Is morality Objective?

[Socrastein]

Secondly, I seem to have missed the part where you explained what your definition of morality is, and what part you think it plays in moral relativism. My mistake, and I apologize, but I would like to ask you to restate them so that we can both have them readily on hand.

Well, I kinda jumped the gun I guess earlier in this post where I redefined morality. Anyway, just to be thorough:

Morality is a description of our desires. More importantly, it describes various acts and whether they are conducive or inhibitive to our desires. Everything that is good/right is conducive to that which we desire. Everything that is bad/wrong is inhibitive to that which we desire (We can be an individual, one's personal morality, or it can be societal, which is where laws come from [at least in a democracy]). Any moral maxim one can produce, can be retranslated into the subcontext of those desires it is espousing and how they are being either realized or threatened. I gave some examples above, such as murder being wrong because we value the safety of innocent people, and theft being wrong because we value the rights to property.

The part it plays in moral relativism is that because morality is based on desires, to say morality is objective/absolute is to say that desires are objective/absolute. Desires are not absolute. Desires change with circumstance. Different societies and different people will desire different things in different degrees depending on the conditions they are living in.

A good example is when countries are at peace, they generally desire liberty and freedoms very much, and will strive to secure them for their people. However, what happens when that society is under threat of attack? Because of this new, very strong desire, liberty and freedom very often times gets put on the back burner, and all of a sudden people are losing those liberties and freedoms for the sake of safety. So one society at peace, and another at war, will have completely different views on what's right or wrong when it comes to liberties and freedoms. And there are some societies that will forsake safety to keep their liberty in times of crisis too. None of these systems are inherently good or bad, they're all relative to the people and their personal desires. To say "Well but you're wrong absolutely" is to say "You don't have the "right" desires, your desires aren't absolutely correct" and that seems rather silly.

Since I think that morality is absolute, I instinctively think of right and wrong as absolute right and wrong. If you could explain what you think of when you think of right and wrong, I will attempt to use those definitions in future posts.

Well I often think of right and wrong in absolutes because I was raised in a society that is absolutely drenched in this idea. However, whenever I'm 'thinking straight' so to speak I recognize that my looking at some person's actions as right or wrong is a matter of what I desire. IN FACT, moral subjectivism has made me a much more tolerant and forgiving person than I was when I was empowered with my ability to appeal to absolutes. Now instead of treating people like cosmic violators of a transcendent law, I just see them as people under different circumstances than myself, with different desires and views, doing what they think is best - just like me.

I have not been trying to define moral subjectivity as chaos, I have been trying to show that it leads to chaos. That is not the same thing, and you haven't done very much to convince me that moral relativism doesn't lead to chaos. If you do convince me (or even partially so) then I will have to change my tactics.

Well like I said, your argument for it has been vague and kind of seems to just jump a few steps to the conclusion.

But anyway, I'll try to counter the idea, rather than the arguments for it.

Morality is based on desires, and although people do differ in their desires and thus their morality, the fact is that because we're all human beings, we all are social creatures (I don't mean we all like to 'hang out' how social is usually used, I mean that we are not autonomous beings, we need society to achieve security and happiness), we all (the vast majority of us) have the ability to empathize with other humansk, and we all desire happiness, many of us are going to have similiar moral systems fundamentally. Since we're all social, we're all going to value society and what it gives us (All = the vast majority, once again). Since we can empathize, we're not going to desire pain for others, because to see others suffer has the potential to personally effect us (This is why a sad movie can make us cry, cause we can identify with the characters and in a small way feel what they are experiencing). So, because of these commonalities, we will share views on things like murder, rape, theft, betrayal, and other common 'bad' things, and we will also share views on courage, honor, selflessness, charity, and other common 'good' things.

If we did not all share such common desires, and say, there were as many people who valued life as people who wanted to kill everyone, and there were as many people who respected property as who wanted to steal from everyone, etc., then there still wouldn't be chaos per se, there would just be a larger divide among the population regarding morality, so you'd have half the people living in society banding together to try and protect themselves from the other half who are all individually trying to scrape by doing many "bad" things to achieve their ends.

Point is, people with common desires are going to work together to realize the fulfillment of their desired ends. Thus, there's no reason chaos is necessary with moral relativism.

 

[Fledge]

Some good stuff here, Socrastein. I'm going to continue to nit-pick about the first point though, but only partly because I'm just a real stubborn jerk at times.

The question is "If you had to choose between killing 4 eldery adults and 3 young children, which would you kill?"

I have a very strong dislike of straightforward answers to questions like this, because I don't think that questions like this are straightforward. See, if I am going to be killing someone, or a group of someones, I need to do something, be it pulling a trigger, lighting a fuse, pushing the boulder, etc. So I think that the question you have posed is inherently deceitful, because it forces me to choose between two actions, neither of which I am interested in taking. Now if you want to reconstruct your question and get rid of the tree limb this squirrel is trying to escape on...

Is that supposed to be a logical syllogism? Boy I hope not.

I will admit that I have never made a formal study of logic, and this morning I realized that I hadn't really done much with that attempt. However, from what you have said, it appears that we both agree that moral subjectivity typically results in people defining "good" as that which helps them, and "wrong" as that which hurts them. I think that I'll just leave it there for right now, and if I've misinterpreted what you have said, let me know.

Of course there's nothing stopping you from deciding people don't matter. People decide this all the time. What WOULD stop them? A lightning bolt from the sky? It's a simple, obvious fact that people make their own morality. Unless you're claiming that everyone's morals are identical.

I'm not trying to claim that everyone's morals are identical, because that's pretty obviously not the case. However, I'm trying to point out that that society doesn't function well when everybody things that they're all that matter (a point that I'm sure we both agree on). I'm also trying to show that subjective morality means that we really don't have anything to appeal to to try and stop people from behaving like selfish jerks (to use a kind word) of the worst kind. Unless there is something that trancends what our minds decide, trying to tell someone that what he is doing is wrong is rather pointless because all we're doing is telling him what we think is right.

You said you've attempted to prove your argument, and in all honesty I respect that. I'm glad that you're trying to be reasonable with your position, that's definitely a good thing. However, again being honest, you haven't done a good job of it. You made what looked like an attempt at a logical syllogism, however it was not clear and the steps did not follow logically. A good logical syllogism follows very precisely, yours was very vague and that's the last thing you want in a logical argument. So if you could make it more specific, and logically demonstrate your conclusions from the premises, then you'd have a lot better of an argument.

I appreciate honesty more than you might realize, and like I said, I've never studied logic. I'll try again, and if you would point out the individual holes of my (Swiss cheese?) argument, I'll know what gaps I need to fill, or if I should just toss the argument into the nearest trash bin.

Basic premise? There is no objective morality.

Conclusion from premise. If there is no objective morality, everyone must decide for himself what is moral and what is not.

Premise number 2 is an observation of human nature that I think you agree with. Unless there is some kind of restraint placed upon them, people will instinctively seek that which makes them happy/famous/rich/popular or whatever fulfills their desires at the moment.

Conclusion from preceding premises. People will usually define good as that which gives them what they want.

Premise number 3 is also a basic observation that I think you will agree with. When everyone is seeking his own pleasure, society functions pretty poorly.

Conclusion from preceding premises. Because good is usually defined (by the individuals) as that which gives them what they want, society will tend to function poorly.

F-? A+? somewhere in between?

Okay, then it's established that whether or not there are moral absolutes, people will all have their own conception of morality.

So the question is, how are you to know for certain who is right? How can you tell Hitler he's wrong, when he is willing to say with just as much certainty that you are wrong? If you're going to appeal to the Bible, then you're going to have to prove that God exists, then you're going to have to prove that the Bible is inspired by him and is completely true, at least where morality is concerned.

