necessarily negates free will.

Thus, the individual who may not know what that absolutely known future is simply has the illusion of free will. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

 

[Hunose]

Absolute knowledge of every single future decision necessarily negates free will.

So you would say that the definition of free will necessarily includes no absolute knowledge (which would take us back to the previous point, wouldn't it?)?

(I only say that because absolute knowledge does not preclude either of the other two aspects you listed in the definition.)

 

[tcampen]

So you would say that the definition of free will necessarily includes no absolute knowledge (which would take us back to the previous point, wouldn't it?)?

(I only say that because absolute knowledge does not preclude either of the other two aspects you listed in the definition.)

I would say when you logically work out the concept of free will, the answer is YES. Even a cursory, logical analysis of my position proves its integrity. Just follow it step by step. If there is a flaw in my analysis, please point it out.

However, I would say that it completely negates "voluntary choice or decision" as free will is defined in Webster's. Being powerless to choose other than that which is already known utterly negates any "voluntary choice" in the matter. How can it be voluntary if you have no choice but to do that which is already known, and therefore fixed in time?

Keep in mind this is a logical quandry that has never been reconciled, even by the greatest philosophical minds. It simply cannot be done. If you want to believe god can be omniscient and we have actual free will, the only honest way to do it is to put it in the same category as the Trinity - it's a mystery accepted on faith alone. I can't argue with that, nor would I want to. But to attempt to work it out logically is an exercise in futility.

 

[Philosoft]

Is it necessary that there be real possible worlds for free will to exist, or do they only need to be perceived?

They are only "real" in the sense that there is a nonzero probability that a particular outcome can occur. Right now, there is, a priori, a possible world in which Larry Flynt becomes governor of California. That is, the assumption that that possible world can be actualized is justified.

Does being S need to believe there are possible worlds, or do there actually have to be possible worlds? Philosphically speaking.

I think this is cart-before-the-horse-ism. Really, all we mean when we say, "there is a possible world in which S does D" is "there is a nonzero probability that S does D."

So, a statement like, "God cannot do evil," which is logically equivalent to, "there is a zero probability that God will do evil," denies a priori that there is a possible world in which God does evil. And, if no possible world exists a priori in which God does evil, it seems meaningless to intimate that God indeed has a choice to do evil.

 

[Jet Black]

It seems that since faith transcends logic.

faith ignores logic.

 

[Jet Black]

So, a statement like, "God cannot do evil," which is logically equivalent to, "there is a zero probability that God will do evil," denies a priori that there is a possible world in which God does evil. And, if no possible world exists a priori in which God does evil, it seems meaningless to intimate that God indeed has a choice to do evil.

indeed. and it depends also on how one defines good, evil, God and his actions.

God can only do good things... can be interpreted in 2 ways:

1) The actions of God, regardless of what they are or any possible justification/reason define what good is. if God kills you, that is good, because God did it, and so killing you is good.
2) God is restricted by some "absolute Good" this would put God in 2nd place, underneath some overriding concept of Good, that is proverbially set in stone. hence if God was going to kill you, but this was not "good" then God could not kill you.

the 2nd statement limits his power and stops him from being all powerful, the first does not.

I realise that this is a digression from your point.

 

[Hunose]

faith ignores logic.

Perhaps in a narrow-minded definition of faith. Since this is a "Christian Forum", and the faith in mind is "Christian faith", the definition would need to be a "Christian definition". The Greek word used in the Bible for faith means "to be convinced (by argument)" which is coincident to logic, not opposed or ignorant of logic.

I admit that many Christians view "faith" and "reason" as opposed, but it doesn't fit the biblical definition of the word. Instead, it is a product of 19th century theological philosophy that assures that "doctrine divides; experience unites" and that true believers should set aside their brains and just "feel" God -- directly in contradiction to many Scriptures.

Submitted for your enlightenment.

 

[tcampen]

However, there are elements of faith that cannot be resolved logically. Within Christianity, for example, the trinity fails logically, as does the free will & omniscience contradiction. Things like this cannot be undertsood or explained with reason, but can only be accepted by trusting god can do what we cannot comprehend or appears illogical to us.

No one ever became devote to any spirituality based on really good logical arguments, as far as I know. Such arguments simply bolster what one already believes to be true.