What you are saying here doesn't appear to be an argument against moral objectivity. Yes, the question that we are left with is not necessarily easy to answer ("what should we use as our source of transcendant morals?"), but that doesn't mean that there is no such thing as moral objectivity. Since people tend to "know" instinctively that things like murder, stealing, rape, and so on, are bad, then it would appear that those things are part of any transcendant moral code that may exist.

Now I haven't done a detailed study of world religions, but from what I know, only Judaism and Christianity have genuinely objective morality. I am pretty sure that a strict interpretation of Islam allows Muslims to treat non-Muslims pretty badly, so that would disqualify Islam as a religion with genuinely objective morality (please let me know whether I am right or wrong here, because I'm not trying to cause a huge division).

My question is - why are you so eager to be able to tell people they are absolutely wrong? I feel that human beings have an innate tendency to want to demonize things and people. When you look down on someone, you build yourself up, and that naturally makes you feel better, makes you feel superior and secure. There are many ways we do this, from simply making fun of the smelly kid in class behind his back, to completely belittling an enemy in war so that we don't see them as human beings, but as nothing more than opponents.

An excellent, accurate observation. However, I am not "eager" to go around telling people that they are "absolutely wrong". I will admit that this is something that can be difficult to not do at times, but I was not the one who came up with the idea of objective morality. Likewise, this does not argue against objective morality, it merely points out some of the things we need to face if objective morality exists. So even though I think your basic observation is quite accurate, it really is beside the point of this discussion.

Morality is another way we do this. A murder trial, for example, shouldn't be about trying to damn and judge people, saying they've violated some transcendent moral code and thus they are wretched and we are all enlightened. It should be nothing more than recognizing this person is inhibitive to the collective desires of this society, and thus we are forced to take measures to ensure the realization of our desired ends.

But the thing is, unless there is some form of objective morality, then we can't pass judment on anyone or anything. Or rather, we can pass judment, but we would simply be stating our own opinion, so it would have no force. Without something higher to appeal to, there is no basis for any kind of a legal system whatsoever.

In both cases, the problem is addressed and all is well, however when we don't assume our morality to be objectively and absolutely "right", we don't have to bother with all the condescension and demonizing that comes with thinking we are somehow privy to the absolute truth and good of the universe. We are not. We are all just different people, who like and dislike different things, and thus our views of right and wrong (Good and bad for my desires) are all different.

I will agree that objective morality has its own set of dangers, and you have done an excellent job pointing them out. However, it appears to me that you treat the "collective desires of [society]" as an absolute. In a universe in which there is no moral objectivity, then the phrase "the good of society" just becomes a statement of what you see to be good for society. Obviously, not everyone will agree with you, but if you are a reasonably sane, rational person, the vast majority of the reasonably sane, rational people in society will agree with you.

However, if you are going to enforce some form of moral judgment on all the members of a society ("good for society" and "bad for society" are moral judgments), then you are acknowledging that something trumps personal moral decisions. However, in a morally subjective universe without any form of moral absolutes, there can be nothing that trumps personal moral decisions.

You've mentioned more than once now the fact that without absolutes, we can't 'absolutely' condemn people's actions. I understand that this is a consequence of moral subjectivism, however, I am not sure whether or not you're using this as an argument for moral absolutes, or if you're just pointing it out. Could you let me know if "Without absolutes nobody is absolutely wrong" is just an observation by you, or if it's somehow an argument against moral subjectivism?

It appears that we have a slight misunderstanding here, and I am probably at least as much to blame for it as you are. I'm not trying to argue that moral subjectivism makes it impossible to condemn something absolutely (though it does), because that isn't much of an argument to use on someone who (probably) doesn't believe in absolutes in general. What I am trying to argue is that moral subjectivism makes it impossible to really condemn an action at all. If everyone must make their own moral decisions, then all of these decisions must be equally valid. Some of them might result in people who are "meaner" than others, but without at least some form of absolute morality (even if it is a single absolute), telling someone that he is wrong is nothing more than saying "I think that what you are doing is wrong". No society can last where criminals are allowed to run rampant through the streets, but since morality would be purely a matter of personal opinion in a subjective universe, there is nothing we can do to force our version of morality on those who would destroy our society.

Before you disagree, think about this. Just because food preferences are subjective, and there is no transcendent, absolute "Tasty", doesn't mean I can't say that what someone likes is gross, does it? I know that it's just my parent's preference to eat sour kraut, but I think it's nasty. And I tell them "How can you eat that ****, it's so nasty!". However, I know that my opinion isn't an absolute, and their tastes are as valid as mine, no matter how strongly I disagree with them.

I've already agreed that we can tell someone that we think he's doing something wrong, and that in a morally subjective universe, this is purely a matter of opinion that doesn't carry any weight. So just like you can say that your parents have disgusting food choices without it really meaning anything, you can tell someone that he has horrible morals without it meaning anything (again, this is in a subjective universe).

Keep in mind though, that even though taste might be purely subjective, our food can cause serious problems. For example, somebody might be violently allergic to the scent of the food that we're eating. Because the health of this other person is more important than fulfilling our craving for a grilled garlic and onion sandwich (yuck!), we would be obligated to eat this sandwich somewhere else or not at all. The only reason why this is the case, is because our food preferences are subject to something higher, like the health of our fellow man.

Similiarly, our actions have to be subject to something if we are to live in peace and harmony. In a morally subjective universe, our actions are subject only to what we belive to be right and wrong, which would most likely be defined as that which gives us what we want. There is no way our statement that something is wrong will carry any weight unless their is something that is higher than our own personal wants and desires, which would imply some form of objective morality.

 

[Fledge]

Continued from previous post...

A society is defined by mutual interests, cooperations, common goods and goals, etc.

To elaborate a bit, when man is in a state of nature (before society) he is in threat of death, in threat of theft, he cannot defend his life or his property beyond his inherent ability to do so, he does not have access to anything he can't make himself, and there are plenty of other restrictions humans have when they live autonomously. So, society is created to provide all that we don't have without society. So we all come together and agree to provide safety to one another, to respect and protect property rights, to respect and protect various freedoms, we work together to provide different goods and services for eachother, and basically we all just cooperate to secure happiness for as many people as possible.

Not a bad definition, but not quite the one that I was using, either. I usually think of society as referring to the laws/customs/regulations that a group of people have formed to make it possible to live/work together without flying at each others throats. One of the byproducts of society is that we tend to give up a few individual liberties, but we get increased productivity and livelihood in exchange.

Morality is a description of our desires. More importantly, it describes various acts and whether they are conducive or inhibitive to our desires. Everything that is good/right is conducive to that which we desire. Everything that is bad/wrong is inhibitive to that which we desire (We can be an individual, one's personal morality, or it can be societal, which is where laws come from [at least in a democracy]). Any moral maxim one can produce, can be retranslated into the subcontext of those desires it is espousing and how they are being either realized or threatened. I gave some examples above, such as murder being wrong because we value the safety of innocent people, and theft being wrong because we value the rights to property.

The part it plays in moral relativism is that because morality is based on desires, to say morality is objective/absolute is to say that desires are objective/absolute. Desires are not absolute. Desires change with circumstance. Different societies and different people will desire different things in different degrees depending on the conditions they are living in

It appears we are using different meanings for the term "morality" as well. Since my source of morality is the Bible, I define morality as that which fulfills the command of loving God and loving our neighbor/fellow man. Obviously, fulfilling this command is extremely difficult, and I am often forced to do things that I don't really want to do because it is "the right thing to do". So I would argue that objective morality does not require objective desires, merely an objective source. Now this does raise (again) the question of what source we are going to use, but that is not the subject of this debate, so I will leave it alone.

A good example is when countries are at peace, they generally desire liberty and freedoms very much, and will strive to secure them for their people. However, what happens when that society is under threat of attack? Because of this new, very strong desire, liberty and freedom very often times gets put on the back burner, and all of a sudden people are losing those liberties and freedoms for the sake of safety. So one society at peace, and another at war, will have completely different views on what's right or wrong when it comes to liberties and freedoms. And there are some societies that will forsake safety to keep their liberty in times of crisis too. None of these systems are inherently good or bad, they're all relative to the people and their personal desires. To say "Well but you're wrong absolutely" is to say "You don't have the "right" desires, your desires aren't absolutely correct" and that seems rather silly.

Now you are getting into the theory of government, and a bit of basic "mob" psychology. Yes, in times of war a government (and its people) will have very different desires than they will in a time of peace. However, because I have a different definition of morality, I would disagree that war necessitates a "change" (not a very good word, but I think it will convey my meaning) of morality. Of course, as soon as morality changes, it is no longer absolute, so my comment here has probably been rather superflous. Still, a dictatorship can be (in theory) fully as moral as a democracy (or even more so, I mean, take a look at the French revolution). Admittedly, totalitarian regimes are typically cruel and repressive, but the problem isn't (so much) the governmental system as it is the way it is used.

As for deciding what freedoms/liberties will be kept, and which will be sacrificed for safety/security, the society (the majority anyway) can agree on what liberties will be kept and what liberties will be sacrificed and still have immoral results. In Nazi Germany (to beat a dead horse), Hitler's view was that the Jews were dangerous, which meant that they had to be removed as a danger to society. He attempted to accomplish this by removing every form of liberty and freedom from the Jews and anyone who helped them. Since the (majority) of society either agreed or accepted it, then wouldn't that mean that the Holocaust was moral?

Obviously, you aren't going to say that the Holocaust was morally right, but I'm not sure how you can justify saying the Holocaust was immoral with your current definition of morality.

Well I often think of right and wrong in absolutes because I was raised in a society that is absolutely drenched in this idea. However, whenever I'm 'thinking straight' so to speak I recognize that my looking at some person's actions as right or wrong is a matter of what I desire. IN FACT, moral subjectivism has made me a much more tolerant and forgiving person than I was when I was empowered with my ability to appeal to absolutes. Now instead of treating people like cosmic violators of a transcendent law, I just see them as people under different circumstances than myself, with different desires and views, doing what they think is best - just like me.

I look at right and wrong as what God would desire, or at least, I try to. Again, this is one of the dangers of absolute morality, but the fact that something is difficult or dangerous to do doesn't mean that it's wrong. Likewise, I would agree that it is good to be respectful (I can't stand the way the word "tolerant" is used in the US today) and forgiving, and that it is sometimes difficult to do so. This is where the principle of "loving the sinner and hating the sin" comes into play for me. Is it difficult to follow? Very much so. Is it something that I should do? Of course. And once again, difficult and bad are not synonymus (in this context anyway)

Morality is based on desires, and although people do differ in their desires and thus their morality, the fact is that because we're all human beings, we all are social creatures (I don't mean we all like to 'hang out' how social is usually used, I mean that we are not autonomous beings, we need society to achieve security and happiness), we all (the vast majority of us) have the ability to empathize with other humansk, and we all desire happiness, many of us are going to have similiar moral systems fundamentally. Since we're all social, we're all going to value society and what it gives us (All = the vast majority, once again). Since we can empathize, we're not going to desire pain for others, because to see others suffer has the potential to personally effect us (This is why a sad movie can make us cry, cause we can identify with the characters and in a small way feel what they are experiencing). So, because of these commonalities, we will share views on things like murder, rape, theft, betrayal, and other common 'bad' things, and we will also share views on courage, honor, selflessness, charity, and other common 'good' things.

It is true that moral relativism hasn't resulted in complete chaos yet, largely because most people agree that things like those you mention above are wrong. And yet, in a truly subjective universe, there is no unmoving basis for any of this. As an example, there are (were anyway, they are either changing or changed at the moment) societies where treason (to one's friends) is a way of life! I am referring to the cannibalistic headhunters that live in a small portion of the jungles of New Guinea (I'm pretty sure it's New Guinea, if you want to read one man's story about it, "The Peace Child" by Don Richardson is an excellent book). So even though most people alive in the world today would agree that treason is a bad thing, these people used to give the highest honors to the people who could betray the most people in the most creative fashion possible.

So even though our society hasn't fallen over any cliffs just yet (at least, not so far as I know), there is nothing to prevent it from happening without some form of absolute to tie ourselves to. You appear to view "the good of society" as such an absolute, so unless I am wrong, you too believe in moral absolutism (although to a much lesser extent). I fully expect you to disagree with me, I just ask that you do so in the kind of detail that you have provided throughout this most recent pair of posts so that I will be able to respond without sounding like a nutcase.

If we did not all share such common desires, and say, there were as many people who valued life as people who wanted to kill everyone, and there were as many people who respected property as who wanted to steal from everyone, etc., then there still wouldn't be chaos per se, there would just be a larger divide among the population regarding morality, so you'd have half the people living in society banding together to try and protect themselves from the other half who are all individually trying to scrape by doing many "bad" things to achieve their ends.

Point is, people with common desires are going to work together to realize the fulfillment of their desired ends. Thus, there's no reason chaos is necessary with moral relativism.

I'm not trying to argue that moral relativism will always automatically produce chaos (I can easily see why you thought that though, so again, my apologies for not being clear). I am trying to argue that there is (logically speaking) nothing to prevent society from collapsing into chaos when morality is considered as a subjective matter. As an example, you need only look back a couple hundred years in time. Things that people do now without a second though (like, nude beaches, pre/extra-marital sex, cohabitation, etc.) would have been considered scandalous (at best) not too long ago. For example, I seem to recall my mother telling me one time that two of her grandparents almost didn't get married because her grandfather tried to kiss my mom's grandmother while they were engaged! My great-grandmother was so scandalized that she nearly called off the wedding.

So clearly, the moral standards that people hold change over time, and there's no way we can tell what they're going to be like in a couple hundred years. If they continue to change at the rate they are now, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that clothes have become superflous relics (except for in winter). The only way that we can prevent this kind of a slide is if there is some form of moral absolute(s) that we can grab on to. Without any moral absolutes whatsoever, the slide will continue on, without any way to stop it.

 

[Socrastein]

Fledge

I don't understand why you're wasting my time with the moral question I posed you. If you don't wish to answer it, then don't. If you're going to answer it, then do so. However, don't bother me with this childish nonsense. I explained to you exactly what I meant, so rewording is unnecessary.

Anyway, your attempt at a syllogism was once again pretty flimsy, so I'm just going to ignore it and get to the meat of this issue.

Tell me Fledge, what stops society from turning to chaos if there are transcendent moral values? What difference will this make to people who want to hurt and steal and kill? It seems that you're assuming in a morally relativist society, everyone will do whatever they want because there's nothing beyond opinion and desire when it comes to morality. Yet you seem to think that if there are moral absolutes, somehow these will compel people to follow them, or even more important than that, you're assuming that somehow we could actually 'access' them and know exactly what they are, and then even further that we could then force people to acknowledge and follow them. This is all completely unsubstantiated.

What about moral absolutes would make people act any different that a world without moral absolutes? That's the issue. Until you can explain this difference, your argument that moral relativism leads to chaos is meaningless.

You say that people instinctively know that murder, rape, stealing, etcetra are wrong. How can you make such a statement confidently? When was the last time you observed a moral human being that had not been influenced in any way by other people and society at large? You cannot assert that we are instinctively moral, because there's no way to know whether or not these seemingly instinctive morals are actually socially instilled. In fact, there is more evidence that morality is social than instinctive due to the fact that no matter how "wrong" a society may be, you'll find plenty of people in that society that have no qualms about their societal morals. If morality was instinctive, then there should be just as much of an uproar against "bad" societies from within the society itself as from without that society (people from other societies).

And regarding my observation of you seeming to keep trying to justify judging people absolutely, I did so because I was getting the impression that this was the reason you thought there had to be an objective morality. A sort of appeal to consequences, wherein you seemed to be pleading that if there is no objective morality, we aren't allowed to objectively condemn people. This is a bad argument, and I got the feeling you were making it, since you kept saying over and over and over again that without objective morality we can't say someone is truly wrong. This is obvious, and isn't a meaningful point, so I thought that possibly the reason you kept stressing it was because you thought it was a good argument against moral relativism.

Legal systems do not have to be about passing judgement. They should simply be about maintaining law and enforcing the desired ends of the society that creates the legal system. This can be done completely without judgement, the same way you can quarantine a man with the flu without blaming him for getting sick.

I didn't mean to equate "collective desires of society" with "good of society". One could argue that what's good for society is different that what a society desires, but I wasn't discussing this manner. Collective desires of society is pretty objective - it's whatever the majority of people in the society desire, simple as that.

What I am trying to argue is that moral subjectivism makes it impossible to really condemn an action at all.

I know. Like I said, I'm curious if this is supposed to be an observation, or an argument somehow. I already understand this, it's quite obvious, so I'm confused as to why you keep asserting it over and over again.

You said that a morally relativistic society would have to allow people to destroy it because they can't appeal to absolutes and say they are wrong. Like I said before, morality does not have to be absolute for people to protect their interests. I don't have to believe a criminal is objectively wrong for trying to rape my sister, but regardless of my views on the objectivity of morality, I care for my sister and I value her safety, so if someone were to try to rape her and I could stop it, I would. It's as simple as that. Animals do this all the time, and unless you would argue that a mother Panda that protects its young from predators is appealing to objective morality, then you must acknowledge that your argument that a relativist society must let criminals run rampant is just absurd.

I usually think of society as referring to the laws/customs/regulations that a group of people have formed to make it possible to live/work together without flying at each others throats. One of the byproducts of society is that we tend to give up a few individual liberties, but we get increased productivity and livelihood in exchange.

I don't see the key difference between this and my definition.

Regarding the definition of morality, if you define morality as God's commands, then what have you been talking about every time you refer to subjective morality? God's commands are not subjective in your view, so then subjective morality is not morality. So then what are you referring to if by your own definition subjective morality is a non-existence concept? It seems you need to broaden your definition so that it encompasses a wider concept. I don't think that God's command is how you define morality, I think rather that God's command is what you accept as true morality, rather.

Also, God is as subjective a source as anyone, assuming that what he commands is what he wants. If it is not, and he does not simply command what he desires (Which still fits with my definition) then morality is beyond even God and it has nothing to do with what he says, anymore than it has to do with what we humans say.

Regarding whether or not Nazi Germany was moral - that's an absolute question. To simply ask in a general manner whether or not it was moral is to assume that there is some outside standard from which to judge it (I know you believe this, but I don't, so to ask me in a way to impose your view on the question is kind of pointless). Did the people who think it was moral think it was moral? Obviously. And people who disagree with it, like me, disagree with it.

You say you can't see how I can say the holocaust was wrong with my definition of morality. It sorrows me to see you still haven't grasped what I've been saying. I have defined morality as indicitive of one's desires, and what is conducive and inhibitive to those desires. So good is conducive to one's desires, and bad is inhibitive to one's desires. So obviously if the holocaust conflicted with my desires, then to me it was wrong. How many times do I have to say this? I understand you disagree, but you can disagree with my position and still understand it at the same time.

I look at right and wrong as what God would desire, or at least, I try to.

How is this not subjective morality? This is exactly as how I have described morality, as what someone does or doesn't desire. Whether it's your father or God, it's still just what's conducive or inhibitive to someone's desires. God is a being with desires, and you have based your morality on what He desires. If I based my morality on what my history teacher desired, why would that be any more subjective, or less objective? Is it because supposedly God's desires never change? If so, then if there were a human who's desires never changed, would any morality based on those desires be absolute?

As for my views regarding the good of society, they are only as 'absolute' as my definition of society. The way I've defined society, there are specific things that are conducive to society, and specific things that are not. Just as according to the definition of a smooth-running car, there are specific things that are conducive to this, and specific things that are not. This doesn't mean there are transcendent principles of car maintence that are inspired by God, it just means that by definiiton, if a car explodes or breaks down, it does not fit the phrase "smooth-running car" because of how we've defined it. The same way murder and rape do not fit the phrase "well-functioning society" because of how I've defined it.

 

[Blackmarch]

Is morality Objective?
Is there a standard for right and wrong?

If there is a God that will enforce some kind of Law, then yes there is

Or is it Subjective?
Do we determine our own rights and wrongs for ourselves?

Only those that can enforce their set of morals in some way over others would it make it the "right" morals.. and so morals would end up being a lot more subjective.

 

[Fledge]

Tell me Fledge, what stops society from turning to chaos if there are transcendent moral values? What difference will this make to people who want to hurt and steal and kill? It seems that you're assuming in a morally relativist society, everyone will do whatever they want because there's nothing beyond opinion and desire when it comes to morality. Yet you seem to think that if there are moral absolutes, somehow these will compel people to follow them, or even more important than that, you're assuming that somehow we could actually 'access' them and know exactly what they are, and then even further that we could then force people to acknowledge and follow them. This is all completely unsubstantiated.

What about moral absolutes would make people act any different that a world without moral absolutes? That's the issue. Until you can explain this difference, your argument that moral relativism leads to chaos is meaningless.

Again, people who want to murder, rape, and steal will do so whether morality is objective or subjective. However, if man is the source of morality, then as I have said before (and now find out you agree with), "moral subjectivism makes it impossible to really condemn an action at all." I had not realized that you agreed, I thought that you simply hadn't understood what I was trying to get at.

That sentence is both an observation and an argument. Unless we can condemn something has wrong or harmful, then any kind of an enforced moral decision will be nothing more than imposing our personal (or societal) whims on someone else. So unless there is some transcendant, unchanging law, then the courts become little more than the enforcers of abitrary and constantly changing decisions. (This is largely true today in the US, and the confusion that it has caused should be pretty clear to anyone. I see it as a direct result of the idea that all morality is subject to the whims of society).

If there are moral absolutes, then there is an unchanging standard that will remain true for ever. If not, then what is considered good in one generation will be considered bad in another, which would imply that any kind of a moral decision is kind of meaningless because it simply isn't true (absolute truth and moral subjectivity don't really work together). If morality is meaningless, then one of the major pieces of fabric that helps hold society together falls into shreds. As an example of this, look at the immense polarization that has occured in the US between people who (on the whole) believe in absolutes, and those whose only absolute is that there are no absolutes. While the US is hardly a society in utter chaos, it should be apparent that there is more chaos now than there was a hundred years ago when people (most of them anyway, including the non-christians) believed that some things were right and some things were wrong. Period.

You say that people instinctively know that murder, rape, stealing, etcetra are wrong. How can you make such a statement confidently? When was the last time you observed a moral human being that had not been influenced in any way by other people and society at large? You cannot assert that we are instinctively moral, because there's no way to know whether or not these seemingly instinctive morals are actually socially instilled. In fact, there is more evidence that morality is social than instinctive due to the fact that no matter how "wrong" a society may be, you'll find plenty of people in that society that have no qualms about their societal morals. If morality was instinctive, then there should be just as much of an uproar against "bad" societies from within the society itself as from without that society (people from other societies).

I'm not trying to denigrate the effect that society has on people. In fact, I would agree that society has an enormous effect on the way people view right and wrong. However, I knew that some things were wrong without ever having heard anyone talk about it. Often, this knowledge was expressed in the "Dad wouldn't like it" format, but this doesn't change the fact that I knew some things were innappropriate (at best) without ever needing to be told.

You said that a morally relativistic society would have to allow people to destroy it because they can't appeal to absolutes and say they are wrong. Like I said before, morality does not have to be absolute for people to protect their interests. I don't have to believe a criminal is objectively wrong for trying to rape my sister, but regardless of my views on the objectivity of morality, I care for my sister and I value her safety, so if someone were to try to rape her and I could stop it, I would. It's as simple as that. Animals do this all the time, and unless you would argue that a mother Panda that protects its young from predators is appealing to objective morality, then you must acknowledge that your argument that a relativist society must let criminals run rampant is just absurd.

I'm afraid that you misunderstood me. I am saying that they would have no basis for preventing people from doing whatever they want. They would doubtlessly attempt to stop people who go around killing others, but they would be doing so in violation of the basic (subjectivistic) principle that since everyone makes their own morality, everyone's morality is equally valid.

I don't see the key difference between this and my definition.

The difference is that you view society more as what the group of people want for themselves as a whole, while I view it as the laws they have decided to follow in an attempt to secure the benefits they desire. So, not a big difference perhaps, but I think that it is important.

Regarding the definition of morality, if you define morality as God's commands, then what have you been talking about every time you refer to subjective morality? God's commands are not subjective in your view, so then subjective morality is not morality. So then what are you referring to if by your own definition subjective morality is a non-existence concept? It seems you need to broaden your definition so that it encompasses a wider concept. I don't think that God's command is how you define morality, I think rather that God's command is what you accept as true morality, rather.

Sorry, I guess I should have specified. Yes, I view God's commands as true morality. When I am referring to subjective morality, I am referring to (theoretical) the state of affairs in which people refuse to follow any form of God's Law, because they want to make their own morality (i.e., there are no moral absolutes).

Also, God is as subjective a source as anyone, assuming that what he commands is what he wants. If it is not, and he does not simply command what he desires (Which still fits with my definition) then morality is beyond even God and it has nothing to do with what he says, anymore than it has to do with what we humans say.

The key difference between God giving the commands according to what he want us to do and us giving the commands according to what we want others to do is fairly simple. God is infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, and loves us more than we can possibly begin to comprehend. Additionally, He (as the Creator) gets to make the Law be whatever He wants it to be. So you could argue that this makes morality subjective, but you must remember that God does not change, no matter how many years go by. Since God is unchanging and without bounds, then His desires are not a source of subjective anything.

You say you can't see how I can say the holocaust was wrong with my definition of morality. It sorrows me to see you still haven't grasped what I've been saying. I have defined morality as indicitive of one's desires, and what is conducive and inhibitive to those desires. So good is conducive to one's desires, and bad is inhibitive to one's desires. So obviously if the holocaust conflicted with my desires, then to me it was wrong. How many times do I have to say this? I understand you disagree, but you can disagree with my position and still understand it at the same time.

Please belive me when I say that I am trying to understand. Likewise, please keep in mind that it seems to me that you don't always understand what I am tyring to say, and that the only way past this mutal barrier is to keep asking questions and keep giving polite responses. I will try for my part, and I know that you will try for your part, but that doesn't make it any easier to actually do.

I am trying to say that your system of morality leaves a paradoxical statement. You say that the Holocaust was wrong, and most people now alive would agree with you on that. However, Hitler and many others thought that it was the right thing to be doing (this is perhaps somewhat mitigated by the fact that most people didn't realize just how bad the concentration camps were). So by your definition of morality, the Holocaust was both good (in Hitler's eyes) and bad (in your eyes), which doesn't make any sense to me. If everything is both good and bad simulataneously (and you can find people who espouse any and all types of moral beliefs), then what is the value of moral discussion at all? After all, it would have become a matter of pure opinion that only affects the individual who holds the belief.

How is this not subjective morality? This is exactly as how I have described morality, as what someone does or doesn't desire. Whether it's your father or God, it's still just what's conducive or inhibitive to someone's desires. God is a being with desires, and you have based your morality on what He desires. If I based my morality on what my history teacher desired, why would that be any more subjective, or less objective? Is it because supposedly God's desires never change? If so, then if there were a human who's desires never changed, would any morality based on those desires be absolute?

It would be more subjective because your history teacher is a mortal who is capable of failing. God (by definition) is infallible, and therefore His desires are "perfect", which is a state of affairs that humans are incapable of attaining. We might be able to get "close" to "perfect" in some areas, but trying to be perfect is like cutting something in half a few dozen times. It might be getting smaller and smaller, but you'll always have some left (I know, the analogy isn't perfect because matter isn't continuous).

As for my views regarding the good of society, they are only as 'absolute' as my definition of society. The way I've defined society, there are specific things that are conducive to society, and specific things that are not. Just as according to the definition of a smooth-running car, there are specific things that are conducive to this, and specific things that are not. This doesn't mean there are transcendent principles of car maintence that are inspired by God, it just means that by definiiton, if a car explodes or breaks down, it does not fit the phrase "smooth-running car" because of how we've defined it. The same way murder and rape do not fit the phrase "well-functioning society" because of how I've defined it.

Please, I am not trying to argue that your view of society is absolute. I am saying that it appears that you view the good of society as an absolute. And if I am correct about this, then you are a moral objectivist, even if your definition of morality is vastly different from mine.

 

[Socrastein]

Again, people who want to murder, rape, and steal will do so whether morality is objective or subjective. However, if man is the source of morality, then as I have said before (and now find out you agree with), "moral subjectivism makes it impossible to really condemn an action at all." I had not realized that you agreed, I thought that you simply hadn't understood what I was trying to get at.

Of course I agreed, and I even asked you why you kept repeating such an obvious assertion dozens of times over.

However, I knew that some things were wrong without ever having heard anyone talk about it.

You can't know that. Memories from that long ago are unreliable, not to mention we have no memory or direct access to subconcious influences.

For evidence to the contrary, look at how hard it is to get very young children to stop stealing from and harming eachother. If morality was instinctive, then you think this wouldn't be such a common tendency. However it is; having been around hundreds of little kids in my life who have exhibited such behavior, I can attest to the evidence against instinctual morality.

They would doubtlessly attempt to stop people who go around killing others, but they would be doing so in violation of the basic (subjectivistic) principle that since everyone makes their own morality, everyone's morality is equally valid.

Yes everyone's is equally valid, and thus everyone can and will try to enforce their morality, this is observable. Sometimes the bad guys win, sometimes the good guys win. There's no violation of subjectivism here.

The difference is that you view society more as what the group of people want for themselves as a whole, while I view it as the laws they have decided to follow in an attempt to secure the benefits they desire. So, not a big difference perhaps, but I think that it is important

I hate to say it, but for some reason I still don't see the difference between "what the people want as a whole" and "the benefits they desire". They seem synonomous to me.

Additionally, He (as the Creator) gets to make the Law be whatever He wants it to be. So you could argue that this makes morality subjective, but you must remember that God does not change, no matter how many years go by. Since God is unchanging and without bounds, then His desires are not a source of subjective anything.

Then answer the question I asked in anticipation of you saying this - if there could possibly be a human who's morality never changed, and we based our values on their morality, would that be an absolute morality?

Also, I don't think most people define subjective morality as "unchanging". Any morality based on a book, for example, would be unchanging, because the words in that book would always be the same. So if I base my morality on Aristotelean virtue (Much of my morality does come from this) as laid out in Nichomachean Ethics, does that mean I have an absolute morality? Hardly. The reason is, subjective morality has nothing to do with whether it changes, it has to do with whether it comes from the desires of a being or from whether it has a transcendent reality that is above and beyond the desires of any and all beings.

So if one defines subjective morality in this way, then yes, your morality is very much subjective. If you still disagree, then answer my questions regarding humans that don't change their morals, or basing morality on a book, which can't and won't 'change it's mind'.

Please belive me when I say that I am trying to understand. Likewise, please keep in mind that it seems to me that you don't always understand what I am tyring to say, and that the only way past this mutal barrier is to keep asking questions and keep giving polite responses.

Agreed. If I come across as rude or cross, I do not intend to - let me say now I'm enjoying this discussion very much and how it's being handled.

I am trying to say that your system of morality leaves a paradoxical statement. You say that the Holocaust was wrong, and most people now alive would agree with you on that. However, Hitler and many others thought that it was the right thing to be doing (this is perhaps somewhat mitigated by the fact that most people didn't realize just how bad the concentration camps were). So by your definition of morality, the Holocaust was both good (in Hitler's eyes) and bad (in your eyes), which doesn't make any sense to me. If everything is both good and bad simulataneously (and you can find people who espouse any and all types of moral beliefs), then what is the value of moral discussion at all? After all, it would have become a matter of pure opinion that only affects the individual who holds the belief.

What you say is correct, that one action or event can be good or bad at the same time depending on who you talk to. Technically this is not a paradox, anymore than it's a paradox that some people look at a sunset and see orange and others argue it's red - it's just a matter of perspective, and if morality is relative to desires, then people with differing desires will surely have differing moral perspectives: this is to be expected. I don't think it's a paradox, however I would say it's probably very counter-intuitive in light of how much society subtly espouses absolute morals all the time. We grow up with a concious or at least subconcious idea that morality is absolute and our society is right, and thus talk of relativism conflicts with our preconcieved notions and the idea is hard to digest because it goes against what we have been raised to believe.

Please, I am not trying to argue that your view of society is absolute. I am saying that it appears that you view the good of society as an absolute. And if I am correct about this, then you are a moral objectivist, even if your definition of morality is vastly different from mine.

Like I said, it's about how you define society. Definitions are objective to a degree, and thus my conception of a well-functioning society is as objective as the definition of a well-functioning society, which I explained previously. This has nothing to do with absolute morality. We define a triangle as a 3-sided polygon, so if you draw something with 9 sides then it's "objectively wrong". We define a society as a collective group working together to secure happiness and security, so if there are people murdering and stealing and raping, then that is "objectively wrong" because that is not what society is. See what I'm getting at?



Here are things I want to know - what is your argument for morality? It seems like nothing more than an appeal to consequence at this point, but I'm probably just misunderstanding, so if you could state it clearly and concisely I'd appreciate it. I stated my argument against it very clearly and very concisely. I'll recap so you know, in a nutshell:

Morality is based on desires (As I have reasoned, though this is the contestable premise)
If morality is absolute, desires are absolute (from the fact that morality is based on desires)
Desires are not absolute (Observed fact)

Conclusion: Morality is not absolute (Modus Tollens from premise 2 and 3)

 

[tcampen]

Yep. The Word that is Jesus Christ. Outside of Him there are no morals, just people's opinions.

There are well over a billion christians, and an equal amount of morality systems.

An objective truth is evidenced by universal acceptance by rational, honest, informed individuals - such as the sky is blue. While there are many, many christians who profess their faith in Jesus Christ, what that faith amounts to varies widely. There are thousands of christian denominations, separated by their interpretations of Jesus and his teachings. Some differences are small, others are huge and material. But in the end, there lacks the type of objectivity professed here. The variety in beliefs within christianity negate such a thing.

So while one might state that everything outside of Jesus is "just people's opinions," the same is equally true among christians themselves. As such, we are all dominated by our opinions, whether we choose to recognize it or not.

 

[Fledge]

Before I get started, I'd like to apologize for the fact that this response will probably seem kind of disjointed. It is, because I'm a bit behind in my sleep. Hopefully that won't affect my writing too much, but I can't tell because I don't have the mental sharpness to proofread it.

You can't know that. Memories from that long ago are unreliable, not to mention we have no memory or direct access to subconcious influences.

True, I can't know that for sure. However, the fact that some concepts are virtually universal would imply that people instinctively tend to reject certain things as undesireable. Since some of these things can prove quite profitable for the people doing them (like theft) I think that this would imply some form of universal morality. The only way that could happen is if it were instinctive.

Yes everyone's is equally valid, and thus everyone can and will try to enforce their morality, this is observable. Sometimes the bad guys win, sometimes the good guys win. There's no violation of subjectivism here

That's part of my point though. The fact that people are attempting to enforce their version of morality on others in violation of the cardinal (for subjectivists) principle that everyone's morality is equally valuable implies that few if any people are genuine moral subjectivists. Now I know that appealing to the majority isn't much of a logical argument, but I'm not trying to use it as such.

The statement "morality is subjective", whether it is made as an absolute statment or otherwise, is in essence a moral statement. Since it is a moral statement, then even the idea of subjective morality proves to be "subjective", and therefore has relatively little force.

Anyway, I'm trying to say that moral subjectivism says that it is inherently wrong (read, immoral) to enforce your version of morality on others. This appears (to me, anyway) to be a moral absolute, which is something precluded by the very idea that morality is subjective. Perhaps I have simply misunderstood something, and if I have, I would appreciate some clarification.

I hate to say it, but for some reason I still don't see the difference between "what the people want as a whole" and "the benefits they desire". They seem synonomous to me.

Let me change the point of emphasis just a bit. You are focusing on what the people want, and I am focusing on the laws which have been created because of those desires.

Then answer the question I asked in anticipation of you saying this - if there could possibly be a human who's morality never changed, and we based our values on their morality, would that be an absolute morality?

I stated that badly. Let me try again. The fact that God does not change means that the rules He establishes do not change. Since God is the ultimate Judge of everything, whatever He decides is automatically an absolute. So God's standards are inherently absolute standards. If a human with unchanging morality (the only people that I have met who have a chance of being like this are those who belive in objective morality in the first place) were to be the source of your morality, you would only have unchanging morality. This is necessary to having absolute morality, but it is not all that is needed. For absolute morality to exist, the source of this morality has to have the authority to enforce his standards. Humans clearly don't, but by definition, God does.

Meanwhile, I would like to log an objection to your using the word "all" in the statement "subjective morality has nothing to do with whether it changes, it has to do with whether it comes from the desires of a being or from whether it has a transcendent reality that is above and beyond the desires of any and all beings." God is a being, but He is the source of all absolutes, and they are absolute only because of Him. A minor point, perhaps, but not one that I am willing to concede.

What you say is correct, that one action or event can be good or bad at the same time depending on who you talk to. Technically this is not a paradox, anymore than it's a paradox that some people look at a sunset and see orange and others argue it's red - it's just a matter of perspective, and if morality is relative to desires, then people with differing desires will surely have differing moral perspectives: this is to be expected. I don't think it's a paradox, however I would say it's probably very counter-intuitive in light of how much society subtly espouses absolute morals all the time. We grow up with a concious or at least subconcious idea that morality is absolute and our society is right, and thus talk of relativism conflicts with our preconcieved notions and the idea is hard to digest because it goes against what we have been raised to believe.

Again, this is part of my point. If morality works the way you claim it does, then the very concept of morality becomes utterly meaningless. I mean, if every action is both right and wrong at the same time (depending on who you ask) then there is no value in having a moral standard at all. Hopefully, I'm not understanding you properly, but once again, this seems to be the logical result of your beliefs regarding morality.

Like I said, it's about how you define society. Definitions are objective to a degree, and thus my conception of a well-functioning society is as objective as the definition of a well-functioning society, which I explained previously. This has nothing to do with absolute morality. We define a triangle as a 3-sided polygon, so if you draw something with 9 sides then it's "objectively wrong". We define a society as a collective group working together to secure happiness and security, so if there are people murdering and stealing and raping, then that is "objectively wrong" because that is not what society is. See what I'm getting at?

I think that I understand what you're getting at, but I'm afraid that you missed my point. Now it's entirely possible that a little bit of extra clarification on your part will clear the confusion up, so I'll rephrase my statement and see if you understand what I'm getting at. You view the good of society as something that is morally good. However you place this "good" at a higher level than the desires of the individual, so whenever the individual desires something that would be harmful to society, the society has the right to impose its desires on the individual. However, as we have already agreed, subjective morality includes the idea that no system of morality is better than another, which has an interesting implication. Namely, this would imply that you view the good of society as trancendent over personal moral decisions, which would imly in turn that you are not a moral subjectivist about everything.

Here are things I want to know - what is your argument for morality? It seems like nothing more than an appeal to consequence at this point, but I'm probably just misunderstanding, so if you could state it clearly and concisely I'd appreciate it.

If my understanding of logic terms serves me right (which it likely doesn't), then I am not attempting an appeal to consequence. I am trying to prove moral objectivism by showing that the other possibility (subjectivism) is illogical, that is, by disproving the contrary. If this is the same thing, then I am indeed using an appeal to consequence, and I'll say some more about this in just a second.

Morality is based on desires (As I have reasoned, though this is the contestable premise)
If morality is absolute, desires are absolute (from the fact that morality is based on desires)
Desires are not absolute (Observed fact)

Conclusion: Morality is not absolute (Modus Tollens from premise 2 and 3)

It looks to me like you are assuming moral subjectivity throughout your entire argument. After all, God's desires could be the source of morality, and because His desires are absolute (I may not be properly understanding your definition of absolute in this argument), your final premise would be flawed, invalidating your conclusion.

The other possibility that I am seeing is that you are already assuming that moral objectivity is false. After all, if moral objectivity is true, then either morality is not based on desires (invalidating 1 and therefore 2), or it is based on God's desires, which (if I have understood your definition of absolute properly) are absolute, invalidating 3.

I'm not sure how I could provide an argument for moral objectivity without either assuming it from the beginning or by trying to do what I've been trying to do all along, which is to disprove the opposite. I'll try my hand at writing a syllogism again, but I'm not at all sure how it's going to turn out.

1 People have been trying to discredit the Bible for years. (Observed fact)
2 Every attempt to discredit the Bible has only increased its credibility. (Observed fact)
3 The "testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (From 1 and 2)
4 The "non-testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (Extension based on the fact that the rest of the Bible is correct, but a very debatable premise)
5 The Bible says that God's law does not change. (Taken from several points in the Bible, but a debate on this subject belongs in a different thread)

Conclusion: Absolute morality exists.

I have no clue how well this will stand up, but at least I tried. There are probably other people out there who could provide a much better syllogism, but that is beside the point. Anway, I'm looking forward to your response, as this is getting to be a very interesting debate.

Fledge

 

[tcampen]

1 People have been trying to discredit the Bible for years. (Observed fact)

Yes, this is true.

2 Every attempt to discredit the Bible has only increased its credibility. (Observed fact)

Not so true. Comparing religious growth with credibility is not a sound conclusion. Christians have been trying to discredit Islam and the teachings of Mohammed for years as well, but number of Muslims is increasing substantially as well.

3 The "testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (From 1 and 2)

Genesis, the flood, the Tower of Babel being responsible for spreading people and language thru the world - all proven to not be true. They are not only testible but found to could not have occurred by objective analysis.

4 The "non-testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (Extension based on the fact that the rest of the Bible is correct, but a very debatable premise))

What does "non-testable" mean? Whether Jesus was the son of god? Whether he was resurrected on the third day? Whether scores of dead Jews got out of their tombs and walked around Jeruselem upon Jesus' crucifixion?

5 The Bible says that God's law does not change. (Taken from several points in the Bible, but a debate on this subject belongs in a different thread)

If God's law did not change, there would be no "NEW" testament, and a discarding of the "old" Jewish law.

Conclusion: Absolute morality exists.

This seems like it was an attempt at a syllogism, but it really didn't work. Even assuming the presuppositions to be true, the conclusion does not logically follow.

 

[Socrastein]

True, I can't know that for sure. However, the fact that some concepts are virtually universal would imply that people instinctively tend to reject certain things as undesireable. Since some of these things can prove quite profitable for the people doing them (like theft) I think that this would imply some form of universal morality. The only way that could happen is if it were instinctive.

It's not very profitable to steal in society, because upon being caught you are punished for it. However, you'll notice that when there's little to no chance of being caught, the majority of people do bad things. Ever wonder why during large-scale riots so many stores are looted? It's not just a small handful of bad people doing this, it's nearly everyone with the chance who is seizing the oppurtunity to do things and go unpunished. Where are the instincts? Instincts shouldn't have anything to do with threat of punishment.

As for enforcing subjective morality - there's nothing inherent in my view of morality that says we must leave other moralities be. I have said numerous times morality is based on what you desire. Unless someone desires that everyone be allowed to do whatever they think is right, that person is not going to think this is a moral maxim. I don't desire to let everyone do what they want. My personal desires outweigh other people's moral desires. Like I said before, if someone wants to rape my sister, I'm going to stop them, because I desire her safety more than the rapist's right to exercise his beliefs about rape.

Maybe some people think everyone should be allowed to do whatever they want, but I have not been advocating this, so it is irrelevent to your discussion with me.

If morality works the way you claim it does, then the very concept of morality becomes utterly meaningless. I mean, if every action is both right and wrong at the same time (depending on who you ask) then there is no value in having a moral standard at all. Hopefully, I'm not understanding you properly, but once again, this seems to be the logical result of your beliefs regarding morality.

There's no absolute tasty, but that doesn't make it utterly meaningless to say "Pizza is good" or "Olives are gross". It only seems meaningless because you've already assumed there should be something more to it than that.

When did I say the good of society is transcendent over the desires of the individual?

You say you're trying to prove objective morality by disproving subjective. I see that. However, what I meant was that the WAY you're trying to disprove subjective morality is through an appeal to consequence. You have said over and over and over "If subjective morality is true, then *insert bad stuff*". This is not an argument against subjective morality at all. Also, saying "Most people who call themselves moral subjectivists are hypocrites because they impose their morals" isn't a valid argument either, even if it was true (Which I don't think it is). It doesn't matter if people mistakenly contradict moral subjectivity and appeal to absolutes, that doesn't prove there are absolutes. It's like trying to say "Well you're an atheist but when you're surprised you say 'Oh my God!' so obviously you're a hypocrite and thus God exists".

You've said that under subjectivism nothing is absolute. This is obvious, but doesn't disprove subjectivism. You've said that nobody can say someone else is really wrong. Again, obvious, but doesn't disprove anything. You've said that if someone enforces their morality they're appealing to absolutes - I have said how I think this is wrong, but even if it is true, it's still not an argument against subjectivism. You've said that morality will change in a subjectivist society and thus it will eventually result in chaos. I've contested this too, but once again even if it IS true, it still doesn't disprove subjectivism.

So this is what I mean by my getting the impression that the only arguments you have are appeals to consequence. If this is so and I haven't missed something in a big way, then you don't actually have any arguments for moral absolutes.

Not to mention, you still have to refute my argument against moral objectivism before you can prove it is true.

It looks to me like you are assuming moral subjectivity throughout your entire argument. After all, God's desires could be the source of morality, and because His desires are absolute (I may not be properly understanding your definition of absolute in this argument), your final premise would be flawed, invalidating your conclusion.

My argument is centered around humans, not God. It's observable that when someone says "This is right/good" or "This is wrong/bad" they are appealing to what they desire and whether the act in question is conducive or inhibitive to their desires.

If you want to contest this, you must give me some moral statements that cannot possibly have anything to do with the person's desires. I will say right now that this is pretty much impossible. So the premise stands (But I'm always up for being surprised )

Like I've said before, even if there are transcendent metaphysical absolutes, there's no way for humans to know them. We will still just do what we think is right, we will still just follow our desires, and it will be no different than if there weren't transcendent absolutes as far as we're concerned. I mean, imagine if there was an absolute tasty food? There were metaphysical principles that dictated what was objectively good, and what was objectively gross. This wouldn't change a damn thing about humans and their tastes. We would still eat what we eat, like what we like, and pass on what we don't like. These transcendent absolutes are quite erroneous and have no impact on us. So not only is there no reason to believe they exist, but there is no reason to think that if they DID exist they would have any noticable effect on the world.

The other possibility that I am seeing is that you are already assuming that moral objectivity is false. After all, if moral objectivity is true, then either morality is not based on desires (invalidating 1 and therefore 2), or it is based on God's desires, which (if I have understood your definition of absolute properly) are absolute, invalidating 3.

I'm not assuming it's false, I'm proving it's false. If you wish to challenge my conclusion, you must disprove a premise. So if 1 is wrong, disprove 1. If any premise is wrong, prove to me that it is wrong. You're just speaking hypothetically, but if you wish to refute my argument, you have to actually disprove my premise(s).

1 People have been trying to discredit the Bible for years. (Observed fact)
2 Every attempt to discredit the Bible has only increased its credibility. (Observed fact)
3 The "testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (From 1 and 2)
4 The "non-testable" aspects of the Bible are correct. (Extension based on the fact that the rest of the Bible is correct, but a very debatable premise)
5 The Bible says that God's law does not change. (Taken from several points in the Bible, but a debate on this subject belongs in a different thread)

Conclusion: Absolute morality exists.

Yeah, at least you tried

1 - agreed.
2 - completely unsubstantiated.
3 - vague use of terminology.
4 - Fallacy = Hasty Generalization
5 - I'll give it to you, though it's debatable as well

Conclusion: completely unwarranted.

 

[mepalmer3]

My argument is centered around humans, not God. It's observable that when someone says "This is right/good" or "This is wrong/bad" they are appealing to what they desire and whether the act in question is conducive or inhibitive to their desires.

If you want to contest this, you must give me some moral statements that cannot possibly have anything to do with the person's desires. I will say right now that this is pretty much impossible. So the premise stands (But I'm always up for being surprised )

It's nonsense for a person to say, "you should not have robbed that store because I don't like robbing stores." The only reason a person would say that to another (if he is being rational) is to appeal to a standard that is not made up by either of them, but some moral standard that truly exists. But if that first person was talking nonsense about suggesting there's an absolute moral standard, then he ought to just laugh at the other fellow. Instead 9 times out of 10 the guy tries to suggest that his special case did not in fact break the absolute moral standard. So it is obvious and very observable that people appeal to an absolute standard of right/wrong.

Now for feelings... certainly if true right/wrong really exist, and we were both created for the purpose of doing right, and even moreso if God communicates to us (believer and non-believer) what that "right" is, then it stands to reason that many of our desires will be for doing what is "right". However, if we are able to disobey that moral law, if we are able to do what is wrong, then we may often have times where we have chosen to do something that is wrong. And in this point, our immediate desire was to do wrong, but we know that the other choice was morally right.

An example... a man gets frustrated at his child's insistent bugging about something so he lashes out and yells at his child. The man did what he desired most in that moment, but yet he and we clearly believe that what he did was morally wrong.

But there is no amount of reasoning that says "if someone has feelings, then there is no objective or absolute morality." The conclusion certainly doesn't follow, rather it's wishful thinking and more of a diversion tactic.

 

[Cian]

I would have to say that morality is subjective, with so much differing opinions from culture to culture how can you determine that only one is right, that morality is objective.

 

[mepalmer3]

I would have to say that morality is subjective, with so much differing opinions from culture to culture how can you determine that only one is right, that morality is objective.

That's not a valid argument. There are a large number of things that we believe are objective, and yet on almost all of those we find people who do not agree. So you're not just arguing against an objective morality in this case, you're arguing against the very concept of "objective" itself, suggesting that there cannot be anything that is objective as long as someone has a differing opinion.

 

[Socrastein]

It's nonsense for a person to say, "you should not have robbed that store because I don't like robbing stores." The only reason a person would say that to another (if he is being rational) is to appeal to a standard that is not made up by either of them, but some moral standard that truly exists.

You're right. It makes a lot more sense if you say "You should not have robbed that store because I value people's right to property". Think about it - if you did not have any value for someone's property rights, why would you care if they got robbed? You wouldn't see it as a bad thing at all.

Instead 9 times out of 10 the guy tries to suggest that his special case did not in fact break the absolute moral standard. So it is obvious and very observable that people appeal to an absolute standard of right/wrong.

Somehow I did not gather this from that paragraph of yours. Could you elaborate? You made one hypothetical moral statement and then jumped to absolute morality being obvious and observable - fill in the blanks a little more for my feeble mind.

But there is no amount of reasoning that says "if someone has feelings, then there is no objective or absolute morality." The conclusion certainly doesn't follow, rather it's wishful thinking and more of a diversion tactic.

Talk about diversion tactics - this straw man argument was never put forth by anyone in this thread. Nobody has said "If someone has feelings then there is no absolute morality".

That's not a valid argument. There are a large number of things that we believe are objective, and yet on almost all of those we find people who do not agree. So you're not just arguing against an objective morality in this case, you're arguing against the very concept of "objective" itself, suggesting that there cannot be anything that is objective as long as someone has a differing opinion.

There is a difference between some people struggling to understand math and then everyone coming to a consensus when they are properly informed (Because math is objective and absolute) and every single culture in the history of the planet having a different opinion on what 2+2 is. The former can happen with regard to an objective system, but the latter is indicitive that the system is not absolute in any stretch of the word. Morality is not of the former, it is of the latter.

 

[Blackmarch]

I would have to say that morality is subjective, with so much differing opinions from culture to culture how can you determine that only one is right, that morality is objective.

Although that does not exclude an objective morality.

 

[:æ:]

For any moral objectivists out there:

What are some other things besides morality that exist objectively? Please be specific.

What is it about those things that lets us know that they are objective? What makes them identifiably objective?

:æ:

 

[MuAndNu]

For any moral objectivists out there:

What are some other things besides morality that exist objectively? Please be specific.

What is it about those things that lets us know that they are objective? What makes them identifiably objective?

:æ:

Again, I argue against the notion that objective = transcendentally absolute. Our morality involves us: human beings. Human beings are much too alike and have too much the same needs, fears, and what all. From those shared attributes--things I see as objective--arise our morality.

Now, I'm talking about basic morality here: don't kill, don't steal, etc. Sure, we can tack on morals that have a more subjective basis.

 

[:æ:]

Again, I argue against the notion that objective = transcendentally absolute. Our morality involves us: human beings. Human beings are much too alike and have too much the same needs, fears, and what all. From those shared attributes--things I see as objective--arise our morality.

1.) I would describe those things as inter-subjective, at best.

2.) It seems to me that you're subtly trying to derive a set of "oughts" from a set of "is's." Yes, we do have common needs and fears etc, but none of those can logically lead to any specific "oughts."

Lastly, I don't see how this answer the questions I posed.

:æ:

 

[MuAndNu]

2.) It seems to me that you're subtly trying to derive a set of "oughts" from a set of "is's."

You know, you may be right. When I posted my opinion before, nobody addressed it in quite that way. There's this rift in my reasoning that I haven't been able to bridge just yet. It seems to me that one edge is so near the other, but they may never meet. I'm going to have to think about it some more.